People v. Lawson CA2/5

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Filed 6/5/25 P. v. Lawson CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B337009

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. MA083509

DWIGHT LAWSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Brian C. Yep, Judge. Affirmed.
Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R.
Maline, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
The jury found Dwight Lawson guilty of attempted murder
(Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a) & 664, count 1) and felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a), count 2). In count 1,
the jury found true the allegations that Lawson personally used a
firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a),
and personally inflicted great bodily harm within the meaning of
section 12022.7, subdivision (a). The jury also found true
aggravated circumstances alleged under California Rules of
Court, rules 4.421(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) and (b)(1) in count 1. The
jury found not true the allegation that the attempted murder was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated. As to both counts, Lawson
admitted that he suffered a prior strike conviction under the
Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)–
(d).) The trial court sentenced Lawson to 28 years 4 months in
prison.
On appeal, Lawson contends that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury’s finding that he intended to kill the
victim, and that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the
jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter and heat of passion
under CALCRIM No. 603.
We affirm the judgment.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
FACTS

On July 3, 2022, Sean Wallace went to Big Shotz Bar and
Grill (Big Shotz) in Lancaster with a female friend.2 Wallace and
his friend were only in the bar briefly; they were not permitted to
remain inside the bar because of the friend’s attire. The friend
argued with the security guard because she wanted to go back
inside the bar. Wallace was trying to get her to leave. Lawson,
who was also outside the entrance to the bar, appeared to be
arguing with another person. Lawson and Wallace’s friend began
arguing. Lawson’s demeanor was very aggressive—he “got in
[Wallace’s friend’s] face[,]” and looked as if he might hit her.
Wallace stepped between Lawson and his friend and pushed
Lawson away from her. Wallace told Lawson to stay out of his
friend’s face. The men separated and looked at each other.
Lawson yelled, “Blood, I am about to shoot these mother fuckers
up.” Lawson started moving toward his car and Wallace ran,
believing that Lawson intended to retrieve a gun. Wallace saw
Lawson open the trunk of his car and pull out a gun. As Wallace
was running away he heard about four shots fired. A bullet hit
Wallace in the leg. He limped into the bar and told everyone that
he had been shot. Some people lowered him to the floor and
applied pressure until an ambulance arrived. Wallace was
transported to a hospital where he was treated for the gunshot
wound and held for several hours.

2 At trial, Wallace testified with the aid of an assisted
listening device and had a sign language interpreter on standby.
Wallace suffered from hearing impairment, but was not deaf.

3
Joy Tucker was also at Big Shotz on July 3, 2022. She had
been at the bar for a while when she first saw Lawson. Lawson
had a beer in his hand and he was arguing with one of the staff.
The argument did not appear to be serious—Lawson was
laughing and smiling. Tucker stopped watching the argument
and ordered food for takeout.
Later, Tucker left the bar and was getting into the driver’s
seat of her car when she saw Lawson pacing back and forth
“bantering off to anyone who walked by.” She was parked close
to the entrance of the bar and could hear Lawson “cussing and
fussing about any and everything.” He looked “really intoxicated
or high.” He appeared to Tucker “like he was really trying to get
someone to just bite to his antics, to him just being outside the
building and just upset, just mad.” Lawson was trying to get
back into the bar, but the staff turned him away. There was a
young woman who was arguing with the security guards because
they would not let her into the bar, either. Tucker saw Lawson
approach the woman. His behavior was “erratic.” He looked “like
a crazed man.” Lawson started yelling at the woman, “ ‘I can
show you all’—‘I can show you’—‘I will show you.’ ” Tucker’s
friend, who was with her in the car, said, “ ‘He is really lit.’ ”
Tucker responded, “ ‘No. That is a demon. He is full on’—”
The argument continued and a security guard started to
move Lawson and the woman away from the door so that
customers could enter. Tucker saw Wallace turn around and talk
to Lawson about pushing the woman. Wallace told Lawson to
back off. Another man standing close by told Lawson “ ‘Nobody’s
talking to you, man.’ ” Lawson said: “I got something for y’all. I
got—I’ma show you. I got something.” Lawson then walked to a
car parked across the street. He opened the trunk and pulled out

4
a gun. Lawson walked toward Tucker’s car, firing the gun as he
walked. Tucker described Lawson as “just gone, not even present
in the moment, and shooting. There wasn’t—it didn’t appear like
there was anyone directly he was trying to shoot at. He was just
shooting. Walking down the street, heading toward my car
shooting.” Lawson shot in the air and everyone who had been at
the door outside of Big Shotz began to run toward the back. As
Lawson walked toward Tucker’s car she tried to duck and pull
her friend down out of harm’s way, but she knew that it was
futile—if Lawson decided to shoot into her car at that point the
bullet would enter and ducking would not make a difference. She
sat up straight and froze, watching Lawson as he passed her car.
Tucker turned to see where Lawson was going. Lawson
continued to walk toward Big Shotz and fired the gun again.
Then Lawson turned and walked back in Tucker’s direction.
Tucker drove away.
When Tucker was a few blocks away she pulled over,
parked the car, and cried. She was parked for about 15 to 20
minutes crying while her friend tried to calm her. Once she was
able to collect herself, she began driving to a Shell gas station
several miles away from Big Shotz. She was stopped at a traffic
light near the gas station when a car pulled up next to her with
the radio blaring. Over the noise of the radio she could hear one
of the occupants of the car screaming and cursing at the other
person in the car. Tucker and her friend looked over. Lawson
was driving the car idling next to them. His window was part
way down and Tucker could see him screaming at the person in
the passenger seat. Lawson looked back at Tucker and her
friend. He stuck his head out of the window and said, “ ‘Oh yeah.
You bitches are a part of this shit, too.’ ” Tucker told her friend

5
that the guy in the car next to them was the shooter from Big
Shotz. Lawson was in a right-turn-only lane, so Tucker hesitated
at the light to make sure Lawson turned right. He did not. She
started to pull forward slowly and go straight. Lawson also
pulled forward. Tucker drove faster and Lawson sped up. Right
after they cleared the intersection Lawson pulled in front of
Tucker, turned his car to the left and blocked the street. There
was no way for Tucker to go around him.
Lawson exited his vehicle and walked toward Tucker’s car
with a half-full bottle of alcohol in his hand. He crawled onto the
hood of Tucker’s car and screamed, “You bitches know who I am.
If you don’t know, now you’re going to learn today. You want to
fuck with this?” Tucker and her friend shook their heads no.
Lawson got off the hood of the car and drove away. Tucker drove
to the Shell station. She called a friend who worked at Big Shotz
and asked if everything was okay. Her friend said that a man
had been shot in the leg and that the shooter had not been
apprehended. Tucker told her friend at the bar that Lawson had
been on the hood of her car and told him which direction Lawson
had driven. Tucker’s friend yelled for a police officer who was
making a report of the incident at Big Shotz. Tucker told the
officer that she was too upset to drive but would wait at the Shell
station to speak with him about the incident.
In total, Tucker saw or heard Lawson shoot into the air
twice while standing next to his own car, fire three to four times
as he approached Tucker’s car, and fire another three shots as he
walked toward Big Shotz. She saw Lawson holding a beer in the
bar and she saw him holding a half-full bottle of alcohol when he
got on top of her car. She did not see him holding any alcohol
outside of Big Shotz during his encounter with Wallace. Tucker

6
described Lawson as a demon because “if it’s not even alcohol,
drugs or mentally[. . . .]” “His actions. . . . He looked gone. Like,
he—eyes glassed over almost. Like, he wasn’t really present in
the moment. Like somebody that’s really—excuse me—fucked
up.”
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Detective James
Phillips retrieved surveillance video of the incident from the area
that was played for the jury. The video depicts Lawson engaging
in a verbal altercation with Wallace’s female friend. Lawson
moves into very close physical proximity to the friend. Wallace
steps between the two and pushes Lawson back, causing Lawson
to step off of the curb that is directly behind him. Lawson can be
seen pointing at Wallace and his friend repeatedly and shouting
at them. Lawson turns and walks across the street to a car,
opens the trunk, and retrieves a gun. Lawson then crosses the
street and appears to fire one or more shots in the air as he
walks. Lawson passes Tucker’s car, which is parked at the corner
directly in front of the Big Shotz entrance. At the same time,
Wallace begins backing down the sidewalk away from Lawson
and the Big Shotz entrance. No other people can be seen on the
sidewalk with Wallace, and no other people were depicted on the
sidewalk before Wallace began backing away. After Lawson is
past Tucker’s car he walks steadily in Wallace’s direction,
following Wallace and firing multiple shots seconds apart.
Lawson then turns, runs back to the car across the street, and
drives away.
Detective Phillips testified for the prosecution regarding
marksmanship. Detective Phillips held the Sheriff’s
Department’s qualification of expert marksman. The detective
testified that hitting a mark requires concentration, knowledge,

7
and control. If the target is 30 yards away, even greater skill and
concentration are required. The difficulty is further increased if
the target is moving. Hitting a target is most difficult if the
shooter is also moving. If a person is shooting wildly there is a
risk that a nearby person or object will get hit.

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Intent to Kill

Lawson first contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury’s finding that he intended to kill Wallace and
was not shooting randomly without intending to kill. The
contention is without merit.

1. Legal Principles

When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review
the record “ ‘ “ ‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below
to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is,
evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 981, 988.) “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted
unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’
[Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We
must “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People
v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The same standard applies

8
when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.”
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court
must accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have
drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) On appeal, we do not consider
whether there is some evidence that could cause the trier of fact
to reach a different conclusion, and we do not re-weigh the
evidence. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
“To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution
must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a
direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended
killing.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591,
602.) “Attempted murder requires express malice, that is, the
assailant either desires the victim’s death, or knows to a
substantial certainty that the victim’s death will occur.” (People
v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 178.) “Direct evidence of intent
to kill is rare, and ordinarily the intent to kill must be inferred
from the statements and actions of the defendant and the
circumstances surrounding the crime.” (Canizales, at p. 602.) If
a jury concludes a defendant’s use of a lethal weapon with lethal
force was purposeful, an intent to kill can be inferred. (People v.
Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741.)

2. Analysis

Lawson contends that the prosecution failed to offer
substantial evidence that he shot at Wallace as opposed to simply
randomly firing his gun at him. He argues that, at most, the
evidence showed he fired in Wallace’s direction with the intent to
scare Wallace. Lawson further argues that Wallace initiated the

9
confrontation by pushing him, and that in Lawson’s intoxicated
condition, this caused him to act without intending to kill.
Lawson asserts that “[i]t is reasonably likely” that he did not say
“Blood, I am about to shoot these mother fuckers up” as Wallace
testified—Wallace suffered from hearing impairment and Tucker
did not testify that she heard Lawson make the statement.
Lawson’s arguments do not concern whether substantial
evidence was presented to support the jury’s findings. His
arguments go to the weight of the evidence, which is not a proper
consideration for this court. Assessing credibility and weighing
evidence are tasks that are entrusted to the jury. (People v.
Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.) It is irrelevant whether the
jury could have reached a different conclusion; we review the
record to determine whether there was substantial evidence to
support the jury’s verdict. (Ibid.)
Contrary to Lawson’s assertion that he reacted to an
unprovoked push from Wallace, the prosecution presented
substantial, uncontroverted, evidence that Lawson, and not
Wallace, initiated the confrontation. The video depicts Lawson
approaching Wallace and his friend shortly after they exit the bar
and starting an argument with Wallace’s friend. Lawson moves
aggressively close to Wallace’s friend. When Wallace steps
between them and pushes Lawson back, Lawson steps back off
the curb, but he does not stumble or fall as a result of the push.
Consistent with the video evidence, Tucker and Wallace both
testified that Lawson was the aggressor. Tucker additionally
testified that Lawson was acting aggressively before Wallace and
his friend exited the bar. It appeared to Tucker that Lawson was
attempting to start a fight.

10
The evidence also demonstrates that Lawson was agitated
by his interaction with Wallace and Wallace’s friend, which is
probative of Lawson’s intent. (People v. Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th
at p. 741 [“evidence of motive is often probative of intent to kill”].)
Tucker testified that Lawson told Wallace and his friend that
Lawson had something for them: “I got something for y’all. I
got—I’ma show you. I got something.” Lawson then immediately
went to his car, retrieved the gun, and came back shooting.
Wallace testified that Lawson yelled, “Blood, I am about to shoot
these mother fuckers up.” Although Wallace suffered from
hearing impairment, he was not deaf. There was no evidence
adduced at trial that he could not hear what Lawson yelled at
him. Wallace’s testimony is sufficient to support the finding that
Lawson said that he was “about to shoot these mother fuckers
up[,]” and that statement evinces that Lawson intended to kill
Wallace. (See People v. Joseph (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 943, 950
[“[t]he ‘testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a
conviction’ unless it is ‘physically impossible or inherently
improbable’ ”].)
Lawson argues that the absence of intent to kill is
evidenced by the fact that he fired “warning shots” as he crossed
the street. The video shows Lawson pointing directly at Wallace
and his friend repeatedly while shouting and then walking
directly across the street and retrieving a gun. Lawson does not
fumble with his keys, stagger, or move haphazardly. Lawson
fires in the air only until he passes Tucker’s car.3 As soon as he

3 Lawson’s later attack of Tucker and her friend suggest
that he saw the women in Tucker’s car and chose not to shoot
directly at them as he followed Wallace.

11
passes Tucker’s car, Lawson lowers his weapon to eye level and
fires in Wallace’s direction as he follows Wallace. Lawson takes
several shots directly at Wallace, with pauses in between that
suggest he is adjusting his aim. Lawson continues to move
toward Wallace as Wallace flees, and he shoots directly at
Wallace multiple times from a close distance, ultimately hitting
Wallace in the leg.4 Viewing Lawson’s deliberate movements, the
jury could reasonably infer intent to kill. Moreover, the witness
testimony was consistent with the video regarding Lawson’s
actions. Tucker testified that she heard Lawson fire three shots
after he passed her car and was walking toward Big Shotz, and
Wallace testified that he heard approximately four shots fired as
he was running away from Lawson. California courts have held
that the “ ‘act of firing toward a victim at a close, but not point
blank, range “in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal
wound had the bullet been on target is sufficient to support an
inference of intent to kill . . . .” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Smith,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 741.) That Wallace “ ‘ “may have escaped
death because of [Lawson’s] poor marksmanship [does not]
necessarily establish a less culpable state of mind.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) Detective Phillips testified that it takes skill
and concentration for a shooter who is in motion to hit a moving
target. The jury could reasonably infer from the fact that Lawson
hit Wallace in the leg that Wallace was Lawson’s mark and that
Lawson intended to kill.

4 Lawson’s assertion that Wallace may not have been shot
is unfounded. Wallace testified that he was shot in the leg. His
testimony was uncontroverted and was sufficient to establish
that fact. (People v. Joseph, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 950.)

12
Finally, as the trial court pointed out when discussing
whether to give an instruction on voluntary intoxication, there
was minimal evidence produced regarding intoxication.5
Although Lawson can be seen drinking in the bar for a few
minutes in one video, it is unclear how much alcohol he
consumed. There is no evidence that Lawson consumed alcohol
outside of Big Shotz before the shooting. Lawson’s deliberate
behavior in the video was inconsistent with intoxication. When
Wallace pushed Lawson, Lawson did not lose his balance or fall,
despite stepping off the curb behind him. Lawson walked directly
to his car. He opened the trunk without fumbling the keys and
retrieved his gun in seconds. Lawson then pursued Wallace and
fired three to four shots directly at him, hitting Wallace in the leg
with one of the shots. By observing his behavior in the video, the
jury could infer that Lawson was not intoxicated, let alone
intoxicated to the point where he could not form the intent to kill.
The video and Tucker’s testimony provided a sufficient basis for
the jury to conclude that Lawson acted deliberately, with malice.

B. Heat of Passion Instruction

Lawson next contends that the trial court erred by refusing
to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of attempted voluntary
manslaughter based upon a heat of passion theory. This
contention also lacks merit.

5 The trial court ultimately decided to give the voluntary
intoxication instruction, as the evidence, while minimal, was a
sufficient basis to present the issue to the jury for consideration.

13
1. Legal Principles

“ ‘A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury “sua sponte
on general principles which are closely and openly connected with
the facts before the court.” [Citation.]’ . . .” (People v. Gutierrez
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 824; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19
Cal.4th 142, 154 (Breverman).) This obligation includes the duty
to give instructions on lesser included offenses, if there is
substantial evidentiary support for them. (Breverman, supra, at
p. 160.) We review de novo the claim that a trial court failed to
properly instruct the jury on the applicable principles of law.
(People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1215.)
In determining whether substantial evidence exists to
support an instruction, trial courts should not usurp the jury’s
function of evaluating the credibility of witnesses. (Breverman,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162.) In the context of lesser included
offenses, substantial evidence means “ ‘ “evidence from which a
jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[ ]” ’ that
the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.
[Citations.]” (Ibid.) “Speculation is insufficient to require the
giving of an instruction on a lesser included offense.” (People v.
Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 174.)
“Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of
murder when the requisite mental element of malice is negated
by a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, or by an unreasonable but
good faith belief in the necessity of self-defense. ‘Only these
circumstances negate malice when a defendant intends to kill.’
(People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59.) . . . To establish
voluntary manslaughter under a heat of passion theory, both

14
provocation and heat of passion must be found. (Id. at p. 60.)”
(People v. Gutierrez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 704, 708.)
“ ‘First, the provocation which incites the killer to act in the
heat of passion case must be caused by the victim or reasonably
believed by the accused to have been engaged in by the decedent.
[Citations.]’ ” (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 708–709.) “A defendant may not provoke a fight, become the
aggressor, and, without first seeking to withdraw from the
conflict, kill an adversary and expect to reduce the crime to
manslaughter by merely asserting that it was accomplished upon
a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. The claim of
provocation cannot be based on events for which the defendant is
culpably responsible. (People v. Johnston (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th
1299, 1312–1313; People v. Hoover (1930) 107 Cal.App. 635.)”
(People v. Oropeza (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 73, 83.) “ ‘Second, . . .
the provocation must be such as to cause an ordinary person of
average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and
reflection.’ (People v. Lujan (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1411–
1412.)” (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 709.)

2. Proceedings

In a hearing outside of the presence of the jury, defense
counsel argued that the court had a duty to give CALCRIM
No. 603 on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary
manslaughter/heat of passion. The prosecutor did not object to
the court giving the instruction. The court asked defense counsel
to prepare the instruction and said they would discuss whether it
was appropriate to give at a later hearing. The court stated that
it viewed the issue as one of whether there was sufficient

15
evidence to support giving the instruction, but that the court
would review the relevant case law.
In a subsequent hearing outside the presence of the jury,
the court informed the parties that it would not instruct on heat
of passion/voluntary manslaughter because it found there was
insufficient evidence that Lawson was sufficiently provoked to
merit shooting the victim and insufficient evidence that Lawson
did not have time to cool down. The court found: “The
provocative conduct of the victim, which is the shove, was not
sufficient provocation that it would cause an ordinary reasonable
person of average disposition to go get a gun and shoot the
victim.” [¶] “In addition, the court finds there was sufficient time
between the victim’s shove and the defendant’s shooting for a
reasonable and ordinary person to have cooled down. For
example, defendant walked to his car. And in doing so, he could
have just drove the car away, which is what an ordinary or
reasonable person with an average disposition would have done
based on the court’s finding and review of the evidence.”
Defense counsel argued that the court was improperly
deciding the issue for the jury. The court disagreed, stating that
its decision was based on a lack of sufficient evidence to support
those two elements. The court concluded, “I mean, is there a
provocation here. And again, I went through. It was a shove.
There’s no question about that. But the victim is trying to get
space and trying to protect his girlfriend at the same time. The
shove is—it’s not—it’s insignificant—it’s not insignificant, but it’s
certainly not enough to provoke a heat of passion where Mr.
Lawson then goes and gets a gun and begins to shoot.”

16
3. Analysis

Lawson contends that there was substantial evidence to
support instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter/heat of
passion under CALCRIM No. 603. Lawson argues that the
evidence Wallace shoved him is a sufficient basis for submitting
the question of whether he was adequately provoked to the jury.
Similarly, Lawson asserts the evidence that he had to cross the
street to retrieve a firearm from his vehicle is substantial
evidence from which a jury could conclude that he did not have
an adequate time to “cool off” before he shot Wallace. Lawson
argues that the trial court usurped the jury’s role by weighing the
evidence rather than instructing the jury on the relevant law and
permitting it to determine whether there was adequate
provocation and/or a sufficient cooling off period.
We need not address either of Lawson’s assertions, because
we conclude that it would have been inappropriate to give
CALCRIM No. 603 for another reason. (People v. Dawkins (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 991, 1004 [Court of Appeal may affirm the trial
court’s ruling on any basis apparent from the record].) Although
the trial court identified Wallace’s shove as a potential, though
insignificant, source of provocation, the uncontradicted evidence
demonstrates that Lawson instigated the confrontation by
picking a fight with Wallace’s friend and approaching her in a
menacing manner. This, in turn, caused Wallace to intervene out
of fear for his friend’s safety.
At trial, Tucker testified that, prior to the shooting, Lawson
was yelling and belligerent. He was pacing back and forth
“bantering off to anyone who walked by” and “cussing and fussing

17
about any and everything.” Lawson looked “like he was really
trying to get someone to just bite to his antics, to him just being
outside the building and just upset, just mad.” Tucker saw
Lawson approach Wallace’s female friend. Tucker described
Lawson’s behavior as “crazed” and “erratic”. Wallace also
testified that Lawson’s demeanor was very aggressive when he
was arguing with Wallace’s female friend—Lawson “got in
[Wallace’s friend’s] face[,]” and appeared as if he was going to hit
her. To shield his friend from harm, Wallace stepped between
Lawson and his friend and pushed Lawson away. The
surveillance video of the incident corroborates the witnesses’
testimony. Prior to the incident, Lawson can be seen
approaching various people, following them and gesturing
aggressively. He approaches Wallace and his friend right after
they exit Hot Shotz, gets uncomfortably close to Wallace’s friend’s
face, and engages her in an argument. It is only after Lawson
initiates the conflict with Wallace’s friend that Wallace steps in
and physically moves him away. In short, Lawson “provoke[d] a
fight, [became] the aggressor, and, without first seeking to
withdraw from the conflict, [attempted to] kill [Wallace].” (People
v. Oropeza, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 83.) Having instigated
the confrontation that culminated in the shooting, Lawson cannot
now claim that he was provoked by Wallace’s reaction to his
provocation. (Ibid.) The trial court did not err by refusing to
instruct on voluntary manslaughter/heat of passion.

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DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

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