CourtListener 10620142•Wan v. Cheng CA2/1
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Filed 6/30/25 Wan v. Cheng CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
BONNIE KWOK LING WAN B335658
et al.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. 19STCV46980)
v.
YUAN HAO CHENG,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part.
Law Offices of Bin Li & Associates and Bin Li for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
Shioda Langley & Change, Steven P. Chang, Gene H.
Shioda and Heidi M. Cheng for Defendant and Respondent.
_____________________
In the midst of a lawsuit in which it accused two of its
former executives of corporate looting, plaintiff and appellant
E & E Optics, Inc. (E&E) voluntarily dissolved itself. The
certificate of dissolution E&E filed with the Secretary of State
declared that “[t]he [c]orporation has been completely wound up.”
Shortly before trial was to begin, one of the executives in
question, defendant and respondent Yuan Hao (Eric) Cheng,1
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that E&E, as a dissolved
corporation, lacked standing to continue prosecuting its claims
against him. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.
This was error. Under Corporations Code section 2010,2
E&E continued to exist for purposes of the litigation despite its
dissolution. The statute and relevant case law affirm that a
dissolved corporation may continue to participate in litigation
either as a plaintiff or as a defendant. We therefore reverse the
dismissal of E&E’s claims and affirm the remainder of the
judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
E&E, under the ownership of plaintiff and appellant
Bonnie Kwok Ling Wan, sold contact lenses and other vision-
related products. On December 31, 2019, E&E and Wan filed a
complaint against Eric, his brother Alex, and WK Vision Inc. (WK
Vision) for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and four other causes
1 To avoid confusion between the two individual defendants
in this case, we follow the parties’ practice in referring to Yuan
Hao (Eric) Cheng as Eric, and Yuan Feng (Alex) Cheng as Alex.
We intend no disrespect.
2 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Corporations Code.
2
of action.3 Wan had hired Alex in 2015 to serve as E&E’s chief
executive officer, and Alex in turn hired Eric as the company’s
vice president. The complaint alleged that, unbeknownst to Wan,
the two brothers soon formed their own company, WK Vision,
which they operated out of E&E’s offices. “WK Vision’s
operations and function [were] to sell the same contact lenses and
associated products as E&E. WK [V]ision would purchase these
goods from E&E and then re-sell E&E’s products to E&E’s
customers at a higher (market) price. WK Vision did not
improve, alter, or change the products in any way.” The plaintiffs
claimed they had suffered at least $350,000 in damages from this
scheme.
Eric denied the allegations. He claimed that another E&E
employee, Tiffany Huang, formed WK Vision at the direction of
Wan and Alex to serve as a “buying group” for E&E, and that
Wan and E&E “were aware that WK Vision used the same office
space and same employees as E&E.” Eric further alleged that he
drew no salary from WK Vision, and that he returned his shares
in WK Vision for no compensation when his employment was
terminated in 2017.
3 The trial court dismissed Alex with prejudice on the
ground that the plaintiffs had failed to serve him properly, a
decision the plaintiffs do not challenge. The court also entered a
default against WK Vision. There is no indication in the record
that WK Vision ever sought relief from the default, nor that a
default judgment was entered against it.
3
Five days before trial was set to begin, Eric filed a motion
in limine4 to dismiss the case on the ground that E&E lacked
standing because, 10 months earlier, E&E had dissolved itself.5
E&E’s certificate of dissolution was filed on a standard form that
included preprinted “[r]equired [s]tatements” declaring that
“[t]he [c]orporation has been completely wound up and is
dissolved,” and that “[t]he known assets have been distributed to
the persons entitled thereto or the corporation acquired no known
assets.” The form also included a statement affirming that “[t]he
dissolution was made by a vote of ALL of the shareholders of the
. . . corporation.” Wan signed the form, declaring under penalty
of perjury that she was “the sole director or a majority of the
directors now in office,” and “that the matters set forth in this
certificate are true and correct of [her] own knowledge.”
The trial court granted the motion, explaining, “[y]ou don’t
have a corporation. It’s completely wound up. That was signed
off by [Wan], and it indicated on that form that she checked that
all members voted for that. So, if, indeed, there was an issue
4 At oral argument, E&E objected to Eric’s late challenge to
E&E’s standing by way of a motion in limine. E&E made no such
argument in its appellate briefing. Because we reverse on the
merits, we need not decide whether E&E forfeited this contention
or, if it did not, whether the trial court erred by failing to afford
E&E sufficient time to respond to a dispositive motion.
5 Eric’s motion also asserted that Wan lacked standing
because she based her individual claims on her status as an E&E
shareholder, and she was thus required to file a derivative action
(which she had not done). The trial court agreed and dismissed
Wan’s claims. Wan appealed alongside E&E, but in the plaintiffs’
appellate briefing, she does not contest the judgment against her.
We therefore affirm that aspect of the judgment.
4
about whether the company should have been dissolved because
of these outstanding claims . . . [or] causes of action for fraud, I
would have expected to see something different to keep that going
so that the proper remedy could be fashioned. That didn’t
happen here.”
The court entered judgment in favor of Eric, and E&E
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
E&E argues that its dissolution did not deprive E&E of
standing to prosecute its case against Eric. Because this is a
question of law that does not depend on resolving any underlying
factual disputes, our review is de novo. (Loeber v. Lakeside Joint
School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 552, 570.)
“At common law, the dissolution of a corporation was
treated like the death of a natural person: Once it had dissolved,
a corporation ceased to exist and could not sue or be sued, and
any actions pending against it abated.” (Peñasquitos, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1180, 1184.) But “California
abandoned the common law rule governing the effect of a
corporation’s dissolution by the enactment of former Civil Code
section 399 in 1929.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Section 2010, the
successor statute to former Civil Code section 399, provides that
“[a] corporation which is dissolved nevertheless continues to exist
for the purpose of winding up its affairs, prosecuting and
defending actions by or against it and enabling it to collect and
discharge obligations, dispose of and convey its property and
collect and divide its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing
business except so far as necessary for the winding up thereof.”
(§ 2010, subd. (a), italics added.)
5
“Under our [state’s] statutory scheme, the effect of
dissolution is not so much a change in the corporation’s status as
a change in its permitted scope of activity. In Boyle v. Lakeview
Creamery Co. (1937) 9 Cal.2d 16 . . . , [the Supreme Court] stated
that the ‘only purpose’ of former Civil Code section 399, a
predecessor of section 2010, was ‘to stop further doing of business
as a going concern, and limit corporate activities to winding up.’
([Boyle, supra,] . . . at p. 20.) Thus, a corporation’s dissolution is
best understood not as its death, but merely as its retirement
from active business.” (Peñasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1190.)
Both the statutory language and Peñasquitos’s gloss on it
support E&E’s position, namely that although E&E’s dissolution
meant it was no longer a going concern, the dissolution did not
prohibit E&E from pursuing its claims against Eric. Eric argues
Peñasquitos held only that after dissolution, a corporation
“continues to exist for purposes of winding up its affairs and, in
particular, for discharging obligations and defending lawsuits.”
(Peñasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1183,
italics added.) The trial court in this case agreed that a dissolved
corporation may defend but not prosecute suits, stating that it
would be an “oxymoron for a company that no longer exists [to be]
able to bring an action.” In the trial court’s view, that would be
“different from a dissolved company that’s being sued. Of course,
you can see the obvious public policy in allowing that to happen,
because [otherwise] the companies would just go buck wild,
dissolve [themselves], and say, ‘Hey, we escaped liability.’ ”
Such a limitation finds no support in the text of section
2010. The statute states that a dissolved corporation “continues
to exist for the purpose of . . . prosecuting and defending actions
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by or against it.” (Id., subd. (a), italics added.) Subdivision (b) of
the same section further clarifies that “[n]o action or proceeding
to which a corporation is a party abates by the dissolution of the
corporation or by reason of proceedings for winding up and
dissolution thereof.” (Id., subd. (b).) To bar E&E from continuing
to prosecute its case against Eric would be contrary to the plain
text of the statute, and we are aware of no case holding
otherwise.
The court in Peñasquitos limited its discussion to dissolved
corporations defending themselves in litigation because that was
the issue presented in that case. (See Peñasquitos, Inc. v.
Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1183-1184.) The court
had no occasion to address suits brought by a dissolved
corporation, and “ ‘ “ ‘cases are not authority for propositions not
considered.’ ” ’ ” (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1252.)
When courts have addressed the issue, they have uniformly
decided that the statute means what it says. In a case
addressing the predecessor to section 2010, our Supreme Court
stated that a dissolved “corporation may even bring actions.”
(Boyle v. Lakeview Creamery Co., supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 20.) In
A.B. Concrete Coating v. Wells Fargo Bank (E.D. Cal. 2020) 491
F.Supp.3d 727, a federal district court applying California law
upheld a corporation’s right to prosecute a claim filed after the
corporation had dissolved. (Id. at pp. 732-733; see also Southwest
Exploration Co. v. Riddell (9th Cir. 1966) 362 F.2d 833, 835, fn.1.)
In Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 189, the court held that a dissolved corporation’s
right to prosecute lawsuits extends to derivative suits filed by the
corporation’s shareholders. (Id. at pp. 212-217.)
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Eric argues we should nevertheless affirm the trial court’s
dismissal because this case was not within the scope of E&E’s
winding-up process. He notes that E&E’s certificate of
dissolution, which Wan signed under penalty of perjury, stated
that E&E “has been completely wound up and is dissolved,” and
that “[t]he known assets have been distributed to the persons
entitled thereto or the corporation acquired no known assets.”
Eric claims that to allow E&E to pursue this litigation would
imply that E&E was not yet completely wound up, and that it
still had an asset—its claim against him—that had not been
distributed.
The federal court in A.B. Concrete Coating rejected a
similar argument, holding that “[a]fter filing a certificate of
dissolution, a corporation’s existence ceases ‘except for the limited
purpose of further winding up of its affairs.’ [Citation.] Thus, the
filing of the certificate of dissolution only marked the end of [the]
plaintiff’s normal business activities, not the completion of its
winding-up process . . . .” (A.B. Concrete Coating v. Wells Fargo
Bank, supra, 491 F.Supp.3d at p. 733, quoting Catalina Invs. Inc.
v. Jones (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.) We find the court’s
reasoning persuasive. To dissolve a corporation voluntarily, the
majority of the directors must declare, as Wan did, that the
corporation has been completely wound up, and its assets have
been distributed. (§ 1905, subd. (a)(1) & (3); A.B. Concrete
Coating, at p. 733.) The corporation’s dissolution becomes
effective “as of the date of filing the certificate of dissolution.”
(§ 1905.1.)
But section 2010 specifically contemplates the possibility
that additional winding up may be required after dissolution.
Subdivision (a) of the statute states that after dissolution, a
8
dissolved corporation does not exist “for the purpose of continuing
business except so far as necessary for the winding up thereof.”
(Id., subd. (a), italics added.) Subdivision (c) states that “[a]ny
assets inadvertently or otherwise omitted from the winding up
continue in the dissolved corporation for the benefit of the
persons entitled thereto upon dissolution of the corporation and
on realization shall be distributed accordingly.” (Id., subd. (c);
see also A.B. Concrete Coating v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 491
F.Supp.3d at p. 733.)6 If the filing of a certificate of dissolution
precluded any further winding up, it would mean that these
provisions regarding the limited continued existence of dissolved
corporations would not apply to any corporation that dissolved
voluntarily. There is no indication the Legislature intended such
a result.
Finally, Eric contends that when Wan signed the certificate
of dissolution affirming that E&E had been completely wound up
and its known assets had been distributed, she implicitly
“admi[tted] that the lawsuit was no longer an asset of E&E.” We
disagree. Under section 2010, subdivision (c), “[a]ny assets
inadvertently or otherwise omitted from the winding up continue
in the dissolved corporation . . . .” (Ibid., italics added.) Thus,
even if Wan intentionally omitted E&E’s cause of action from the
6 Eric contends that E&E forfeited any reliance on section
2010, subdivision (c) by failing to cite that portion of the statute
before the trial court. We disagree. Section 2010, subdivision (c)
merely clarifies what happens to assets omitted from the winding
up “inadvertently or otherwise.” Subdivision (a) of the same
statute provides dissolved corporations with the authority to
prosecute or continue to prosecute cases, and E&E cited
subdivision (a) before the trial court.
9
winding up, under the statute, it continued to belong to E&E. In
addition, Eric argued before the trial court that Wan’s claims
were derivative in nature, and the trial court agreed. In a
derivative suit, “ ‘ “the right of action and recovery belongs to . . .
the corporation” ’ ” (Bader v. Anderson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th
775, 793, quoting Oakland Raiders v. National Football League
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 650-651), and the stockholder who
brings the suit “ ‘ “is merely a nominal party plaintiff.” ’ ” (Favila
v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at
p. 222.) For Eric to reverse course and now assert that Wan’s
claim belonged to her personally subjects him to judicial estoppel,
which “ ‘ “precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking
one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an
incompatible position.” ’ ” (Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th
974, 986.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s judgment is reversed as to E&E’s causes of
action against Eric but is otherwise affirmed. E&E is awarded
its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. M. KIM, J.
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