In re Bailey B. CA4/2

CourtListener 10597591CalctappJun 3, 2025

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Filed 6/3/25 In re Bailey B. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re BAILEY B., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E085477

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2300128)

v. OPINION

J.B. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun,

Judge. Conditionally reversed with directions.

Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant, J.B.

Lelah S. Forrey-Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant, E.C.

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Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Larisa R-McKenna,

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jorge B. (Father) and Evelyn C. (Mother) appeal from the juvenile court’s order

terminating parental rights to their daughter, Bailey B. The parents argue that the court

and Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to comply

with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related

state law. We agree and conditionally reverse.

BACKGROUND

In April 2023, DPSS took newborn Bailey into protective custody after Mother

and the baby tested positive for amphetamines at Bailey’s birth. Mother disclosed that

she had been using methamphetamine daily for the past five years. Father disclosed that

he had recently used methamphetamine with Mother.

Mother lived with the maternal great-aunt. Mother identified the maternal aunt as

someone willing to care for Bailey; the maternal aunt and the maternal grandmother lived

in Oregon.

Both parents denied any Indian ancestry when interviewed by the social worker,

and they filed Judicial Council ICWA-020 forms indicating the same.1

DPSS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision

(b), alleging that both parents abused controlled substances. (Unlabeled statutory

1 Because ICWA uses the term “Indian,” we use it as well “to reflect the statutory
language.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).) No disrespect
is intended.

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references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) The court detained Bailey from

both parents. It found that “ICWA likely does not apply” but directed DPSS to continue

its ICWA inquiry “as to any relatives that make themselves available.”

When interviewed for the jurisdiction/disposition report, Mother said that she

occasionally spoke to the maternal grandmother. Mother again stated that she wanted the

maternal aunt to be considered for placement, and she provided the maternal aunt’s phone

number. Mother mentioned that she also had a brother, and she identified him by name.

Father reported that he wanted the paternal uncle to be considered for placement, and he

provided a phone number for the paternal uncle.

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in May 2023, the court found the

allegations of the petition true, adjudged Bailey a dependent of the court, removed her

from both parents’ custody, and ordered reunification services for the parents. The court

authorized the maternal aunt to be assessed for placement in Oregon under the Interstate

Compact on Placement of Children (Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq.). The court also found

that ICWA did not apply but again directed DPSS “to continue its inquiry with any

relatives that it may come across.”

The court terminated the parents’ reunification services at the contested 12-month

review hearing and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. Two review reports

during the reunification period listed phone numbers for the maternal aunt and the

maternal grandmother.

The court held a postpermanency review hearing in November 2024. It found that

sufficient ICWA inquiry had been made and that ICWA did not apply to Bailey.

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At the section 366.26 hearing in February 2025, the court found that Bailey was

likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. A maternal cousin was present at the

hearing, and the court asked whether he had any Indian ancestry. The maternal cousin

replied that he did not. Although the court did not make an express ICWA finding at the

section 366.26 hearing, the order terminating parental rights “was necessarily premised

on a current finding by the juvenile court” that ICWA did not apply to Bailey. (In re

Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 10.)

DISCUSSION

The parents argue that the court prejudicially erred by failing to ensure that DPSS

conducted an adequate ICWA inquiry. We agree. DPSS failed to discharge its duty of

initial inquiry with respect to extended family members.

The child welfare department and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and

continuing duty to inquire” whether a child in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an

Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “The duty to inquire consists of two phases—the duty

of initial inquiry and the duty of further inquiry.” (In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th

671, 678 (Ricky R.), disapproved on another ground by Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at

p. 1152, fn. 18.)

“The duty of initial inquiry applies in every dependency proceeding.” (Ricky R.,

supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 678.) The child welfare department’s duty to inquire begins

“when first contacted regarding a child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) The department must

ask the “party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that

the child may be an Indian child,” and the department must also ask the child and the

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child’s family members, including extended family members, upon first contact with

those individuals. (Ibid.) In addition, if the child is taken into the department’s

temporary custody under section 306, “or if they were initially taken into protective

custody pursuant to a warrant described in Section 340,” then the department must ask

“the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others

who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether

the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) Extended family

members include adults who are the child’s stepparents, grandparents, siblings, brothers-

or sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, or first or second cousins. (§ 224.1,

subd. (c)(1).)

Although the child welfare department is required to conduct an ICWA inquiry of

extended family members, state law “‘does not require the agency to “find” unknown

relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely to make reasonable

inquiries. The operative concept is those people who are reasonably available to help the

agency with its investigation into whether the child has any potential Indian ancestry

should be asked.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.)

Juvenile courts must conduct their own initial inquiry as well. “Federal

regulations require state courts to ask each participant ‘at the commencement’ of a child

custody proceeding ‘whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is

an Indian child.’” (Ricky R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 678-679, quoting 25 C.F.R.

§ 23.107(a) (2022).) Similarly, state law requires the court to pursue an ICWA inquiry at

the first hearing on a dependency petition (or at the first court appearance of a party or

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“other interested person[],” if the party or other interested person was not present at the

first hearing). (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) Further inquiry is required only if the court or the

child welfare department has “reason to believe” that an Indian child is involved.

(§ 224.2, subd. (e).)

The child welfare department “must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a

detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all

information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule

5.481(a)(5).) The juvenile court may find that ICWA does not apply to the proceedings if

it finds “that an agency’s inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the

resulting record provided no reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C.,

supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.)

“[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate,

proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to

a deferential standard of review. [Citations.] ‘“On a well-developed record, the court has

relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper,

adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the less developed

the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.”’ [Citations.] [¶] If,

upon review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and

ICWA does not apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence and record

documentation as required by California law [citation], there is no error and conditional

reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has

an interest in the child. On the other hand, if the inquiry is inadequate, conditional

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reversal is required so the agency can cure the error and thereby safeguard the rights of

tribes, parents, and the child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)

DPSS failed to inquire of several extended family members who were reasonably

available in this case. The agency had contact information for the maternal aunt, the

maternal grandmother, and the paternal uncle. But there is no evidence that DPSS

attempted to contact those relatives to inquire about possible Indian ancestry. In addition,

there is no evidence that DPSS asked for the maternal uncle’s contact information or

otherwise attempted to contact him after Mother identified him by name. The agency

erred by failing to discharge its duty of initial inquiry with respect to those extended

family members. Father contends that DPSS also erred by failing to ask the maternal

great-aunt about possible Indian ancestry, but we find no error with respect to her. She

does not qualify as an extended family member under the statutory definition. (In re D.S.

(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053 [agency did not have a duty to inquire of great-

grandparents because they were not extended family members under ICWA].)

For these reasons, there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s implied

finding that DPSS conducted an adequate and proper ICWA inquiry. We therefore

conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand for DPSS to

conduct a proper inquiry. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)

DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. On remand, the

juvenile court shall order DPSS to comply with its duty of initial inquiry under

subdivision (b) of section 224.2 and, if applicable, the duty of further inquiry (§ 224.2,

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subd. (e)) and the duty to provide notice to the proper tribes (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a);

§ 224.3). The court shall also order DPSS to comply with the documentation

requirements of rule 5.481(a)(5) of the California Rules of Court. If the court determines

that DPSS has complied and that ICWA does not apply, then the court shall reinstate the

order terminating parental rights. If the court determines that ICWA applies, then it shall

proceed in conformity with ICWA and related California law.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

MILLER
J.

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