CourtListener 10622173•Szeto v. Chen CA4/3
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Filed 7/2/25 Szeto v. Chen CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
GENE SZETO,
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and G064497
Appellant;
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-
SHUN C. CHEN, 01087212)
Objector and Appellant, OPINION
v.
SUNG YI,
Defendant, Cross-Complainant,
and Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gassia Apkarian, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Law Offices of Shun C. Chen and Shun C. Chen for Plaintiff,
Cross-defendant, and Appellant Gene Szeto and for Objector and Appellant
Shun C. Chen.
No appearance for Defendant, Cross-complainant, and
Respondent Sung Yi.
Plaintiff Gene Szeto filed an unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion to
strike defendant Sung Yi’s cross-complaint for declaratory relief. The trial
court found the motion was frivolous and awarded Yi $24,880 in attorney
fees. (Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 425.16, subd. (c).) Szeto appeals from that fee award.
We reject the majority of Szeto’s challenges to the trial court’s fee
order. Because the order failed to recite the conduct justifying the fee award,
however, we reverse and remand so that the court may either specify the
reasons for the award or deny sanctions.
FACTS2
In 2019, Szeto obtained a judgment against Steve Yuk Woo in
San Bernardino Superior Court. Unable to collect from Woo, Szeto filed this
lawsuit against Woo, Yi, and others in attempt to set aside certain property
transfers from Woo to Yi and from Yi to others.
Yi filed a cross-complaint against Szeto, asserting a single cause
of action for declaratory relief. Citing the parties’ disagreement about who
must pay Szeto’s judgment against Woo in the San Bernardino case, Yi
sought a declaration that he has no obligations to Szeto arising from the
disputed property transfers.
Szeto moved to strike Yi’s cross-complaint, asserting it arose from
protected activity (Szeto’s filing of the first amended complaint) and has no
merit. The trial court denied the motion, finding the challenged claim for
declaratory relief was not based on Szeto’s filing of the first amended
1 All further statutory references are to this code.
2 A more thorough recitation of the facts can be found in our
unpublished opinion in Szeto v. EQD, LLC (G063969), in which we affirm the
trial court’s order denying Szeto’s motion to strike Yi’s cross-complaint.
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complaint, but rather from the parties’ underlying dispute, and thus does not
arise from protected activity. Szeto filed a notice of appeal from that order.
Meanwhile, Yi filed a motion for attorney fees on the grounds
that Szeto’s anti-SLAPP’s motion was frivolous, seeking $54,975. While that
motion was pending, the trial court observed during a case management
conference that the entire case was stayed in light of Szeto’s appeal. When
the time came for Szeto to oppose Yi’s fee motion, Szeto filed a notice of stay
in lieu of opposition. At the hearing on the fee motion, the court observed it
still had jurisdiction to consider the fee motion notwithstanding the pending
appeal, and thoughtfully continued the hearing so Szeto could submit a
substantive opposition.
After the continued hearing, the trial court granted Yi’s fee
motion. It found Szeto’s anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous, a fee award was
mandatory, but Yi’s request for $54,975 in fees was excessive. It therefore
ordered Szeto and his attorney to pay Yi $24,880. Szeto appeals from that
order.
DISCUSSION
If a trial court finds an anti-SLAPP motion is frivolous or solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court “shall award costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees . . . pursuant to Section 128.5” to the plaintiff or
cross-complainant who defeats the motion. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Frivolous
in this context means that any reasonable attorney would agree the motion
was totally devoid of merit.’” (L.A. Taxi Cooperative, Inc. v. The Independent
Taxi Owners Assn. of Los Angeles (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 918, 932.) We
review an award of attorney fees under sections 425.16 and 128.5 for abuse of
discretion, but we review questions of law de novo. (City of Rocklin v. Legacy
Family Adventures-Rocklin, LLC (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 713, 727.)
3
Szeto challenges the trial court’s fee order on several grounds.
The first three are meritless.
First, the trial court properly heard the fee motion despite the
pending appeal. An anti-SLAPP appeal does “not divest the trial court of
jurisdiction to consider [a] motion for attorney fees and costs.” (Carpenter v.
Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 461.)
Second, the trial court had discretion to impose attorney fees
against Szeto’s counsel personally. When defense counsel file sanctionable
anti-SLAPP motions, prevailing plaintiffs recover those fees “pursuant to
Section 128.5.” (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) “Attorney fees under section 128.5 may
be assessed against a party, the party’s attorney, or both.” (Moore v. Shaw
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 199; accord Personal Court Reporters, Inc. v.
Rand (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 182, 193−194 [affirming anti-SLAPP fee award
against “[d]efendants and their counsel”]; Moore v. Kaufman (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 604, 615 (Moore) [attorney fees can be imposed against counsel
“as sanctions”].)3
This reasoning applies equally to counsel for cross-complainants
like Szeto who file frivolous anti-SLAPP motions. Thus, the court permissibly
imposed attorney fees against Szeto and his attorney “jointly and severally.”
Third, the trial court did not award an unreasonable amount of
fees. To the contrary, the court reasoned that the total amount sought
($54,975) was excessive, much of the work performed by the partner could
3 The anti-SLAPP statute’s asymmetry explains why Moore
disallowed an attorney fee award against plaintiff’s counsel. “Fee awards
against attorneys are . . . generally not allowed under routine fee-shifting
provisions like the one in section 425.16” that authorizes attorney fees to all
prevailing defendants. (Moore, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.)
4
have instead been performed by his associate, and the heavy invoice
redactions prevented it from determining whether all the time entries were
reasonable. The court therefore significantly cut the partner’s time and
awarded Yi $24,880—less than half of his claimed fees. “‘The “experienced
trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in
[her] court, and [her judgment] will not be disturbed unless the appellate
court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
On the other hand, Szeto correctly notes the trial court failed to
provide specific findings of fact supporting the sanctions award. “[B]y
authorizing an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 128.5,
section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) ‘incorporates the substantive and procedural
requirements of section 128.5.’ [Citations.] Therefore, the court was required
to specify in its written order the reasons for the award of attorney fees.
Because the order contained no justification for the fees, it ‘must be reversed
with directions to either specify the reasons for the award or deny
sanctions.’”4 (Nunez v. Pennisi (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 861, 879–880.)
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed to
either enter a new sanctions order in accordance with sections 425.16,
subdivision (c), and 128.5, subdivision (c), or in the alternative, deny
4 We do not reach Szeto’s claim the motion was not frivolous
because the trial court has not yet explained its findings. (Morin v. Rosenthal
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 673, 683.)
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sanctions. In the interests of justice, neither party shall recover costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
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