Wald v. Martin CA2/6

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Filed 6/16/25 Wald v. Martin CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

JAMES WALD et al., 2d Civ. No. B335960
(Cons. w/ B340328)
Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants (Super. Ct. No.
and Respondents, 2023CUPP012195)
(Ventura County)
v.

TRAVIS EDWARD MARTIN,

Defendant, Cross-
Complainant and Appellant.

Travis Edward Martin appeals an order granting a special
motion to strike his cross-complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP
statute (Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 425.16). Appellant also challenges an
award of attorney fees and costs.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.
We will reverse the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion
as to the menacing-duress cause of action. Accordingly, we will
also reverse the order awarding attorney fees and costs. On
remand, the trial court will determine whether respondents are
entitled to attorney fees and costs in connection with their anti-
SLAPP motion and on appeal and, if so, in what amount.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2022, a jury convicted appellant of seven counts
of lewd acts upon a child, P.W. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), as
well as one count each of using a minor for sex acts (id., § 311.4,
subd. (c)) and possession of child pornography (id., § 311.11, subd.
(a)). The court sentenced him to a total prison term of 610 years
to life. Subsequently, P.W., her parents James and Natalie
Wald2, and a related corporation filed a complaint alleging
various causes of action related to appellant’s criminal conduct
and alleged “smear campaign” against the Walds. Appellant filed
a cross-complaint against the Walds and P.W. alleging
negligence, menacing-duress, conspiracy,3 intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and defamation.
As to negligence, appellant alleged the Walds knew
appellant “was a registered sex offender for orally copulating a
girl under 13.” Nevertheless, they “would provide P.W. directly
to [appellant] once or twice a week knowing she was alone with
him for hours, sometimes all day.” Appellant asserted the Walds

2 We refer to James and Natalie collectively as “the Walds.”

Due to their shared surname, for clarity we refer to each
individually by their first name.

3 Appellant does not challenge the court’s striking of the

conspiracy cause of action. Thus, we do not address it.

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owed him a duty of care and “failed to take reasonable steps to
implement safeguards to protect [him] from being accused of
sexual assault. Without the means and opportunity of alone time
directly provided by [the Walds], accusations of abuse wouldn’t
have been possible.” Appellant claimed that because of this
negligence, he “has been sentenced to life in prison, suffering
physical, emotional and financial damage.”
Appellant asserted “MENACING-DURESS” based on
Natalie’s use of “threats, intimidation and blackmail to extort
monetary compensation from [him].” Appellant alleged Natalie
“used her detailed knowledge” about his prior conviction and fear
of returning to prison “to force [him] to pay her children’s private
school tuition and finance her lavish lifestyle . . . .” Appellant
sought “recovery of all funds paid and laid out under duress and
menace by Natalie Wald according to proof.”
Regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress,
appellant alleged Natalie “for years used the looming threat of
prison to emotionally abuse” him. Appellant claimed he “lived in
a constant state of fear from the threat Natalie would call the
police on him.” He further alleged the Walds “for the purposes of
pure selfish greed sent [appellant] to prison so they could get
complete control of the company from [him]. Life time [sic] loss of
liberty and loss of relationships is the ultimate intentional
emotional abuse.”
As to defamation, appellant alleged the Walds and P.W.
“have publicly slandered [him] stating as fact that he sexually
molested P.W.” Appellant also claimed he “was libelled [sic] in
statements he raped and sodomized P.W. This statement was
sent in a letter to [appellant’s] friends” to disrupt his friendships.

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Appellant alleged his criminal case lacked “a single allegation,
charge, or conviction of penetration . . . .”
The Walds and P.W. filed a motion to strike the cross-
complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 425.16). The
trial court granted the motion. The court later awarded attorney
fees and costs totaling $14,037.27. (§ 425.16, subd. (c).)
DISCUSSION
General Legal Principles
The anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public
participation) statute “authorizes a special motion to strike a
claim ‘arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue.’” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 871, 884 (Wilson); § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
By statute, such acts in furtherance include: “(1) any
written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,
executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review
by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right
of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e).)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step
process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of

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establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e]
from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.”
(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) “A defendant satisfies the first step of
the analysis by demonstrating that the ‘conduct by which
plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four
categories described in subdivision (e) [of section 425.16]’
[citation], and that the plaintiff’s claims in fact arise from that
conduct.” (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6
Cal.5th 610, 620.) “‘If the defendant carries its burden, the
plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least “minimal
merit.”’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff fails to meet that burden, the
court will strike the claim.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on the anti-
SLAPP motion. (Doe v. Ledor (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 731, 741.)
Mixed Causes of Action
A so-called “‘“mixed cause of action”’ . . . rests on allegations
of multiple acts, some of which constitute protected activity and
some of which do not.” (Bonni v. St. Joesph Health System (2021)
11 Cal.5th 995, 1010.) Courts should not attempt to ascertain the
“essence or gist of a so-called mixed cause of action . . . .” (Id. at
p. 1012.) Instead, they “should analyze each claim for relief—
each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there
may be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to determine
whether the acts are protected . . . .” (Id. at p. 1010.) But
“[a]ssertions that are ‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ are not
subject to section 425.16. [Citations.] Allegations of protected
activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim
for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.”
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 394.)

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“In short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should
consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions
by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form
the basis for liability.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.)
Negligence
“To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff
must show that the ‘defendant had a duty to use due care, that
[the defendant] breached that duty, and that the breach was the
proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” (Brown v. USA
Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213.)
In his cross-complaint, appellant alleged negligence based
on the Walds’ sending P.W. to be alone with appellant, a
registered sex offender. This conduct, by itself, does not appear
to constitute protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision
(e) (§ 425.16(e)). However, the cross-complaint implicitly framed
the duty and breach in terms of sexual assault accusations. The
cross-complaint alleged the Walds failed to take reasonable steps
“to protect [appellant] from being accused of sexual assault.”
Similarly, it indicated the “accusations of abuse” would not have
been possible without the Walds’ conduct—in other words, that
the Walds’ conduct caused the accusations. But accusations of
abuse from the Walds and P.W.—both to law enforcement and at
trial—fall squarely within section 425.16(e). Those accusations
were not incidental to the negligence claim. Accordingly, this
cause of action arises from protected activity.
Appellant offers no substantive argument as to the anti-
SLAPP analysis’s second step for any of his claims. Therefore, he
has forfeited any argument his claims have minimal merit under
the second step. (See In re Marriage of Carlisle (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 244, 255; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1).)

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Menacing-Duress
“Civil Code sections 1566, 1567, and 1570 establish a right
to rescission in cases in which a person’s consent to a transaction
was obtained by ‘menace’: threats of confinement, of unlawful
violence to the person or his or her property, or of injury to a
person’s character. This is effectively the civil version of
extortion.” (Tran v. Nguyen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 523, 525
(Tran).) Although appellant denominates this cause of action as
menacing-duress rather than simply menace, section 425.16’s
application does not depend on such labels. (See Moriarity v.
Laramar Management Corp. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 125, 133.)
Respondents have failed to carry their first-step burden of
demonstrating the activity underlying this claim “is protected by
the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
This claim is based on Natalie allegedly threatening to report
appellant’s misconduct to extract money from him. Such de facto
“threats of imprisonment . . . in effect . . . necessarily [would be]
threats of injury to the character of [appellant], and consequently
a menace.” (Morill v. Nightingale (1892) 93 Cal. 452, 456
(Morill); Tran, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 530-531.) Natalie’s
alleged statements were not made in an official proceeding, in
connection with an issue then under official review, or publicly.
Nor do the alleged statements fall within section 425.16(e)(4)’s
catchall.
Our Supreme Court has articulated a two-step inquiry for
that catchall provision: “‘First, we ask what “public issue or . . .
issue of public interest”’ is implicated by the challenged activity.
[Citation.] Second, we look to the ‘functional relationship’
between the challenged activity and the public issue it implicates,
and ask whether the activity contributed to public discussion of

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that issue.” (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1246
(Geiser); FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
133, 149-150 (FilmOn).) Courts must consider both content and
context. (FilmOn, at p. 149.) Contextual factors include “the
identity of the speakers or participants,” the “location and
audience,” and the “purpose and timing.” (Geiser, at p. 1253.) In
certain cases, “it may be more efficient to look to the whole
context from which the conduct underlying the lawsuit arises,
rather than attempting to parse which considerations fall under
which of FilmOn’s two steps.” (Id. at p. 1256.)
Here, the alleged statements underlying the menace claim
essentially functioned as a promise not to speak publicly in
exchange for money. The alleged statements did not contribute
to or participate in a public discourse. Respondents’ attempts to
relegate or discount this claim’s fundamental extortionary
character are unavailing. The menace claim does not arise from
activity the anti-SLAPP statute protects.
Natalie’s subsequent report to law enforcement, which
qualifies as protected activity, does not propagate backward in
time to bring the alleged menace within section 425.16(e).
Moreover, “[u]nder that kind of menace which consists in a threat
of injury to the character of a person, it is entirely immaterial
whether such person is guilty or innocent of the crime to be
charged.” (Morill, supra, 93 Cal. at p. 456.) And although the
cross-complaint relays a portion of Natalie’s testimony, that
testimony was “just evidence of liability” and not itself “the wrong
complained of . . . .” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.)
Appellant mistakenly relies upon Flatley v. Mauro (2006)
39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley), where the Court concluded the anti-
SLAPP statute did not apply because the communications at

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issue “constituted criminal extortion as a matter of law . . . .” (Id.
at p. 305.) But “the Flatley exception applies only in ‘narrow
circumstance[s]’ where ‘either the defendant concedes, or the
evidence conclusively establishes’ illegality as a matter of law.”
(Flickinger v. Finwall (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 822, 832.) “‘If . . . a
factual dispute exists about the legitimacy of the defendant’s
conduct, it cannot be resolved within the first step but must be
raised by the plaintiff in connection with the plaintiff’s burden to
show a probability of prevailing on the merits.’” (City of
Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424; see also Flatley,
at p. 316.)
Here, no concession exists, and the evidence does not
conclusively establish extortion as a matter of law. The evidence
consists of little more than appellant’s claim that extortion
occurred. Natalie did not concede to extortion merely by
submitting a declaration with an attached letter, purportedly
sent by appellant, that accused Natalie of allowing abuse to occur
in exchange for financial benefit.
Although the Flatley exception does not apply, respondents
have not satisfied their burden at the first step of the anti-SLAPP
analysis. Thus, we need not proceed to the second. The trial
court erred in striking this claim under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
The elements of IIED are: “‘“(1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional
distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional
distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. . . .”’”
(Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)

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The IIED cause of action arises from protected speech.
First, appellant claimed Natalie “used the looming threat of
prison to emotionally abuse [him],” and that he “lived in a
constant state of fear from the threat Natalie would call the
police on him.” However, Natalie’s report to law enforcement
regarding appellant’s sexual abuse of her daughter falls within
section 425.16(e). (See Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th
1563, 1569.) Unlike the menace claim, this IIED claim does not
hinge on monetary extortion. The prospect of prison due to
Natalie’s report supplied the alleged distress. Given that we
must construe section 425.16 broadly (§ 425.16, subd. (a)), we
decline to separate Natalie’s report from its antecedent, non-
menacing communications putting appellant in fear of his own
actions’ consequences. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 322, fn. 11
[“‘“communications preparatory to or in anticipation of bringing
an action or other official proceeding”’ are protected by section
425.16”].) Far from being incidental, Natalie’s report to law
enforcement is inextricably linked with this claim.
Second, appellant claimed the Walds out of “pure selfish
greed sent [him] to prison so they could get complete control of
the company from [him]. Life time [sic] loss of liberty and loss of
relationships is the ultimate intentional emotional abuse.” This
discrete claim arises from the protected conduct of reporting to
law enforcement or testifying. (Cf. Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 892 [“If conduct that supplies a necessary element of a claim is
protected, the defendant’s burden at the first step of the anti-
SLAPP analysis has been carried, regardless of any alleged
motivations that supply other elements of the claim”].)
Finally, for reasons already discussed, the Flatley exception
does not apply to appellant’s IIED cause of action.

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Defamation
The elements of defamation are “‘“(a) a publication that is
(b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a
natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.”’”
(Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 763.)
Appellant’s defamation cause of action appears to raise two
distinct claims. First, appellant alleged: “On information and
belief James Wald, Natalie Wald and P.W. have publicly
slandered [appellant] stating as fact that he sexually molested
P.W.” While appellant does not specify the forum, this claim
fairly implicates reports to law enforcement and court testimony,
both of which fall within section 425.16(e).
Second, appellant alleged libel based on a letter stating he
raped and sodomized P.W. Appellant asserted the letter was sent
to his friends to disrupt his friendships. The cross-complaint
dates the defamation cause of action on July 5, 2023—months
after appellant was convicted and sentenced. We conclude this
claim comes within section 425.16(e)(4)’s catchall.
“We are not concerned with . . . the degree to which [the
speech] propelled the conversation in any particular direction;
rather, we examine whether a defendant—through public or
private speech or conduct—participated in, or furthered, the
discourse that makes an issue one of public interest.” (FilmOn,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 151.) By advising appellant’s friends of his
purported sexual misconduct with a child, the alleged letter
participated in and furthered the discourse regarding the
significant public issues of “preventing child sexual abuse and
protecting children from sexual predators . . . .” (Cross v. Cooper
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 375.) While appellant was then
incarcerated, the possibility of future release and recidivism still

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existed. Moreover, incarceration does not always prevent
communication, including of a sexually inappropriate nature.
Appellant cites perceived differences between the alleged
letter’s statements regarding rape and sodomy and the Walds’
other statements, including trial testimony. While such
disparities might be relevant to the merits of a defamation claim,
they do not negate the protection of section 425.16 at the first
step. The putative disparities are not uncontroverted evidence
the alleged letter’s statements are false. (Cf. Kenne v. Stennis
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 967 [controverted allegation of false
report insufficient to eliminate protection of section 425.16].)
Furthermore, as explained above, Natalie’s declaration does not
operate as a concession in the way appellant imagines.
Amendment of Cross-Complaint
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying amendment of the cross-complaint. “‘The absence of
cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to
treat [a] contention[] as’ forfeited.” (In re Marriage of Carlisle,
supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 255.) In his appellate briefs,
appellant cites no legal authority to support this contention. Nor
does he provide cogent legal argument. (United Grand Corp. v.
Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 165, fn. 6
[“‘[A]n appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal
authority, but also explain how it applies in his case.’”].) We
treat this contention as forfeited.
Our decision does not prevent appellant from seeking to
amend the menacing-duress cause of action on remand. We
express no view on the merits of such a requested amendment.

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Fees and Costs
Subject to statutory exceptions not relevant here, cross-
defendants prevailing on anti-SLAPP motions “shall be entitled
to recover . . . attorney’s fees and costs,” including those incurred
on appeal. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1); accord Frym v. 601 Main Street
LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 613, 622.) “‘“‘[A] party who partially
prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion must generally be considered a
prevailing party unless the results of the motion were so
insignificant that the party did not achieve any practical benefit
from bringing the motion. The determination whether a party
prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion lies within the broad
discretion of [the] trial court.’ [Citation.]”’” (Area 51 Productions,
Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 605 (Area 51).)
“[A]s a general rule, a defendant who prevails in part in
bringing a special motion to strike is entitled to fees and costs,
subject to the trial court’s determination of the appropriate
amount awardable based upon the defendant’s partial success.”
(Maleti v. Wickers (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 181, 232-233.) Thus, we
will reverse the order awarding attorney fees and costs. The trial
court will determine whether respondents are entitled to attorney
fees and costs (including those incurred on appeal) and, if so, in
what amount. (Cf. Area 51, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 605
[““‘Although this court has the power to fix attorney fees on
appeal, the better practice is to have the trial court determine
such fees.’””]; Capistrano Taxpayers Assn., Inc. v. City of San
Juan Capistrano (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1516-1517
[reserving appellate costs for future adjudication in trial court].)

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion is
reversed as to the cause of action denominated “MENACING-
DURESS.” In all other respects, that order is affirmed.
The order awarding attorney fees and costs is reversed. On
remand, the trial court will determine whether respondents are
entitled to attorney fees and costs in connection with their anti-
SLAPP motion and on appeal and, if so, in what amount.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Jeffrey G. Bennett, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
____________________________________

Bamieh & De Smeth, Ron Bamieh, Danielle De Smeth, and
Charlotte E. Krem, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
TencerSherman, Philip C. Tencer, for Defendant and
Appellant.

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