CourtListener 10615457•People v. Cid CA2/6
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Filed 6/23/25 P. v. Cid CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B334916
(Super. Ct. No. 23CR03394)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
JAIME CID,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Jaime Cid challenges the trial court’s denial of
her Romero1 motion, arguing recent amendments to Penal Code
section 13852 apply to a trial court’s discretion to dismiss a
defendant’s prior strikes. We disagree and will affirm.
1 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero).
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant and her boyfriend were arguing in a Walmart
parking lot when appellant began slashing the tires of her
boyfriend’s car. He called 911, and appellant lunged at him with
a knife. He sustained a minor break to his skin.
Appellant was charged by information with one count of
assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) (count 1), and
one count of vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)) (count 2). She was
convicted by jury of assault with a deadly weapon and it was
found true she was armed with a weapon at the time of the crime.
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 4.421, subdivision (a)(2).) The jury
deadlocked on count 2, the court declared a mistrial as to that
count, and the prosecution moved to dismiss the count.
Appellant waived her right to a jury deciding her prior
convictions. The court found proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that she has numerous prior convictions (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421, subd. (b)(2)), served a prior term in prison (id., subd.
(b)(3)), and was on probation when the crime was committed (id.,
subd. (b)(4)).
Appellant’s motion for reduction of the charge from a felony
to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b) was
denied. Appellant’s Romero motion to dismiss the strike priors
for sentencing was denied on the basis that section 1385,
subdivision (c), does not apply to strike priors.
The trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years to life based
on the two prior strike offenses (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)), imposed a
reduced restitution fine of $1,000, and a parole revocation fine of
$1,000. Appellant was credited with 254 days of pre-sentence
custody, 254 additional credits, and 42 days of milestone credits,
for a total of 550 days credit.
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DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying her Romero motion because recent amendments to
section 1385 should not be construed in a narrow, technical sense
as applying only to enhancements, but should be interpreted as
applying to prior strikes as well. We reject this claim.
Whether section 1385, subdivision (c), applies to the court’s
decision to dismiss prior strike convictions within the meaning of
the Three Strikes law is a question of statutory interpretation we
review de novo. (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242
(Burke).) Where a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous,
a court presumes the Legislature meant what it said, and the
statute’s plain meaning controls. (People v. Canty (2004) 32
Cal.4th 1266, 1276.) “‘[W]hen a word used in a statute has a
well-established legal meaning, it will be given that meaning in
construing the statute.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Olay (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 60, 65.)
Amendments to section 1385 which took effect on January
1, 2022, provide guidance regarding the trial court’s discretion to
dismiss sentence enhancements in the furtherance of justice.
(Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 242-243.) Subdivision (c) of
section 1385 now provides, “(1) Notwithstanding any other law,
the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance
of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is
prohibited by any initiative statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its
discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and
afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove
that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to
(I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
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enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c).)
Section 1385, subdivision (c) expressly applies to the
dismissal of “an enhancement” in the furtherance of justice. The
“Three Strikes” law is not an enhancement, it is an alternate
sentencing scheme. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 527; People
v. Williams (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 733, 744.)
Citing Arden Carmichael, Inc. v. County of Sacramento
(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1070, appellant argues section 1385,
subdivision (c) contains a “latent ambiguity” we must resolve by
reading the law in a manner consistent with the Legislature’s
true intention. “‘“[A] latent ambiguity is said to exist where the
language employed is clear and intelligible and suggests but a
single meaning, but some extrinsic evidence creates a necessity
for interpretation or a choice among two or more possible
meanings.”’” (Id., at p. 1075.) Arden Carmichael cautioned,
“[o]ur duty is not to twist words to substitute our own judgment
for that of the voters; it is to determine and apply the intent of
the people . . . .” (Id., at p. 1076.) We do not conclude the
legislative history “clearly” shows lawmakers intended section
1385, subdivision (c) to apply to strikes.
As the court explained in Burke, “We presume the
Legislature was aware of, and acquiesced in, both this
established judicial definition of enhancement and the distinction
between an enhancement and an alternative sentencing scheme
such as the Three Strikes law. [Citation.] The Legislature did
not otherwise define the word ‘enhancement’ in section 1385.
Because the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we
follow its plain meaning . . . . [Citation.] The plain language of
subdivision (c) of section 1385 applies only to an ‘enhancement,’
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and the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement. We therefore
conclude that section 1385, subdivision (c)’s provisions regarding
enhancements do not apply to the Three Strikes law.” (Burke,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 243-244.)
Appellant urges us to disagree with Burke and conclude the
Legislature intended the amended section 1385 to apply to
sentencing under the Three Strikes law. We decline. The
Legislature amended section 1385 against the backdrop of settled
precedent defining the terms “enhancement” and “strike.” Yet it
expressly limited its amendment of subdivision (c) to
enhancements, without including any reference to strikes. We
presume the Legislature was aware of the legal context in which
it was operating and “acquiesced in the previous judicial
construction” of those terms. (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23
Cal.4th 82, 89.)
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
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Stephen Foley, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Bess Stiffelman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Lauren Sanchez, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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