People v. Serpas CA3

CourtListener 10613053CalctappJun 18, 2025

Full text

Filed 6/18/25 P. v. Serpas CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C095167

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 19FE001752)

v. OPINION ON TRANSFER

CESAR EDUARDO SERPAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury found defendant Cesar Eduardo Serpas guilty of several felonies related to
an attempted carjacking and found true some associated enhancements. The trial court
sentenced defendant to the upper term on all counts that it could and imposed the
maximum sentences on the enhancements.
In his prior appeal, defendant argued that we should vacate his sentence and
remand for the trial court to consider whether to exercise its new discretion after several
recent changes in the law, including Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill No. 567) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731), which took effect while his appeal was pending. In
an unpublished opinion, we affirmed the judgment, concluding that the trial court

1
complied with amended Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (b), in relation to one
aggravating circumstance the court relied on in sentencing defendant to the upper term,
and that the court’s consideration of additional aggravating circumstances inconsistent
with the new statutory standard was harmless error. (People v. Serpas (Oct. 2, 2023,
C095167) [nonpub. opn.] (Serpas).)
Defendant sought review in the California Supreme Court, which ordered this
court to vacate our previous opinion and reconsider the matter in light of People v. Lynch
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch) and People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416 (Salazar).
Having done so, we agree with defendant that remand for a resentencing hearing is
required.
BACKGROUND
Defendant and a codefendant approached two people getting in a car outside a
store and robbed them at gunpoint. Defendant hit one of the victims in the head with his
gun. The injured victim was able to escape into the nearby store while defendant
attempted unsuccessfully to start the car. Defendant then entered the store, fired multiple
shots, and made threats against calling the police before fleeing on foot.
Defendant was charged with six felonies: second degree robbery (§ 211—count
one); attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215, subd. (a)—count two); attempted murder
(§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)—count three); assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd.
(b)—count four); threatening a witness or victim (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)—count five); and
being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)—count eight).
Three sets of firearm enhancements were alleged: personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)) on counts one through five; personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) on
counts one through three; and intentional discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c))

1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

2
on counts one through three. It further was alleged that defendant had a prior serious
felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12.) At trial, defendant stipulated to having been convicted of a felony offense.
The jury found defendant guilty of all charges and found true all enhancement
allegations, although on count three it acquitted defendant of attempted murder, instead
finding him guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter
(§§ 664, 192, subd. (a)), and found not true any of the intentional discharge of a firearm
enhancements.
At the sentencing hearing on November 5, 2021, the trial court made several
findings before imposing a sentence. It first held a court trial and found the prior strike
allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt and denied defendant’s motion to strike the
strike, finding that “[t]here doesn’t seem to be a willingness to be rehabilitated or
certainly hasn’t shown any valuable skills since incarceration.” For this finding, the trial
court relied on a certified record of defendant’s prior strike conviction from the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
The trial court next considered defendant’s motion to stay execution of sentence
on all but one conviction under section 654. The court denied this in part, finding that
defendant’s crimes could be split into two separate acts: The robbery and the attempted
voluntary manslaughter/assault with a firearm in the store.
The trial court then explained its intent to impose the upper term sentence, saying,
“[I]f this isn’t a case for the upper[]term, then I don’t know what is, given his criminal
history, given the violence.” Specifically, the court said it was “imposing the upper[]term
for the following reasons: [California Rules of Court, rule]4.421(a)(1): The crimes
involved great violence, other acts, disclosing a high degree of viciousness or
callousness; [California Rules of Court, rule 4.421](a)(8): The manner in which the
crimes were carried out indicates planning, professionalism; [California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421](b)(1): The Defendant engaged in violent conduct, which indicates a serious

3
danger to society; [California Rules of Court, rule 4.421](b)(2): The Defendant’s prior
convictions and prior record; and [California Rules of Court, rule 4.421](b)(3): The
Defendant has served a prior prison term. [¶] So in the aggregate, the Court finds all
those sufficient to justify a[n] upper[]term. [¶] Even if the Court of Appeal were to find
that one or more of those were not—were not appropriately imposed—even—based on
even one of those factors, the Court would exercise its discretion to impose the
upper[]term.”
The trial court next discussed the enhancements. The court imposed 10 years for
the firearm enhancements, even though it had the discretion to impose less time for the
enhancements under section 12022.5, subdivision (a). It further explained that for the
section 12022.53, subdivision (b), enhancements “[E]ven if, for some reason, I was
supposed to use the [section] 12022.5[, subdivision] (a) instead of the [section 12022.]53,
I would still impose the upper[]term.” The court also considered its discretion to strike
the firearm enhancements, deciding to not exercise this discretion for similar reasons it
found the upper term appropriate, including that it found “that there are no factors in
mitigation.” It also declined to strike defendant’s section 667, subdivision (a),
enhancement “for all of the same reasons why it would not be in the interest of justice to
strike the firearm enhancements.”
The trial court then formally imposed the following sentence for a total of 38 years
four months: on count four, nine years (upper term) doubled to 18 years for the prior
strike plus 10 years for the section 12022.5, subdivision (a), firearm enhancement; on
count one, one year (one-third the middle term) doubled to two years for the prior strike
plus three years four months (one-third the middle term) for the associated section
12022.53, subdivision (b), enhancement; and five years for the prior serious felony
conviction. (§ 667, subd. (a).) The court then imposed but stayed, under section 654,
sentences on all remaining counts and enhancements.

4
DISCUSSION
At the time of defendant’s sentencing, trial courts had discretion under sections
1170 and 1170.1 to select the appropriate term if a statute prescribed a sentencing triad.
(§§ 1170, former subd. (b), 1170.1, former subd. (d).) Pursuant to Senate Bill No. 567,
section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), now provides that “the court shall, in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” The referenced exception provides that an upper
term sentence may be imposed “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the
crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Similarly, section 1170.1 now provides that a trial
court may impose the upper term for an enhancement “only when there are circumstances
in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by
the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170.1, subd. (d)(2).)
In our previous opinion, we determined that while Senate Bill No. 567 applied
retroactively to defendant’s nonfinal judgment, remand for resentencing was not required
because the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant suffered a prior
strike, and the trial court’s consideration of the other aggravating circumstances was
harmless error. (Serpas, supra, C095167.) The California Supreme Court ordered this
court to reconsider defendant’s request for resentencing in light of Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th 730 and Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th 416. Having done so, we conclude that we
must reverse defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing in compliance with
Senate Bill No. 567.

5
As explained in Lynch, “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause,
‘provides that those “accused” of a “crime” have the right to a trial “by an impartial
jury.” This right, in conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each element
of a crime be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] In the context
of California’s determinate sentencing scheme, Cunningham v. California (2007)
549 U.S. 270 . . . held that, ‘under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a
defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and
established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence.’
(Id. at p. 281.) ‘Inhering in that guarantee is an assurance that a guilty verdict will issue
only from a unanimous jury.’ ” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 742.)
“Effective January 1, 2022, Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) (hereafter
section 1170[, subdivision] (b)) was amended to prohibit imposition of an upper term
sentence unless aggravating circumstances justify that term and the facts underlying any
such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, ‘have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the
judge in a court trial.’ (§ 1170[, subdivision] (b)(2), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 731,
§ 1.3.) Allegations of prior convictions may be tried by the court alone and proven by
certified records of conviction. (§ 1170[, subdivision] (b)(3).)” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 742, fn. omitted.) This amendment has been uniformly applied
retroactively to defendants whose judgments were not final on direct appeal at the time
the statute took effect. (Id. at pp. 742, 746.)
In Lynch, our high court held “that a court reviewing a case where the former
version of section 1170[, subdivision] (b) was employed must apply the Chapman
standard of review. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).)” (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742-743.) “Accordingly, in a case where the judgment is not yet
final, a sentence imposed under former section 1170[, subdivision] (b) must be reversed

6
and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a
jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts
upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts
were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute. (§ 1170[,
subdivisions] (b)(2), (3).)” (Id. at p. 743, italics added; see also id. at p. 768.)
Here, the aggravating factors upon which the trial court relied were that the crime
involved great violence, as well as planning and professionalism, defendant engaged in
violent conduct indicating a serious danger to society, defendant’s prior convictions/prior
record, and defendant’s prior prison term. Defendant did not stipulate to the existence of
these circumstances, nor did the jury find them true beyond a reasonable doubt. There is
a certified record of conviction in the record on appeal, but that would at most render the
last two factors appropriately considered under the modified statutory framework. The
remaining three factors are subjective. Our Supreme Court has cautioned against
attempting to determine whether a jury would have found true aggravating circumstances
that require “an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts.” (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 775-776.) “ ‘ “[T]o the extent a potential aggravating
circumstance . . . rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for
a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the
jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.” ’ ”
(Id. at p. 775.) Such is the case here. Whether defendant posed a serious danger to
society, the crimes involved planning and professionalism, or the crime involved great
violence are somewhat subjective inquiries, not capable of precise determination. Any
conclusion on our part would be speculative.
We therefore cannot find the omission of a jury finding harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt as to all the aggravating facts upon which the trial court relied, and

7
defendant’s sentence must consequently be vacated and the matter remanded for full
resentencing.2 (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.)
The People argue remand is not required because “the trial court only relied on a
single aggravating circumstance.” In making this argument, the People focus on the trial
court’s statement: “[B]ased on even one of those factors, the Court would exercise its
discretion to impose the upper[]term.” The People contend this means that because at
least one of the factors would have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt—defendant’s
prior prison term—remand is unnecessary because “the trial court’s statements at
sentencing gave a clear indication that it would impose an identical upper[]term sentence
on remand.” This analysis misapplies Lynch.
The Supreme Court in Lynch analyzed “the appropriate remedy when the trial
court was not aware of the full scope of its discretionary powers at the time of the
defendant’s sentencing.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 770-771.) Under Salazar and
the earlier case People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, our Supreme Court in Lynch
determined “ ‘it is almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the
sentencing court would have done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at
the time of sentencing.’ ” (Lynch, at p. 776.) That was the case in Lynch as the trial court
there “did not make the kind of definitive statements that we have found to clearly
indicate it would not impose a lesser sentence under any circumstances.” (Id. at p. 777.)
Thus, the court found “[t]he reasoning in Gutierrez and Salazar also requires reversal of
the sentence and remand here.” (Ibid.)

2 Defendant makes additional arguments challenging his sentence. We do not
address these arguments as defendant will be entitled to make them at his full
resentencing. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [explaining the full
resentencing rule].)

8
We do not even reach the “clearly indicates” analysis under Salazar because there
was reversible error under Chapman. The Supreme Court in Lynch never indicated that
courts may bypass the Chapman analysis and rely instead on Salazar. Even though the
trial court said it would hypothetically impose the upper term with any one factor, it
ultimately said it was “imposing the upper[]term for the following reasons” and then
named five factors. As discussed above, we cannot conclude that Chapman review is
satisfied for “all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify [the]
upper term.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) The Supreme Court said plainly in
Lynch that a defendant “is entitled to a reversal and remand for resentencing
unless . . . we can conclude that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term
sentence.” (Id., at p. 775.) The Salazar analysis was an additional harmless error
analysis that “also require[d] reversal of the sentence and remand” in Lynch. (Id. at
p. 777, italics added.) Because we do not find the Chapman analysis satisfied, we do not
reach the Salazar analysis. This is also why People v. Cabada (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
1186, cited by the People does not apply here. In that case, the appellate court affirmed
an upper term sentence after finding both Chapman and Salazar satisfied. (Id. at
pp. 1193-1194 [finding “any factfinding error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”
and “the trial court’s statements clearly indicate that it would not have imposed a lesser
sentence”].) Here, we have concluded that the trial court’s actions do not pass muster
under Chapman, thus reversal and remand is required.

9
DISPOSITION
The sentence is reversed. The matter is remanded for a full resentencing and
further litigation of the aggravating circumstances and for the trial court to exercise its
discretion under section 1170, subdivision (b), as amended. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.

\s\ ,
Krause, J.

We concur:

\s\ ,
Renner, Acting P. J.

\s\ ,
Boulware Eurie, J.

10

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.