Liebovich v. Tobin CA2/2

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Filed 6/18/25 Liebovich v. Tobin CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MATTHEW LIEBOVICH et al., B333285

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BP138119)
v.

DIANE JANICE TOBIN et al.,
Individually and as Trustees,
etc.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jonathan L. Rosenbloom, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Stewart Levin, Stewart Levin; Joseph S.
Socher, Esq., and Joseph S. Socher for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Carico Glowacki Macdonald Kil & Benz, Christopher D.
Carico and William G. Benz for Defendants and Respondents.
Matthew Liebovich, individually and as successor-in-
interest to Joshua Liebovich; Andrew Liebovich; and Esther
Liebovich (appellants or Bruce’s children) appeal from a final
order entered following dismissal of appellants’ petition, filed in
probate court, alleging financial elder abuse of appellants’
grandparents, Theodore and Shirley Liebovich. The petition
alleged appellants’ aunts, Lori Gayle Robin and Diane Janice
Tobin (respondents), exploited Theodore and Shirley and caused
them to disinherit appellants.1 The trial court sustained
respondents’ demurrer to the elder abuse petition without leave
to amend on the grounds of collateral estoppel and lack of
standing. We affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
The family
Theodore and Shirley Liebovich, each born in the 1920’s,
married and had four children—Diane Janice Tobin, Lori Gayle
Robin, Stuart Jerome Liebovich, and Bruce Allen Liebovich.
Bruce had four children—Esther, Matthew, Andrew and Joshua,
who are appellants in this matter.
Initial estate planning—from 1984 through 2011
In May 1984, Theodore and Shirley executed the Liebovich
1984 Trust. (trust). Theodore and Shirley thereafter jointly

1 Because many of the persons involved in this case share the
same last name, we will use first names for clarity. No disrespect
is intended.
2 Most of this background is taken from our two prior
nonpublished opinions in this matter. (Liebovich v. Tobin
(Sept. 5, 2019, B292177) (Liebovich I) and Liebovich v. Tobin
(Aug. 26, 2021, B306184) (Liebovich II).

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executed multiple amendments to the trust, the last of which was
the Sixth Amendment to and Complete Restatement of Trust (the
sixth amendment).
The sixth amendment was executed on July 28, 2006. It
named Theodore and Shirley as both the trustors and the initial
trustees. The amendment directed each of the spouses could
alter, modify and amend the trust during their lifetimes only if
they acted jointly. After they both died, specified sums would be
donated to various charities, with the remainder of the estate to
be split equally among their four children. If one of their children
predeceased them, that child’s children would get their deceased
child’s share.
At the same time Theodore and Shirley executed the sixth
amendment, Shirley executed a “Durable Power of Attorney
(Limited)” (power of attorney). In the power of attorney, Shirley
appointed Theodore as her attorney-in-fact with regard to certain
specified actions. The power of attorney did not expressly
authorize Theodore to amend the beneficiaries of the trust or to
waive legal notice of legal proceedings.
Signing for himself and, on the basis of the power of
attorney, for Shirley, Theodore executed four more amendments
to the trust (the seventh through 10th amendments) in October
2006, April 2007, April 2010, and December 2011. These
amendments acknowledged Bruce’s death and modified the
distribution of trust assets upon Theodore and Shirley’s deaths.
Pursuant to the amendments, after specified sums were donated
to various charities, Stuart would receive a $500 monthly
stipend, and more if needed for his support, health, maintenance
and education, and Diane and Lori would split the remainder
equally. So modified, Bruce’s children received no inheritance.

3
2013 petition to reform the sixth amendment and power of
attorney
In December 2012, Theodore filed a petition to modify and
reform the sixth amendment and Shirley’s power of attorney.
Specifically, he sought (1) to amend the sixth amendment to add
language that it “‘may be modified or revoked by an attorney-in-
fact under a power of attorney,’” (2) to amend the power of
attorney to add language that “Theodore . . . shall have the
authority as [Shirley’s] attorney-in-fact to designate or change
the designation of beneficiaries to receive any property, benefit,
or contract right on [Shirley’s] death,” and (3) to make those
amendments retroactive, thereby validating the seventh through
10th amendments. The basis for the motion was scrivener’s
error. Shirley had expressed to the couple’s estate planning
lawyer during a meeting in June 2006, an unequivocal desire and
intent that Theodore be empowered to amend the trust as her
attorney-in-fact. The lawyer intended to add language to the
sixth amendment and power of attorney to effectuate Shirley’s
desire but erred in omitting that language.
Theodore served the petition on Lori, Diane, Stuart and
Bruce’s four children. Theodore served Bruce’s four children by
mailing notices to each of them at their mother’s home address.
At that time, only Joshua lived at that address, and he was 14
years old. Theodore did not serve the petition on Shirley.
Theodore served the probate court’s notice of hearing in the same
manner.
Days before the hearing, Theodore signed a waiver of notice
purporting to waive notice of the hearing on Shirley. He signed
the petition as Shirley’s attorney-in-fact.

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On April 10, 2013, the probate court issued a written order
granting Theodore’s petition reforming the sixth amendment and
power of attorney as requested and retroactively validating the
seventh through 10th amendments (the 2013 order).
Subsequent amendments and postamendment events
Relying on the power of attorney, Theodore executed four
more amendments to the 1984 trust (the 11th through 14th
amendments) before he passed away on January 7, 2014.
Shirley passed away on April 17, 2017.
The successor trustees of the 1984 trust were Diane, Lori,
and Marc Chopp, a family friend. On August 23, 2017, the
trustees sent notice of Shirley’s death to each of Bruce’s children.
Pursuant to the 14th amendment, each child was entitled to
$25,000 if they signed a release agreeing not to contest the 1984
trust. Each child was also entitled to $5,000 to hire “skilled legal
counsel to advise him or her” whether to accept their inheritance
in exchange for the release. Bruce’s children each cashed the
$5,000 checks, but declined to sign the release.
Motion to vacate 2013 order and first appeal
On March 22, 2018, Bruce’s children filed a motion to
vacate the 2013 order as void and named the trustees as
respondents. Through declarations, they asserted Theodore’s
service of process at their mother’s house was improper. They
also asserted they had not objected to the 2013 order because
none of them knew of it until Shirley’s death in 2017, when they
heard one of their cousins inherited money from Shirley. The
declarations also asserted each of Bruce’s children’s personal
belief that Lori and Diane manipulated Theodore and
subsequently “hid” Shirley from them, and it was not in their

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grandparents’ nature to deny them an inheritance. After briefing
and a hearing, the probate court denied the motion to vacate.
Bruce’s children appealed the denial of their motion to
vacate the 2013 order. (Liebovich I, supra, B292177.) This court
concluded the probate court erred in denying the motion to
vacate. Although we agreed with the probate court that Bruce’s
children were not entitled to notice, we concluded the order was
void on its face due to lack of notice to Shirley. Because Bruce’s
children had sought relief under Code of Civil Procedure section
473, subdivision (d), which provides for discretionary relief, we
remanded the matter to the probate court and directed it to
exercise its discretion and consider (1) whether Shirley’s
participation in the proceedings regarding the petition to reform
the sixth amendment and power of attorney would have led to a
different result and (2) whether Bruce’s children had been
diligent in bringing their motion to vacate.
Remand and second appeal
After the matter was remanded, the probate court issued
an order asking for briefing on whether to exercise its discretion.
In their memorandum of points and authorities in response to the
court’s briefing order, appellants argued the 2013 order was void,
thus all subsequent amendments were invalidated as a matter of
law because Shirley did not sign them. Appellants argued,
“Financial Elder Abuse remedies are available as per the
attached Petition, Exhibit 2.” Appellants attached a complete
copy of the financial elder abuse petition filed in this matter,
thereby alleging the identical allegations as the petition that is
the subject of this appeal.
The elder abuse petition, which was attached to the
memorandum of points and authorities filed in connection with

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the remand briefing, made allegations that “Aunts, the
Respondents, [implemented] their plan to wrest the entire estate
of Theodore and Shirley from their own brothers . . . .” They
alleged the aunts, Diane and Lori, “control[led] and
manipulate[d] Theodore, while letting nature take its course with
Shirley, who had Alzheimer’s and was mentally incompetent
directly after signing the subject Sixth Amendment and
Restatement of Trust.” Appellants included allegations the aunts
“isolated the Trustors from their own grandchildren.” Appellants
alleged when it came to estate planning, “Lori and Diane were in
control, not Theodore and certainly not Shirley.”
As to the second factor, whether appellants were diligent in
bringing their motion to set aside the 2013 order, appellants
argued the defense of laches should not apply as there was no
time limit on the motion they made.
Respondents filed an opposition to appellants’
memorandum.
After briefing and oral arguments, on December 18, 2019,
the probate court issued an order declining to vacate the 2013
order. The court noted it had been directed to exercise its
discretion to consider “(1) whether Shirley’s participation in the
proceedings regarding the petition to reform the Sixth
Amendment and power of attorney would have led to a different
result . . . requiring showing of ‘a meritorious case’ to obtain
equitable relief from a judgment under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473 . . . and (2) whether [appellants] were diligent in
bringing their motion to dismiss . . . .”
As to the second issue, the court found appellants had
notice of the 2013 proceedings in early 2014 when one of their
attorneys requested and received certain documents. At that

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time Shirley was still living, and the trust was therefore
revocable. Despite notice of the status of the trust, no petitions
were filed at that time. The court concluded, “As the [appellants]
received copies of the Trust and its Amendments and failed to
challenge them until almost four years after Shirley’s death, the
trustees were deprived of the readiest means of proving Shirley’s
intent and was [sic] necessarily prejudiced thereby.”
As to the question of whether Shirley’s participation in the
proceedings would have led to a different result, the court found,
“Shirley’s ready participation in the Sixth Amendment and
signing of the [power of attorney] leads this court to the
conclusion that Shirley was very aware of her role as Trustor.
She was represented by an attorney who talked to her separately
from her husband and she apparently understood the proposed
terms of the trust and her responsibilities as Trustor. . . .
Moreover, Shirley was not opposed to disinheriting the
grandchildren as she did so in disinheriting her grandchild by her
son Stuart. For the above stated reasons, the court finds that
Shirley’s participation in the petition to reform the Sixth
Amendment and power of attorney would not have led to a
different result.”
The court therefore exercised its discretion to not overturn
the 2013 order.
Appellants appealed, and on August 26, 2021, this court
affirmed the order of the probate court declining to overturn the
2013 order. (Liebovich II, supra, B306184). We had “no doubt
that the probate court acted well within its discretion in declining
to vacate the void 2013 order.” (Id. at p. *18.) We explained,
“With regard to the first factor, the question was whether
[appellants] could articulate a ‘sufficiently meritorious’ basis for

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concluding that the probate court would not accept Shirley’s
lawyer’s claim of a scrivener’s error if the 2012 petition were
litigated now.” (Ibid.) In analyzing this question, the court
analyzed the sworn testimony of Shirley’s lawyer “attesting to
Shirley’s actual intent” and weighed it against “the inference
proffered by [appellants] that Shirley must not have intended to
allow Theodore to alter the Trust on her behalf because
Theodore’s decision to file the 2012 petition rather than have
Shirley re-execute amended versions of the sixth amendment and
power of attorney meant that Shirley’s position must have been
unfavorable to his.” (Ibid.) We determined the probate court did
not abuse its discretion in giving greater weight to the firsthand
evidence. (Id. at p. *20.) We further determined the probate
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that appellants
“were not reasonably diligent and that their lassitude prejudiced
the trustees.” (Ibid.)3
The elder abuse petition in the present matter
On February 11, 2020, during the pendency of Liebovich II,
appellants filed the instant petition against respondents in their
individual and cotrustee capacities, and against Chopp as
cotrustee. The petition contains two causes of action: (1) for
financial elder abuse and (2) for a constructive trust. Appellants
alleged that starting in 2006, Theodore and Shirley suffered from
mental limitations that restricted their ability to carry out
normal activities and protect their rights, and that Lori and
Diane deliberately sought to take advantage of their parents’
vulnerabilities to their own ends. Appellants sought a

3 We denied appellants’ petition for rehearing on
September 13, 2021. The California Supreme Court declined to
hear appellants’ petition for review on November 10, 2021.

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declaration that the 2006 restatement and amendment of the
1984 Liebovich Trust is the only valid trust document, and
sought to invalidate the seventh through 14th amendments to
the trust. The petition contained language assuming the 2013
order would be invalidated.4
On July 15, 2022, appellants filed a notice of withdrawal of
their elder abuse petition and the claims against the trustees but
maintained their financial elder abuse claims against
respondents in their individual capacities.
Respondents’ demurrer to the financial elder abuse
petition
On March 20, 2023, respondents demurred to the elder
abuse petition arguing it was barred by the preclusive effect of
prior orders with respect to the seventh through 10th
amendments, and appellants lacked standing with respect to the
11th through 14th amendments.
Appellants opposed the motion, arguing the claims in the
petition were independent of the issues raised in the motion to
vacate the 2013 order and that the 2013 order did not have a
preclusive effect over the elder abuse claims.
The demurrer was heard on June 9, 2023, and taken under
submission. On July 31, 2023, the court issued a written order
sustaining respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend.

4 For example, the petition states, “This Petition presumes
that the Probate court will invalidate April 2013 Order that
validated Theodore’s right to make amendments to the Trust on
behalf of Shirley and validating Theodore’s right to make certain
amendments after 2006, based upon CCP 473(d), following
Remittitur from the Appellate Court.”

10
The court determined the issues already decided in the
proceeding would bar appellants’ claims under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. The court held appellants “had opportunity to
challenge, and did challenge, the 2013 Order already.” Along
with that challenge, the validity of the seventh through tenth
amendments was already decided. Further, appellants “have not
shown a financial or pecuniary interest in effectively reverting
the Trust back to the tenth amendment.” The court concluded:
“The Court sustains the demurrer as to both claims on the
ground that, insofar they [sic] challenge the validity of the
seventh through tenth amendments, the challenges are barred by
collateral estoppel and, insofar as they challenge the later
amendments, [appellants] fail to plead sufficient standing. The
Court does not believe these defects can be cured by amendment.”
The court signed and entered a final order on February 1,
2024, denying appellants’ petition with prejudice. Appellants
appealed.5

DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
We review a ruling sustaining a demurrer de novo,
exercising independent judgment as to whether the complaint
states a cause of action as a matter of law. (Kan v. Guild
Mortgage Co. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 736, 740.) “We give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, assuming that all properly
pleaded material facts are true, but not assuming the truth of

5 Appellants’ notices of appeal were dated September 27 and
September 28, 2023. However, we treat the appeal as appealing
from the February 1, 2024 order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.104(d).)

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contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (Ibid.) We may
properly “‘take judicial notice of a party’s earlier pleadings and
positions as well as established facts from both the same case and
other cases.’” (Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 336, 344.)
We need not accept the trial court’s reasons for sustaining
the demurrer, “as it is the ruling, not the rationale, that is
reviewable.” (Kan v. Guild Mortgage Co., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th
at p. 740.)
II. Res judicata and collateral estoppel
A. Res judicata, or claim preclusion
“The claim preclusion doctrine, formerly called res judicata,
‘prohibits a second suit between the same parties on the same
cause of action.’” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 91.) “Claim preclusion, the ‘“‘primary
aspect’”’ of res judicata, acts to bar claims that were, or should
have been, advanced in a previous suit involving the same
parties.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813,
824 (DKN Holdings).)
“Claim preclusion ‘prevents relitigation of the same cause
of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in
privity with them.’” (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.)
“Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves (1) the same
cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final
judgment on the merits in the first suit.” (Ibid.) “If claim
preclusion is established, it operates to bar relitigation of the
claim altogether.” (Ibid.)
In determining whether two proceedings involve identical
causes of action for the purposes of claim preclusion, “California
courts have ‘consistently applied the “primary rights” theory.’”

12
(Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 797
(Boeken).) For the purposes of claim preclusion, “The cause of
action is the right to obtain redress for a harm suffered,
regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory . . .
advanced.” (Id. at p. 798.) “‘Even where there are multiple legal
theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury
gives rise to only one claim for relief. “Hence a judgment for the
defendant is a bar to a subsequent action by the plaintiff based
on the same injury to the same right, even though he presents a
different legal ground for relief.”’” (Ibid.) “When two actions
involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm,
they generally involve the same primary right.” (Ibid.)
Claim preclusion also bars claims that could have been
raised in the original suit. (Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11
Cal.App.5th 1180, 1191; Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Court
(1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 813, 821 [“Res judicata bars ‘not only the
reopening of the original controversy, but also subsequent
litigation of all issues which were or could have been raised in the
original suit.’”].)
B. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion
“Issue preclusion, the ‘“‘secondary aspect’”’ [of the res
judicata doctrine] historically called collateral estoppel, describes
the bar on relitigating issues that were argued and decided in the
first suit.” (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.)
“Issue preclusion prohibits the relitigation of issues argued
and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises
different causes of action.” (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 824.) “Under issue preclusion, the prior judgment conclusively
resolves an issue actually litigated and determined in the first
action.” (Ibid.)

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“Issue preclusion differs from claim preclusion in two ways.
First, issue preclusion does not bar entire causes of action.
Instead, it prevents relitigation of previously decided issues.
Second, unlike claim preclusion, issue preclusion can be raised by
one who was not a party or privy in the first suit.” (DKN
Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.) “In summary, issue
preclusion applies (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical
issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first
suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit
or one in privity with that party.” (Id. at p. 825.)6
III. Appellants’ claims are barred under the doctrine of
res judicata or claim preclusion
Appellants’ financial elder abuse claims are barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion. As set forth in more detail below,
appellants’ financial elder abuse petition involves the same
primary right as that involved in their prior petition to void the
2013 order. It also involves the same parties and resulted in a
final judgment on the merits.
“Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves (1) the
same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final
judgment on the merits in the first suit.” (DKN Holdings, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 824.) “If claim preclusion is established, it
operates to bar relitigation of the claim altogether.” (Ibid.)
There is no dispute that the parties to the 2019 proceeding
are the same as the parties to the present matter. We discuss
each of the remaining elements of claim preclusion below.

6 In keeping with the Supreme Court, we use the terms claim
preclusion and issue preclusion in this opinion.

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A. Same cause of action
1. Primary rights analysis
“To determine whether two proceedings involve identical
causes of action for purposes of claim preclusion, California
courts have ‘consistently applied the “primary rights” theory.’”
(Boeken, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 797.) “When two actions
involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm,
they generally involve the same primary right.” (Id. at p. 798.) A
cause of action is the “right to obtain redress for a harm suffered,
regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory . . .
advanced.” (Ibid.)
Appellants’ initial petition in the probate court sought to
vacate the 2013 order as void. Through the 2013 order, the
probate court modified the power of attorney to permit Theodore
to act as Shirley’s attorney-in-fact to designate or change
beneficiaries, and retroactively validated the seventh through
10th amendments, which collectively acknowledged Bruce’s death
and modified the trust to disinherit appellants.
Appellants’ initial petition to vacate the 2013 order
asserted faulty service of process. However, it also attached
declarations, including the declaration of Matthew asserting
“both of my aunts manipulated and controlled my elderly and ill
grandfather to alter the life-long commitment of my
grandparents . . . against [Theodore’s] will, and certainly against
the will of my grandmother Shirley.”
While the Court of Appeal reversed on the ground of lack of
service to Shirley, the Court of Appeal made it clear that upon
remand the probate court was to determine “whether Shirley’s
participation in the proceedings regarding the petition to reform
the Sixth Amendment and power of attorney would have led to a

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different result.” (Liebovich I, supra, B292177, citing Rappleyea
v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 982 [requiring showing of a
“meritorious case” to obtain equitable relief under Code Civ.
Proc., § 473].)
Upon remand, appellants argued, among other things, that
all trust amendments and orders based upon the 2013 order are
void. In other words, appellants sought the same remedy they
seek here—a declaration that the amendments divesting them of
their inheritance are void. Appellants specifically raised the
financial elder abuse claims, stating “Financial Elder Abuse
remedies are available as per the attached Petition, Exhibit 2.”
Attached as exhibit 2 was the identical petition filed to initiate
this matter.
As illustrated by the briefing described above, the question
of whether Shirley’s participation in the proceedings resulting in
the 2013 order would have led to a different result necessarily led
to appellants’ allegations of financial elder abuse. In arguing the
seventh through 10th amendments went against Shirley’s will,
appellants set forth their claims that both Shirley and Theodore
were manipulated by Lori and Diane.7 The probate court
implicitly rejected these claims, finding “Shirley was very aware

7 Because appellants’ allegations concerning elder abuse in
the 2019 proceedings concerned both Shirley and Theodore, we
reject appellants’ suggestion that even if the prior litigation
resolved all possible issues of elder abuse against Shirley,
Theodore’s own rights to be free from abuse were not addressed.
On the contrary, they were raised and considered by the probate
court in denying appellants’ efforts to void the 2013 order. For
this reason, we also need not address the parties’ competing
arguments concerning whether the allegations as to Theodore are
barred by the statute of limitations.

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of her role as Trustor” and was “represented by an attorney who
talked to her separately from her husband and she apparently
understood the proposed terms of the trust and her
responsibilities as Trustor.” These factual findings do not leave
room for appellants’ suggestion of financial elder abuse as to
Shirley during the time preceding the 2013 order. Shirley’s
competent entrustment of her wishes to Theodore further
undermines appellants’ suggestion of elder abuse leading up to
the 2013 order. As the court noted in its 2023 order sustaining
respondents’ demurrer in this matter, appellants “had
opportunity to challenge, and did challenge, the 2013 Order
already.” Appellants had no financial interest in any later
amendments not encompassed by the 2013 order.8
The probate court set forth in its order declining to void the
2013 order a brief history of the proceedings, noting that
following remand “the attorneys were ordered to file
Memorandum of Points and Authorities . . . and an order to show
cause hearing was set . . . wherein oral arguments were
presented.” The court further noted it rendered its decision only
after “[h]aving considered the parties’ memorandums and oral
arguments and reviewed the petitions, objections, [and]
declarations . . . .” We credit the court’s own affirmation that it
read the documents presented to it, including appellants’
proposed petition regarding financial elder abuse. Although

8 Appellants do not challenge the probate court’s
determination that they had no standing to challenge the 11th
through 14th amendments due to their previous disinheritance.
Instead, they argue they have standing to challenge the seventh
through 10th amendments (which were retroactively validated in
2013) disinheriting them.

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appellants’ claims of financial elder abuse were not specifically
mentioned in the order declining to void the 2013 order, we
presume the probate court considered such claims, as they were
before the court at the time. “All intendments and presumptions
are indulged to support [the judgment] on matters as to which
the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.”
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.). Per its
own order, the probate court considered appellants’ claims of
financial elder abuse in reaching its decision declining to void the
2013 order.
Appellants argue that the 2019 order only addressed
whether the 2013 order should have been set aside due to lack of
notice to Shirley. However, appellants concede that within this
topic, the probate court was required to consider whether
Shirley’s participation in the proceedings would have led to a
different result. Appellants raised the issue of financial elder
abuse, and set forth their allegations of abuse against both
Shirley and Theodore, in an effort to convince the probate court
that the result would have been different with Shirley’s
participation. The probate court expressly acknowledged its
consideration of these claims in its order declining to void the
2013 order.
Appellants acknowledge they made reference to elder abuse
in their postappeal memorandum of points and authorities before
the probate court. Appellants argue the references to elder
abuse were ancillary to the issues and arguments before the court
in 2019. They argue these references to elder abuse do not mean
the issue was “actually litigated” for the purposes of issue
preclusion, or collateral estoppel. However, as set forth above, we
rely on the doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, to bar

18
appellants’ current claims. Under the doctrine of claim
preclusion, or res judicata, appellants are barred from asserting
any claim that could have been litigated in the original suit.
(Thompson v. Ioane, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 1191; Torrey
Pines Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 821.)
Appellants raised the elder abuse issue in arguing the 2013
order—including all the amendments it encompassed—should
have been void. Although appellants raised the issue, they
apparently failed to focus the court’s attention on this issue or
pursue it during the proceedings. This does not prevent
application of the doctrine of claim preclusion, which applies to
issues that were or could have been raised.
Appellants further contend the elder abuse issues could not
have been litigated in the 2019 proceedings because those
proceedings were limited to determining the intentions of Shirley
at the time of the execution of the power of attorney in 2006 and
whether Shirley’s participation in 2013 would have made a
substantial difference in the result.
The probate court was not limited to these questions in
deciding the question of whether the 2013 order should be voided.
This court directed the probate court to “consider, among other
relevant factors, (1) whether Shirley’s participation in the
proceedings regarding the petition to reform the Sixth
Amendment and power of attorney would have led to a different
result . . . and (2) whether plaintiffs were diligent in bringing
their motion to dismiss.” (Liebovich I, supra, B292177, italics
added.) Appellants raised the issue of elder abuse in arguing the
2013 should be considered void. They are precluded from raising
it a second time against the same parties seeking the same
result.

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2. The elder abuse claims are not “related” claims,
but address the same primary right
Appellants take the position that the elder abuse claims are
related, but not the same. Appellants cite Friedman Prof.
Management Co., Inc. v. Norcal Mutual Ins. Co. (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 17, 26, for the proposition that “claims can be
‘related’ without being subject to a res judicata defense.”
(Capitalization and italics omitted.) Appellants seek to narrow
the issue determined in the 2019 proceedings, arguing the 2013
order simply adjudicated whether Shirley had intended to include
Theodore’s ability to modify the beneficiaries of the trust when
she initially executed the power of attorney and the sixth
amendment. Appellants ignore that the later proceedings, in
2019, seeking to void the 2013 order, had a greater scope,
including whether the notice irregularity was prejudicial. The
question of whether Shirley’s participation in the 2013
proceedings would have made a difference opened the
proceedings to appellants’ claims of elder abuse.
The cases appellants cite are distinguishable. Estate of
Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 791 involved a widow’s action
against her deceased husband Frank’s estate for her share of the
estate. As part of the action, she claimed Frank’s daughter
(Barbara) by a previous marriage was liable for financial abuse of
Frank. Following trial and appeal of that action, in which the
widow was awarded a portion of Frank’s estate, Barbara filed an
action claiming the widow committed financial elder abuse
against Frank. The widow argued that matter was res judicata,
as she had won the prior action and was determined to be an
omitted spouse. The Dito court held the primary right in the first
action—whether the widow was an omitted spouse—was

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different from the primary right in the second action—whether
the widow committed financial elder abuse against Frank. The
court explained: “The financial elder abuse allegations have no
bearing upon the determination of whether [the widow was] an
omitted spouse entitled to receive a share of Frank’s estate
pursuant to [law].” (Id. at p. 802.) The court noted, “even if the
elder abuse issue had been raised in the prior proceeding, it
would have been improper for the court to rely on a
determination that [the widow] committed financial elder abuse
as the basis for denying her entitlement to a share of the estate.”
(Ibid.)
Here, in contrast, the allegations of financial elder abuse
were relevant to the question of whether the 2013 order should be
declared void. Appellants properly raised these allegations in
their efforts to convince the probate court to declare the 2013
order void. Had the probate court been convinced that financial
elder abuse took place, it would undoubtedly have affected the
probate court’s decision as to whether to void the 2013 order. The
allegations of elder abuse were relevant to the question of
whether Shirley’s participation in the proceedings would have
changed the outcome.
Hight v. Hight (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 498 is also
distinguishable. It presented one of the “‘rare cases’” where “‘a
judgment may not be res judicata.’” (Id. at p. 503.) Although a
prior proceeding had been brought by the State of Colorado on
behalf of the former wife against her former husband for child
support, she was not present at the prior proceedings and was
only a nominal party. (Id. at pp. 503–504.) She had no control
over the proceedings, had no part in the request for dismissal or
failure to appeal, and her evidence as to her husband’s

21
affirmative defense was never heard. (Id. at p. 505.) Such
circumstances do not exist here, where appellants prosecuted the
2019 action to void the 2013 order, had every opportunity to
present their arguments, and appealed the unfavorable decision.
Dunkin v. Boskey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 171 (Dunkin), cited
for the first time in appellants’ reply brief, held that an earlier
judgment dismissing a man’s declaratory relief action to establish
paternity did not preclude his later action for breach of contract
brought against the woman who had promised him parentage,
custody, and visitation rights to her child. The Dunkin court
noted that in evaluating claim preclusion, “[w]e must compare
the two actions, looking at the rights which are sought to be
vindicated and the harm for which redress is claimed.” (Id. at
p. 182.) “‘Reference must be made to the pleadings and proof in
each case.’” (Ibid.)
Considering those factors, the Dunkin court found the
action before it for breach of contract did not assert the same
primary right as the appellant’s prior action in family law court
to establish paternity. The appellant previously sought to
establish that he was the legal father of the child, and resolution
of the enforceability of the contract was unnecessary to the
court’s judgment. Thus, the prior judgment did not bar the action
at issue. (Dunkin, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 182.)
Here, in contrast, we have found appellants’ petition for
financial elder abuse asserts the same primary right as the 2019
proceedings to void the 2013 order. Through the present elder
abuse allegations, appellants seek to void the 2013 order, as well
as the seventh through 10th amendments to the trust.
Appellants sought the same thing in 2019, through their motion
to vacate the 2013 order. They had the opportunity to raise, and

22
did raise, their current allegations of financial elder abuse. Thus,
this matter is distinguishable from Dunkin.
Similarly, in George v. California Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1475, the two actions at issue
involved two separate primary rights. A public employee
appealed disciplinary actions to the State Personnel Appeals
Board, then later filed a civil suit for retaliation under the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The court
explained, “The primary right protected by the state civil service
system is the right to continued employment, while the primary
right protected by FEHA is the right to be free from invidious
discrimination and from retaliation for opposing discrimination.”
(Id. at p. 1483.)
Here, appellants have challenged the same order twice in
the same court. They seek to vindicate the same primary right—
to be free of the effects of trust amendments allegedly undertaken
without the trustors’ full awareness or agreement. Appellants
raised the elder abuse claims in the prior proceeding, as they
were relevant. Under the circumstances, the primary right at
issue is not merely related, but identical.
B. The 2019 order declining to void the 2013 order
is final, valid, and on the merits
The 2019 order declining to void the 2013 order was
appealed, and affirmed, on appeal. The Supreme Court declined
to consider it. It is therefore final, valid, and on the merits. As
set forth above, appellants raised, and the probate court
considered, appellants’ claims of financial elder abuse during

23
those proceedings. The probate court implicitly rejected those
claims.9

DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Each side is to bear their own costs
of appeal.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.

9 We reject appellants’ arguments that the 2013 order was
void, and a void order cannot be res judicata. The probate court
declined to void the 2013 order, and that decision was affirmed on
appeal. Further, the subject of the current matter was previously
litigated during the 2019 proceedings, and there is no question
that the 2019 order is valid and final.

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