People v. Robles CA4/3

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Filed 6/2/25 P. v. Robles CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063262

v. (Super. Ct. No. 97CF0592)

RICARDO ROBLES, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Gassia Apkarian, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Ricardo Robles appeals from the trial court’s order denying his
motion to vacate his convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7.1 The
Attorney General concedes Robles did not understand his plea’s immigration
consequences. Exercising our independent review, we conclude Robles’ error
was prejudicial. We reverse with directions for the court to grant the motion.
FACTS
In 1997, Robles pleaded guilty to a felony violation of section 288,
subdivision (a) (lewd act upon a child) and a felony violation of section 261.5,
subdivision (d) (unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor). Robles, 26 years
old at the time, admitted to having engaged in sexual intercourse with a 12-
year-old girl over a three-month period. He was facing a maximum sentence
of eight years in prison but accepted a negotiated plea in which he served 90
days in jail. At the advice of his attorney, he accepted the plea to avoid
receiving a maximum sentence.
In 2023, pursuant to section 1473.7, Robles filed a motion to
vacate his conviction. The motion included declarations from himself and his
immigration attorney, Fabian C. Serrato, as well as letters of support from
his mother and half-brother. In his declaration, Robles explained he came to
the United States in 1995 when he was 24 years old. His mother, half-
brother, and grandfather resided in the United States, and he has
maintained employment since arriving. Robles was expecting a child at the
time of the plea whom he began to reside with, as well as the mother, after he
was released from custody. Robles attested he “would never have entered a
guilty plea to the charge against [him]” had he known that he “would never
be able to apply for some form of relief from deportation . . . .” The attorney

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
who represented him at the plea “did not discuss with [him] the possibility of
facing any immigration consequences if [he] entered a guilty plea” nor did his
attorney “ask[] about [his] immigration status.” His attorney also did not
inform him of any “option to plead guilty to alternative charges.”
After a short hearing at which the court took no evidence, the
court denied the motion.2
DISCUSSION
“In section 1473.7, the Legislature has expressed its particular
concern for immigrants who suffer convictions without understanding that it
will in the future result in their deportation or other adverse immigration
consequences.” (People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 765.) The
Legislature has directed us to interpret the statute “‘in the interests of justice
and consistent with the findings and declarations” recognizing that “‘[t]he
immigration consequences of criminal convictions have a particularly strong
impact in California.’” (People v. Villalba (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 659, 665.) We
must honor “the remedial goal of the new law” (People v. Ruiz (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 1061, 1070) and “the broader context of the Legislature’s implied
and explicit intent regarding the treatment of noncitizen criminal
defendants” (People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 874 (Mejia)).
Section 1473.7 entitles a defendant to ask a court to vacate a
conviction which is “legally invalid due to prejudicial error [which]
damage[ed] the [defendant’s] ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration
consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)

2 We need not address Robles’ challenges to the hearing or the

adequacy of the court’s findings.

3
This is a two-step process.
“The defendant must first show that he did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences of his plea.” (People v. Espinoza
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319 (Espinoza).) We accept the Attorney General’s oral
argument concession that Robles did not understand his conviction rendered
him subject to mandatory deportation.
We move to the second step to see whether Robles has shown “his
misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 319.) This requires him to demonstrate ‘“a reasonable probability that
[he] would have rejected the plea if [he] had correctly understood its actual or
potential immigration consequences.’” (Ibid.)
In evaluating prejudicial error, we “must ‘consider the totality of
the circumstances.’” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.) ‘“Factors
particularly relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United
States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the
defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant
had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was
possible.’” (Ibid.) “Also relevant are the defendant’s probability of obtaining a
more favorable outcome if he had rejected the plea, as well as the difference
between the bargained-for term and the likely term if he were convicted at
trial.” (Ibid.)
“These factors are not exhaustive” and “we weigh all relevant
circumstances, with no single factor being dispositive in our consideration of
the totality.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) “[N]o single type of
evidence is a prerequisite to relief” and we may consider a wide array of
“[o]bjective evidence,” including “facts provided by declarations . . . .” (Ibid.)

4
“Because the trial court here conducted no evidentiary hearing,
there is no basis for deference, and ‘it is for the appellate court to decide,
based on its independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice
under section 1473.7.’” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.)
Here, our review of the totality of the circumstances shows a
reasonable probability Robles would have rejected the plea if he had correctly
understood its immigration consequences.
First, we find Robles had meaningful ties to the United States.
While he immigrated as an adult, he came here to join his mother, half-
brother, and grandfather in California. At the time of his plea he was
employed, living with and assisting his grandfather, and expecting his first
child. While the Attorney General notes a lack of corroborating evidence, “a
defendant’s declaration is one form of objective evidence relevant to a
prejudicial error inquiry.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 322.)
Next, Robles’ plea suggests a reasonable possibility of an
immigration-neutral disposition or a favorable result at trial. The prosecution
did not put all its eggs in the section 288, subdivision (a) basket. It also
charged Robles with a far less serious violation of section 261.5, subdivision
(d)—an offense with no immigration consequences. (Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder
(9th Cir. 2009) 589 F.3d 1010, 1011–1012.) A marked disparity exists
between the seriousness of charges based on sexual intercourse with a 12-
year-old girl and the leniency of a 90-day deal. That the prosecution would
accept such a light sentence leaves us to question the likelihood of a
conviction.
Like the Espinoza court, we place little weight on the absence of
evidence showing any “contemporaneous confusion” about immigration
consequences or Robles’ desire at the time of his plea to avoid deportation.

5
(See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 324.) Robles did not even discover his
plea had any immigration consequences until many years later, when he
began to pursue legal residency as the parent of a United States Marine. He
was “not required to provide the declaration of plea counsel” or “to submit
contemporaneous documentation from the time of the plea.” (Id. at p. 325.)
“[N]o specific kind of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Ibid.)
As our independent review of the totality of the circumstances
reveals a reasonable probability Robles would have rejected the plea if he had
correctly understood its immigration consequences, “‘[t]he appropriate
remedy is to direct the trial court to grant the motion.’” (Mejia, supra, 36
Cal.App.5th at p. 873.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Robles’ motion is reversed. The matter is
remanded with directions to vacate that order and enter a new order
granting the motion.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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