CourtListener 10620145•People v. Montano CA1/4
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Filed 6/30/25 P. v. Montano CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169526
v.
RICARDO MONTANO, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 168257B)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Ricardo Montano appeals the denial of his petition for
resentencing of his attempted murder conviction under Penal Code1 section
1172.6. He argues there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s
finding that he acted with intent to kill when he repeatedly shot at the
victim. We find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
On February 15, 2012, an information charged defendant with
attempted murder and a variety of other charges and enhancing allegations.
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted murder and admitted the
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.
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enhancements for personal use of a firearm and infliction of great bodily
injury. He was sentenced to a total of 22 years in prison.
On May 24, 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing. The court
appointed counsel and ordered briefing. The prosecution conceded defendant
made a prima facie case, requiring an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). At the evidentiary hearing, the court relied
on the preliminary hearing testimony of Oakland Police Officer Makisig
Sevilla, who witnessed the shooting.
Officer Sevilla testified that on October 14, 2010, he was driving
eastbound towards 71st Street in Oakland, in an unmarked car and in
civilian clothes, when he noticed a Toyota Camry stopped in the middle of the
street. Two individuals were in the car, one in the driver’s seat and the other
in the front passenger seat; the person in the passenger seat was later
identified as defendant. Defendant was speaking to a pedestrian on the
sidewalk, the victim.
Although he could not hear the conversation, Officer Sevilla noticed
defendant was getting agitated. After less than a minute, the victim turned
around and ran the opposite direction down 71st Street and turned right on
Hamilton. Defendant exited the Camry, pointing his handgun at the victim
as he chased him down. The Camry followed defendant and the victim, and
Officer Sevilla followed the Camry. Officer Sevilla briefly lost sight of
defendant and the victim when they turned the corner, and he heard several
gunshots within seconds of losing sight of them.
When Officer Sevilla turned the corner, he saw the victim on the
ground and defendant standing over him at the victim’s waist, about half a
foot away. He also saw the driver, who was carrying a handgun, exit the
Camry and stand next to defendant. The two fired several shots at the victim
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on the ground while Officer Sevilla observed from about 20 to 25 yards away.
The victim, who was unarmed, laid in a fetal position and used his hands to
protect himself. The shooting was very quick. Officer Sevilla was not sure
what part of the victim’s body the individuals were aiming for, but he could
tell it was not towards the head. The victim’s whole body was constantly
moving to evade the shots. Sevilla testified that most of the shots appeared
to hit the victim’s “lower, maybe, stomach, lower extremity area.”
After the shooting, the driver and defendant fled in their car. Officer
Sevilla tried to follow the Camry, but stopped after defendant leaned out the
window and pointed a handgun at him. Shortly afterwards, other officers
arrested defendant and the driver and recovered two guns from their car.
The victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds, including to the left leg, left
knee, right calf, right lower leg, and right wrist. Officers recovered 16
casings at the scene of the shooting; eight were .40 caliber while the other
eight were .9 millimeter caliber.
The court denied defendant’s petition, finding that he acted with intent
to kill and was thus ineligible for relief. The court stated that it was “pure
happenstance” that there was “an eyewitness who happened to be a law
enforcement officer,” and noted that the officer’s testimony “was materially
unimpeached.” The court inferred that the victim felt threatened when he
ran away from defendant, and further found that defendant followed and
pointed something at the victim, indicating that defendant intended to harm
the victim. Seconds later, the officer heard gunshots and the officer followed
the Camry to the scene where he saw both the driver and defendant shooting
at the victim while he was in a fetal position, blocking the shots with his
hands.
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Relying on and partially quoting from People v. Smith (2005),
37 Cal.4th 733, 741, the court explained: “The act of firing toward a victim at
a close, but in this case, I would say point-blank range in a manner that could
have inflicted a moral [sic] wound had the bullet been on target is sufficient
to support an inference of intent to kill.” Continuing to paraphrase and quote
from Smith, the court further stated: “The fact that the shooter may have
fired only once — that’s not this case. There were multiple shots — and then
abandoned his efforts . . . out of fear, out of necessity or fear does not comply
[sic] the conclusion that he lacked the animus to kill in the first instance.
Nor does the fact that the victim may have escaped death because of the
shooter’s poor marksmanship necessarily established a less culpable state of
mind.” Notwithstanding that “the victim was on the ground or the defendant
missed,” the court found it “unreasonable” to infer that defendant was merely
trying to scare or maim the victim. Under Smith and its progeny, the court
found that the prosecution had established intent to kill beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A denial of a section 1172.6 petition is reviewed for substantial
evidence. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) The record must be
reviewed “in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) We
further presume all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment.
(People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.) If the circumstances reasonably
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justify the findings of the trier of fact, we will not reverse a judgment simply
because the circumstances might also support a contrary finding. (Ibid.) As
a reviewing court, we neither reweigh the evidence nor do we reevaluate the
witnesses’ credibility. (Ibid.) “The ultimate determination is whether a
reasonable trier of fact could have found for the respondent based on the
whole record.” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994)
22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633, italics omitted.)
II. Applicable Legal Principles
A. Attempted Murder
Attempted murder requires “the specific intent to kill and the
commission of a direct but ineffectual act towards accomplishing the intended
killing.” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890; Smith, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 739.) Intent to kill requires proof that the assailant desires
the victim’s death or knows, to a substantial certainty, that the victim will
die because of the assailant’s actions. (Smith, at p. 739.)
As there is rarely direct evidence of a defendant’s intent, intent may be
derived from the circumstances of the crime, including the defendant’s
actions. (People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945-946 (Lashley).)
“The act of firing toward a victim at a close, but not point blank, range ‘in a
manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the bullet been on
target is sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill. . . .’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Chinchilla (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690, quoting Lashley, at
p. 945.) “The fact that the shooter may have fired only once then abandoned
their efforts out of necessity or fear does not compel the conclusion they
lacked the animus to kill in the first place. Nor does the fact that the victim
may have escaped death because of the shooter’s poor marksmanship
necessarily establish a less culpable state of mind.” (Ibid.)
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B. Senate Bill No. 1437
Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 1–2) amended sections
188 and 189, which defined malice and the degrees of murder respectively.
(People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 335.) Section 188 now states,
“Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of
a murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (Ibid.) The Legislature also amended section 189 “to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did
not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) Relief is unavailable to
defendants who participated in the crime with the intent to kill. (§189,
subd. (e).)
Defendants who were convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial may petition for
resentencing if they could not currently be convicted of the crime due to the
changes made to sections 188 or 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Once the court
determines that the petition establishes a prima facie case for relief, the court
will hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the conviction and
resentence the defendant. (§1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At this hearing, “the
burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law, as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The court can consider
evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible
under the current law, including witness testimony. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
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III. The Court Correctly Denied the 1172.6 Petition
On appeal, defendant argues there is insufficient evidence that he fired
with an intent to kill, contending that the record supports only an inference
that he was aiming to injure the victim’s legs. He further asserts that Smith
is not applicable, as he fired from a point blank range, rather than the “close,
but not point blank, range” discussed in that case. (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th
at p. 740.) Defendant theorizes that since he shot the victim eight times at
point blank range and hit only the victim’s legs (aside from a hand shot
attributable to the victim’s defensive motion), the record supports only an
inference that he shot with the intent to injure, rather than to kill. We
disagree that an intent to injure is the only reasonable inference supported
by the record.
Defendant highlights Officer Sevilla’s testimony that he saw defendant
“point [his gun] towards the lower half, meaning from the waist downwards
of the victim,” and that both men fired “in the direction of the lower
extremity.” However, as respondent notes, Officer Sevilla also testified that
the gunshots targeted the victim in the “lower, maybe stomach, lower
extremity area” and that the victim’s “whole body was moving” in response to
the gunshots, likely to defend himself or dodge the bullets. A shot to the
stomach can plainly be a fatal wound, and, given that defendant and the
driver fired sixteen shots at the victim who was lying defenseless on the
ground, the court did not err in concluding it was “a miracle” that the victim
was not killed. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s argument that Officer
Sevilla’s testimony supports only an intent to injure.
In addition to focusing on Officer Sevilla’s testimony, defendant asserts
that the victim’s injuries — which were mostly leg wounds — demonstrate
only an intent to injure. This argument implicitly rests on an assumption
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that he aimed at the victim with military precision. As noted above, however,
the shooting was a quick and chaotic event, and the victim was constantly
moving — facts that would make it unlikely for a shooter to be able to hit a
precisely intended target. And indeed, the record reflects that sixteen shots
were fired but only five hit their mark. On these facts, we have little trouble
concluding the trial court could reasonably infer that defendant intended to
kill, but because of the short duration of the shooting and the victim’s
movement, the victim narrowly avoided a fatal wound.
Defendant also argues Smith is irrelevant as the court there expressly
stated intent to kill can be derived from “firing towards a victim at a close,
but not point blank, range,” making it inapplicable in point blank situations
such as this one. (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 742.) We are unconvinced
by this argument, which implicitly assumes that shooting from a point blank
range makes it impossible to miss the intended target. As noted, however,
the victim’s constant movements made it less likely that defendant could
precisely hit his target, even at point blank range. Moreover, given that
eleven out of the sixteen shots missed the victim, the trial court could
reasonably infer that the victim would have suffered a fatal wound had
defendant aimed better in this chaotic situation. The court in People v.
Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102, 120–121 rejected the same argument as
defendant advances here: “That the bullets struck [the victims] in their feet
and ankles similarly does not show that there was insufficient evidence of
specific intent to kill them. One reasonable inference that could be drawn
from that evidence, as Cardenas does, is that Cardenas shot both men with
the intent to injure or to frighten and not the intent to kill. However, another
reasonable inference that could be drawn from that evidence is that Cardenas
intended to shoot to kill both [victims] but had poor aim.” As defendant
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concedes, Smith covers situations involving “hypothetical missed targets and
poor [marksmanship].” Smith is thus applicable, for if defendant had better
aim, he could have inflicted a fatal wound.
Contrary to defendant’s contention, there is substantial circumstantial
evidence supporting his intent to kill. Officer Sevilla testified that defendant
was agitated when speaking to the victim before the shooting. (Lashley,
supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 945 [defendant’s conduct and behavior prior to the
shooting can constitute substantial evidence of intent to kill].) Officer Sevilla
also said he saw the unarmed victim running the opposite direction while
defendant pursued him with a firearm. (People v. Richmond (1991)
2 Cal.App.4th 610, 618 [attacking a fleeing victim is indicative of an intent to
kill].) Smith explains that a “shooter’s purposeful ‘use of a lethal weapon
with lethal force’ against the victim, if otherwise legally unexcused, will itself
give rise to the inference of the intent to kill.” (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
p. 742.) As there was certainly no legal excuse for defendant’s attack on a
fleeing and unarmed victim, these facts constitute more than sufficient
evidence to support an intent to kill.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.
People v. Montano (A169526)
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