CourtListener 10603618•People v. Scott CA2/5
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Filed 6/12/25 P. v. Scott CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B335316
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA420534)
SEDRIC WAYNE SCOTT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Terry A. Bork, Judge. Vacated and remanded.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This is the second appeal arising out of an order
resentencing defendant and appellant Sedric Scott (defendant)
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.1 This time, we are asked
to decide whether the trial court erred in (1) selecting robbery as
the crime to which defendant’s second degree murder conviction
should be redesignated, and (2) selecting the high term for the
robbery sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct
Defendant, John Armstrong (Armstrong), and Curtis Lowe
(Lowe) were members of the Swans criminal street gang. In May
2012, defendant and Armstrong approached victim Patrick Lister
(Lister) outside a market and asked where he was from—
commonly understood to be a gang-related confrontation. Lister
did not respond and entered the market.
Defendant and Armstrong followed Lister inside, and
defendant tore a gold chain from Lister’s neck. As defendant ran
out of the market, Lister gave chase. Defendant, Armstrong, and
other members of the Swans gang then attacked Lister. Lowe
ran from across the street and joined in the group assault. At
some point during the altercation, defendant pocketed the chain.
When the attack stopped, Lister’s chest was covered in blood.
Lister died days later from a six-inch-deep stab wound that had
pierced his heart.
The market’s surveillance camera, which captured portions
of the attack, showed Lowe walking toward the market from the
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
direction of the fight, moving something from his left hand to his
right hand, and putting it in his pocket. Later, the video showed
Lowe opening his right palm and looking down at it. Another
Swans gang member interviewed by police after the murder
claimed Lowe stabbed Lister, though the gang member conceded
he had not seen the actual act of stabbing himself.
B. Trial, and the Murder Instructions Given
Defendant, Nathaniel Willard (Willard), Lowe, and
Armstrong were charged with Lister’s murder in 2014. The
information alleged the murder was committed while the men
were engaged in the commission of a robbery and was committed
for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a
criminal street gang.
During the defense case at trial, defendant testified he
accidentally broke Lister’s chain during the altercation but he
gave it back to Lister. Defendant said Lister was not bleeding
when he returned the chain, and he had not known at the time
that Lister had been stabbed.
The jury was instructed that defendant and his accomplices
were being prosecuted under three theories of murder: (1) malice
murder, (2) felony murder, and (3) murder pursuant to the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The instruction on murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine stated that “[t]o prove that the defendant
is guilty of murder under a theory of aiding and abetting, the
People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant is guilty of battery
or assault; 2. During the commission of battery or assault, a co-
participant committed the crime of murder; [¶] AND 3. Under all
of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s
3
position would have known that the commission of the murder
was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of
battery or assault.” The instruction also stated, “[i]f you find a
defendant guilty of murder under a natural and probable
consequence theory, the defendant is guilty of murder in the
second degree. A defendant cannot be found guilty of first degree
murder based on this theory alone.”
The felony murder instruction stated defendant “may be
guilty of murder, under a theory of felony murder, even if another
person did the act that resulted in the death.” For felony murder,
one of the enumerated elements the People were required to
prove was that “[t]he defendant committed, or aided and abetted,
robbery . . . .” The instruction on felony murder stated that if the
jury found defendant guilty of murder under a felony murder
theory, he is guilty of murder in the first degree.
The jury convicted defendant of second degree murder. The
jury found true allegations that Lister’s murder occurred during
the commission of a robbery and the murder was committed for
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a street
gang. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life in
prison for the murder.
Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction and a prior
panel of this court affirmed the conviction but ordered the
robbery-murder special circumstance finding stricken.
C. The Petition for Resentencing
Defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing
and the trial court subsequently appointed counsel for defendant.
The People conceded defendant’s trial jury “rejected the felony
murder theory of liability” (because it convicted on second degree
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murder, not first degree murder) and defendant was not
ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the prosecutor had
argued stabbing and murder were a natural and probable
consequence of simple assault and battery. The trial court
determined defendant had established a prima facie case for
relief and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
A few months later, the parties stipulated defendant was
eligible to have his murder conviction vacated and redesignated
to another offense. In briefs filed in advance of a hearing to
redesignate the offense pursuant to the parties’ stipulation and
resentence defendant, defendant argued he should be
resentenced to assault or battery as the target offense because
the jury convicted him of second degree murder based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. The People argued
the trial court could redesignate the offense as both robbery and
felony assault.
The trial court held a hearing in September 2021. The
court accepted the stipulation of the parties and vacated
defendant’s murder conviction. The court found the murder had
been charged generically and believed no target offense (for
natural and probable consequences doctrine purposes) was
charged. The court therefore determined it would redesignate
defendant’s conviction as one for second degree robbery—treating
that as the “underlying felony.”
In explaining its rationale, the trial court stated that this
court, when it earlier struck the special circumstance finding
attached to the murder charge, did not conclude there was
insufficient evidence of an underlying robbery or defendant’s
participation in that robbery. The court also believed the
evidence in the trial record established beyond a reasonable
5
doubt that the conduct underlying the murder conviction
constituted second degree robbery. The court stated it was
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of
robbery and that the gang allegation previously charged against
defendant was true. (The court recognized it could strike the
gang enhancement, but it declined to do so.)
The court accordingly sentenced defendant to a total of 15
years in state prison, comprised of the upper term of five years
for the newly redesignated offense of robbery, plus ten years for
the gang enhancement. In doing so, the court found the following
circumstances in aggravation: the crime involved great violence
and great bodily harm; the manner in which the crime was
carried out indicated planning, sophistication or professionalism;
defendant engaged in violent conduct that indicated he was a
serious danger to society; defendant’s prior convictions were
numerous or of increasing seriousness; and defendant had served
a prior prison term.
D. The Prior 1172.6 Appeal and the Proceedings on
Remand
Defendant appealed the new judgment of conviction. As
pertinent here, defendant challenged the trial court’s imposition
of the gang enhancement. He did not address the court’s
selection of robbery as the redesignated offense. A prior panel of
this court agreed there was insufficient evidence to find the gang
enhancement true under the law as it had since been amended,
and this court reversed and remanded with instructions to give
the People the opportunity to prove the gang enhancement under
the then-prevailing legal standard. (People v. Scott (Mar. 30,
2023, B315262) [nonpub. opn.].)
6
The People elected not to retry the gang allegation and the
trial court dismissed it in the interests of justice. Before
defendant was resentenced, the People represented defendant
had custody credits in excess of the maximum possible sentence
for robbery. The trial court resentenced defendant to five years
in prison, the high term for the redesignated robbery offense.
Relying on defendant’s record of prior convictions in the
probation officer’s report and court file, the court identified the
following aggravating circumstances: (1) the victim died; (2)
defendant’s prior convictions were numerous or of increasing
seriousness; and (3) defendant had served a prior prison term.
II. DISCUSSION
Practically, the issues we are asked to decide in this appeal
(whether robbery was the correct redesignated offense and, if so,
whether an upper term sentence was proper) are of limited
significance: defendant by this point has already served the
maximum possible sentence for robbery so our resolution of this
appeal does not affect the sentence he will ultimately serve. But
practical consequences aside, we believe defendant is correct that
robbery was not the correct redesignated offense. As the People
previously conceded in the trial court, the trial jury’s second
degree murder finding reveals the jury rejected felony murder as
a theory of murder liability. Thus, to be eligible for resentencing
as the parties had stipulated, defendant must have been
convicted on a natural and probable consequences theory of
murder and the trial court could only properly resentence
defendant to the target crimes (assault and battery) that the
prosecution argued for its natural and probable consequences
theory. We shall accordingly reverse and remand for
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reimposition of sentence, and we need not address defendant’s
argument that an upper term sentence for the robbery conviction
was unjustified.
“[S]ection 1172.6 provides an opportunity for criminal
defendants who were convicted of murder under either a natural
and probable consequences theory or (in some circumstances)
under a felony-murder theory—and who could not be convicted of
murder under the law as it currently stands—to file a petition to
be resentenced. A successful petitioner is entitled to have the
murder ‘conviction, and any allegations and enhancements
attached to the conviction’ vacated and to be ‘resentenced on the
remaining charges.’ [Citation.] But a successful petitioner who
was charged with murder ‘generically, and the target offense was
not charged’ is entitled to have the murder conviction
‘redesignated’ as ‘the target offense’ of the natural and probable
consequences theory—or the ‘underlying felony’ of the felony
murder—and to be resentenced accordingly. [Citation.]” (People
v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 463-464; see also Pen. Code
§ 1172.6, subd. (e) [“The petitioner’s conviction shall be
redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for
resentencing purposes if the petitioner is entitled to relief
pursuant to this section, murder or attempted murder was
charged generically, and the target offense was not charged”].)
Defendant’s murder was charged “generically” and no
target offense was charged. That means, pursuant to section
1172.6 and Arellano, defendant’s redesignated offense should
either be the target offense(s) that served as the predicate for the
natural and probable consequences theory of liability or the
underlying felony offense if convicted on a felony murder theory
of liability.
8
In light of the instructions given to defendant’s trial jury
and the verdict it returned, only the natural and probable
consequences target crimes were available choices for a
redesignated offense of conviction. The natural and probable
consequences instruction stated that if the jury found defendant
guilty of murder under that doctrine, he was “guilty of murder in
the second degree.” The felony murder instruction, in contrast,
provided that if the jury were to find defendant guilty of felony
murder, he was “guilty of murder in the first degree.”
Defendant’s jury found him guilty of second degree murder. As
the People conceded below, this means the jury rejected the
felony murder basis for murder liability—and that means
redesignating defendant’s conviction as the felony underlying the
felony murder theory was not a permissible option.2 (See People
v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 470 [“jury’s factual findings
should be given preclusive effect”]; People v. Lopez-Barraza
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1247-1248 [“Because section 1172.6
is not meant to provide for relitigation of issues that were decided
at the prior trial, however, the resentencing court is precluded
from deciding the new issues based on factual findings that are
inconsistent with facts necessarily found by the jury”].) Only the
target crimes actually presented to the jury in connection with
the natural and probable consequences doctrine (battery and
assault) were available options when redesignating defendant’s
offense of conviction.
2
The jury’s special circumstance finding concluding the
murder occurred during the commission of a robbery, which was
stricken on direct appeal, is irrelevant. “Once a jury’s finding is
stricken, it is stricken.” (People v. Barboza (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
955, 965.)
9
The Attorney General has only two responses, neither of
which directly disputes the foregoing analysis. The Attorney
General argues, first, that defendant’s challenge to the
redesignated offense chosen is waived because he could have, but
did not, raise the issue in his first appeal from the resentencing
order. We agree with defendant, however, that the claim is not
waived because designating the conviction as something other
than the target offense of assault or battery results in an
unauthorized sentence that can be raised in a successive appeal
even though it should have been raised earlier. (See, e.g., People
v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 329; People v. Jordan (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1145.) The Attorney General also argues,
second, that the trial court’s sentence was not improper because
the record of conviction does not establish defendant was
necessarily convicted of murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The People point to the fact that the jury
was instructed they did not all need to agree on the same theory
to find defendant guilty of murder. But we do not think the
possibility that some jurors would have been willing to convict
defendant of felony murder undercuts the fact that the jury
ultimately rejected that theory.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is vacated and the cause is remanded with
directions to enter a new judgment of conviction limited to the
available target offenses that were presented to the jury in
connection with the instruction on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
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