CourtListener 10605306•People v. Young CA4/1
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Filed 6/16/25 P. v. Young CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085710
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI19002410)
ARI AKI YOUNG,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Miriam I. Morton, Judge. Affirmed.
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina and Elizabeth M. Renner, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Ari Aki Young appeals a judgment following his jury
conviction of gross negligent discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code,1 § 246.3,
subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Young to 16 months, deemed served in
consideration of the custody credits he had accrued as of that date.
On appeal, Young argues the trial court erred in failing to give two
instructions to the jury. First, he contends the court should have informed
the jury of the People’s burden to prove he did not act in self-defense. We
disagree. The trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury because
there was no evidence Young acted in self-defense when discharging the
firearm. Young’s second claim of error is that the jury should have been
informed of the need to agree upon which of two gunshots it based its guilty
verdict. Contrary to Young’s assertion, however, the continuous course of
conduct exception is a valid exception to the unanimity requirement and is
applicable to the facts of this case.
Finally, we conclude that Young forfeited his claim under the Racial
Justice Act (RJA) and that he failed to show how his trial counsel’s
performance was deficient. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2019, Young’s mother called 911 and stated, “Oh my God.
Please send somebody, please. Oh my gosh, send somebody, please.” She said
she wanted her 21-year-old son removed from her home. As a sheriff’s deputy
arrived, Young and his mother walked out the front door. Young’s mother
appeared “scared” and was holding a knife. Young “beelined directly
towards” the deputy, who was unsure of what was going on, but understood
from the call he was the suspect.
1 Unless specified, further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The deputy talked to Young, asked what was going on and attempted to
perform a cursory search for weapons. When she went to place her hands on
Young’s back to conduct a pat down search, he threatened to “headbutt” her.
Young then became physically aggressive, and the deputy radioed for backup.
She told him to stop fighting and get on the ground, but he grabbed hold of
her wrist. In a “necessary escalation,” the deputy grabbed her collapsible
baton and extended it to its full length. Young, however, grabbed it from her
and threw it onto the nearby gravel. Young then grabbed the back of the
deputy’s hair and began pulling her head down and punching her in the face.
Young began punching the deputy in the side of the face and head
repeatedly. The deputy felt like she was beginning to lose consciousness and,
fearing that she would lose the fight, removed her firearm from its holster.
The deputy told Young twice that she would shoot him in an attempt to
defuse the situation and make Young stop hitting her. The deputy then lost
her footing in the gravel and fell onto her back, still holding her firearm.
Young continued to hit her as she fell to the ground. The deputy testified she
fired her weapon towards Young’s head when he was “on top of” her because
she “knew” she “was going to die if [she] did not.” The gunshot missed
Young, and then Young pinned her hand, still holding the firearm, in the
gravel, where it discharged into the ground.
Young and the deputy fought over the gun and Young managed to pry
it out of her hand. As the deputy turned and fled to the cover of nearby
houses, Young pulled the slide on her gun back and fired it. Meanwhile,
three other patrol vehicles arrived on the scene. Still carrying the deputy’s
gun, Young walked towards the arriving deputies, raised both hands and
fired the gun straight up. While the arriving deputies shouted, “drop the
gun,” they shot Young.
3
The district attorney charged Young with attempted murder of a peace
officer (§ 664/187, subd. (a)) and assault with a firearm upon a peace officer
(§ 245, subd. (d)(1)). Both these counts carried additional allegations that
Young personally and intentionally discharged a handgun (§ 12022.53, subd.
(c)), and personally used a handgun (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), during the
commission of the offense. The information also charged Young with
resisting an executive officer (§ 69), resisting an officer by removing her
firearm (§ 148, subd. (c)), discharging a firearm with gross negligence, a
serious felony (§§ 246.3, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(2), and battery with injury
on a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2)).
A jury found Young guilty of discharging a firearm with gross
negligence and acquitted him of attempted murder and assault with a
firearm on a peace officer. After further deliberations, the jury was not able
to reach verdicts on the charges for resisting arrest and battery on a peace
officer. The trial court then dismissed those remaining counts in the interest
of justice. Young was sentenced to 16 months with credit for time served.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Trial Court’s Duty to Instruct on Self-Defense and Unanimity
Young contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury
that: (i) the People must establish Young was not acting in self-defense when
he discharged the firearm, and (ii) the jury must agree unanimously upon
which gunshot to base a guilty verdict. We disagree.
A. Additional Procedural Background
The parties discussed jury instructions in chambers and did not
mention instructions relating to discharging a firearm with gross negligence
in pretrial briefing or on the record.
4
At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury with a
modified version of CALCRIM No. 970 without the self-defense element:
“The defendant is charged . . . with shooting a firearm in a
grossly negligent manner in violation of Penal Code section 246.3.
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
must prove that:
“1. The defendant intentionally shot a firearm;
“2. The defendant did the shooting with gross negligence;
“AND
“3. The shooting could have resulted in the injury or death of a
person;
“Gross negligence involves more than ordinary carelessness,
inattention, or mistakes in judgment. A person acts with gross
negligence when:
“1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of
death or great bodily injury[ ]
“AND
“2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that
way would create such a risk.
“In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the
way he acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful
person would act in the same situation that his or her act
amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the
consequence of that act.”
In closing argument, the prosecution did not address the count of
discharging a firearm with gross negligence. Young’s trial counsel argued
Young fired two shots: the first, in a northeast direction that hit the garage,
5
that was in a different direction than where the deputy was running and
second, into the air as officers were arriving. As to the shot into the garage,
counsel said: “He’s not aiming at her. He’s not going in her direction.
Nothing.” He additionally argued, regarding the attempted murder count:
“Mr. Young had no intent to kill anyone. I mean think about it.
The gun was working perfectly. He got up. He could just start
blasting her right there. If I want to kill here, I’m going to just
start blasting her right there.
“He didn’t. He intentionally goes backwards and then turns and
pivots northeast and walks into the street and fires. And she has
gone the other way. There’s no intent to kill. He could have
easily changed direction. In fact, he never even looks at her. He
never looks at her. Never.”
Young’s trial counsel went on to argue that as soon as Young gained
control of the gun, the deputy “may be scared, but Mr. Young is no longer
paying attention to her” and, “[a]s soon as he backs up and pivots northeast,
he’s not paying attention to [the deputy]. She’s gone. It’s not about her. It’s
not about her.”
As far as the shot into the air, counsel argued that Young, “has no
desire to harm anybody. His hands go straight up. He’s headed to the police.”
Counsel explained:
“He fires into the air. I don’t know. Maybe he’s scared, too. But
everyone that testified said that it went straight up into the air.
It wasn’t tilted down.”
In conclusion, counsel argued that Young was guilty of gross negligent
discharge of a firearm, but nothing else:
“And remember, with the unlawful detention we’re done with
two, three, four and six, which leaves us with five. Do you know
what that one was? Does anyone remember what Mr. Young is
charged with? It is negligent discharge of a firearm. Find him
guilty of that. That’s what he did.
6
“I’m not going to sit here and snow you guys. He shot the gun in
the direction where, God, it could have, you know, hurt
somebody. And he shot the one in the air that could have hurt
someone, too.
“That doesn’t require lawful performance of duties. So I’m not
going to sit here and make up some BS argument. He did that,
and that’s what he should be convicted of in this case, because
that’s what he did.”
Counsel then again requested the jury find Young guilty of
discharging the firearm with gross negligence, but not guilty on the
other counts.
B. The Court Had No Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on Self-Defense
A trial court must instruct on the law applicable to the case. (People v.
Ponce (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1386.) However, the trial court must only
give instructions supported by substantial evidence and may properly refuse
requested defense instructions on any theory not supported by the evidence.
(Ibid.) In instructing the jury on the count of discharging a firearm with
gross negligence, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the fourth
element of CALCRIM No. 970—that the People must prove the defendant did
not act in self-defense or defense of someone else—if “there is sufficient
evidence of self-defense or defense of another . . . .” (Bench Notes to
CALCRIM No. 970 (2025).) “In determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the
credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was evidence
which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt . . . .’
[Citations.]” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983.)
Here, contrary to Young’s assertion, there was no “substantial
evidence” presented at trial Young acted in self-defense. Under his own
7
version of events, Young fired shots in the air, not at the deputies, and there
was no evidence anyone other than Young was the initial aggressor. Young
now claims the first shot “was fired as a warning shot,” yet concedes the
deputy was running away from him when he fired it. Moreover, before firing
the gun, Young had repeatedly punched the deputy in the head and disarmed
her while she begged “please, please, please.” Then, as deputies approached
in their patrol cars, Young fired again into the sky. Young and his counsel
never explained why Young fired shots in the air, although his counsel
argued Young’s motivation “maybe” was because he was “scared.”
Young’s only statements about the shooting admitted at trial were
when he told a deputy, “She assaulted me, and you guys win,” and when he
told another deputy at the hospital, “I didn’t shoot at you. I shot into the air.”
There is no evidence in the record Young claimed to fire the gun as a
warning, or in self-defense. Therefore, we conclude there was not substantial
evidence that Young acted in self-defense. (See People v. Odell (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 307, 321 (Odell) [“The trial court rightly declined to instruct on
self-defense because no evidence suggested [the defendant] actually believed
he was in danger.”].
Because there was not substantial evidence in support of the
self-defense instruction, the trial court had no duty to give it.
C. Any Error Was Harmless
Moreover, even if the trial court had erred in not instructing the jury on
this fourth element, we would conclude it was not prejudicial. “[A]n
erroneous instruction that omits an element of an offense is subject to
harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
[Citations.] In general, the Chapman test probes ‘whether it appears “beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
8
verdict obtained.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54
Cal.4th 643, 662–663.) Thus, “even when jury instructions completely omit
an element of a crime, and therefore deprive the jury of the opportunity to
make a finding on that element, a conviction may be upheld under Chapman
where there is no ‘record . . . evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary
finding’ with respect to that element. [Citations.]” (People v. Davis (2005) 36
Cal.4th 510, 564.)
As discussed, there was no evidence Young acted in self-defense and his
trial counsel argued to the jury he was guilty. Thus, reversal is not required
because it is “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th 453,
473.)
D. No Unanimity Instruction Was Required
The state and federal constitutions require unanimous verdicts.
(People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132; Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) 590
U.S. 83.) “As a general rule, when violation of a criminal statute is charged
and the evidence establishes several acts, any one of which could constitute
the crime charged, either the state must select the particular act upon which
it relied for the allegation of the information, or the jury must be instructed
that it must agree unanimously upon which act to base a verdict of guilty.”
(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679.) “This requirement of
unanimity as to the criminal act ‘is intended to eliminate the danger that the
defendant will be convicted even though there is no single offense which all
the jurors agree the defendant committed.’ ” (Russo, at p. 1132.) “On the
other hand, where the evidence shows only a single discrete crime but leaves
room for disagreement as to exactly how that crime was committed or what
the defendant’s precise role was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the
9
basis or, as the cases often put it, the ‘theory’' whereby the defendant is
guilty.” (Ibid.)
Thus, there are several exceptions to the general rule. “For example,
no unanimity instruction is required if the case falls within the continuous-
course-of-conduct exception, which arises ‘when the acts are so closely
connected in time as to form part of one transaction’ [citation], or ‘when the
statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct or a series of acts over a
period of time.’ [Citation.] There also is no need for a unanimity instruction if
the defendant offers the same defense or defenses to the various acts
constituting the charged crime.” (Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 679.)
Here, the evidence showed Young fired the two shots within seconds of
one another. Young pulled the slide on the gun back and fired it as the
deputy ran for cover. Within 10 seconds, as patrol vehicles pulled up to
Young as he was still holding the same weapon in the same area, Young shot
the gun straight up into the air. At trial, counsel argued Young was guilty of
discharging the gun with gross negligence in both circumstances. Therefore,
Young’s firing of the weapon was a continuous course of conduct and the
defense, or lack thereof in this case, was the same for both counts. His claim
of error fails.
Similarly, in People v. Flores (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 216, the defendant
fired seven rounds from a semiautomatic handgun outside of an apartment
complex, striking two parked vehicles and the door to an apartment complex.
(Id. at p. 219.) He admitted to firing the gun “up in the air” to scare people
who disrespected him and admitted that he “might have just popped” a
vehicle as he was raising the gun skyward. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held
that the trial court “had no obligation to give a unanimity instruction”
because the gunshots were part of a continuous course of conduct: witnesses
10
“heard ‘gunshots’ without indicating a significant delay” between shots, the
location of the casings suggested the defendant “repeatedly fired the gun
while standing in one location,” and the defendant used the same defense for
each gunshot. (Id. at pp. 222–223.)
Young argues that cases applying the continuous-course-of-conduct
exception are “outdated” and “no longer good law” after Ramos. But as we
explained in People v. Wilson (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 128, Ramos “held that
the Sixth Amendment’s unanimity requirement applies to criminal trials in
state courts. Given California’s existing requirement of a unanimous verdict,
the Supreme Court’s decision has no direct effect on California and does not
change our analysis.” (Id. at p. 161, fn. 17.) Young does not identify
anything about the holding in Ramos that distinguishes it from the
unanimity principle long recognized in California or is in any way
inconsistent with the continuous-course-of-conduct exception under
California law. Thus, although the “factual circumstances” are different, we
conclude as we did in Wilson, that “[n]othing in Ramos suggests that a
unanimity instruction was required in this case.” (Ibid.)
Young’s reliance on People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, is
similarly misplaced. There, the defendant was convicted of unlawful
possession of a firearm and ammunition. (Id. at p. 563.) The Court of Appeal
concluded the trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction
because “the record reveal[ed] the possibility of two distinct possessions
separated by time and space.” (Ibid.) The facts there, however, are readily
distinguishable as the incidents of possession were at two different locations
(outside a house and inside a car at a gas station parking lot), were separated
by more than an hour, and there was conflicting evidence whether the
defendant had a gun at both locations and whether it was the same gun. (Id.
11
at p. 574.) Additionally, as opposed to here, the defendant “tendered a
different defense to each alleged possession.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, even assuming there was error, it was harmless. There was
substantial evidence supporting a jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt on
both gunshots. The first gunshot was fired into a residential garage and, as
Young’s trial counsel argued, “could have . . . hurt somebody.” The second
gunshot was fired directly into the air in a residential neighborhood and
“could have hurt someone, too.” Both incidents were captured on video, and
Young’s trial counsel argued that Young was guilty of both. Therefore, a
unanimity instruction was not required.
E. Young Has Not Shown Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to effective assistance
of counsel. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 684–685 (Strickland).) To establish
ineffective assistance, “the defendant must first show counsel’s performance
was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms. Second, the defendant must show
resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).) An ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fails if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on either one of these components. (Strickland, at p. 687.) “It is
defendant’s burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of trial counsel.” (People
v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436 (Lucas).)
12
In reviewing such claims, we give significant deference to trial counsel’s
reasonable tactical decisions, and the “ ‘strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ ”
(Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 437, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 689.) “ ‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.’ ”
(Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 105.) And it is “particularly
difficult” for a defendant to prevail on direct appeal on a claim of ineffective
assistance by trial counsel. (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) It is not
ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel to admit obvious weaknesses in
the defense case. (In re Alcox (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 657, 668.) “[W]here the
evidence of guilt is quite strong, ‘it is entirely understandable that trial
counsel, given the weight of incriminating evidence, made no sweeping
declarations of his client's innocence but instead adopted a more realistic
approach, namely, that . . . defendant . . . may have committed [some of the
charged crimes] . . . .’ ” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 612.)
“ ‘[G]ood trial tactics [may] demand[ ] complete candor’ with the jury.
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) It is not ineffective assistance of counsel to concede some
measure of culpability and offer the jury some other choice in defendant's
favor. (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 392–393.)
Young, who at the beginning of trial faced a potential sentence of 35
years to life for attempted murder of a peace officer, has not shown that the
16-month low-term sentence he received because of his trial counsel’s efforts
is deficient representation. Video evidence showed that Young took the
deputy’s gun and fired it at least twice. Considering this incontrovertible
evidence, counsel called three expert witnesses to examine the weapons and
the crime scene to successfully establish that Young did not fire the gun at
13
anyone intentionally. In this case, it was entirely reasonable for counsel to
admit what was captured on video, but to provide a less culpable
explanation.2
Therefore, Young has not met his burden to establish that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance.
II.
Young Forfeited His RJA Claim
Young also argues that his jury conviction should be reversed because
the “criminal process in this case was affected by implicit racial bias” and his
rights under the RJA were violated. He contends the responding officer was
subconsciously biased based on his “perceived Blackness from the very first
moments of his encounter with law enforcement that day, as an immediate
criminal ‘suspect.’ ” He asserts another officer’s “very first impression of the
situation was a person with ‘an Afro,’ ” and a third officer had “recently
accepted responsibility for unlawfully beating a different Black man.”
The People assert that Young forfeited his RJA claim by failing to raise
it in a timely manner in the trial court. We agree.
In People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804 (Lashon), the appellate
court held “the long-standing procedural appellate rules governing forfeiture
of issues” apply in the context of section 745, such that a defendant that has a
meaningful opportunity but fails to raise an RJA claim in the trial court
2 In his reply brief, Young argues for the first time on appeal that
“nothing in the record suggests counsel obtained” his consent to argue he was
guilty of discharging a firearm with gross negligence. “[W]e do not consider
arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” (Doe v. McLaughlin
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 657; Mansur v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 1365, 1387–1388 [appellate court will not consider arguments
raised for the first time in reply because it deprives respondent of opportunity
to respond].) We decline to consider Young’s argument here.
14
forfeits that claim on appeal. (Id. at pp. 809, 815–816; see also People v.
Corbi (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 25, 38–42 (Corbi) [agreeing with the analysis in
Lashon]; People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 113–116 [same].)
The court in Lashon explained: As originally enacted, on January 1,
2021, section 745, subdivision (b) allowed defendants to “seek relief by filing a
motion in the trial court or, if judgment had been imposed, by filing a
‘petition for habeas corpus, or a motion under section 1473.7, in a court of
competent jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a).’ (§ 745, subd.
(b).)” (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 810.) At that time, section 745
applied “only prospectively to cases in which judgment had not been entered
prior to January 1, 2021 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317).” (Lashon, at p. 810.)
“In 2022, the Legislature amended the statute to provide that a section
745 motion shall be made in the trial court ‘as soon as practicable upon the
defendant learning of [an] alleged violation,’ and ‘[a] motion that is not timely
may be deemed waived, in the discretion of the court.’ (§ 745, subd. (c); added
by Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2.)” (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 812–
813.)
The Legislature amended the statute again, “effective January 1, 2023,
to provide for retroactive application to judgments that were not final.”
(Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 810; Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2.) The
amended statute created a timeline for defendants to bring claims related to
judgments entered before January 1, 2021. (Lashon, at p. 810; Stats. 2022,
ch. 739, § 2.) Notably, though, it did not remove the waiver provision in
section 745, subdivision (c). (Lashon, at p. 813.)
“After retroactive application became possible,” the Legislature
modified section 745 once more, through Assembly Bill No. 1118 (Stats. 2023,
ch. 464) (Assembly Bill 1118), effective January 1, 2024. (Lashon, supra, 98
15
Cal.App.5th at p. 810.) Section 745, subdivision (b) “now provides that
postjudgment [RJA] claims based on the trial record may be raised on direct
appeal from the conviction or sentence (including to cases with judgments
entered before January 1, 2021).” (Lashon, at p. 810.) Current section 745,
subdivision (b) states, “[f]or claims based on the trial record, a defendant may
raise a claim alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the
conviction or sentence,” and allows a defendant to “move to stay the appeal
and request remand to the superior court to file a motion pursuant to this
section.” As the court in Lashon noted, it “does not state that a defendant
may raise a section 745 claim on direct appeal for the first time and does not
refer to the general appellate rules governing the preservation or forfeiture of
claims presented on direct appeal.” (Lashon, at p. 810; § 745, subd. (b).)
Considering this history, and the fact that “the Legislature did not include
any language indicating a section 745 claim could be presented on direct
appeal for the first time,” the Lashon court determined RJA claims remain
“subject to the general appellate rules of preservation and forfeiture of claims
that could have been but were not made in the trial court.” (Lashon, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 812–815; accord Corbi, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 41;
Singh, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.)
Here, Young had an adequate opportunity to present his claim in the
trial court. He failed to do so and has therefore forfeited the claim on appeal.
We decline Young’s request to exercise our discretion to disregard his
forfeiture. (See, e.g., People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 720.)
Recognizing this potential result, Young asserts his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise an RJA claim in the trial
court. Young fails “to persuade us that had [his] counsel made a timely
motion asserting that the [court] violated the RJA . . . , the motion would
16
have been granted. Thus, [he has] not established either the deficient
performance or the resulting prejudice required to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Quintero (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
1060, 1078.) We have reviewed the briefs and record and cannot say there is
no possible satisfactory explanation for his trial counsel’s failure to bring a
motion under the RJA. The record shows that the encounter escalated due to
Young’s aggressive conduct and not the result of improper bias or animus on
the part of the deputies. Counsel could have thus concluded there was no
reason or benefit to raising an RJA motion. (Singh, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
at p. 117 [perceived futility one of “multiple reasonable tactical reasons why
defense counsel may not have objected to defendant's statement to police”].)
Trial counsel may also have made a strategic decision not to assert an
RJA claim but to instead use the claim of racial bias at trial to impeach the
officers and argue for a conviction of only the least serious charged offense–
discharging a firearm with gross negligence. If so, the strategy was
successful. Moreover, even had trial counsel raised a successful RJA claim,
the remedies set forth in the RJA for such a prejudgment claim do not include
dismissal of the charges and likely would not have resulted in a more
favorable outcome. (§ 745, subd. (e); R.D. v. Superior Court (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 1227, 1239–1244.)
17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
BUCHANAN, J.
18
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