People v. Montoya CA3

CourtListener 10617818CalctappJun 26, 2025

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Filed 6/26/25 P. v. Montoya CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101366

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 13F00205)

v.

CARLITO MONTOYA,

Defendant and Appellant.

This case returns to our court for the third time after we directed the trial court to
resentence defendant Carlito Montoya in a prior appeal. (People v. Montoya (Aug. 31,
2022, C094240) [nonpub. opn.].) In this appeal, defendant contends the trial court
imposed an unauthorized fine, failed to recalculate the time he has served in custody, and
failed to correct an error in the abstract of judgment. The People contend the challenged
fine was authorized but otherwise concede the errors and identify additional errors in the
abstract of judgment. We agree with the People that the trial court properly imposed the

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parole revocation restitution fine. We order the court to recalculate defendant’s time in
custody and prepare an amended abstract of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder; one
count of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder; and one count of assault
with a firearm. For the murders, the jury found defendant personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing the victims’ deaths. For the attempted murder, the jury
found defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily
injury to the victim. The jury also found defendant personally used a firearm to commit
the assault. For each count, the jury found defendant committed the offense for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. The jury also
found true the special circumstance allegation that defendant committed multiple
murders.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for each of the murders. It also sentenced him to 82 years to life plus
19 years for the other counts and the firearm enhancements. The court imposed a
restitution fine of $10,000, plus a matching parole revocation restitution fine, and
credited defendant for the time he had served in custody.
On appeal, this court struck the jury’s gang enhancement findings and remanded
for the trial court to resentence defendant and exercise its new discretion to strike or
dismiss the firearm enhancements. (People v. Montoya (June 4, 2019, C082283)
[nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court declined to dismiss the firearm
enhancements. (People v. Montoya (Aug. 31, 2022, C094240) [nonpub. opn.].) On the
subsequent appeal, this court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for
resentencing consistent with recently amended sentencing laws. (Ibid.)
Following this most recent remand, the trial court again sentenced defendant to a
term of life in prison without the possibility of parole for each of the murders, plus 25

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years to life in prison for each firearm enhancement. For the attempted murder, the court
sentenced defendant to life in prison with the possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life in
prison for the firearm enhancement. For the assault, the court sentenced defendant to the
lower term of two years in prison, plus the lower term of three years in prison for the
firearm enhancement.
The trial court imposed a $10,000 restitution fine pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1202.4 but then stayed the fine because defendant was indigent and facing a long
period of incarceration. The court also imposed a $10,000 parole revocation restitution
fine pursuant to section 1202.45, which the court ordered suspended unless defendant’s
parole is revoked. The court did not recalculate the time defendant had served in
custody, instead ordering the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to determine
what credit he had earned.
The trial court prepared an amended abstract of judgment, listing the indeterminate
terms imposed on one form and the determinate terms imposed on a separate form. The
determinate form listed the number of days defendant had spent in custody from the
original abstract of judgment prepared in 2016.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court was not authorized to impose a parole
revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45, failed to recalculate the time he has
served in custody, and failed to correct an error on the abstract of judgment. The People
contend the parole revocation restitution fine was authorized but otherwise concede the
errors. The People also identify other purported errors in the abstract of judgment. We
agree with the People that the court properly imposed the parole revocation restitution

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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fine. We order the trial court to recalculate defendant’s time in custody and prepare an
amended abstract of judgment as explained below.
I
Parole Revocation Restitution Fine
Defendant contends section 1202.45 did not authorize the trial court to impose a
parole revocation restitution fine because his sentence includes two terms of life without
the possibility of parole. We disagree.
Section 1202.45, subdivision (a) provides: “In every case where a person is
convicted of a crime and his or her [or their] sentence includes a period of parole, the
court shall, at the time of imposing the restitution fine pursuant to subdivision (b) of
[s]ection 1202.4, assess an additional parole revocation restitution fine in the same
amount as that imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 1202.4.” A determinate
prison term imposed pursuant to section 1170 includes a period of parole. (§ 3000,
subd. (a)(1).) Thus, a determinate sentence also includes, by law, a suspended parole
revocation restitution fine. (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1075.)
Defendant concedes that the trial court imposed a determinate prison term for
assault, which “conceivably could result in release on parole,” but urges us to follow
People v. Oganesyan (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1185, which held that, when a
“sentence does not presently allow for parole and there is no evidence it ever will, no
additional restitution fine must be imposed.” We cannot follow Oganesyan because our
Supreme Court has distinguished that case, in which the trial court did not impose a
determinate term of imprisonment, from the circumstances present in this case.
(People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1075; accord People v. Baker (2021)
10 Cal.5th 1044, 1108-1109.) As our Supreme Court noted, defendant “is in no way
prejudiced by assessment of the fine, which will become payable only if he actually does
begin serving a period of parole and his parole is revoked.” (Brasure, at p. 1075.)

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Accordingly, the trial court properly imposed a suspended parole revocation
restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.45.
II
Recalculating Time In Custody And Correcting The Abstract Of Judgment
We agree with the parties that the trial court should have calculated and included
in the amended abstract of judgment the actual time defendant spent in custody between
the initial sentencing and the resentencing.
Pursuant to section 2900.1, “[w]here a defendant has served any portion of his[,
her, or their] sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is
subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment,
such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he[, she, or they] may receive
upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.” This means a court
resentencing a defendant must credit the defendant “with all actual days [the defendant]
had spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time.” (People v. Buckhalter
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37; see §§ 2900.1, 2900.5; see generally Couzens et al., Sentencing
California Crimes (The Rutter Group 2024) §§ 15:15, 15:20, 15:24, 26:6.) The updated
total of credits must then be added to the abstract of judgment. (People v. Phoenix (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125, 1129-1130; § 2900.5, subd. (d).)2
Here, the trial court directed the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to
determine defendant’s custody credits, rather than recalculating the number of days
defendant had spent in custody. The most recent amended abstract of judgment thus
specifies the same credits for time spent in custody awarded at the initial sentencing. On
remand, the trial court must calculate the number of days defendant spent in custody from

2 Conduct credits earned by defendant during his prison sentence (see §§ 2930-
2935) are the responsibility of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and need
not be added to the updated abstract. (See In re Martinez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 29, 37.)

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the initial sentencing through the date of the resentencing and prepare an amended
abstract of judgment. The court must also update the form to indicate that the new
sentence was pronounced at the June 12, 2024 resentencing hearing, not on the date of
the original sentencing hearing.
Finally, when the trial court prepares an amended abstract of judgment, it should
correct other errors identified by the parties. The “year crime committed” field on both
the determinate and indeterminate pages of the abstract of judgment should be corrected
to 2012 to match the charging document. The box next to “amended abstract” at the top
of the determinate page of the abstract of judgment should be checked. The “crime” field
for attempted murder should not say “2nd degree” because “[a]ttempted murder is not
divided into different degrees.” (People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 876.)3

3 We reject the People’s contention that the proper sentence for attempted murder is
“seven years to life.” This phrase “is common shorthand to refer to a life sentence with
minimum parole eligibility. However, the shorthand pronouncement is incorrect because
it indicates a minimum term exists, rather than a minimum parole eligibility.” (People v.
Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, 977, fn. 4.) “[S]ection 664, subdivision (a), provides a
person found guilty of an attempt to commit a willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder ‘shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility
of parole’; there is no minimum term specified under the statute.” (Ibid.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment consistent with this opinion and forward a certified copy of the
amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

/s/
ROBIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/
DUARTE, J.

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