In re J.P. CA2/6

CourtListener 10597590CalctappJun 3, 2025

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Filed 6/3/25 In re J.P. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re J.P., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B343849
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. J073611)
(Ventura County)

S.P.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF
VENTURA,

Respondent;

VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,

Real Party in Interest.

S.P. (Mother) petitions for extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of
Court, rules 8.452, 8.456), challenging the juvenile court’s orders
bypassing family reunification services as to her son J.P. under
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)
and setting a selection and implementation hearing. (§ 366.26.)
She requests we vacate the hearing and order the court to offer
her reunification services, or, in the alternative, order a new trial
on jurisdiction and disposition. She contends the Ventura County
Human Services Agency (Agency) did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence J.P. would not benefit from receiving
services. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the bypass
order and will deny the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother Adopts J.P.
Mother and L.B. began an on-again, off-again relationship
when they were 12 years old. They have an adult daughter
named L.B.P. and children from other relationships as well. L.B.
had a son in 2021 with a woman who used amphetamines,
fentanyl, and cannabis during her pregnancy. Both were
incarcerated when J.P. was born. A juvenile court in Los Angeles
terminated their parental rights and placed J.P. with Mother.
She adopted him in 2023.
Mother rekindled her relationship with L.B. after the
adoption. He lived in the Simi Valley apartment she shared with
J.P. and her four minor children, who ranged in age from 10 to
16. Mother’s and L.B.’s adult daughter, L.B.P., lived down the
street and helped take care of her five siblings.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code unless stated otherwise.

2
The Shooting
Police responded to reports of screaming from Mother’s
apartment in the early hours of November 27, 2024. The officers
found the four children outside. They reported hearing a gunshot
while Mother and L.B. were arguing in their room. J.P. (now
three years old) was in the room with his parents. Officers then
saw Mother come to the front door of the apartment with blood on
her hands. She said L.B. shot himself and needed an ambulance.
J.P. then emerged with blood on his face and clothes.
Officers found L.B. unconscious in the master bedroom
with a gunshot wound to his neck and a puncture wound on his
mid-back. They found a pistol behind a shoe rack in the closet, a
large black knife underneath L.B.’s body, and several other
knives scattered on the floor. Blood was pooled and splattered
around the room. Officers applied a chest seal to his back.
Paramedics and firefighters arrived and performed lifesaving
measures before taking him to the hospital. L.B. survived but
remained hospitalized with partial paralysis and breathing
difficulty as of late December of 2024.
Mother’s Account
Mother told social workers she bought a Beretta pistol
because she was concerned for her safety as a single mother. She
kept it in her closet. The night of the shooting, J.P was sleeping
in a toddler bed in the master bedroom. She and L.B. began
arguing after he accused her of cheating on him. L.B. came out of
the bathroom wearing a fanny pack containing her pistol.
Mother did not know how or when he retrieved it from the closet.
She tried to yank the pistol from him and it fired.
The Children’s Account
Mother’s four older children gave generally consistent
accounts of the shooting to social workers. They heard Mother

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and L.B. arguing loudly throughout the night about L.B. cheating
on Mother. The two oldest children knocked on the master
bedroom door in the early morning hours when they heard
banging and glass breaking. They asked to take J.P. out of the
room but Mother told them to go back to sleep. The door then
opened and J.P came running out of the room crying. One of the
boys took J.P. to his bedroom and began setting up a video for
him to watch. Mother retrieved J.P., returned to the master
bedroom, and locked the door behind her.
The arguing resumed. The two oldest children heard L.B.
ask mother something like “[t]his is what you are doing?’ or
“[w]hy would you do this?” He said he was taking his son and
leaving. All four children then heard a sound like a gunshot from
the room. J.P stopped crying. Mother yelled, “Everything is fine”
but would not open the door. They could hear L.B. saying “I can’t
breathe.”
Criminal Charges Against Mother
Prosecutors charged Mother with attempted murder but
later dismissed this count. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/184, subd. (a).)
The court released her on her own recognizance on December 20,
2024. She was later held to answer on charges of felony assault
with a deadly weapon (id., § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and felony child
endangerment (id., § 273a, subd. (a)). Each charge includes an
enhancement for committing a felony while on bail.
The Agency Detains J.P. and His Siblings
The Agency detained J.P. and placed him in the care of
L.B.P. It placed the four older children with their respective
fathers, both of whom lived locally and already shared custody
with Mother. The Agency filed a dependency petition pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and
(b)(1)(A). It alleged that Mother’s assault on L.B. in the presence

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of J.P. placed the boy at substantial risk of abuse or neglect.
Mother contested the petition. She invoked her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and the court
granted a no-contact order at her request.
Mother Denied Reunification Services
The juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearing on February 4, 2025. The Agency
recommended bypassing reunification services as to J.P
considering the severity of the events on November 27. (§ 361.5,
subd. (b)(6).) His caretaker noted signs of emotional trauma,
such as waking in the night crying and screaming inconsolably.
Mother’s need for services was not known because of the court’s
no-contact order. J.P.’s current caretaker, L.B.P., agreed to
permanent placement. The Agency requested an order
authorizing J.P.’s treatment for “rampant dental decay
penetrating the nerves.” Minor’s counsel agreed with the
Agency’s recommendations.
Mother argued the Agency failed to prove both its
jurisdictional allegations or grounds for bypassing services. She
described her household as safe and stable, with no prior pattern
of criminality, substance abuse, or domestic violence. She noted
prosecutors had dismissed the attempted murder charge and
released her on her own recognizance. J.P.’s alleged signs of
emotional trauma with his caretaker, she argued, could also be
attributed to his pre-existing epilepsy or his separation from
Mother. Social workers otherwise described him as energetic,
bubbly, and with no “signs of distress.” There was no evidence
she could not engage meaningfully in services or provide J.P.
with a stable living environment within 12 months.
The juvenile court sustained the Agency’s allegations and
declared J.P. a dependent. It found the Agency proved grounds

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for bypass, and, further, that Mother did not show reunification
services were in J.P’s best interest. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(6) & (c).)
The court set a selection and implementation hearing with a plan
of adoption for May 28, 2025. (§ 366.26.)
DISCUSSION
Bypass of Reunification Services
“Section 361.5, subdivision (a) directs the juvenile court to
order services whenever a child is removed from the custody of
his or her parent unless the case falls within one of the
enumerated exceptions of section 361.5, subdivision (b).” (Jose O.
v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 703, 706 (Jose O.).)
Subdivision (b) provides: “Reunification services need not be
provided to a parent or guardian . . . when the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [¶] (6)(A)
That the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any
subdivision of Section 300 as a result of . . . the infliction of severe
physical harm to the child, . . . and the court makes a factual
finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification
services with the offending parent or guardian.”
“A finding of the infliction of severe physical harm . . . may
be based on . . . any . . . torturous act or omission that would be
reasonably understood to cause serious emotional damage.”
(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(C).) “When determining whether the child
would benefit from reunification services, the statute requires the
court to consider the following factors, as well as any other
circumstances it deems relevant: (1) the ‘specific act or omission’
that caused the severe physical harm; (2) the ‘circumstances
under which’ the harm was inflicted; (3) the ‘severity of the
emotional trauma’ the harm caused; (4) any ‘history of abuse of
other children by the offending parent’; (5) the likelihood the
child may be safely returned to the care of the offending parent

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within 12 months with no continuing supervision; and (6)
whether ‘the child desires to be reunified with the offending
parent.’” (In re T.R. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, 1149, quoting
§ 361.5, subd. (i) (T.R.).)
“If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a
bypass provision applies, it must deny services unless the parent
proves that services would be in the child’s best interests.
(§ 361.5, subd. (c).) While the parent bears the burden of proof on
that issue, the department bears the burden of proving the
threshold issue of whether a bypass provision applies.” (T.R.,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1148.) “The court shall read into the
record the basis for a finding of . . . severe physical harm under
paragraph (6) of subdivision (b), and shall also specify the factual
findings used to determine that the provision of reunification
services to the offending parent or guardian would not benefit the
child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (k).)
We review an order bypassing reunification services for
substantial evidence. (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121.) Thus, we review the entire record most
favorably to the juvenile court’s findings to determine if
substantial evidence supports the findings. (Id. at p. 1122.) We
do not make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence.
(Id. at p. 1121.) “We do not inquire whether substantial evidence
would have supported a different order, nor do we reweigh the
evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile
court.” (In re Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1195.)
“When the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof
applied in the juvenile court to the challenged finding, we must
‘account for’ that heightened standard by determining whether
‘the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable the fact

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was true.’” (T.R., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1150, quoting
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
Substantial Evidence Supports Bypassing
Reunification Services
Mother contends the juvenile court misapplied section
361.5 when it bypassed reunification services. We disagree and
conclude substantial evidence supports the order.
The Agency bore the initial burden to prove the two
requirements for bypassing services under section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(6): (1) “infliction of severe physical harm” to J.P.;
and (2) “that it would not benefit [J.P.] to pursue reunification
services” with Mother. Mother contends the court skipped over
the second requirement of subdivision (b)(6) and prematurely
shifted the burden to Mother to prove services were in J.P.’s “best
interests” under subdivision (c). She does not challenge the
juvenile court’s finding that the Agency proved the “severe
physical harm” requirement.
Counsel for the Agency, Mother, and J.P. attended the
bypass hearing. They discussed the respective burdens of the
Agency and Mother under section 361.5 throughout the hearing.
Mid-hearing, the juvenile court stopped argument and stated,
“Well, it sounds like there’s still a disagreement as to who has the
burden and what finding the Court needs to make. So why don’t
we take a short recess and dial that in.” When they went back on
the record after the recess, the court stated, “We all got some
time to look at the standard a little more closely.” The court
allowed the attorneys to continue arguing. When they rested, the
court recited its factual findings at length, concluding the Agency
had “proven the bypass grounds by clear and convincing
evidence. That shifted the burden to the mother to prove by clear

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and convincing evidence that reunification is in the child’s best
interest.”
Section 361.5, subdivision (i) lists six factors the court must
consider when determining whether services would benefit a
minor. Four of these six factors—i.e., the “specific act or
omission” that caused the severe physical harm, the
“circumstances under which . . . the harm was inflicted,” the
“severity of the emotional trauma” the harm caused, and the
likelihood the minor could be “safely returned to the care of the
offending parent . . . within 12 months with no continuing
supervision”—overlap factually with the Agency’s burden to
prove infliction of severe physical harm. The court made detailed
factual findings relating to these factors before turning to
Mother’s obligation to prove services would be in J.P’s “best
interests” under subdivision (c). There is no indication the court
relieved the Agency of its initial burden under subdivision (b)(6)
to prove services would not benefit J.P., or conflated this finding
with Mother’s burden to prove reunification services were in
J.P.’s best interests under subdivision (c).
The record contains substantial evidence that Mother
meets the statutory criteria for bypassing services. (In re Brian
M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401.) “Statutory provisions
enacted before [section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)] had mandated
reunification services in all cases for children more than five
years of age except for a few very narrow circumstances.” (Jose
O., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 707.) “[S]ubdivision (b)(6) freed
the dependency court to ‘exercise discretion based on
consideration of the individual facts . . . [of] a case, under less
restrictive guidelines.’” (Ibid., quoting Assem. Com. on Judiciary,
Worksheet on Sen. Bill No. 1564 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) p. 2.)
The Agency introduced ample evidence that Mother shot and

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stabbed J.P.’s biological father in the presence of J.P. Mother
gave incomplete and conflicting accounts of the incident to police
then requested the Agency not contact her while criminal charges
were pending against her. “Providing the court with discretion to
not order services for a parent who has inflicted severe physical
harm on the child by knifing to death the child’s other parent in
the child’s presence supports the legislative purpose to allow the
court to exercise its discretion based on consideration of the
individual facts of a case.” (Jose O., at p. 707.) While Mother
may not have killed L.B. in front of J.P., she attempted to do so.
The record contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact would find highly probable Mother
committed a “torturous act . . . that would be reasonably
understood to cause serious emotional damage” to him. (§ 361.5,
subd. (b)(6)(C).)
Mother likens her situation to T.R. The juvenile court in
that case bypassed reunification services for a father under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). The Court of Appeal reversed
the bypass order. It noted the juvenile court judge had “simply
said he was adopting the proposed findings in the department’s
report.” (T.R., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1149.) The judge “did
not state for the record which bypass provision applied, mention
the infliction of severe physical harm or identify any specific
instances of it, or address whether [the minors] would benefit
from attempting to reunify with their father.” (Ibid.) The Court
of Appeal declined the agency’s request to infer the required
findings from the record for two reasons. First, section 361.5,
subdivision (k) requires the juvenile court to read the basis of its
ruling into the record when bypassing services under subdivision
(b)(6). Second, the record contained no evidence of father
physically injuring the children other than an incident described

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in a previous section 300 petition involving only the mother.
(T.R., at pp. 1151-1152.)
We discern few parallels with T.R. in Mother’s case. She
has been held to answer charges of assault with a deadly weapon
and child endangerment in connection with the events giving rise
to these dependency proceedings. Eyewitness accounts of these
events from four of her children and three first responders show
L.B. suffered critical injuries during a violent confrontation with
Mother in the presence of J.P. The juvenile court separately
stated the basis of its findings as to section 361.5, subdivisions
(b)(6) and (c) at the bypass hearing. Even assuming it did not,
the evidentiary record is robust enough to infer its findings. (See
Jose O., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 708 [“Implicit in the court’s
denial of services is a finding that reunification services would
not benefit [the minor]. A reviewing court may imply a finding if
substantial evidence supports it.”].)
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

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Gilbert A. Romero, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________

Dependent Family Advocates, Rabiah A. Rahman, for
Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, and Joseph J. Randazzo,
Principal Assistant County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.

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