CourtListener 10602932•People v. Pryor CA2/1
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Filed 6/11/25 P. v. Pryor CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B336786
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A915615)
v.
MARION MARC PRYOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura Ellison, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy Gaynor and David Andreasen, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
Defendant and appellant Marion Marc Pryor challenges the
trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 In 1988, a jury convicted Pryor of one
count of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with a felony-
murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Pryor
argues that the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict him
on a theory of liability that is no longer valid, and the superior
court erred by finding he failed to make a prima facie case that
he was eligible for resentencing. We disagree and affirm. The
jury instructions, which did not reference accomplices or other
participants in the crime, and the jury’s verdict, show
unequivocally that Pryor was convicted as the actual killer.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Because courts may not engage in factfinding at the prima
facie stage (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972), we
summarize the offense conduct briefly and only as background for
understanding the issues. This account is based on our prior
opinion in Pryor’s direct appeal of his conviction. (People v. Pryor
(Dec. 28, 1989, B036280) [nonpub. opn.].)
The victim, Doreen Bandosingh, was Pryor’s stepsister, and
they lived together in the same home. On June 24, 1986, Pryor’s
father found Bandosingh’s body under some blankets in a closet
in Pryor’s bedroom. She was nude from the waist down, with
tape covering her mouth, nose, and eyes, and an electrical cord
was pulled tight around her neck. A representative of the
coroner’s office took swabs from Bandosingh’s vagina, which
1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
2
showed the presence of semen. The cause of death was
determined to be strangulation and suffocation.
Bandosingh’s sister testified that she and Bandosingh were
both afraid of Pryor, to such an extent that Bandosingh slept
with a knife under her pillow. Pryor was at home when
Bandosingh’s body was discovered, but he denied killing her.
Pryor was taken into custody about two weeks later and
initially denied any involvement. An officer testified that Pryor
said that Bandosingh consented to have sex with him, but that
she attacked him before he could finish, and he hit her on the
back of her head with his fist. He then sodomized her with her
consent, but she screamed, so he got a roll of tape and covered
her face with it. Pryor confessed that he then put Bandosingh in
a closet and strangled her with a piece of electrical cord for five
minutes. Pryor later testified that he was elsewhere at the time
of the crime and denied making any confession to the police.
The People charged Pryor with one count of murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)), one count of forcible rape (former § 261, subd. (2)),2
and one count of forcible sodomy (former § 286, subd. (c)).3 The
trial court granted Pryor’s motion to dismiss the sodomy count
pursuant to section 995.
The jury instructions were based on the then-current
CALJIC pattern instructions. The jury was instructed on the
2 This provision has subsequently been recodified as section
261, subdivision (a)(2). (See Sen. Bill No. 2586 (1989-1990 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 1990, ch. 630, § 1).)
3 This provision has subsequently been recodified as section
286, subdivision (c)(2)(A). (See Assem. Bill No. 1844 (2009-2010
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2010, ch. 219, § 6).)
3
definition of homicide, in an instruction based on CALJIC
No. 8.00: “The word homicide means the killing of one human
being by another, either lawfully or unlawfully. As used in these
instructions the word homicide includes murder and
manslaughter, which are unlawful, and the acts of excusable and
justifiable homicide, which are lawful.”
The jury also received an instruction defining murder,
based on CALJIC No. 8.10. It read, “Defendant is charged in
[c]ount I of the information with the commission of the crime of
murder, a violation of [s]ection 187 of the Penal Code. [¶] The
crime of murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought or the unlawful killing of a human being
which occurs during the commission or attempt to commit a
felony inherently dangerous to human life. [¶] In order to prove
the commission of the crime of murder, each of the following
elements must be proved:
“1. That a human being was killed,
“2. That the killing was unlawful, and
“3. That the killing was done with malice aforethought or
occurred during the commission or attempt to commit a felony
inherently dangerous to human life. Rape is a felony inherently
dangerous to human life.”
Next, the jury was instructed on first degree felony murder,
based on CALJIC No. 8.21: “The unlawful killing of a human
being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which
occurs as a result of the commission of or attempt to commit the
crime of rape, and where there was in the mind of the perpetrator
the specific intent to commit such crime, is murder of the first
degree. [¶] The specific intent to commit a rape and the
4
commission [of] such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
The jury also received two instructions on the special
circumstance allegation. The first was based on CALJIC
No. 8.80: “If you find the defendant[] in this case guilty of
murder of the first degree, you must then determine if murder
was committed under the following special circumstance:
commission of a rape. [¶] A special circumstance must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] If you have a reasonable doubt as
to whether a special circumstance is true, it is your duty to find
that it is not true. [¶] In order to find the special circumstance
charged in this case to be true or untrue, you must agree
unanimously.”
Second, the jury received an instruction specific to the
felony-murder special circumstance, based on CALJIC
No. 8.81.17. Because this instruction is central to this case, we
preserve the points where the trial court struck out portions of
the pattern instruction by writing “[redacted]” at these points.
“To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these
instructions as murder in the commission of a rape, is true, it
must be proved:
“1a. That the murder was committed while the defendant
was engaged in [redacted] in the commission or [redacted] of a
rape[,] or
“2. That the defendant intended to kill a human being
[redacted,]
“3. That [the] defendant intended to commit a rape[,]
“4. That the murder was committed in order to carry out or
advance the commission of the crime of rape or to facilitate the
escape therefrom or to avoid detection. In other words, the
5
special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not
established if the [redacted] rape was merely incidental to the
commission of the murder.”
The jury received no instructions on aiding and abetting,
accomplices, or attributing guilt based on any other person’s
actions. It also did not receive any instruction on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.
The jury convicted Pryor of first degree murder and forcible
rape, and found true the special circumstance allegation that he
committed the murder while engaged in the commission of a
rape. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The trial court sentenced him to
life without the possibility of parole.
Pryor filed his petition for resentencing on January 12,
2024. In the petition, which was prepared by his attorneys, Pryor
argued that he had made a prima facie case for resentencing
because the jury instructions allowed him to be convicted of
murder without a showing that he was the actual killer or acted
with the intent to kill. The district attorney opposed the petition,
arguing that the instructions required the jury to find that Pryor
was the actual killer. The resentencing court agreed with the
district attorney and denied the petition at the prima facie stage.
DISCUSSION
A. Background on Resentencing under Section 1172.6
Section 1172.6 allows certain defendants convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or voluntary manslaughter to
petition for their convictions to be vacated and to be resentenced.
To be eligible for relief under the statute, it must be the case that
“[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) These
6
changes to the law, enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), amended section 188 to
provide that, “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of [s]ection 189,
in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act
with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(3).) One effect of this amendment was to abolish the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis of liability
for murder. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 847-848.)
Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, a defendant could
be convicted of murder under this doctrine simply by acting as an
accomplice in an offense that foreseeably resulted in the
commission of a murder, even if the defendant did not share the
mens rea of the killer. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
449; People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 164-165.)
In addition to abolishing the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, Senate Bill No. 1437 also amended section
189 to restrict the application of the felony-murder doctrine,
requiring greater personal culpability for a defendant to be liable
under that doctrine. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
707-708.) To convict a defendant of felony murder under the new
law, the prosecution must prove that the defendant either was
the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); acted with the intent to kill
in aiding, abetting, commanding, encouraging, or soliciting the
actual killer (id., subd. (e)(2)); or “was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life” (id., subd. (e)(3)).
To obtain relief under section 1172.6, a petitioner must first
make a prima facie case for eligibility. (See id., subd. (c).) “[T]he
prima facie inquiry under [section 1172.6,] subdivision (c) is
7
limited,” and the resentencing court must “ ‘ “take[] [the]
petitioner’s factual allegations as true” ’ ” and “should not engage
in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise
of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 971, 972.) The court may deny a defendant’s petition if the
record refutes the defendant’s allegation that he is eligible for
resentencing (id. at p. 971), but this does not occur “unless the
record conclusively establishes every element of the offense.”
(People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
B. The Resentencing Court Did Not Err by Denying the
Petition on the Basis of the Jury Instructions and
Verdicts
Pryor argues he has made a prima facie case for
resentencing because the jury instructions allowed him to be
convicted of felony murder without the mens rea required under
current law. He focuses primarily on the instruction for the
felony-murder special circumstance. At the time Pryor
committed the murder in 1986, this special circumstance applied
only if the defendant acted with the intent to kill. (People v.
Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 798, citing Carlos v. Superior Court
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 135, overruled in People v. Anderson (1987)
43 Cal.3d 1104, 1115.)4 However, the jury instruction on the
4 The law regarding the felony-murder special
circumstance has changed several times in subsequent years.
(See People v. Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 798 [summarizing
the changes].) By the time of Pryor’s trial in 1988, the Supreme
Court had expanded the scope of the special circumstance to
apply to defendants who did not intend to kill, so long as they
actually killed the victim, rather than merely aided and abetted.
8
special circumstance in this case did not accurately reflect the
law, or the pattern instruction on which it was based, CALJIC
No. 8.81.17, because of the inclusion of the word “or,” which
appears in handwriting in the instruction the trial court gave:
“To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these
instructions as murder in the commission of a rape, is true, it
must be proved:
“1a. That the murder was committed while the defendant
was engaged in . . . the commission . . . of a rape or
“2. That the defendant intended to kill a human being.”
(Italics added.)5
Pryor argues, and we agree, that the inclusion of the
extraneous “or” allowed the jury to find the special circumstance
true even if it did not believe he intended to kill, so long as it
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed
while he was engaged in the commission of a rape.
We disagree, however, that this is sufficient to make a
prima facie case of eligibility for resentencing. Instead, despite
the extraneous “or” in the special circumstance instruction, the
record of conviction, including the remaining jury instructions
and verdicts, demonstrates without any need for factfinding that
the jury necessarily convicted Pryor as the actual killer. The
instructions told the jury that murder is a type of homicide,
(Ibid., citing People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1147.)
The jury instruction in Pryor’s case did not reflect this change,
however.
5 The trial court’s oral instruction to the jury omitted this
“or,” but when a discrepancy exists between the written and oral
version of a jury instruction, the written instruction controls.
(People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 201.)
9
which “means the killing of one human being by another.”
(CALJIC No. 8.00.) Murder in turn means “[t]hat a human being
was killed” in an “unlawful” manner either “with malice
aforethought or . . . during the commission . . . [of] a felony
inherently dangerous to human life.” (CALJIC No. 8.10.) With
no instructions on aiding and abetting or any other form of
vicarious liability, the jury could not have convicted Pryor of
murder without finding that he actually killed Bandosingh.
Nothing in the instructions on felony murder and the special
circumstance called this conclusion into question.
In a similar case where a defendant was prosecuted for
felony murder with no instructions on aiding and abetting or
other perpetrators, the court in People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45 likewise affirmed the denial of a petition for
resentencing at the prima facie stage because “[t]he instructions
and verdicts show the only path to convicting [the defendant] of
first degree felony murder with special circumstances and a
personal-infliction-of-great-bodily-injury enhancement was based
on a finding she actually killed” the victim. (Id. at p. 56.)
Pryor argues that Harden is distinguishable because the
jury instructions in that case were written in the active voice.
Instead of defining murder as “the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought or . . . during the commission” of
a specified felony, as in this case, the jury in Harden was
instructed, based on a newer version of CALJIC No. 8.10, that
“ ‘[e]very person who unlawfully kills a human being with malice
aforethought or during the commission . . . of a [specified felony],
is guilty of murder.’ ” (People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 58.) This difference is immaterial here. The jury was told that
Pryor was charged with murder, and that murder was “the
10
unlawful killing of a human being.” With no further instruction
on accomplices or a defendant’s responsibility for the acts of
another, there was no reasonable interpretation of the instruction
that allowed the jury to convict Pryor without finding he was the
killer.
Next, Pryor contends that the court in Harden erred by
overlooking the possibility of a conviction upon a finding that the
defendant merely caused the death of the victim, rather than
actually killing him. There is indeed a difference between those
two concepts, such as when a defendant orders someone else to
kill or aids and abets in a killing. Thus, in People v. Garcia
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, where the victim died by
asphyxiation, the defendant who put tape over the victim’s mouth
was an actual killer. A codefendant who handed the tape to the
killer might have done “ ‘an act that caused the death of another
person’ ” (id. at p. 150) but was not the killer. Causing a death
may be distinct from actually killing even in cases with only a
single perpetrator. For example, in People v. Vang (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 64, the court reversed the finding of a felony-murder
special circumstance based on an instruction that confused the
two concepts. (Id. at p. 91.) In that case, the evidence indicated
that the victim died after jumping out of a moving truck while
trying to escape from a kidnapping. (Id. at p. 73.) The defendant
might have caused the victim’s death but was not the actual
killer. (See id. at pp. 84-91.)
In another similar case, People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1, the court reversed the denial of a petition for
resentencing at the prima facie stage. In that case, however, the
instructions stated, “that to find [the] defendant guilty of felony
murder, it had to find he committed robbery and ‘[w]hile
11
committing robbery, the defendant caused the death of another
person.’ ” (Id. at p. 16.) The defendant made a prima facie case
for resentencing because the jury could have convicted him
pursuant to this instruction without finding he personally killed
the victim. (Id. at pp. 16-20.) The court in Harden reached the
opposite conclusion because “[u]nlike Lopez, the jury in this case
was not asked whether the defendant merely ‘committed an act
that caused the death’ ” of the victim. (People v. Harden, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 58.)
Pryor argues that even without an instruction using the
phrase “caused the death of another person,” the jury still could
have convicted him without finding he actually killed. He cites
the Merriam-Webster dictionary, which defines “kill” as “to
deprive of life” or “cause the death of.” (<https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/kill> [as of June 9, 2025].) But in the
vast majority of cases, especially those involving only one
perpetrator, there is no difference between those two terms—a
person who causes someone’s death actually kills that person.
We are skeptical that the term “kill” can be interpreted as
equivalent to “cause the death of” in California law. As the court
stated in Harden, in common understanding, the term “ ‘ “the
person who unlawfully kills” . . . refer[s] to the person who
inflicted the fatal injury.’ ” (People v. Harden, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 55, quoting People v. Bell (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
1, 16.) Indeed, under a longstanding rule, first degree felony
murder does not apply where a defendant indirectly causes a
death by a provocative act, but instead “requires that the felon or
his accomplice commit the killing.” (People v. Washington (1965)
62 Cal.2d 777, 781.) Even in People v. Garcia (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 956, where the victim died from cardiac arrhythmia
12
an hour after the defendant robbed him, the court held that the
defendant was the actual killer because “[h]e was the sole
perpetrator of a robbery where a death occurred as a direct
consequence of his actions.” (Id. at p. 969.) It was irrelevant that
the victim’s preexisting heart condition contributed to his death,
or that a healthy victim would not have died from the assault.
(Id. at pp. 970-971.)
Even if we assume a jury could hypothetically interpret
“kill” as including indirectly causing a victim’s death, the record
shows that it did not happen in this case. Although neither we
nor the resentencing court may “engage in ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion’ ” (People v.
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972) at the prima facie stage, we
may review the record of conviction to determine the basis of a
defendant’s conviction. (See People v. Bodely (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1193, 1202.) If “[n]o other contributing factor was
alleged to be involved in [the victim]’s death,” we may conclude
that “the record conclusively establishes [the] defendant was
[the] actual killer.” (Ibid.) As part of our analysis, we may
consider the closing arguments to understand the basis of the
jury’s conviction. (See People v. Rushing (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
1025, 1033-1035; People v. Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 16.)
Had any question of an indirect cause of death been presented,
the court would have been required to instruct the jury as to
proximate causation (People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d
567, 591), and we would have expected to see some mention of the
possibility in the closing arguments. No such theory was argued
13
to the jury,6 and no such instruction was given. The
prosecution’s theory was that Pryor raped Bandosingh and then
intentionally strangled her to death. The defense did not contend
that Pryor indirectly caused the victim’s death. It argued Pryor
had consensual sex with Bandosingh, did nothing to cause her
death, and that the People failed to perform a full investigation
and had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt he had anything
to do with her death.
Because “it would have been impossible on this record for a
jury to have made the findings it did without finding that [the
defendant] was [the] actual killer” (People v. Beaudreaux (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1248), Pryor is ineligible for resentencing,
and the trial court did not err in denying his petition at the prima
facie stage. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233
[affirming the denial of a petition at the prima facie stage
because “the record here makes clear that [the defendant] was
the actual killer and the only participant in the killing”].)
6 Trial transcripts (including the closing arguments) were
attached to Pryor’s section 1172.6 petition on a compact disc. As
a supporting attachment to the petition, they should have been
included in the appellate record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.320(d)(1)(C).) We sua sponte augment the appellate record to
include them. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.155, 8.340(c).)
14
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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