In re Nathaniel N. CA2/4

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Filed 6/30/25 In re Nathaniel N. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re NATHANIEL N., a Person B342506
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP05792B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Ernesto Paz Rey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________________________

Mother, D.B., appeals from an order terminating her
parental rights over her son, Nathaniel (born 2019), under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Mother contends
the juvenile court erred in finding she did not establish the
parental benefit exception to adoption. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition
In September 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging
mother was hospitalized, tested positive for methamphetamine,
and admitted using other drugs. Mother had three children but
did not want to disclose their names.2
Mother told a social worker “she had been clean and sober
for seven years prior to relapsing at the end of August.” She said
her “drug of choice” was methamphetamine. DCFS filed a
section 300 petition alleging Nathaniel was at risk due to

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Nathaniel has two half-siblings: M.B. and G.B. M.B. lived with
her father, B.H., who had full custody of her. G.B. reunified with her
father, M.I., during the underlying proceedings. Neither Nathaniel’s
siblings nor his father, S.N., are parties to this appeal. We focus on
the facts relevant to the issue raised by mother.

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mother’s methamphetamine use. Less than two months later,
DCFS filed a first amended section 300 petition adding
allegations that mother and Nathaniel’s father, S.N. (father), had
a history of violent altercations and that father was a current
methamphetamine user. The juvenile court detained Nathaniel
from the parents and ordered monitored visitation for them.
Nathaniel was placed with maternal great uncle J.V. and his
husband, E.A.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in February
2021, the juvenile court sustained the first amended petition as
amended by interlineation. The court removed Nathaniel from
the parents’ care and ordered family reunification services for
them. The court further ordered the parents to have a minimum
of three monitored visits a week for three hours each.

B. Reunification Period
Caregivers J.V. and E.A. reported mother initially visited
Nathaniel two to three times a week for a few hours. However,
the caregivers stated that, after a month or two, mother’s visits
and contact with Nathaniel became inconsistent, and at times,
she would go a full week without calling or visiting. A concurrent
planning assessment completed by DCFS in September 2021
reflected mother had 10 “[v]isits/[c]ontact” in the preceding six
months. The caregivers believed mother’s inconsistent visitation
confused Nathaniel and caused him to act out after visits. At the
six-month review hearing in October 2021, the juvenile court
found the parents had not consistently and regularly visited or
made significant progress in resolving the case issues but
continued reunification services.

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In February 2022, DCFS reported mother was visiting
Nathaniel every Saturday or Sunday. Mother was also scheduled
to have visits at DCFS’s office on Mondays, but they were
cancelled because mother failed to attend them. At the 12-month
review hearing in April 2022, the juvenile court found mother
had not made substantial progress in resolving the case issues
and terminated her reunification services.

C. Post-Reunification Period
In August 2022, mother was reportedly visiting Nathaniel
weekly on Sundays, with Nathaniel’s paternal grandmother
monitoring visits. Because of issues with paternal grandmother’s
monitoring, including her absence due to a vacation, mother was
asked to obtain another monitor. She did not identify a monitor
or reach out to monitoring services. In a status review report
filed in October 2022, DCFS stated mother stopped visiting at the
end of August.
In December 2022, father filed a section 388 petition
seeking to set aside the jurisdictional findings against him due to
lack of proper notice, which the juvenile court granted. The court
set the matter for a jurisdiction and disposition hearing as to
father. The court sustained the first amended petition as pled,
removed Nathaniel from father, and ordered reunification
services for him. Caregiver J.V. passed away in late 2022, and
caregiver E.A. told the social worker he wished to continue caring
for Nathaniel through adoption.
Mother was arrested three times between November 2022
and May 2023. Mother was convicted of a felony in June 2023
and was residing in an in-patient drug treatment program. Prior
to being incarcerated in November 2022, DCFS reported mother’s

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visits were “sporadic.” After her incarceration, DCFS said she
“only had a few visits.”
In December 2023, a social worker reached out to mother
about having visits in the DCFS office, but mother did not follow
up about them. In March 2024, a social worker saw Nathaniel
and father on a visit at a fast food restaurant and was surprised
to find mother and her boyfriend present without authorization.
The next business day, the social worker called mother to talk
about visitation, but mother did not respond. In an April 2024
status review report, DCFS stated mother was no longer having
scheduled visits with Nathaniel.
In September 2024, a dependency investigator interviewed
mother regarding visitation. Mother acknowledged she did not
consistently visit Nathaniel throughout the case. While she cited
the caregivers and transportation issues as reasons for missing
visits, DCFS noted mother also historically missed visits with her
other children, G.B. and M.B.
The following month, DCFS reported mother was visiting
Nathaniel once a week in its office. In November 2024, DCFS
reported mother was continuing to visit Nathaniel at its office
whenever she “secures transportation,” but the visits were not
consistent. Also in November 2024, mother filed a section 388
petition seeking to have reunification services reinstated. In the
petition, which was denied, mother stated that although her
“visits have been sporadic during the life of the case,” her visits
had “been more consistent over the 3 months [sic].”

D. Termination of Parental Rights
At the section 366.26 hearing, mother argued the parental
benefit exception to adoption applied. The juvenile court,

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however, terminated parental rights and determined no
exception applied. The court found, “[Mother’s] visitation has
been consistent for the last five months, but previously in the
four years this case has been before the court, her visitation has
not been consistent.” The court also found it would not be
detrimental to Nathaniel to terminate parental rights. Mother
appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The goal at the section 366.26 hearing is “‘specifically . . . to
select and implement a permanent plan for the child.’” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) After
reunification services are terminated, adoption is the
Legislature’s preferred permanent plan. (In re Andrew M. (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 803, 814.) Accordingly, at a section 366.26
hearing, the court must select adoption as the permanent plan
and terminate parental rights unless it finds doing so would be
detrimental to the child under a specified statutory exception.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); Caden C., at p. 625.)
One of these exceptions is the parental benefit exception,
which applies where “[t]he parents have maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) A
parent must prove three elements to establish the exception
applies: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship,
the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) “The burden is on the
parent asserting the parental [benefit] exception to produce

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evidence establishing that exception.” (In re A.G. (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 973, 996.)
In this case, the first prong of Caden C. is dispositive. This
prong is “straightforward,” involving an assessment of “whether
‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent
permitted by court orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632.)
A substantial evidence standard of review applies to the
first prong. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) We
review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s
determinations and draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the court’s findings and orders. (In re A.P.
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1142 (A.P.).) Furthermore, where,
as here, the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded the
party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that
party appeals, the question for a reviewing court becomes
whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant
as a matter of law. (Ibid.) Specifically, we ask whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) uncontradicted and unimpeached
and (2) of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a
finding. (Ibid.)

B. Mother Does Not Carry Her Burden on Appeal
Mother forfeited any challenge to the juvenile court’s
finding that she did not satisfy the first Caden C. prong. It is a
“fundamental rule of appellate review” that the order or
judgment appealed from is presumed correct, and all
intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its
correctness. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149

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Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach).) The burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error is on the appellant. (Fundamental Investment
etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 966, 971.) “It
is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine
the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness.”
(Benach, at p. 852.)
Concerning the first Caden C. prong, mother merely points
out that her counsel in the juvenile court argued she consistently
visited in the six months before the section 366.26 hearing.
“Statements and arguments by counsel are not evidence.”
(Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 139.)
Moreover, mother fails to provide any analysis, legal authority, or
citation to the record to suggest the court’s finding was
erroneous. (People v. Clayburg (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 86, 93
[failure to present “reasoned argument and analysis” forfeits
issue on appeal]; Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 [“An
appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to
support his contentions. This burden requires more than a mere
assertion that the judgment is wrong”].)
Mother, in her reply, contends she did not forfeit the issue
because she asserted in the introduction to her opening brief that
she “met her burden of establishing the ‘beneficial parent-child
relationship.’” “When points are perfunctorily raised without
adequate analysis and authority, we may treat them as
abandoned or forfeited.” (City of Palo Alto v. Public Employment
Relations Board (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1271, 1302; see Meridian
Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684
[reviewing courts are “not required to develop the parties’
arguments or search the record for supporting evidence”].)

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Even if we consider mother’s argument on the merits,
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
mother failed to meet the first Caden C. prong. At the disposition
hearing in February 2021, the juvenile court ordered monitored
visitation for mother for a minimum of three visits per week for
three hours each. While mother initially visited two to three
times a week, Nathaniel’s caregivers reported that after a month
or two, mother’s visits became inconsistent. In September 2021,
DCFS indicated mother had only 10 “[v]isits/[c]ontact” with
Nathaniel the six months prior. Additionally, the caregivers
reported mother’s inconsistent visits “‘confused’” Nathaniel and
caused him to act out.
Throughout the more than four years the case was pending,
the caregivers and DCFS reported mother’s visits and contact
remained inconsistent. She does not dispute that evidence.
Rather, mother, in the section 388 petition filed in November
2024, acknowledged her visits had “been sporadic during the life
of the case.” (In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1070–1071
[father failed to show regular visitation where his visitation
“throughout the years-long dependency proceeding was sporadic
and also entailed significant gaps”].)
Mother fails to point to any uncontradicted and
unimpeached evidence in the record that compels a finding in her
favor as a matter of law. (A.P., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1142.) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that mother did not maintain regular visitation and
contact. As mother does not demonstrate the juvenile court erred
in finding she did not satisfy the first Caden C. prong, we do not
reach her arguments concerning the other prongs. (In re
Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 322. fn. 10 [“a parent

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must prove all three components of the beneficial relationship
exception. A failure of proof on any one of them is fatal”].)

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

MORI, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

GARCIA UHRIG, J. **

** Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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