People v. Perez CA5

CourtListener 10598340CalctappJun 4, 2025

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Filed 6/4/25 P. v. Perez CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088478
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF142069A)
v.

FELICIANO PEREZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Melinda Myrle
Reed, Judge.
Feliciano Perez, in pro. per.; and Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Snauffer, J.
Appellant Feliciano Perez appeals the denial of his request for resentencing after a
hearing to determine whether he was entitled to relief. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6.)1
Appellant’s counsel initially filed a brief requesting this court independently review the
record in line with principles defined in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo). Appellant then submitted a separate supplemental letter brief raising seven
issues he wished to have reviewed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is the second time an appeal from appellant’s petition for resentencing has
reached this court. We first repeat and incorporate our factual and procedural background
from appellant’s first appeal.2 We then provide additional factual and procedural
information following remand.
In 2005, appellant and two codefendants, Daniel Alonzo and Jose Gonzalez, were
charged in a criminal complaint with the murder of Jesus Gonzalez (the victim), two
counts of arson, one count of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, and one count of
destroying evidence. Appellant was additionally charged with the special allegations that
he used a deadly weapon (a baseball bat) during the murder and committed the murder
while engaged in committing robbery and kidnapping. Following appellant’s preliminary
hearing, the subsequent information filed included three special circumstance allegations
of felony murder and charges for kidnapping, second degree robbery, and first degree
residential burglary.
In 2006, appellant entered into a plea agreement in which he would plead to first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and first degree residential burglary (§ 459;
count 4) and have all other allegations dismissed in exchange for a stipulated sentence of

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 At appellant’s request, this court previously took judicial notice of the record
from his previous appeal (People v. Perez (Apr. 9, 2024, F086733) [nonpub. opn.]).

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29 years to life. Appellant then entered his plea “pursuant to People v. West”3 and
stipulated “to the preliminary hearing transcript that you presided over for purposes of
factual basis as to Counts 1 and 4.” The trial court sentenced him in line with the plea
agreement.
The preliminary hearing transcript contained multiple versions of the events
surrounding the murder and burglary. The victim was noticed to be missing during an
investigation into a fire at his house. The house also showed signs of a potential burglary.
While the investigation was ongoing, the victim was found dead in a canal, having been
bound and beaten. His death was deemed to result from drowning.
In one of the versions of events described at the preliminary hearing, appellant
allegedly admitted to burglarizing a house with two others and stealing property from it.
Appellant was later seen driving the victim’s truck. Appellant purportedly admitted to
striking the victim with a baseball bat, but more broadly claimed that he and his
codefendants, together, had bound the victim before throwing him into the canal.
In another version, one of appellant’s codefendants described how he, appellant,
and the third codefendant went to the victim’s house to complete a robbery. According to
the codefendant, appellant struck the victim with a hatchet before binding him. The three
then attempted to burn down the victim’s house before transporting him to a canal.
There, appellant struck the victim multiple times with a baseball bat before he was
thrown, alive, into the canal. The codefendant admitted to participating in some of these
events and to apologizing to the victim as it was happening.
In yet another version, appellant’s other codefendant alleged that appellant had
taken all of the most violent actions. In this version, while at the victim’s house,
appellant found an ax and threatened the victim with it. Appellant then ordered his
codefendants to tie up the victim. Appellant struck the victim several times before

3 People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595.

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moving him to the back of a van. When the three codefendants reached the canal,
appellant ordered the victim be killed. When this order was not followed, appellant
struck the victim with a baseball bat and threw him into the canal.
In 2023, appellant petitioned for resentencing. The trial court initially denied
appellant’s petition based on his failure to make a prima facie showing of eligibility. On
appeal from that order, and in line with the People’s concessions, this court found that
that the factual discrepancies contained in the preliminary hearing transcript precluded
finding appellant was ineligible for resentencing without a show cause hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (c). (People v. Perez, supra, F086733.)
The trial court held the required show cause hearing on August 6, 2024. The trial
court began the proceedings with a hearing on the prosecution’s in limine motion seeking
to declare one of appellant’s codefendants, Jose Antonio Rios Gonzalez, unavailable and
to admit his prior preliminary hearing testimony as admissible statements made against
penal interests under Evidence Code section 1230.
In line with this request, Tulare County District Attorney’s Office, Bureau of
Investigations, Sergeant John Lee testified to the efforts made to locate Gonzalez. Lee
testified that process servers were unable to locate Gonzalez and Lee’s own initial
searches also failed to locate Gonzalez. Lee found a parole record from December 2014
and learned that Gonzalez may have been turned over to the Department of Homeland
Security and possibly deported to his country of origin. While Lee believed that location
to be Mexico, he had no confirmation of that fact. Lee later became aware that a person
by the name of Jose Gonzalez was “detained … at the border” but could not confirm his
birth date matched with certainty and had no other way to confirm that person was the
same Gonzalez.
After argument, the trial court found the People had exercised reasonable diligence
to procure Gonzalez’s attendance, rendering him unavailable, and that testimony
regarding Gonzalez’s statements to investigators that had been recounted at appellant and

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Gonzalez’s joint preliminary hearing pursuant to section 872, subdivision (b) was
admissible in the show cause hearing under Evidence Code section 1230.
Following this, the court heard evidence from two witnesses, Jeanette G.
(appellant’s former girlfriend) and Daniel Alonzo (appellant’s codefendant). Jeanette
generally claimed she could not remember much from the events nearly 20 years prior.
However, she was able to recall appellant going out with a few people and getting into an
altercation or fight involving a baseball bat, the victim in the fight had been tied up, and
she had spoken to an investigator and testified previously about what she had been told at
the time.
The prosecutor attempted to refresh Jeanette’s memory by showing her some of
her prior statements. Based on this attempt, Jeanette confirmed appellant had stated
“they confronted the man, scared a man, and took him for his money,” but later claimed
to only admit to the fact that if she had said that before, it was accurately recounted on
the paper she was shown. Eventually, she recalled appellant stating that the victim had
been hit by someone with a baseball bat, tied up, and thrown into a canal.
During her testimony, Jeanette twice asked whether she could speak to counsel
before proceeding. In both instances, she explained, “It has been a very long time,” or
“[T]here’s a lot of things I don’t remember.” The trial court denied the requests, stating
there was no legal basis for them.
Alonzo began his testimony by also requesting to speak with an attorney before
proceeding. In response to this request, the trial court stated it had no information why
Alonzo would be entitled to an attorney and asked for additional input. Appellant’s
counsel stated he had not spoken with Alonzo previously and had no information. The
People argued there was no risk of self-incrimination as Alonzo was already in custody
on the relevant crime. The trial court then instructed the People that they could proceed.
Under questioning, Alonzo stated that he, Gonzalez, and appellant went to the
victim’s house because Gonzalez told them to go steal some weapons. After gaining

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entry by telling the victim they ran out of gas, Alonzo testified appellant “walked out with
an axe, and then I tied” the victim. Appellant allegedly told the victim he was going to
kill him before Alonzo dragged the victim outside while appellant and Gonzalez searched
the house for weapons. Stolen items were placed in the victim’s truck before appellant
drove that truck to a canal while Alonzo and Gonzalez followed in a van with the victim.
Alonzo claimed there was no specific plan and he did not recall seeing who set fire to the
victim’s house.
Once the three reached the canal, Alonzo asked appellant what he planned to do,
and appellant stated he was going to kill the victim. Alonzo and Gonzalez removed the
victim from the van, and appellant struck the victim in the head two or three times with a
baseball bat. Alonzo claimed that he and Gonzalez then threw the victim into the canal.
Following this testimony, the People rested. The trial court then asked whether the
prosecutor was “asking that the Court consider the testimony of Detective Arnold as
impeachment evidence” as to Jeanette’s testimony and Alonzo’s testimony. The
prosecutor responded affirmatively. Appellant’s counsel then asked the trial court take
judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript to the extent it showed the cause of
death as drowning. The trial court affirmed it had “read and considered all the admissible
evidence for this hearing that may be received, taken from the preliminary hearing
transcript.” The trial court further explained, “[T]he testimony of Investigator Arnold as
to [Jeanette] is to be received in this hearing as impeachment testimony. The same is true
as to … Alonzo at this hearing. The testimony of Detective Arnold as it differs from
Alonzo’s testimony here today, is properly considered by the Court as impeachment
testimony.”
The trial court then heard argument from both sides before denying the petition.
In explaining this ruling, the trial court noted that Alonzo had previously testified that
appellant had thrown the victim into the canal but that the evidence is clear the victim

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was beaten and tied up prior to drowning. The trial court also noted that Jeanette’s prior
statements were not clear on who threw the victim into the canal.
The trial court then found the People had proven appellant guilty of malice murder
beyond a reasonable doubt and laid out several bases. First, the trial court found express
malice based on appellant’s statements that he was going to kill the victim. The trial
court also found implied malice from appellant’s actions and that the natural and probable
consequences of those acts were dangerous to human life or involved a high degree of
probability that they would result in death, a fact appellant was found to have known at
the time.
The trial court also found the People had proven appellant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of felony murder. Although the trial court believed appellant to be the
actual killer in this case, it noted that “if not the actual killer, … [appellant] clearly acted
with the intent to kill, and he aided and abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of the murder.”
Relatedly, the trial court concluded, “[Appellant] was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” The trial court
based this finding on the facts that appellant “threatened to take the victim’s life”;
“retrieved the axe which was used to hit the [victim]”; “drove the victim’s car to the
canal”; “was involved in throwing the victim into the canal”; and at “no time, ever
attempted to intervene and save the victim’s life.”
This appeal timely followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant’s letter brief raises seven issues. The issues are broadly categorized as
misconduct claims (first–third, fifth, & sixth issues) and ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claims (fourth & seventh issues). Within the misconduct claims,
appellant raises judicial misconduct claims related to actions or rulings by the trial judge,
judicial/prosecutorial misconduct claims related to witnesses’ requests for counsel, and

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prosecutorial misconduct claims concerning the nature of the prosecutor’s questioning.
The ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims allege appellate counsel should
have raised appellant’s second, third, fifth, and sixth issues on direct appeal. This court
will resolve the misconduct claims first, leaving the ineffective assistance claims until
last.
Applicable Law
In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court set out the principles to follow when counsel
finds no arguable issues for appeal following the denial of a resentencing request under
section 1172.6: “When appointed counsel finds no arguable issues to be pursued on
appeal: (1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that determination,
including a concise recitation of the facts bearing on the denial of the petition; and (2) the
court should send, with a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the
defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and that if no letter or brief is
filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter. [Citations.]
“If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of
Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a
written opinion. The filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not compel an
independent review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 231–232.) “While it is wholly within the court’s discretion, the Court of
Appeal is not barred from conducting its own independent review of the record in any
individual section 1172.6 appeal.” (Id. at p. 232.)
Appellant’s Misconduct Claims Fail
As noted, appellant’s letter brief contains five issues that are broadly categorized
as misconduct allegations. In the first issue, appellant contends the trial judge was “NOT
an unbiased judge” based on her visible demeanor and decisions, which appellant
contends were “ ‘reading’ the prosecutor[’]s mind.” This contention is described in the
sixth issue, which alleges judicial misconduct when the trial judge “miraculously ‘read

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the prosecutor’s mind’ ” by asking whether certain preliminary hearing evidence that had
previously been admitted would be used as impeachment evidence as to Jeanette and
Alonzo. The second issue claims judicial misconduct when the trial court found
statements in the preliminary hearing transcript were admissible based on Gonzalez being
unavailable and the statements satisfying Evidence Code section 1230. The third and
fifth issues claim judicial and prosecutorial misconduct when the court denied Jeanette’s
and Alonzo’s requests for counsel at the hearing and the prosecutor both challenged
Jeanette’s memory of the events and allegedly improperly attempted to refresh Alonzo’s
memory.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“We review claims of judicial misconduct on the basis of the entire record.”
(People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 789.) “A trial judge may examine witnesses to
elicit or clarify testimony.” (People v. Rigney (1961) 55 Cal.2d 236, 241.) “The trial
judge, however, must not become an advocate for either party or under the guise of
examining witnesses comment on the evidence or cast aspersions or ridicule on a
witness.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “ ‘[O]ur role … is not to determine whether the trial judge’s conduct left
something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better left
unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it
denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Seumanu
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1321.) Generally, “a specific and timely objection to judicial
misconduct is required to preserve the claim for appellate review.” (Id. at p. 1320.)
However, “a defendant’s failure to object does not preclude review ‘when an objection
and an admonition could not cure the prejudice caused by’ such misconduct.” (People v.
Perkins (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1567.)
“We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct pursuant to a settled standard.
‘Under California law, a prosecutor commits reversible misconduct if he or she makes

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use of “deceptive or reprehensible methods” when attempting to persuade either the trial
court or the jury, and it is reasonably probable that without such misconduct, an outcome
more favorable to the defendant would have resulted. [Citation.] Under the federal
Constitution, conduct by a prosecutor that does not result in the denial of the defendant’s
specific constitutional rights—such as a comment upon the defendant’s invocation of the
right to remain silent—but is otherwise worthy of condemnation, is not a constitutional
violation unless the challenged action “ ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make
the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th
731, 760 (Dykes).)
“We review the trial court’s rulings on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of
discretion.” (Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 792–793.) Thus, “ ‘ “a defendant may not
complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the
same ground—the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the
jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety.” ’ ” (Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at
p. 760.) Where no objection is made, “ ‘the point is reviewable only if an admonition
would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct’ ” or an objection would have
been futile. (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 577, quoting People v. Price (1991)
1 Cal.4th 324, 447.)
Analysis
This court notes that no objections based on judicial or prosecutorial misconduct
were made during the proceedings. Nor does the record reflect that raising such concerns
would have been futile, as the record shows the trial court was engaged in the
proceedings and willing to discuss all issues raised. Accordingly, appellant’s claims can
be deemed forfeited. (See People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 577 [objection required
to preserve prosecutorial misconduct claim]; People v. Perkins, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1567 [objection required to preserve judicial misconduct claim].)

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In light of the procedural posture of this case, this court also notes that we have
reviewed appellant’s claims on the merits and find no error. Appellant’s first and sixth
issues derive from the trial court’s confirmation that the preliminary hearing transcript
was being offered as impeachment evidence against Jeanette and Alonzo. “Evidence of a
statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement
is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing .…” (Evid. Code, § 1235.) Prior
statements inconsistent with a professed memory loss are admissible where the lack of
memory amounts to deliberate evasion. (People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 403.)
Further, the trial court has a duty and a right to conduct a trial in such a manner that the
truth will be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. (People v. Carlucci
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 249, 255.) Thus, the trial court had the authority to raise issues with the
scope of the evidence offered and how it would be used. Further, the trial court’s
discussion with counsel and its rulings demonstrate it only admitted prior testimony
“when it differ[ed]” from witness testimony. This court sees no error in this ruling.
Similarly, upon review of the record as a whole, this court sees no evidence
supporting appellant’s argument of bias based on the trial court’s demeanor. Rather, as
reflected in this court’s discussion here and below, the record shows the trial court
professionally working through the issues in front of it and properly engaging in its
duties. There is no objective evidence in the record to support appellant’s claims the trial
court held an improper demeanor or that the trial court’s demeanor affected its ability to
remain unbiased.
Appellant’s third and fifth issues concern the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel
for two witnesses. However, appellant has pointed to no law, and this court has found
none, that demonstrates a witness is entitled to court-appointed counsel when testifying
generally. Counsel may be appointed when a self-incrimination issue arises, but there is
no indication of such an issue here. Jeanette merely expressed concern that she may have
forgotten things over time, and Alonzo was already in custody for the offense and thus

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faced no further criminal risk. (See People v. Lopez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1554
[noting court’s duty to review claims of privilege not to testify and that such claims fail
when a defendant has already pleaded guilty to a charge and time to appeal has ended].)
The trial court committed no misconduct in properly denying the unsupported requests
for counsel.
Nor do the questions and exchanges surrounding these requests demonstrate
prosecutorial or judicial misconduct. Appellant contends that objections to leading
questions and other prosecutorial efforts were routinely overruled and the trial court
improperly aided the prosecutor when they failed to properly refresh past recollections.
Again, this court sees no error. It is well settled that the trial court may permit leading
questions and has a duty to properly manage the proceedings. (See People v. Williams
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 672 [trial court has broad discretion to permit leading questions];
People v. Corrigan (1957) 48 Cal.2d 551, 559 [noting “it is the right and the duty of a
judge to conduct a trial in such a manner that the truth will be established in accordance
with the rules of evidence”].) Nothing in appellant’s arguments show the trial court erred
or that its rulings reflected any bias toward appellant. Similarly, nothing in the
prosecutor’s questions implies or demonstrates the use of deceptive or reprehensible
methods or conduct that infected the trial with unfairness. (See Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th
at p. 760.)
Appellant’s second issue alleges judicial misconduct based on admitting
Gonzalez’s testimony from the preliminary hearing. Appellant contends the prosecutor
failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in seeking Gonzalez because the investigator
seeking Gonzalez determined someone with the same name and birth date was in custody
with the Department of Homeland Security but did nothing to further verify that person
was the correct Gonzalez. We do not agree there was an error.
The record does not show the detained individual shared the same birth date with
the correct Gonzalez, as the investigator clearly indicated that the person was found under

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multiple birth dates. Nor does the record show the fact a Gonzalez was detained had
been known for weeks, as the investigator testified that he only learned of this when he
“reran him through [United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement] yesterday.”
More importantly, one is unavailable when they are absent and reasonable diligence was
made to procure their attendance, with reasonable diligence connoting perseverance and
efforts of a substantial character made in good earnest. (People v. Roldan (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 969, 979.)
Substantial evidence in the record shows such efforts, including evidence of
efforts by process servers, a review of records showing Gonzalez had been removed to
his home country, and continuing efforts up to the day of the hearing resulting in, at best,
a discovery that Gonzalez might have been in custody at the border but with no way to
confirm that potential fact. On these grounds, the court acted within its discretion in
finding Gonzalez unavailable, and the record fails to demonstrate judicial bias influenced
this decision.
Finally, even if the court were to find an error, appellant cannot demonstrate that
error was prejudicial. Appellant is only entitled to resentencing if the prosecution fails to
prove “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted
murder under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Malice cannot be imputed solely
based on participation in a crime. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) A participant in a robbery or
burglary in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if (1) they are the actual killer,
(2) they acted to assist the actual killer in commission of murder with an intent to kill, or
(3) they were a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Here the trial court found appellant could be convicted of murder under all of the
above theories. Even if this court only reviews the evidence provided by Alonzo’s
testimony at the hearing, the trial court’s ruling is well supported by the evidence. As

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noted above, Alonzo testified that appellant was a major participant in the robbery and
kidnapping of the victim; expressed a direct intent to kill the victim; struck the victim
multiple times; and instructed others to participate in the binding, transportation, and
eventual act of tossing the victim into the canal. Even if this court accepts that appellant
is not the actual killer, the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant
assisted the actual killer while harboring an intent to kill and was a major participant in
the underlying felony that acted with a reckless indifference to human life. The trial
court correctly found appellant ineligible for relief.
Appellant’s Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claims Fail
Appellant’s fourth and seventh issues raise ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel arguments based on counsel’s decision to file a brief under Delgadillo, and
thereby not raise the points discussed in the first through third, fifth, and sixth issues.
Appellant’s arguments fail.
“ ‘A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel by both
the state and federal Constitutions.’ ” (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 832,
disapproved on another ground in Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842, 854,
fn. 5.) “ ‘In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first
show counsel’s performance was “deficient” because his “representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness … under prevailing professional norms.”
[Citations.] Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel’s performance or
lack thereof. [Citation.] Prejudice is shown when there is a “reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” ’ ” (In re Harris, pp. 832–833.) “Similar concepts have been used to
measure the performance of appellate counsel.” (Id. at p. 833.)
This court’s above analysis finds no judicial or prosecutorial misconduct and no
error in the rulings challenged in appellant’s letter brief. Accordingly, appellant’s

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ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims must fail. Even if this court were to
find deficient performance, which it does not on this record, appellant cannot demonstrate
a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
An Independent Review of the Record Shows No Error
In order to review the issues raised in appellant’s letter brief, this court was
required to undertake a thorough review of the record. Based on this, the court chose to
exercise its discretion to review the entire record for any additional error. (See
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232 [“While it is wholly within the court’s discretion,
the Court of Appeal is not barred from conducting its own independent review of the
record in any individual section 1172.6 appeal.”].) Upon review, this court finds no
potential error that would warrant reversing the trial court’s determination that appellant
is ineligible for relief.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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