CourtListener 10620143•People v. Withers CA4/1
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Filed 6/30/25 P. v. Withers CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082423
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN301965)
DESTIN LEE WITHERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Blaine K. Bowman, Judge. Affirmed.
Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina, Supervising Deputy Attorney General and Christine
Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Destin Lee Withers appeals from an order denying his
request for Penal Code section 1172.61 resentencing. After an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court found Withers was not eligible for section 1172.6
relief because the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life in
the murder of Denise Rodriguez. Withers contends insufficient evidence
supports the court’s order. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury convicted Withers and his codefendant, Jeffrey McCreary, of
first degree murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) It found true an allegation that
McCreary alone was armed with a handgun (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and
personally discharged a handgun causing death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) The
court sentenced Withers to 25 years to life in prison plus a determinate term
of three years for his prison priors. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
We set forth in full the facts of the underlying offenses in our prior
opinion. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the judgment over Withers’s
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence that, as a factual matter, he
committed felony murder based on his role in Rodriguez’s kidnapping or on
the legal claim that he aided and abetted McCreary in committing the
murder. (People v. Withers, et al. (Sept. 29, 2016, D067156) [nonpub. opn.],
review den. Jan. 18, 2017, S238120 (Withers).) Here, we merely summarize
the facts for context.
In January 2012, McCreary, who often carried a handgun and owned a
bulletproof vest, acted as an “enforcer” for a drug dealer who lived in an
apartment complex (the Del Dios apartment) where people regularly
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. (§ 1172.6
added by renumbering former § 1170.95, Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2
consumed drugs. (Withers, supra, D067156.) That month, McCreary met
Rodriguez at the Del Dios apartment. McCreary knew that Rodriguez and
D.R., who was a Chula Vista gang member, used methamphetamine and had
consensual sex.
Withers, who was a big, formidable, street fighter and mixed martial
arts practitioner with a reputation for helping women in trouble, met
Rodriguez the next day when he went to the Del Dios apartment to buy
methamphetamine. Rodriguez tearfully told him she was raped. Withers
took her and her baby to his house. She initially told him someone had given
her bad drugs and some men had taken turns raping her, but later said only
her boyfriend (D.R.) had raped her.
A day or two later, Withers took Rodriguez to the Del Dios apartment
to conduct an “investigation” of the rape and drugs allegations. Withers
questioned McCreary about who had raped Rodriguez. McCreary said that
Rodriguez and D.R. had had consensual sex. Nevertheless, in retaliation for
the alleged rape, Withers stole D.R.’s car and took Rodriguez to his house.
When she saw McCreary there, she became hysterical and screamed at him,
claiming she received bad drugs and was raped. Withers told somebody, “Get
rid of this bitch. Get this bitch out of here.” (Withers, supra, D067156.)
Rodriguez told Withers he should not have stolen D.R.’s car. She continued
to scream and yell, and then tried to leave, but Withers shoved her against a
wall, and took her into a bathroom for about 20 minutes.
Later that same day, Withers arranged for McCreary to get a
“throwaway” gun, which is an untraceable gun. McCreary texted Withers,
“Im [sic] in negotiations on a throw away, too little time advanced notice for
anything clean and my personal takes too long to clean and assemble which
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is why I don’t usually pack backups. There will be rental, but I’ll throw in
$60 cash towards that.” (Withers, supra, D067156.)
That night, Withers drove McCreary and Rodriguez to a hotel. They all
smoked methamphetamine. After midnight, Withers and McCreary left the
hotel and went to the Del Dios apartment and confronted D.R., who
convinced Withers the rape allegations were false. Withers apologized to him
and promised to return his car to him. Withers thereafter called the hotel
and, referring to Rodriguez, told one of his contacts there something like,
“[p]ut that bitch in a corner” or “[p]ut her in check.” (Withers, supra,
D067156.) Withers was angry that Rodriguez had lied to him. After
Withers’s phone call ended, McCreary nodded his head and told Withers, “I
got it. I’ll take care of it.” (Withers, supra, D067156.)
Withers and McCreary returned to the hotel, and Withers grabbed
Rodriguez, put her in the backseat of his vehicle, and drove away. About five
minutes into their drive, McCreary, sitting in the front passenger seat,
turned around and fired four gunshots into her. According to a forensic
pathologist, she was shot possibly while she tried to open the car door. The
gunshots eventually caused her death.
Withers returned with McCreary and Rodriguez’s body to his home. He
took a blanket from his house out to the car. Withers and McCreary ate some
food. Withers told McCreary to take the car and “clean that mess.” (Withers,
supra, D067156.) McCreary then drove Withers’s vehicle to an undeveloped
cul-de-sac and left Rodriguez’s body there. McCreary texted Withers that he
had found a perfect spot. Withers later went to a friend’s remote property
and burned items that were in his car.
Withers was arrested while he was driving McCreary’s vehicle.
Withers had in his pocket the same type of ammunition fired from the gun
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that killed Rodriguez. Withers told a homicide detective that when he pulled
into his driveway, he thought she was still alive but “damn near gone.” A
little later, she “was gone,” meaning she was dead. Withers and McCreary
had something to eat and drink, and planned their next step.
The day after his arrest, Withers volunteered to provide police
information regarding the homicide. Withers placed a recorded telephone
call to McCreary, who implicated himself as the shooter. Withers told
McCreary, “[Y]ou, didn’t have to fuckin’ shoot four fuckin’ times, idiot. That
was crazy.” Withers added, “Yeah I [was] fucking . . . driving on the fuckin’
side of the road and all of a sudden you fucking pop four rounds, I was like
holy shit.” (Withers, supra, D067156.) McCreary laughed, and they
discussed dumping Rodriguez’s body and getting rid of everything.
Two days later, when police arrested McCreary, he had the murder
weapon in his possession. After Withers’s arraignment and as he was being
led back to his holding cell, Withers yelled out several times, “It was only
supposed to be a rape.”
While in custody, Withers spoke extensively to a cellmate and said
McCreary was not “supposed to shoot the bitch in my back seat.” (Withers,
supra, D067156.) Withers admitted he had grabbed Rodriguez by the arm
and put her in the car, and that an argument occurred in the car just before
Rodriguez was shot. Withers said he handled the gun before putting
Rodriguez in the car. He described the controlled telephone call he made to
McCreary. The cellmate asked Withers why, during that call, he had not
asked McCreary to state his reason for shooting Rodriguez. Withers
responded, “I couldn’t Bro. I couldn’t.”
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During a recorded phone call between Withers and his wife, she asked
him what they had planned to do to Rodriguez that night, and Withers said,
“I was going to beat [her].”
Withers and McCreary both testified at trial, claimed there was no plan
to kill Rodriguez, and each identified the other as the shooter. Each claimed
he was surprised by the other’s shooting Rodriguez, and that he feared the
shooter.
Resentencing Proceedings
In November 2020, Withers filed a section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing. The trial court conducted Withers’s evidentiary hearing but
did not receive new evidence. At the outset of the hearing, the court noted it
had presided over the trial, and was therefore familiar with the case. It read
all of the parties’ moving and opposing papers, as well as the entire trial
transcript.
The prosecutor argued, “[I]f the court recalls, there were earplugs found
in [Withers’s vehicle] that belonged to [ ] Withers, and there were two pairs of
earplugs. I believe there was three found total. And . . . Withers didn’t have
a gun that we know of, that the gun was produced by [ ] McCreary which
would suggest that they also procured the ear protection, the earplugs,
because they were going to shoot the gun. [¶] Now, if you were shooting the
gun someplace out like a field, you would not need earplugs. But if you were
shooting on the inside of a car and you knew you were going to be shooting on
the inside of car and you knew that guns were going to be extremely loud on
the inside of a car, then you would procure earplugs. [¶] So I think that
there is plenty of evidence to suggest and to prove that [ ] Withers was (1), an
aider and abettor and falls out of the scope of [section 1172.6]. [¶] But (2),
even if the jury found strictly on a theory of felony murder, . . . [Withers] was
6
indeed a major participant and, in fact, the person who orchestrated the
entire events that night.”
Defense counsel disagreed: “I’ll just . . . talk about the earplugs the
district attorney talked about in her oral argument, and just say, again, it
shows that so there are earplugs in the car. I don’t believe that there’s any
evidence that there’s DNA or that they were used. I mean, there’s lots of
reasons somebody might have earplugs. You certainly—I mean, even when I
fire weapons in open fields, I wear ear protection because it can get quite
loud. [¶] But again, the fact that there are earplugs, could it be because they
were planning on shooting [ ] Rodriguez? I guess. But there’s nothing else to
suggest that that’s what happened, and so I think it’s speculation. [¶] I
know that—[a]gain, it could be that that was the case, but again, beyond a
reasonable doubt isn’t could or could have been.”
Following arguments by counsel, the court denied the petition, finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that Withers was a major participant, who set the
“whole thing in motion,” and he acted with reckless indifference to human
life.
DISCUSSION
Withers contends the trial court erroneously denied his resentencing
petition, as insufficient evidence supported its finding that he was a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.
I. Legal Principles Concerning Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature amended the felony murder
rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
7
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Sen. Bill No. 1437; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957.)2 It redefined “malice” in section 188 to add a requirement that all
principals to a murder “shall act with malice aforethought” and that “[m]alice
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2; Curiel,
at p. 449.)
The Legislature also narrowed the classes of persons liable for felony
murder under section 189. Now, “[a] participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) [including
kidnapping] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the
following is proven: (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person
was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was
a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”
(§ 189, subd. (e); People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448.)
The Legislature put in place a procedural mechanism for those
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to seek relief where the two substantive changes
described above affect a defendant’s conviction. (People v. Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 449.) It includes a petition procedure in which the court decides
2 As of January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended the law to allow a
defendant to seek resentencing under its provisions for attempted murder
and manslaughter convictions, among other changes. (Sen. Bill No. 755;
Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
8
whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). (Curiel, at p. 450.) Upon such a
showing, the court is required to issue an order to show cause and conduct an
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1); Curiel, at p. 450.)
At the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder . . . under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188
or 189 effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and
the prosecution may offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens, and the “admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by
the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously
admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,
including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially
noticed.” (Ibid.) The trial court acts as an independent factfinder in
determining whether the People have met their burden. (People v. Schell
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 442.)
This court ordinarily reviews for substantial evidence the trial court’s
denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the evidentiary hearing stage. (See
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) Under this standard, our role
differs from that of the trial court. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298.) “While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence,
evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to
credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to
support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.)
In applying this standard, we “review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
9
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (Reyes, at p. 988.) We will not reverse the order
unless there is no hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial evidence
exists to support the trial court’s decision. (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 112, 125.) “We must ‘presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’
[Citation.] ‘The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily
on circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘An appellate court must accept
logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have drawn from the
circumstantial evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) Under settled appellate principles, we
affirm if the trial court’s order is correct on any legal theory, regardless of the
reasoning in reaching its decision. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929,
976.)
II. Law Regarding Felony Murder
As Withers was not the actual killer, under section 189, subdivision
(e)(3), we evaluate whether he was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. The California
Supreme Court in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 794 (Banks) and a
follow-up decision, People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 618-622 (Clark),
identified several factors courts should consider in determining whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, a defendant was a major participant
in an underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
(In re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 551-553.) In Banks, the California
Supreme Court explained that a defendant’s knowing participation in a
robbery with others who are armed is insufficient, without more, to prove the
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Strong
10
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 706; Banks, at pp. 808-810.) Banks concluded that
“[a]wareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any
armed crime is insufficient,” because a defendant must “knowingly creat[e] a
‘grave risk of death’ ” through the defendant’s “own actions.” (Banks, at pp.
808, 807.)
Clark expanded on the “reckless indifference to human life” element,
stating that it “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in
killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically
desire that death as the outcome of [the defendant’s] actions.” (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 616, 617.) “ ‘These requirements significantly overlap . . .
for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more
likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Id. at p. 615.)
In In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, the California Supreme Court
explained “reckless indifference to human life” has a subjective and an
objective element. (Id. at p. 677.) “As to the subjective element, ‘[t]he
defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in
which the particular offense is committed,’ and [the defendant] must
consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death [the defendant’s] actions
create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective element, ‘ “[t]he risk [of death] must
be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of
the [defendant’s] conduct and the circumstances known to [the defendant], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the [defendant’s] situation.” ’ . . . Notably,
‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an armed robbery could anticipate lethal
force might be used’ is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to
human life.” (Ibid.)
11
Whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life
depends upon the totality of the circumstances. (In re Scoggins, supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 677.) “Relevant factors include: Did the defendant use or know
that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons were
ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did he
or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What
was the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony
and the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her
confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What
efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the
felony? [Citation.] ‘ “[N]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any
one of them necessarily sufficient.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see also People v. Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 706.)
III. Analysis
The first factor in determining if Withers was a major participant in
the kidnapping and murder is, “What role did the defendant have in planning
the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?” (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 803.) Withers admits he “planned to kidnap Rodriguez so he
could retaliate by beating or raping her.” However, he argues that “no
evidence showed that the plan involved shooting Rodriguez.”
The evidence shows that in planning Rodriguez’s kidnapping, Withers
secured the participation of McCreary, a drug dealer’s enforcer known for
wearing a bullet proof vest. Withers ensured McCreary had a throwaway
gun to use during the crime. A factfinder could reasonably conclude that
given Withers’s physical build and fighting experience, if he merely intended
to beat or rape Rodriguez as he claimed, he most likely could have
accomplished that by relying on his own strength and martial arts skills.
12
Therefore, his decision to bring along an armed companion evinced his
intention that the gun be used to possibly kill Rodriguez for lying to him and
causing him to defend her by stealing a gang member’s vehicle. We conclude
this factor supports the court’s finding.
The second factor asks, “What role did the defendant have in supplying
or using lethal weapons?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) Withers
concedes the evidence showed he asked McCreary to obtain a throwaway gun.
But he adds, “[T]he evidence did not show that [he] knew McCreary was
armed in the car. And even if it did, that would not necessarily establish that
[he] was a major participant.” As stated, Withers arranged for McCreary to
obtain the gun to carry out the attack on Rodriguez. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume he relied on that assurance of McCreary who, after
witnessing Withers’s anger upon discovering Rodriguez’s lies, told him, “I got
it. I’ll take care of it.” Additionally, Withers could be confident that as
McCreary was armed, he would handle any eventuality that arose during the
incident, including shooting Rodriguez. This factor supports the court’s
finding.
The third factor asks, “What awareness did the defendant have of
particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 803.) Withers acknowledges the “evidence supported a finding that [he]
planned to kidnap Rodriguez so he could punish her for lying about being
raped by either beating or raping her.” But he claims “the plan did not
involve shooting Rodriguez in [his] car.” The factfinder need not accept as
truth Withers’s self-serving statements that he intended only to beat or rape
Rodriquez. Rather, as Withers was the mastermind behind the criminal
plan, it is reasonable to assume he knew the particular danger posed by his
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enlisting an armed enforcer to participate in the crime. He knew McCreary,
and recruited him for the assignment precisely because of his reliability as an
enforcer and his expertise in using a firearm, which would help to accomplish
Rodriguez’s death if needed. This factor also supports the court’s finding.
The fourth factor asks whether “the defendant [was] present at the
scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder,
and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death.”
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) Withers concedes he was present and
driving the car when McCreary shot Rodriguez. But he argues McCreary
fired the gun without warning and in rapid succession, thus he could not
have intervened to stop him. Contrary to Withers, we do not start our
analysis of this factor at the moment he and McCreary put Rodriguez in the
car. Rather, we also take into account that minutes earlier Withers ordered a
man to keep Rodriguez in check until Withers reached the hotel. During the
intervening time, it is reasonable to assume Withers honed his plan to make
Rodriguez pay for misleading him into thinking D.R. had raped her. At any
point before reaching the hotel, Withers could have halted his plan by
declining to take an armed McCreary with him, or by instructing McCreary
not to use his gun. But the evidence indicates he did no such thing.
Specifically, during the controlled call, Withers appeared to take for granted
the gun would be used in the kidnapping; which would explain why his
objection was only to the number of shots McCreary fired in the car. This
factor therefore supports the court’s finding.
As for the final factor, “What did the defendant do after lethal force was
used” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803), Withers acknowledges he “acted
callously after Rodriguez’s death, by covering her body with a blanket and
telling McCreary to clean up the mess.” He nonetheless argues, “Even
14
though [he drove] McCreary and Rodriguez’s body to his home and went
inside, no evidence showed that Rodriguez may have survived if [he] had
helped her.” By Withers’s own admission, Rodriguez was alive, albeit barely,
when he returned to the house. Accordingly, if Withers did not intend for her
to be killed, he could have manifested that intent by taking her to a hospital
or calling 911. He did neither, nor did he take any other action to ease
Rodriguez’s suffering or prevent her death. Instead, while she lay dying, he
and McCreary ate and drank. He instructed McCreary to clean up the mess,
which McCreary did by disposing of Rodriguez’s body. This factor also
supports the court’s finding.
Balancing the above factors, we conclude the record contains
substantial evidence supporting the court’s conclusion Withers was a “major
participant” in the kidnapping and homicide. No factor supports his contrary
claim.
As stated, the major participant factors analyzed above and the
reckless indifference factors we now turn to “ ‘significantly overlap.’ ” (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.) Therefore, to the extent they overlap, we need
not repeat our analysis when considering these Clark factors.
The first Clark factor addresses the “defendant’s awareness that a gun
[or other deadly weapon] will be used,” whether the defendant personally
used a lethal weapon, and the number of lethal weapons used. (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-619.) This factor supports the court’s finding for the
reasons set forth above. Specifically, the record shows Withers asked
McCreary to get a throwaway gun to handle Rodriguez in light of her lying
about being raped.
Regarding the second factor, the defendant’s “[p]roximity to the murder
and the events leading up to it” and the opportunity to either restrain the
15
crime or aid the victim (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 619-620), this factor
also supports the court’s finding. As set forth above, Withers did nothing to
either restrain McCreary from killing Rodriguez or to aid her once she was
shot four times.
The third factor addresses whether the murder took place “at the end of
a prolonged period of restraint of the victim[ ] by defendant.” (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 620-621.) The court explained: “Where a victim is held at
gunpoint, kidnapped, or otherwise restrained in the presence of perpetrators
for prolonged periods, ‘there is a greater window of opportunity for violence’
[citation], possibly culminating in murder.” (Id. at p. 620.) This incident
began with Withers’s order that a man keep Rodriguez in check while
Withers returned to the hotel to deal with her. He later drove the vehicle
with her as his passenger along with McCreary, the enforcer. This factor
supports the court’s finding, as Withers ordered Rodriguez’s detention,
participated in her kidnapping, and was seated next to McCreary when
McCreary shot her. The fact that McCreary shot Rodriquez within five
minutes of the kidnapping does not alter our analysis. The forensic evidence
shows McCreary shot her while she was trying to exit the car, which likely
precipitated his decision to shoot her earlier rather than later.
As for the fourth factor, the “defendant’s knowledge of . . . a cohort’s
likelihood of killing” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621), as set forth above,
this factor supports the court’s finding that Withers arranged for McCreary to
get a throwaway gun. It is reasonable to infer Withers would not have done
so unless he intended for the gun to be used in the kidnapping. The earplugs
found in Withers’s car also permitted the inference he and McCreary knew
gunshots would be fired in his vehicle and therefore sought to protect their
hearing while undertaking their mission to shoot Rodriguez.
16
The fifth factor addresses whether the defendant made an “effort[ ] to
minimize the risks of violence in the commission of a felony.” (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 621-622.) As stated, on this record, Withers did nothing to
minimize the risks of violence. This factor therefore supports the court’s
finding.
Balancing the factors from Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, and
considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the record
demonstrates that all the factors show Withers acted with reckless disregard
for human life. He “ ‘knowingly creat[ed] a “grave risk of death,” ’ ” that
involved a “gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in [his] situation” (In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
683); accordingly, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding he acted
with reckless indifference to human life.
Relying on In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, Withers argues no
evidence showed he was a major participant, or that the plan involved
shooting Rodriguez. He claims any knowledge he had that McCreary was
armed or any indication he failed to reduce the risk of violence still does not
show he acted with reckless indifference. He also argues the kidnapping
lasted only a short time before McCreary independently decided to kill
Rodriguez. He adds that no evidence showed the plan contemplated killing
Rodriguez. We are not persuaded by Withers’s reliance on that case because
as a general matter, “Determining a defendant’s culpability under the special
circumstances statute requires a fact-intensive, individualized inquiry.”
Further, the Bennett case is distinguishable, as that court, relying on Banks
and Clark, concluded the defendant “ ‘did not see the shooting happen, did
not have reason to know it was going to happen, and could not do anything to
stop the shooting or render assistance’ ”; moreover, no evidence showed his
17
coparticipants’ propensity to shoot the victim. (Bennett, supra, at pp. 1023-
1024.) By contrast, as shown, Withers masterminded the plan to kidnap
Rodriguez, and directed McCreary to obtain a gun and participate in the
crimes. Withers was next to McCreary in the limited confines of his car when
McCreary shot Rodriguez. Afterwards, Withers rendered no assistance to
Rodriguez. Under these circumstances, the court did not err in finding
Withers was a major participant and acted in reckless disregard for human
life.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
KELETY, J.
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