People v. Lopez CA4/2

CourtListener 10599898CalctappJun 6, 2025

Full text

Filed 6/6/25 P. v. Lopez CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, No. E084816

v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1400906)

ANTHONY JACOB LOPEZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Joshlyn Pulliam, Judge.

Dismissed.

Lizabeth Weis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Anthony Jacob Lopez appeals the trial court’s

postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing of his voluntary manslaughter

conviction (Pen. Code,1 § 192, subd. (a)) under section 1172.6. Appointed counsel has

filed a brief under the authority of People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216

(Delgadillo), requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record. In

addition, defendant has had an opportunity to file a supplemental brief with this court and

has not done so. Because defendant’s counsel filed a brief raising no issues and

defendant was notified that failure to timely file a supplemental brief may result in the

dismissal of the appeal as abandoned and was given an opportunity to file a personal

supplemental brief but failed to do so, we dismiss the appeal as abandoned. (Id. at

pp. 231-232.)

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

On February 10, 2014, defendant, a former member of the Arlanza 13 gang, was

involved in a fight with Johnnie Huerta and his uncle, Paul Mungia, two former members

of the 18th Street gang, after the two men rushed and confronted defendant. Mungia

called out 18th Street and said “Fuck Arlanza.”{CT 50, 62, 64, 73, 95-96, 98, 100, 138}

1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 A summary of the factual background is taken from the preliminary
hearing.{CT 41-196}

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One of them cocked a gun and said they were going to smoke defendant, and called him

by his moniker “Smokey.”{CT 100-101, 139, 141} Mungia, who was wearing a white t-

shirt, was stabbed in the chest during the fight by defendant and succumbed to his

injuries.{CT 50, 97-98, 105, 123, 133, 135, 137-138}

After defendant was arrested, defendant told the investigating detective that he had

stabbed the man in the white t-shirt in self-defense.{CT 139, 141-145, 147-148}

On January 25, 2016, defendant pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192,

subd. (a); count 1) and assault with force likely to result in great bodily injury (§ 245,

subd. (a)(4); count 2). Defendant also admitted the allegations that he personally used a

deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) in the commission of count 1 and that he

committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,

subd. (b)(1)(A).) Defendant also admitted that he had suffered a prior prison term

(§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (c) and (e)(1), 1170.12,

subd. (c)(1).){CT 14-15; SuppRT 4-7}

On February 26, 2016, defendant was sentenced to a total term of 25 years in state

prison as follows: 12 years for manslaughter (count 1), plus one year consecutive for the

deadly weapon enhancement, plus 10 years consecutive for the gang enhancement; a

concurrent term of two years for aggravated assault; the court stayed the punishment for

the prior prison term and the gang enhancement attached to count 2.{CT 17-20}

On May 4, 2024, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to

section 1172.6.{SuppCT 6} In his petition, he alleged that a complaint or information

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was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory in which

malice is imputed to a person based on that person’s participation in a crime or under the

natural and probable consequences doctrine, that he was convicted of murder following a

trial or after he accepted a plea offer in lieu of trial, and that he could not presently be

convicted of murder because of changes to sections 188 and 189.{SuppCT 6} Defendant

requested the appointment of counsel.{SuppCT 8} The trial court subsequently

appointed counsel for defendant.{CT 23}

On July 30, 2024, the People filed its points and authorities in support of

ineligibility finding at the prima facie stage. The People also asked the trial court to take

judicial notice of defendant’s plea form, the preliminary hearing transcript, the abstract of

judgment, and the information, which were attached as exhibits to the People’s motion.

The People argued defendant was the actual perpetrator as he admitted to the detectives

that it was he who had stabbed and killed the victim with a knife with no other

participants mentioned.{CT 24-204}

The prima facie hearing was held on October 11, 2024.{CT 205; RT 4} At that

time, the prosecutor argued, in relevant part, that “[t]he evidence at the preliminary

hearing demonstrated that the petitioner was the one who stabbed and killed the victim;

therefore, he is ineligible for relief as a matter of law and his Penal Code section 1172.6

petition should be denied.”{RT 4} Defense counsel responded, “During the preliminary

hearing a police officer testified that the defendant admitted stabbing the victim. The

defense will not be introducing any evidence at this time that would contradict that.”{RT

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4-5} Defense counsel thereafter submitted.{RT 5} The trial court noted that it had

“reviewed the court records, along with the preliminary hearing transcript, the

defendant’s plea forms and the abstract,” and based on the information provided, the

court found defendant was “ineligible for relief under this statute.”{RT 5} The court thus

denied defendant’s section 1172.6 petition.{CT 205; RT 5} Defendant timely

appealed.{CT 206}

III.

DISCUSSION

After defendant appealed, appointed appellate counsel filed a brief under the

authority of Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, setting forth a statement of the case and a

summary of the procedural background. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436

(Wende); Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders).) Counsel considered

potential issues on appeal but found no specific arguments as grounds for relief, and

requests that we exercise our discretion and independently examine the appellate record

for any arguable issues.{AOB 5-9} Under Anders, which requires “a brief referring to

anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal,” (Anders, at p. 744)

counsel raises the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying

defendant’s section 1172.6 petition.{AOB 9}

We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief. We

noted that if he did not do so, we could dismiss the appeal. Nevertheless, defendant has

not filed one.{ACCMS 4/16/25 Order} Under these circumstances, we have no

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obligation to independently review the record for error. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th. at

pp. 224-231.)

In Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, the California Supreme Court held that

Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738 procedures do not apply in

appeals from the denial of a section 1172.6 postjudgment petition. (Delgadillo, at pp.

224-226.) Thus, we need not examine the entire record ourselves to look for arguable

grounds for reversal. (Id. at p. 228.) Because defendant’s counsel filed a brief raising no

issues, and defendant was given an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief but

declined, we may dismiss the appeal as abandoned. (Id. at p. 232.) “Independent review

in Wende appeals consumes substantial judicial resources,” and “[t]he state . . . has an

interest in an ‘economical and expeditious resolution’ of an appeal from a decision that is

‘presumptively accurate and just.’” (Id. at p. 229.)

We, however, have discretion to conduct Wende review even when it is not

required. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) This case does not call for us to

exercise our discretion to independently examine the record for arguable issues, and

decline to exercise our discretion to independently examine the record. Accordingly, we

dismiss the appeal as abandoned. (Delgadillo, at p. 232.)

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IV.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL
J.

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