Premier Capital v. Yakovi CA2/5

CourtListener 10617893CalctappJun 26, 2025

Full text

Filed 6/26/25 Premier Capital v. Yakovi CA2/5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

PREMIER CAPITAL, LLC, B311833

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BC271003)

SHAUL YAKOVI,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Mark E. Goodfriend and Mark E. Goodfriend
for Defendant and Appellant.
Verus Law Group, Holly Walker, and Mark N. Strom for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Plaintiff and respondent Premier Capital (Premier) is the
assignee and successor in interest to NC Venture I, L.P. (NC
Venture). NC Venture obtained a default judgment against
defendant and appellant Shaul Yakovi (Yakovi) in 2002. Nearly
20 years later, Yakovi moved to set aside the default judgment
based on the contention it was void because plaintiff effected
service of the summons and complaint at an address that was no
longer defendant’s “usual place of business” (Code Civ. Proc.,1
§ 415.20, subd. (b)). The trial court denied Yakovi’s motion and
we initially affirmed, relying on authority that such a late motion
to set aside the judgment must prove the judgment is invalid
looking only to the “judgment roll” (i.e., the summons, proof of
service, the complaint, the request for entry of default and the
entry of the same, and the judgment). Our Supreme Court then
granted review and transferred the matter back to us with
directions to vacate our prior opinion and reconsider the matter
in light of its intervening opinion in California Capital Insurance
Company v. Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th 207. (Id. at 223, 225
[section 473, subdivision (d) motion to vacate judgment as void
for improper service, which relies on extrinsic evidence, is not
subject to a two-year time limit].) Our prior opinion is hereby
vacated and we now consider the matter anew as directed.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Default Judgment
Yakovi was president of Sam Electronics, Inc. and, in 1992,
personally guaranteed a $65,800 Small Business Administration

1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

2
loan issued to the company. Yakovi and Sam Electronics
eventually defaulted on the loan payments due, and NC Venture
(as servicer of the loan) sued Yakovi and Sam Electronics in
March 2002 for breach of promissory note, money lent, open book
account, and account stated. NC Venture claimed damages in
the amount of $64,185.75, the balance owing on the loan at the
time, plus interest and attorney fees.
A proof of service for the summons and complaint indicates
defendants were served by substituted service, i.e., by leaving a
copy of the summons, complaint, and other materials with a
“manager” and “person in charge” (listed as John Doe, with a
physical description provided) present at the business located at
429 South Broadway in Los Angeles and mailing a copy of the
documents to the same address. A “Declaration of Due Diligence”
submitted with the proof of service indicates three attempts were
made to serve Yakovi personally before resorting to substituted
service. Notations are appended to each of the attempts at
personal service listed on the declaration; the first two notations
read “defendant not in” and the third notation reads “defendant
not in per manager.”
Defendant did not timely answer or respond to the
complaint. In May 2002, NC Venture requested entry of the
defendants’ default. The clerk of the court did not enter the
default, however, because NC Venture did not attach the
summons and proof of service to its request. NC Venture cured
the problem in a later request for entry of default, which was
filed the following month, and the clerk entered defendants’
default.
NC Venture subsequently asked the trial court to issue a
default judgment against defendants. The trial court issued an

3
order requiring NC Venture to provide “support for the place of
service, 429 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California 90013 as
the correct address for service” of the summons and complaint.
NC Venture filed a declaration from its attorney. The
declaration attached a certified copy of a 1993 statement of
information filed with the California Secretary of State listing
Sam Electronics and Yakovi’s address as 429 S. Broadway, Los
Angeles, CA 90013. The same statement of information also
listed defendant as “President,” “Designated Agent for Service of
Process,” “Chief Executive Officer,” and “Chief Financial Officer”
for Sam Electronics. Counsel’s declaration further averred (1) he
served copies of the request for entry of default at the 429 South
Broadway address, which were not returned by the postal service,
and (2) the proof of service of the summons and complaint
already on file with the court stated Yakovi was “‘not in’ rather
than ‘does not work here’” when three attempts at personal
service were made.
The court thereafter entered a default judgment against
Yakovi and Sam Electronics in the amount of $74,845.17 in
October 2002. In March 2005, NC Venture assigned the
judgment to Premier and Premier filed the notice of assignment
of judgment on February 9, 2010. Roughly a year and a half
later, Premier applied for and obtained renewal of the judgment
in the amount of $142,492.55.2 Notice of the renewal of judgment
was filed on January 13, 2012.

2
The 2012 application for renewal of the judgment was
served on Yakovi by mail at an address on Simpson Avenue in
Los Angeles.

4
B. Yakovi’s Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment
In December 2020—roughly eight years after renewal of
the judgment and some 18 years after the default judgment was
originally entered—Yakovi moved to vacate the entry of default
and default judgment. Yakovi contended the judgment was “void
for lack of service of process, lack of jurisdiction[,] and lack of due
process.” The motion and accompanying declarations claimed the
judgment was void because substituted service was effected at an
“incorrect address.” Specifically, Yakovi asserted that while he
was “employed” at the 429 South Broadway address until 1996,
he was employed elsewhere after that time.3
Premier opposed Yakovi’s motion to vacate the judgment.
Premier asserted the proof of service of the summons and
complaint completed by the process server established
substituted service was proper. Premier also emphasized the
nearly two decade long delay in seeking to set aside the
judgment—and the limitation that any defect in the judgment
must appear “on the face of the record”—as further reasons for

3
Yakovi declared he was employed at two addresses on 11th
Street in Los Angeles from 1998 to 2005. He also complained
Premier had used the judgment to levy his bank account in 2019
and collected approximately $19,000. Neither the motion to set
aside the judgment nor the accompanying declarations explained
the months-long delay between this apparent levy and Yakovi’s
attempt to set aside the default judgment. Yakovi also submitted
a declaration from one Yosef Cohen who claimed to be the only
manager at a business at 429 South Broadway from “at least
1998 until about 2011.” Cohen averred Yakovi was not, during
that time, an employee of the business, otherwise associated with
the business, or, to his knowledge, ever present at that address.

5
refusing to grant Yakovi any relief. Premier also asked the trial
court to take judicial notice of both the 1993 statement of
information filed with the Secretary of State listing Sam
Electronics’ address at 429 South Broadway and more recent
materials (including a 2001 Statement by Domestic Stock
Corporation filed by Sam Electronics and a January 22, 2021
Business Search – Entity Detail printout from the California
Secretary of State website) purporting to show Yakovi continued
to be associated with the 429 South Broadway address.

C. Supplemental Briefing and the Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court held an initial hearing on Yakovi’s motion to
vacate the judgment in February 2021. The court asked counsel
for Yakovi when his client “learned about this case” and counsel
professed not to know, though he did concede Yakovi knew about
the case at least as of roughly two years before when “about
$19,000 . . . was taken from an account of his.” But counsel
argued Yakovi’s delay in filing the motion to vacate the judgment
was “irrelevant to whether he was served and whether the
substitute service was valid.” The court agreed it needed to
“wrestle with[ ] if the service was proper,” and believed it may
come down to whether Premier properly relied on the statement
of information listing Yakovi as the agent for service of process at
the 429 South Broadway address. The court continued the
hearing and permitted Premier to file a sur-reply addressing the
propriety of service, specifically addressing whether Premier
attempted to serve Yakovi at his residential address before
resorting to substitute service.
Premier’s sur-reply (and accompanying declaration from a
process server) established efforts were made to serve Yakovi at a

6
residential address before relying on substitute service. More
significantly for our purposes, the supplemental brief also argued
(1) a section 473, subdivision (d) motion seeking to vacate a
facially valid judgment for improper service can only be brought
within two years of the entry of the judgment under the rule
articulated in Rogers v. Silverman (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1114
and (2) regardless, Yakovi was validly served by substitute
service at his “office,” i.e., the 429 South Broadway address where
he was registered as the agent for service of process—a role from
which he never resigned.4
The parties appeared for the continued hearing on Yakovi’s
motion to vacate the default judgment in March 2021. At the
outset of the hearing, the trial court articulated a tentative ruling
on the record: “We have additional information and declarations
that were submitted to fill in some gaps that we needed.
According to the declaration of [the process server], [Premier] did
make attempts to serve [Yakovi] at the [residential] address; that
was not clarified at the last time we were here. Also the other
information from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case also ties in
that defendant addresses for which the court can conclude that
notice was given and that service was proper. Therefore, the
default entered was proper. My tentative is to deny the motion.”

4
Premier also requested judicial notice of pages of a 2014
federal court bankruptcy filing by Yakovi’s spouse that listed the
judgment against him in this case among the unsecured
nonpriority claims. Premier contended it would be inequitable
for Yakovi to treat the judgment as valid for purposes of filing
bankruptcy but years later challenge it as invalid on service of
process grounds.

7
Yakovi argued against the court’s tentative ruling, chiefly
contending substitute service was invalid because the 429 South
Broadway address was not his “work address for years” and only
Sam Electronics, not Yakovi personally, could be faulted for the
failure to correct records listing Yakovi as the agent for service of
process at 429 South Broadway. The court responded that there
were “competing pieces of information on that. Your client is
saying, I didn’t agree to be anybody’s agent for service of process.
There’s a legal document indicating that he is. I have to weigh by
a preponderance which is more reasonable to believe.”
Premier argued, as it did in its sur-reply, that Yakovi’s
motion to vacate the judgment was time barred because the
judgment was valid on its face and an attack on the validity of
service of process relying on extrinsic evidence must be made
within a reasonable time—which Yakovi’s motion, made some 18
years after the judgment, had long exceeded. Premier also
argued its substitute service of the complaint was proper because
it relied on publicly filed documents naming Yakovi as the agent
for service of process at the 429 South Broadway address and if
those documents were incorrect, it was incumbent on Yakovi to
formally resign as the agent and correct the record.
The trial court ruled it would “stick[ ] to [its] tentative” and
denied the motion to vacate the judgment because it was “not
convinced [Yakovi] has met its burden to justify setting aside
th[e] default.”

D. Appellate Proceedings
This court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on appeal. Our
opinion did not address whether service was proper considering
all the evidence the parties submitted in the trial court. Instead,

8
relying on Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 1009, a case that followed the rule in Rogers, supra,
216 Cal.App.3d 1114, we looked only to the judgment roll
materials and held—on that basis—that Premier’s process server
made adequate attempts at personal service before resorting to
substitute service and that service was not deficient because a
copy of the summons and complaint were left with a person in
charge of what was apparently Yakovi’s usual place of business
(the “manager” who said Yakovi was “not in” when attempts at
personal service were made).
Our Supreme Court granted review and held the matter for
its decision in Hoehn, supra, 17 Cal.5th 207. As we have
mentioned, that opinion expressly disapproves Rogers, supra, 216
Cal.App.3d 1114 and its progeny and holds a section 473,
subdivision (d) motion to vacate a judgment for improper service
of process—even when made long after the judgment in
question—may rely on extrinsic evidence and is not limited to the
smaller set of materials that comprise the judgment roll. (Hoehn,
supra, at 223, 225.) The Supreme Court returned this cause to us
after Hoehn issued for our reconsideration.

II. DISCUSSION
Now considering, as Hoehn requires, the full record made
below and not just the judgment roll materials, affirmance is still
warranted. In ruling on Yakovi’s motion to vacate the judgment,
the trial court did not limit its consideration (as we did on appeal)
to the judgment roll materials—that is evident from the court’s
express consideration of the extrinsic evidence, its
acknowledgment of the need to weigh that evidence, and its
determination that “service was proper.”

9
The trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of its discretion.
(Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 301
[reviewing for abuse of discretion a ruling on a motion to vacate
judgment for defective service]; see also County of San Diego v.
Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1230 [factual findings
made in connection with a discretionary ruling on a motion to
vacate a judgment are reviewed for substantial evidence].) The
proof of service of the summons and complaint establishes the
process server made adequate attempts at personal service before
resorting to substituted service. (See, e.g., Espindola v. Nunez
(1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1389, 1392 [two or three attempts at
personal service sufficient].) The proof of service materials
combined with the supplemental information the trial court
requested about the address where service was made before it
entered the default judgment further establish that a copy of the
summons and complaint were left with a person in charge of
what was apparently Yakovi’s usual place of business at the time
(the agent for service of process statements on file with the
Secretary of State and the “manager” who said Yakovi was “not
in” when attempts at personal service were made). That is
enough under the deferential standard of review to support the
trial court’s finding that substitute service “was proper.”
(§ 415.20, subd. (b); Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742,
750-751 [substituted service properly effected where plaintiff
attempted to personally serve defendant at his place of business
on three separate occasions and then left the complaint and
summons with the office manager].)

10
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Premier is awarded
costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

11

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.