People v. Thompson CA4/3

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Filed 6/9/25 P. v. Thompson CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063283

v. (Super. Ct. No. FBA1300235)

GREGORY PIERRE THOMPSON, OPINION
JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Miriam Ivy Morton, Judge. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed
and remanded with directions in part.
Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Gregory Pierre Thompson, Jr., was convicted of the murder of
Darnell Cleveland and the attempted murder of Devontea Cole. Thompson
raises the following claims on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to
support the findings that the murder and attempted murder were willful,
premeditated, and deliberate; (2) the trial court erred in admitting extensive
gang evidence; (3) the prosecution committed misconduct by eliciting
evidence he was a gang member; (4) the prosecution committed misconduct
by improperly describing premeditation and deliberation; (5) his sentence on
count 2 must be modified to reflect the statutory punishment; (6) he is
entitled to a limited remand pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th
261 (Franklin); and (7) the restitution fine violates the prohibition against ex
post facto laws.
The Attorney General concedes Thompson’s sentence on count 2
should be modified to reflect the proper statutory punishment. We agree and
reverse and remand to the trial court to modify Thompson’s sentence. On
remand, we also direct the court to conduct a Franklin proceeding at
Thompson’s request. We otherwise affirm the judgment.
FACTS
A. Cole Identifies a Gang Member in a Prior Shooting
In early 2013, Anthony Mosby, a member of the Tre Roc Mafia
gang, was in the front passenger seat and Cole was in the back seat of a car
which pulled up to a bus stop where two people were waiting for a bus. Mosby

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asked, “Where are you from, cuz?” Mosby then fired a handgun out the
window, striking one of the people.
Cole later identified Mosby as the bus stop shooter. As a result,
Cole, a member of the West Side Village Park gang, was beaten up for
snitching and kicked out of the gang. A police officer who investigated the bus
stop shooting testified that snitching is taken very seriously in gang culture
and could lead to serious consequences such as physical injury or death.
B. Shooting of Cole and Cleveland
1. Prosecution’s Case-in-Chief
Two months after the bus stop shooting, M.T. had a party at her
house, which included her best friend Cleveland and Cleveland’s friend Cole.
Thompson, who M.T. had known for about a year, eventually arrived at the
party uninvited. Thompson asked M.T. why she allowed a snitch in her
house. Thompson told M.T. he was supposed to shoot up her house because of
the snitch she let in, but she told him her children were there and to take it
outside. Thompson went outside, and M.T. could see he was on his phone.
M.T. told Cleveland that Thompson told her there was a snitch at
her house but she did not know who it was. When M.T. went outside,
Thompson again stated he was supposed to be “shooting it up” because
someone had snitched, which caused his “big homie” to be locked up.
Thompson said the snitch was from the “Vill.”
Cleveland then walked outside and asked Thompson who the
snitch was, but Thompson did not answer. Cole came outside and stated
there were no snitches there. Thompson then pulled out a gun and started
shooting. M.T. did not see Cleveland or Cole with a gun. M.T. ducked to avoid
being hit. When she got up, she saw Cleveland and Cole lying on the ground.
Thompson fled.

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Other witnesses, including Cleveland’s brother E.F., stepbrother
J.D., and sister R.H., also testified Thompson had stated there was a snitch
at the party. They all heard gunshots and ran outside to see Cleveland and
Cole had been shot. They testified they did not see Cleveland or Cole with a
gun.
When police arrived, they saw Cleveland on the ground with a
gunshot wound to the chest and Cole standing in the driveway with a
gunshot wound to the leg. Paramedics attempted to treat Cleveland, but he
was already dead. None of the officers saw any guns in the area.
Police found Thompson a few blocks away, carrying a gray
backpack, which matched witnesses’ descriptions. Thompson jumped into the
passenger seat of a truck parked on the street. After ordering Thompson out
of the truck, police arrested him. Police found Thompson’s gray backpack in
the truck, as well as an LG cell phone belonging to Thompson in the front
passenger side door pocket.
The driver of the truck, J.M., testified Thompson had called him
for a ride. When Thompson had gotten into the car, he appeared nervous and
was carrying a black revolver. J.M. asked for the gun and Thompson gave it
to J.M., who put it between his legs. Thompson told J.M. he “finally got” the
person who was “messing with a family member.” The police recovered a
Taurus .357 Magnum revolver from the truck.
Police searched the back alley from where Thompson had run and
discovered four fired cartridge casings and one live .357 bullet. Examination
of the cartridges and bullet indicated they had been fired from a Taurus
revolver.
A criminalist testified he received a gunshot residue kit for
Cleveland and Thompson. Three residue particles were found on Thompson’s

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right hand and four particles on his left hand. One particle was found on
Cleveland’s left hand.
2. Cole’s Testimony
Cole, who went by the gang moniker “Taz,” was a member of
West Side Village Park gang. Cole sought to take the blame for the shooting
by testifying he shot first at Thompson, who then fired back in self-defense.
Cleveland then fired a gun at Thompson. The prosecution’s gang expert
testified that, if Cole, a snitch in the bus stop shooting, “took the blame off”
Thompson by testifying falsely at trial, Cole would gain protection from
future retribution by the Tre Roc Mafia gang.
3. Defense Case
Thompson testified in his own defense. He stated he did not know
Cole and Cleveland would be at M.T.’s house and was surprised to see M.T.
was having a party. Thompson denied saying anything about snitches to M.T.
As he turned to leave, Cole and Cleveland approached him. Cole asked him,
“Do we have an issue?” Thompson told Cole he had no idea what he was
talking about and did not know anything about a snitch. When Thompson
walked out of the house, Cole and Cleveland followed him. After Cole fired
his gun at Thompson, he shot back at Cole and Cleveland in self-defense.
On cross-examination, Thompson was asked about a recorded
telephone conversation he had with Mosby while in custody, approximately
one week after the shooting, in which he told Mosby, “I got the phone call to
knock out Taz.”
C. Procedural History
A jury found Thompson guilty of willful, deliberate, and

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premeditated murder (Penal Code1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and willful,
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count
2). The jury also found true various firearm allegations (§ 12022.53, subds.
(b), (c), (d)) as to both counts 1 and 2.
The trial court sentenced Thompson to a total term of 82 years to
life, consisting of 25 years to life on count 1 and 7 years to life on count 2,
plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancements on each of counts 1 and 2.
Thompson was required to pay $300 in restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)).
DISCUSSION
I.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Thompson contends the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury’s findings the murder of Cleveland and the attempted murder of Cole
were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. He argues the shootings were
unplanned and instead occurred during the heat of the moment when he
unexpectedly encountered Cleveland and Cole. We conclude the evidence was
sufficient and affirm the convictions.
A. Applicable Law
“A verdict of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder
requires more than a showing of intent to kill.” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1041, 1080.) “‘Deliberation’ refers to careful weighing of
considerations in forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’” means thought
over in advance.” (Ibid.) “‘[A]ttempted murder requires the specific intent to
kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing

1All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.

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the intended killing.’” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739.)
A first degree murder or attempted murder is premeditated and
deliberate when it occurs “as the result of preexisting thought and reflection
rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.” (People v. Stitely (2005) 35
Cal.4th 514, 543.) “Premeditation and deliberation do not require an
extended period of time, merely an opportunity for reflection.” (People v. Cook
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 603 (Cook).) “‘The true test is not the duration of time
as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other
with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at
quickly . . . .’” (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767, overruled on
other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2.)
Appellate courts typically rely on the following evidence to
determine the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain findings of premeditation
and deliberation: “(1) planning activity, (2) motive, and (3) manner of killing.”
(People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 (Perez).) These factors, “while
helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree
premeditated murder [or attempted murder], nor are they exclusive.” (Ibid.)
However, “[w]hen the record discloses evidence in all three categories, the
verdict generally will be sustained.” (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499,
529.) In conducting this analysis, we draw all reasonable inferences
necessary to support the judgment. (Perez, supra, at p. 1124.)
B. Standard of Review
“When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, the appellate court reviews the entire record to see
‘““whether it contains substantial evidence—i.e., evidence that is credible and
of solid value—from which a rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”’”(People v. Cochran (2002) 103

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Cal.App.4th 8, 12–13 (Cochran), disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 248, fn. 12.) “We view the facts in the light most
favorable to the judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in its support.”
(Cochran, at p. 13.) “The test on appeal is not whether we believe the
evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether ““any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.””” (Ibid.)
“Review on appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the finding of premeditated and deliberate murder [or attempted murder]
involves consideration of the evidence presented and all logical inferences
from that evidence . . . .” (Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1124.) “‘[I]t is the jury,
not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier
of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances
might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant
a reversal of the judgment.’” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to demonstrate both
the murder and attempted murder were premeditated and deliberate. First,
the evidence showed planning activity. Thompson brought a .357 revolver
fully loaded with hollow point rounds to M.T.’s party. (People v. Villegas
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224 (Villegas) [defendant’s act of carrying a
loaded gun at the time of the shooting was evidence of prior planning].) After
arriving at the party, Thompson complained to M.T. that she had invited a
“snitch,” who had caused his “big homie [to get] locked up,” and that he
therefore had to “shoot up” M.T.’s house. After Thompson later walked
outside, with Cleveland and Cole following, demanding to know who the

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snitch was, Thompson pulled out the loaded gun from his backpack and shot
four times in close succession.
Second, there was sufficient evidence of Thompson’s motive in
shooting Cleveland and Cole. The jury heard Thompson’s recorded telephone
call to Mosby a week after the shooting in which Thompson told Mosby he
had been told to “knock out” Cole because Cole had allegedly snitched on
Mosby regarding the earlier bus stop shooting. Thompson’s friend J.M. also
testified Thompson told him directly after the shooting that he “finally got”
the person who was “messing with a family member.” This evidence was in
addition to M.T.’s testimony that Thompson told her before the murder that
he had to shoot up her home because someone at the party had snitched on
his homie.
Third, the manner of killing supports a finding of premeditation
and deliberation. In addition to demonstrating planning activity, the act of
bringing a loaded gun is evidence of premeditation and deliberation. (People
v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636 [finding of premeditation and deliberation
upheld where, inter alia, “defendant brought a loaded handgun with him on
the night [of the killing], indicating he considered the possibility of a violent
encounter”].) After pulling out a loaded gun, Thompson shot at Cleveland and
Cole four times in quick succession and at close range, striking them both.
(Villegas, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1225 [noting “‘the act of firing toward a
victim at a close, but not point blank, range “in a manner that could have
inflicted a mortal wound had the bullet been on target is sufficient to support
an inference of intent to kill . . . .”’”].) After shooting the victims, Thompson
immediately fled, discarding the used shell casings, and attempting to evade
police, which demonstrates a guilty conscience. (People v. Batey (1989) 213

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Cal.App.3d 582, 586 [holding evidence of defendant fleeing crime scene is
relevant to show consciousness of guilt].)
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s
findings the murder and attempted murder were premeditated and
deliberate.
II.
ADMISSION OF GANG EVIDENCE
Thompson argues the trial court erred in admitting extensive
prejudicial gang evidence, particularly because there were no gang charges or
enhancements. He contends the admission of the gang evidence violated his
right to due process and a fair trial because it lowered the prosecution’s
burden of proof. We conclude the gang evidence, although extensive, was
relevant to the issues of motive and premeditation and deliberation and did
not violate Thompson’s right to due process and a fair trial. Even assuming
the trial court erred in admitting some of the gang evidence, any alleged error
was harmless given the substantial evidence of Thompson’s guilt.
A. Factual Background
The prosecution sought to introduce gang evidence as proof of
Thompson’s motive and state of mind, pursuant to Evidence Code section
1101, subdivision (b). Defense counsel objected “to any evidence of gangs
coming in at this point in time.” The trial court permitted introduction of
evidence of Thompson’s, Cleveland’s, and Cole’s gang ties. The trial court
further determined that, during its opening statement, the prosecution could
say Thompson was associated with gang members but not that he was or is a
gang member. Any further references to Thompson’s involvement in a gang
would depend on the evidence adduced at trial.

10
A gang expert testified regarding gang culture, including
territory, colors, hand signs, respect, gang challenges, committing crimes,
and putting in work. The expert explained various hand signs Thompson
made in photographs discovered on his cell phone, as well as the spelling of
certain words in letters found in Thompson’s backpack, noting they were
associated with the Tre Roc Crip Mafia gang.
In addition to the expert witness, the prosecution solicited the
testimony of four officers from the Barstow Police Department, including the
officer who investigated the bus stop shooting, a gang officer, and two police
officers. The officer who investigated the bus stop shooting testified he knew
Mosby to be a gang member with the moniker “Tone.” He also testified about
snitching in gang culture. The gang officer testified he was familiar with Cole
and knew him to be a West Side Village Park gang member. The two other
police officers testified they had prior contacts with Cole and were aware he
was a gang member.
B. Applicable Law
“[E]vidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other
act,” is admissible “when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, [or] absence of
mistake . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.” (Evid.
Code § 1101, subd. (b).) The trial court has discretion to exclude relevant
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed” by the possibility
of a “substantial danger of undue prejudice.” (Id., § 352.)
The prosecution is generally “entitled to ‘introduce evidence of
gang affiliation and activity where such evidence is relevant to an issue of
motive or intent.’” (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1550
(Gonzalez).) “[E]ven where gang membership is relevant,” however, “because

11
it may have a highly inflammatory impact on the jury, trial courts should
carefully scrutinize such evidence before admitting it.” (People v. Williams
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193.) On the other hand, “‘[b]ecause a motive is
ordinarily the incentive for criminal behavior, its probative value generally
exceeds its prejudicial effect, and wide latitude is permitted in admitting
evidence of its existence.’” (Gonzalez, at p. 1550.)
C. Standard of Review
“On appeal, we review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling
on whether evidence is relevant, not unduly prejudicial, and thus
admissible.” (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 654.) “‘[T]he trial
court is vested with wide discretion in determining relevance and in weighing
the prejudicial effect of proffered evidence against its probative value. Its
rulings will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.’”
(People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 87; People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th
584, 634-635 [holding that “a trial court’s discretionary ruling under
[Evidence Code, section 352] “‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a
showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice’””].)
D. Analysis
1. The Evidence Was Properly Admitted
Here, the gang evidence was relevant because it explained
Thompson’s motive for shooting Cleveland and Cole, which was to punish
Cole for snitching on Mosby. It also established the premeditation and
deliberation required to prove murder and attempted murder. The evidence
Cole was a gang member was also relevant to explaining why he testified
falsely that he shot at Thompson first, i.e., to protect himself from further
gang retaliation.

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Thompson has failed to demonstrate the gang evidence was
improperly admitted. Thompson himself concedes some of the gang evidence
was relevant to prove motive. Although he argues the gang evidence was
“extensive and cumulative,” he fails to pinpoint which specific witness or
witnesses should have been excluded or identify with any precision what
particular testimony was unduly excessive or prejudicial.
Although the gang evidence was certainly damaging, we cannot
say on this record that it was unduly prejudicial. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11
Cal.5th 1, 29 [““‘In applying section 352, “prejudicial” is not synonymous with
“damaging.”””].) The trial court limited the prejudicial nature of the evidence
by prohibiting the prosecution from arguing Thompson was a gang member,
while still admitting evidence the victims, Cleveland and Cole, were in a
gang.
Thompson also argues the trial court’s error in admitting the
large quantity of gang evidence was so serious as to violate due process and
his right to a fair trial. But the admission of evidence, even if erroneous
under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial
“‘fundamentally unfair.’” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 67; People v.
Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913.)
Here, although the testimony of the gang expert and other police
officers constituted a significant portion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, it
was far from the primary evidence of Thompson’s guilt. For example, M.T.
testified Thompson told her he was going to “shoot up” her house because
there was a snitch there who had caused his “big homie [to get] locked up.”
Multiple witnesses, including M.T, E.F., J.D., and R.H., testified they either
saw Thompson shoot Cole and Cleveland or heard gunshots and immediately
ran outside to find the victims had been shot. These witnesses all stated

13
neither Cleveland nor Cole had a gun. The witnesses also testified Thompson
fled, wearing a gray backpack. Officers responding to the shooting found
Thompson in a nearby alley, wearing a gray backpack. J.M. testified that,
after Thompson got into J.M.’s truck, he told J.M. he had shot someone and
gave J.M. the gun he was holding. After police arrested Thompson, they
recovered the .357 caliber gun in the truck. Police also recovered shell casings
in the alley, matching the .357 caliber weapon.
This evidence was sufficient to demonstrate Thompson’s guilt
absent the gang evidence. Therefore, the admission of the gang evidence did
not render Thompson’s trial so “fundamentally unfair” as to violate his
federal rights to due process or a fair trial.
2. Any Error Was Harmless
We are not convinced the trial court erred in admitting the gang
evidence as it was relevant for the reasons discussed. However, even
assuming the court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352,
any error was harmless. “Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in
admitting evidence is subject to the traditional” test under People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.) The
reviewing court must ask whether it is reasonably probable the verdict would
have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error. (People v. Earp
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 878; Watson, at p. 836.)
Here, there was substantial eyewitness and physical evidence
linking Thompson to the crime, as well as evidence regarding Thompson’s
motive for shooting Cole and Cleveland. It is not reasonably likely the
outcome of trial would have been different absent admission of the gang
evidence, and any error was therefore harmless.

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III.
PROSECUTION’S USE OF GANG EVIDENCE
Thompson argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by
eliciting evidence he was a gang member, contrary to the trial court’s pretrial
ruling the prosecution could only show he was associated with gang
members. We disagree.
A. Relevant Law
“‘Prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal when it “so infect[s]
a trial with unfairness [as to] create a denial of due process. [Citations.]
Conduct by a prosecutor that does not reach that level nevertheless
constitutes misconduct under state law, but only if it involves the use of
deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the court or jury.”’” (People v.
Peterson (2020) 10 Cal.5th 409, 465.)
B. Waiver
The defendant must object to the prosecutor’s misconduct and
request “‘the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety.’” (People v.
Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 952.) “When a defendant believes the
prosecutor has made remarks constituting misconduct during argument, he
or she is obliged to call them to the court’s attention by a timely objection.
Otherwise no claim is preserved for appeal.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25
Cal.4th 34, 43–44 (Morales).) However, the defendant’s failure to object “may
be excused if it would have been futile or an admonition would not have cured
the harm.” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 760.)
Although defense counsel made a general objection at the pretrial
hearing to any gang evidence being admitted, there were no individual
objections nor any request for the trial court to admonish the jury to
disregard the gang evidence. Nor has Thompson posited any reason why a

15
request for admonishment would not have cured the harm. The claim is
therefore waived. (Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 43–44.)
C. Analysis
Even if this claim had not been waived, it lacks merit. There was
no prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor complied with the trial
court’s pretrial order prohibiting arguing Thompson was a gang member in
opening statement. Rather, the evidence adduced at trial merely established
Thompson had gang ties, not that he himself was a gang member. Although
the gang expert testified regarding Thompson’s gang ties, including
photographs and letters, he did not opine that Thompson was a gang
member. When specifically queried by defense counsel, the gang expert
testified law enforcement had not documented Thompson as a gang member.
Thompson testified in his own defense that he was a member of the Duce
Blocc Young Thugs, but the Thugs were not a criminal street gang.
Moreover, even if the prosecutor’s actions constituted misconduct,
any error was harmless. Prosecutorial misconduct can result in reversal
under state law if there was a “reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
verdict in the absence of the challenged conduct” and under federal law if the
misconduct was not “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Cook, supra, 39
Cal.4th at p. 608.) Given the substantial evidence against Thompson, it is not
reasonably likely the outcome at trial would have been different even if the
prosecutor had not introduced the gang evidence. Accordingly, we reject
Thompson’s claim of error.
IV.
PROSECUTION’S COMMENTS REGARDING PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION
Thompson contends the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial
misconduct by improperly explaining premeditation and deliberation to the

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jury in closing argument by analogizing it to the determination whether to
stop at a yellow light. He argues comparing the premeditation and
deliberation necessary to find a defendant guilty of murder to the quotidian
decision whether to drive through a yellow light diminished the prosecution’s
burden of proof. We find no error.
A. Factual Background
In closing argument, the prosecutor explained the standards for
determining premeditation and deliberation as follows:
“Easily broken down, willful just means intended to kill.
Deliberate, just weighing considerations for and against to kill, premeditated,
deciding to kill before completing the act.
“Now, the length of time is not the . . . end all be all. It’s not
something rash or impulsive, but a cold, calculated decision to kill can be
made quickly. This isn’t a perfect equivalent, but it’s a helpful analogy.
“Willful, deliberate, premeditated, like driving towards a
stoplight. The light turns yellow, and you have a few seconds to act. And in
those few seconds you’re thinking. You’re thinking, can I make this light? Do
I know this light? Is it particularly, say, a yellow for a long time? Are there
any cops around? Is there anyone behind me? Can I make it? All those
thoughts happen in a few seconds. You think about it. You make a decision
on it.”
Defense counsel neither objected to the prosecutor’s statements
nor requested a curative instruction. The trial court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 521, which defined the deliberation and premeditation
necessary to support a murder conviction.

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B. Applicable Law
When a claim of prosecutorial misconduct “focuses upon
comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed or applied any of the
complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.” (Morales, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 44.) It is considered misconduct to misstate the law to the jury,
and bad faith is not required. (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666.)
“But a prosecutor is allowed to vigorously argue the case and is afforded
‘significant leeway’ in discussing the facts and the law in closing argument.”
(People v. Azcona (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 504, 516.)
C. Waiver
Defense counsel must object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct
and request a curative instruction to avoid waiver of the claim. (Morales,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 43–44.) Here, defense counsel failed to object or
request a curative instruction. Nor has Thompson posited any reason why a
request for admonishment would not have cured any alleged harm.
Therefore, the claim is forfeited.
D. Analysis
Even assuming the claim were not waived, it lacks merit. Our
Supreme Court, in reviewing a very similar use of the yellow traffic light
analogy, concluded it was a permissible means of explaining the concept of
premeditation and deliberation to the jury. (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th
680, 715.) In Avila, the court held the prosecutor did not improperly argue
the calculated judgment whether to commit murder was the equivalent of a
decision to stop at a yellow light; rather, it was simply an illustration of how
quickly a decision may be made yet nevertheless be premeditated and
deliberate. (Ibid.) We are bound by the decisions of the California Supreme

18
Court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
Therefore, we reject Thompson’s claim of error.
V.
CORRECTION OF SENTENCE ON COUNT 2
Thompson argues the trial court improperly imposed a sentence
of seven years to life for the attempted murder in count 2 and instead should
have sentenced him to a term of life in prison with a minimum parole
eligibility of seven years. The Attorney General concedes the court erred. We
agree and remand to the court to modify the sentence on count 2.
The punishment for attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder is “imprisonment in the state prison for life with the
possibility of parole.” (§ 664, subd. (a).) A defendant serving a life sentence
shall not be paroled until serving a minimum of seven years in prison.
(§ 3046, subd. (a)(1).) Accordingly, the correct statement of Thompson’s
sentence for attempted murder in count 2 is life with the possibility of parole.
(People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, 977–978, fn. 4 [noting “there is no
minimum term” for a defendant found guilty of an attempt to commit willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder; rather, “there is a minimum parole
eligibility of seven years, but that is not part of the sentence that is
pronounced”].)
Accordingly, upon remand, the trial court shall prepare an
amended abstract of judgment which corrects Thompson’s sentence for
attempted murder in count 2 to life in prison with the possibility of parole.
VI.
ENTITLEMENT TO A FRANKLIN HEARING
Thompson, who was 25 years old at the time of the shooting,
argues his case should be remanded to the trial court to permit him to make

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a record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth, pursuant to Franklin. At the
time of Thompson’s trial and sentencing in 2023, defense counsel did not
present any evidence regarding his level of maturity, cognitive ability, or
other youth-related factors or raise the need to create a record for
Thompson’s future youth offender parole eligibility hearing. We agree
Thompson is entitled to request a Franklin proceeding.
A. Relevant Law
Because he committed the charged crimes at the age of 25 and
received an indeterminate sentence, Thompson is entitled to a youth offender
parole hearing during the 25th year of his sentence. (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1),
(b)(3).) When determining whether to grant parole, the Board of Parole
Hearings (Board) “shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of
youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any
subsequent growth and increased maturity . . . .” (§ 4801, subd. (c).)
“The criteria for parole suitability set forth in . . . sections 3051
and 4801 contemplate that the Board’s decisionmaking at [a defendant’s]
eventual parole hearing will be informed by youth-related factors, such as his
cognitive ability, character, and social and family background at the time of
the offense.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 269.) This information may
include statements by “‘[f]amily members, friends, school personnel, faith
leaders, and representatives from community-based organizations with
knowledge about the individual before the crime.’” (Id. at p. 283.) Franklin
observed that “[a]ssembling such statements ‘about the individual before the
crime’ is typically a task more easily done at or near the time of the juvenile’s
offense rather than decades later when memories have faded, records may
have been lost or destroyed, or family or community members may have
relocated or passed away.” (Id. at pp. 283-284.)

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B. Analysis
The Attorney General argues Thompson forfeited the opportunity
to request a Franklin hearing because he failed to do so at the time of
sentencing, citing People v. Medrano (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 961 (Medrano). In
Medrano, the court declined to remand the case for a Franklin hearing but
affirmed the judgment without prejudice to allow the defendant to file a
motion in the trial court under section 1203.01 requesting such a hearing.
(Medrano, at p. 968.)
Medrano is distinguishable because, in that case, the court of
appeal affirmed the conviction and did not have cause to remand the case.
Here, because we are already remanding to the court for the limited purpose
of modifying Thompson’s sentence on count 2, it is unnecessary to require
Thompson to file a separate motion in the trial court under section 1203.01 to
obtain a Franklin hearing. Instead, on remand, we direct the court to conduct
a Franklin proceeding if Thompson requests one. If he does, then both parties
should be permitted “to put on the record any relevant evidence that
demonstrates [Thompson’s] ‘culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise
bears on the influence of youth-related factors.’” (In re Loza (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 797, 807.)
VII.
RESTITUTION FINE
Thompson contends the $300 restitution fine imposed at
sentencing in 2023 violates federal and state prohibitions against ex post
facto laws because, at the time he committed the crime in 2013, the minimum
restitution fine was $280. We conclude Thompson’s claim of error is without
merit.

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When Thompson committed the instant crimes in 20132, the
minimum restitution fine was $280. (former § 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) Effective
January 1, 2014, the minimum restitution fine was raised to $300. (§ 1202.4,
subd. (b)(1).) At the time of sentencing in 2023, the trial court imposed a
restitution fine of $300, which was within the statutory mandated range of
$280 to $10,000, under the former statute in effect when Thompson
committed the crimes in 2013. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).)Defense counsel did not
object at sentencing to the imposition of the restitution fine.
Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit the imposition of
ex post facto laws. (U.S. Const., art. 1, § 10, Cal. Const., art. I, § 9.) Because
“the imposition of restitution fines constitutes punishment, . . . [it] is subject
to the proscriptions of the ex post facto clause and other constitutional
provisions.” (People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 143.) Thus, the trial court
was required to apply the law in effect when Thompson committed the
offenses in 2013 when determining his restitution fine. (See Ibid.)
We agree with the Attorney General the claim is waived because
defense counsel did not object at the time of sentencing. “[T]he rule of
forfeiture is applicable to ex post facto claims [citation], particularly where
any error could easily have been corrected if the issue had been raised at the
sentencing hearing.” (People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1189.)
Moreover, absent evidence to the contrary, it is presumed the
trial court properly exercised its legal duty. (Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19
Cal.3d 899, 913.) Thus, without any explicit statement by the court it was
imposing the minimum $300 restitution fine based upon the statute in effect

2 All citations to former section 1202.4, are to the version of the

statute enacted by Stats. 2011, chapter 358, section 1.

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at the time of sentencing, rather than an amount within the statutory range
of up to $10,000 at the time the crime was committed in 2013, we assume the
court properly exercised its discretion.
DISPOSITION
We remand the case to the trial court to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment which properly states Thompson’s sentence on count 2.
The court shall forward a certified copy of the same to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. On remand, we also direct the court to
conduct a Franklin proceeding if Thompson so requests. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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