CourtListener 10621183•People v. Hill CA2/1
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Filed 7/1/25 P. v. Hill CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B342345
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA507928)
v.
KALEN AHMAD HILL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Affirmed.
Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Christopher G.
Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________________
A jury convicted defendant Kalen Ahmad Hill of: First
degree premeditated murder of Harrison Kristol (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1)1; assault with a semiautomatic weapon
(§ 245, subd (b); count 2); shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246;
count 3); second degree murder of Laroyice Deondra McFarland
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 4); fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor
vehicle and causing serious bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 2800.3,
subd. (a); count 5); and two counts of hit and run while driving
resulting in death or serious injury (Veh. Code, § 20001,
subd. (b)(2); counts 6 & 7). The jury also found true certain
firearm enhancement allegations in connection with counts 1
and 2 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and an allegation that defendant
personally inflicted great bodily injury against the victim in
count 7 (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court found true certain
aggravating sentencing factors, and further found that he had
violated probation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (2)
& (8).) The court sentenced defendant to prison for 58 years
8 months to life.
On appeal, defendant contends that the court prejudicially
erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on involuntary
manslaughter as to count 4. We disagree, and affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Prosecution Evidence
On August 6, 2018, defendant, a member of the West
Boulevard Crips street gang, was driving his car with Kiara
Lester as a passenger. As defendant pulled into a supermarket
1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
parking lot, he and Lester argued about how Lester had been
“cheating” on defendant with Harrison Kristol, a member of a
rival gang. While they sat in their parked car, defendant and
Lester saw Kristol and a companion walk out of the supermarket
to Kristol’s car. As defendant backed out of his parking space,
Lester asked Kristol what he was doing, and defendant told her
to “mind [her] fucking business.”
Kristol drove out of the parking lot and headed eastbound
on Rodeo Road.2 Defendant, driving at a high rate of speed,
caught up to Kristol’s car and told Lester to get her head down.
As defendant drove in the center median alongside Kristol’s
car, he fired multiple gunshots through the open passenger-side
window at Kristol’s car. A bullet struck Kristol in the head,
killing him. Kristol’s car swerved toward the curb on the north
side of Rodeo Road and struck Laroyice McFarland, who was
standing next to a parked vehicle. McFarland died as a result of
his injuries.
Los Angeles Police Department Officer Jorge Avila and
his patrol partner saw the shooting, turned on their marked
patrol car’s lights and sirens, and gave chase. Defendant drove
at speeds between 100 and 120 miles per hour, through at least
two red lights and two residential stop signs, and at times on
the wrong side of the road. During the chase, he struck and
injured a bicyclist.
Defendant successfully evaded the pursuing officers that
day, but was later arrested. While in jail, he made incriminating
statements to an undercover informant. Cell phone records
2 Sometime after the incident, Rodeo Road was renamed
Obama Boulevard.
3
connected defendant to the incident and indicated that he
traveled to Las Vegas a few days after the shooting.
B. Defense Evidence
Calvin Thomas testified for the defense. Thomas lived
in Las Vegas in August 2018. He testified that defendant
was visiting him in Las Vegas on August 6, 2018, the day of the
shooting. Thomas was certain of the date because “that’s the
day Aretha Franklin died.” He “was playing Aretha Franklin all
day and [defendant] kept on asking [him] why, why, why, Aretha
Franklin.”
After the defense rested, the parties stipulated that
Aretha Franklin died on August 16, 2018.
DISCUSSION
In count 4 of the information, the prosecution charged
defendant with the murder of McFarland, the pedestrian struck
by Kristol’s car after defendant shot Kristol. The court instructed
the jury on first and second degree murder. Neither party
requested an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, and the
court did not give one. The jury found defendant guilty of second
degree murder of McFarland.
Defendant contends that failure to instruct the jury
sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter was prejudicial error.
We disagree.
“A trial court must instruct on a lesser included offense if
substantial evidence exists indicating that the defendant is guilty
only of the lesser offense.” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th
547, 584.) Substantial evidence in this context, “is not merely
‘any evidence . . . no matter how weak’ [citation], but rather
‘ “evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons]
4
could . . . conclude[ ]” ’ that the lesser offense, but not the greater,
was committed.” (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 664.) “On
appeal, we review independently the question whether the trial
court failed to instruct on a lesser included offense.” (People v.
Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1215.)
Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder.
(People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 813; People v. Gutierrez
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1145.) The feature that distinguishes
murder and manslaughter is malice. (People v. Schuller (2023)
15 Cal.5th 237, 252; People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 460.)
Malice “may be either express or implied. It is express ‘when
there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take
away the life of a fellow creature.’ (§ 188.)” (People v. Chun
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1181.) It is implied “when ‘the killing
is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.)
“[W]hen the evidence presents a material issue as to
whether a killing was committed with malice, the court has
a sua sponte duty to instruct on involuntary manslaughter as
a lesser included offense, even when the killing occurs during
the commission of an aggravated assault.” (People v. Brothers
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 35.) When, however, “the defendant
indisputably has deliberately engaged in a type of aggravated
assault the natural consequences of which are dangerous to
human life, thus satisfying the objective component of implied
malice as a matter of law, and no material issue is presented as
to whether the defendant subjectively appreciated the danger to
5
human life his or her conduct posed, there is no sua sponte duty
to instruct on involuntary manslaughter.” (Ibid.)
Here, defendant, while driving at a high rate of speed,
fired several bullets at Kristol, the driver of another vehicle.
One bullet hit Kristol, killing him, causing his car to lose control
and hit the bystander McFarland.3 Defendant indisputably
and deliberately engaged in an aggravated assault the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to human life. The same
conduct presents no material issue as to defendant’s subjective
appreciation of the danger of his conduct to human life.
The fact that defendant may not have been aware of
McFarland or of the danger his conduct posed to particular
persons is irrelevant. “ ‘[I]mplied malice aforethought does not
exist in the perpetrator only in relation to an intended victim.
Recklessness need not be cognizant of the identity of a victim or
even of his existence.’ [Citations.] When a defendant commits
an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to
human life, with a conscious disregard for life in general, he acts
with implied malice towards those he ends up killing. There is no
requirement the defendant specifically know of the existence of
each victim.” (People v. Taylor (2004) 32 Cal.4th 863, 868, italics
omitted; see People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 887
[“implied malice may be found . . . whenever, inter alia, the facts
establish a defendant’s awareness and conscious disregard that
his conduct poses a high probability of death to some person”].)
3 Defendant does not dispute the jury’s finding that
defendant’s act of shooting at Kristol legally caused McFarland’s
death.
6
Based on the record, there is no substantial evidence from
which jurors could conclude that defendant acted without malice
in firing his gun at Kristol. The court therefore had no duty to
instruct as to involuntary manslaughter.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
7
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