CourtListener 10615350•In re A.M. CA3
Full text
Filed 6/23/25 In re A.M. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
----
In re A.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile C102331
Court Law.
PLACER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (Super. Ct. No. 53005636)
AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant, father of minor A.M., appeals from the jurisdiction and disposition
order of the juvenile court. His sole contention on appeal is that the order must be
reversed for failure to adequately comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian
Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). Because the juvenile court had
not made a final ICWA finding at the time of this appeal, and because the ICWA inquiry
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is still ongoing in that court, we conclude the sole claim on appeal is premature and
dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We dispense with a detailed recitation of the underlying facts and procedure as
they are unnecessary to our resolution of the limited issue on appeal. It is sufficient to
say that in July 2024, the Placer County Department of Health and Human Services
(Department) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300 dependency petition on
behalf of the minor. The juvenile court ordered the minor removed from parental
custody, adjudged him a dependent of the court, and provided reunification services for
mother. The court denied reunification services for father.
At the outset of the proceedings, the Department inquired of mother, maternal
grandmother, and father as to Indian ancestry. Mother and maternal grandmother denied
any known ancestry. Father reported that he believed he may be Native American but
was unsure as to which tribe. At the detention hearing, the juvenile court asked mother,
father, maternal grandmother, maternal grandfather, and two family friends whether they
had any information that the child was a member of or was eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe. Each responded in the negative. Based on those responses, the court stated
it found at that “time [the] ICWA does not apply.” The court explained, “So it’s an
ongoing obligation. We’re going to ask a few hundred times.” Mother and father filed
parental notification of Indian status (ICWA-020) forms indicating that they did not know
of any Indian ancestry.
On August 8, 2024, father informed the Department that his mother’s great-
grandfather was Comanche Indian. The Department attempted contact with paternal
grandfather and paternal uncle to gather more information but was unable to reach them.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
The Department contacted paternal aunt, who reported that the family has both Apache
and Comanche Indian heritage. Paternal grandmother reported that paternal grandfather
always said his family was Apache, but she had never seen any documentation of the
actual family lineage. She also reported that her Comanche Indian heritage traced back
to her grandfather. Based on this information, the Department mailed out notice of child
custody proceeding for Indian child forms (ICWA-030) to the Apache and Comanche
tribes.
At a subsequent hearing, the juvenile court asked the family whether anyone had
new information regarding the minor’s membership or eligibility for membership in an
Indian tribe. None of the family members present at the hearing—which included
mother, father, maternal aunt, maternal grandmother, maternal grandfather, a cousin, and
a great-aunt—indicated they had new information.
Following a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court
found that “[t]here’s reason to believe the child may be an Indian child” and directed the
Department “to make further inquiry.”
Father appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition order.
DISCUSSION
“The ICWA protects the interests of Indian children and promotes the stability and
security of Indian tribes by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian
children from their families, and by permitting tribal participation in dependency
proceedings. [Citations.] A major purpose of the ICWA is to protect ‘Indian children
who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.’ ” (In re A.W.
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 655, 662.) The ICWA defines an “ ‘Indian child’ ” as a child who
“is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)
“Under ICWA’s state analogue, the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-
ICWA . . . ), courts and child welfare agencies are charged with ‘an affirmative and
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continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child’ in
dependency cases.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, quoting § 224.2,
subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).) We review claims of inadequate inquiry
into a child’s Indian ancestry for substantial evidence. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); H.A. v.
Superior Court (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 956, 961; Dezi C., at p. 1134.)
Father argues the disposition order should be conditionally reversed because the
Department and the juvenile court did not comply with the inquiry and notice provisions
of the ICWA. He contends that the Department should have asked paternal grandfather
about possible Indian heritage when paternal grandfather testified at the contested
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. He also contends that “the Department did not
diligently comply with its duty of further inquiry” because the ICWA-030 forms it sent
out were deficient in several respects. For these reasons, father claims the juvenile court
could not have reasonably found the Department’s inquiry was adequate.
But the juvenile court never found that the Department’s inquiry was adequate. In
fact, in the order appealed from, the court expressly found the ICWA may apply and
directed the Department to make further inquiry. Any ICWA inquiry and notice
compliance issues are thus not yet ripe for review and father’s claim of ICWA error is
premature.
“ ‘Ripeness’ refers to the requirements of a current controversy.” (City of Santa
Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 59.) An issue is not ripe for review unless
and until it is “sufficiently concrete to allow judicial resolution even in the absence of a
precise factual context.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982)
33 Cal.3d 158, 170; see id. at pp. 170-172.) As this court explained in J.J. v. Superior
Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 447, if the juvenile court did not yet make a final ICWA
ruling at or before the challenged hearing as to whether the ICWA applies to the
proceeding, a parent’s challenge is premature. (J.J., at p. 461.) Any remarks we would
make now on the adequacy of the ICWA compliance would be advisory. (See People v.
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Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 693 [“We . . . abide by . . . a ‘ “cardinal principle of judicial
restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more” ’ ”].)
Relying on our Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th
1112, father insists that any insufficiency in the ICWA compliance requires us to
conditionally reverse the appealed order. Father, however, fails to appreciate that the
procedural posture of his appeal differs significantly from the appeal taken from
termination of parental rights in Dezi C.
Compliance with the ICWA is required before terminating parental rights.
(In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 458.) Thus, conditional reversal of an order
terminating parental rights is necessary when the juvenile court has made no final finding
whether the ICWA applied prior to terminating parental rights or where it has made an
erroneous finding as to compliance with and application of the ICWA. (See
In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1136-1139.)
Based on the record before us, the present dependency case is still ongoing, as is
ICWA compliance. Reversal of the disposition order is unnecessary to secure ICWA
compliance. (See In re S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 177; see also In re Dominick D.
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 567.) The complained of, and any other, perceived
deficiencies with the ICWA inquiry and noticing may still be brought to the juvenile
court’s attention and may be resolved during the normal course of the ongoing
dependency proceedings. (See In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 904 [ICWA claim
was premature where no final ICWA ruling was made at dispositional hearing].) Indeed,
we expect all involved parties and entities will cooperate to ensure that the ICWA
proceedings and their documentation are thorough and thus the juvenile court’s exercise
of its discretion is fully informed. (See H.A. v. Superior Court, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 965-966) [describing this court’s expectations of counsel, the juvenile court, and the
department on remand for ICWA compliance]; id. at p. 965 [explaining that the
nonforfeiture rule for ICWA inquiries “is not an invitation to sit idly by, aware of alleged
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deficiencies in ICWA compliance, while making no effort to remedy the matter in the
juvenile court proceedings”].) If at any time, a party’s counsel becomes aware that the
juvenile court has failed to make necessary findings or orders, or that the Department has
failed to make adequate inquiry under the ICWA, counsel has an obligation to promptly
bring such matters to the attention of the juvenile court. (H.A., at p. 965; see also
Williams v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 320, 330 [“ ‘Counsel should not forget
that they are officers of the court, and while it is their duty to protect and defend the
interests of their clients, the obligation is equally imperative to aid the court in avoiding
error’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
DUARTE, J.
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