People v. Zarut CA1/2

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Filed 6/2/25 P. v. Zarut CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169317
v.
JAVIER ZARUT, (San Francisco County
Super. Ct. No. 22005435)
Defendant and Appellant.

Javier Zarut was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to
the upper term. He contends the trial court failed to appreciate its
discretionary authority to impose a lower term despite the jury having found
true the alleged aggravating factors. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I.
Procedural Background
An amended information filed on October 4, 2023, charged Zarut with
murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)), with allegations that he personally

1 Further statutory references will be to the Penal Code.

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used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)2 The information alleged six
aggravating circumstances (Cal. Rules of Court,3 rule 4.421).
A jury found Zarut not guilty of murder but guilty of the lesser offense
of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and found true the allegation
that Zarut personally used a deadly weapon. The jury found true three of the
alleged aggravating circumstances: that “the crime involved great violence,
great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm or other acts disclosing a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness” (rule 4.421(a)(1)), that Zarut
“was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the crime” (rule 4.421(a)(2))
and that Zarut “engaged in violent conduct which indicates a serious danger
to society” (rule 4.421(b)(1)).4
At sentencing on November 3, 2023, the trial court struck the arming
enhancement5 and sentenced Zarut to the upper term of 11 years. He filed a
timely notice of appeal on November 20, 2023.

2The amended information also charged a codefendant in the offense.
We describe only the allegations pertaining to Zarut.
3 Further references to rules will be to the California Rules of Court.
4 The other aggravating circumstances alleged in the amended
information were that the victim “was particularly vulnerable”
(rule 4.421(a)(3)) and Zarut “induced others to participate in the commission
of the crime or occupied a position of leadership or dominance of other
participants in its commission” (rule 4.421(a)(4)). The amended information
also alleged “[a]ny other factors statutorily declared to be circumstances in
aggravation, or which reasonably relate to [Zarut] or the circumstances under
which the [murder] was committed,” with notice of incidents on April 24,
2019, and November 16, 2021, documented in identified San Francisco police
reports (rule 4.421(c)).
5 The prosecutor had asked the court to stay sentence on the arming
enhancement and use it as a factor in aggravation, so as not to “doubly
punish[]” Zarut.

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II.
Factual Background
On June 3, 2022, Elijah Wallace was stabbed and died from a wound to
his chest that ran from under the left side of his clavicle to the area near the
lower left side of his neck, causing significant hemorrhage from major vessels
including the carotid artery.
Joshua Schodorf witnessed a fight between Zarut and Wallace near the
intersection of 15th Street and South Van Ness Avenue in San Francisco.
Schodorf first noticed two people arguing across the street from where he was
standing, yelling at each other, trying to throw punches and wrestling on the
ground. They separated, then a man wearing an orange shirt and a Santa
hat, whom Schodorf believed to be homeless, pulled out two knives and
handed a long knife to a shorter man wearing a “darker shirt,” pants and
socks but no shoes, who Schodorf identified at trial as Zarut.6 At this point,
Schodorf began recording the incident on his cell phone. The video was
played at trial.
The man in the Santa hat also had a weapon but did not get involved in
the fight. Zarut pursued Wallace and appeared to be taunting him as
Wallace tried to get away. Schodorf saw Wallace try to run and grab his dog,
heard a scream and saw Wallace go halfway down the block before lying on
the ground. Schodorf stopped recording and called 911. When the police
arrived, he pointed them to Zarut and the person in the Santa hat and told
the police he had recorded the incident.

6 The man in the Santa hat was the second person charged in the case.
(See footnote 2, ante, p. 2.)

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Schodorf did not see how the fight started or how it turned physical.
After the knife appeared, as Wallace tried to get away, he continued to face
Zarut; Schodorf did not remember Wallace taking a fighting stance. He did
not see a knife or other weapon in Wallace’s hands.
Another witness, Joanne Scott, was in a car on 15th Street, heading
toward South Van Ness when she noticed three people fighting in the street.
Her husband stopped the car, and she saw the three “swinging at each other.”
One of the three, a tall man in an orange shirt and Santa hat, had a knife
with a blade that was about 12 inches long and had a “curved” tip. Another
of the men was “smaller” and wearing a dark shirt. The men were “circling,”
and “some shoes came off.” The third person “lurched out of the fight at a
certain point and started to fall toward the sidewalk,” then “they disappeared
behind a car” and Scott could no longer see them. She did not see the smaller
man with any weapons; she testified that as her car came to the intersection,
she made eye contact with the smaller man, who was in the street and
“pretty agitated,” and was not looking to see if he had anything. The smaller
man had blood on one side of his face. Scott called 911.
Police officers arrived at the scene and took over from bystanders who
were attempting to render aid to Wallace, who was lying on the ground.7
Wallace was bleeding profusely from a wound to his chest; one of the officers
testified it was the most blood he had ever seen coming from a single wound.
Zarut had small lacerations on his face.

7 Police Officer Gustavo Lopez was asked on cross examination about
observing other officers restraining the victim from fleeing the scene and
responded, “That’s incorrect. Based on what I observed, that wasn’t his
action.” He acknowledged having testified at the preliminary hearing that he
observed other officers restrain Wallace as he attempted to flee the scene.

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Officer Lopez detained Zarut at the scene. Zarut complied with the
officer’s orders. Lopez testified that when he asked whether Zarut had any
weapons, Zarut said, “the knife that I stabbed him with is in the tent.” Asked
if he remembered whether Zarut used the word “stabbed,” Lopez testified
that he recalled Zarut saying “the knife that I killed him with is in the tent.”8
Zarut gestured toward the tent and said, “it’s in the front part of the tent.”
Police Officer Laura Presley looked inside the tent after being advised
that there was knife there. She saw a metal object with fresh blood on it.
The weapon, which had a blade about 18 to 20 inches long, was displayed to
the jury at trial.
Zarut presented no witnesses at trial. The primary theory of the
defense, as argued by counsel, was that Zarut acted in self-defense.9 Defense
counsel also argued involuntary and voluntary manslaughter as alternative
theories, including telling the jury that the latter could be based on a sudden

8 Lopez spoke with Zarut in Spanish, the officer’s “primary” language,
when he realized Zarut did not speak English. Lopez speaks Mexican
Spanish and Zarut spoke a Cuban dialect, but Lopez testified that this did
not impact his ability to communicate with Zarut. Asked further about
whether Zarut used the word “stabbed” or “killed,” Lopez acknowledged that
at the preliminary hearing he referred to Zarut having said he “stabbed”
Wallace but testified that this was a mistake and that the exact translation of
the word he used in his report is “killed.”
9 In arguing that Zarut reasonably believed he was in imminent
danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury, reasonably believed
immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against this danger,
and used no more force than was reasonably necessary, counsel argued points
including that Wallace came to Zarut’s home and injured Zarut in the fight,
that Wallace’s behavior showed he was not going to stop fighting, and that
Zarut stabbed Wallace only once, in the area of his shoulder, and the only
reason he caused so much damage was the length of the blade, which Zarut
did not choose.

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quarrel that provoked Zarut so as to cause him to act rashly, under the
influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment (and
would have so provoked a person of average disposition).
DISCUSSION
I.
Additional Background
A. The Parties’ Positions on Sentencing
The probation report recommended that the court deny probation and
sentence Zarut to an aggregate prison term of 12 years, the upper term of
11 years for the manslaughter conviction plus 1 year for the arming
enhancement. The report listed two circumstances in aggravation—the crime
involved great violence or other conduct disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness or callousness (rule 4.421(a)(1)) and Zarut engaged in violent
conduct indicating a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1))—and one
mitigating circumstance—Zarut had no prior record (rule 4.423(b)(1)).
Zarut’s sentencing memorandum urged the court to grant probation or,
if it denied probation, impose a lower term sentence. The memorandum
described Zarut’s circumstances: He lawfully immigrated to the
United States in 2014, at age 42, to join his father; his father lost their
housing soon after Zarut moved in; and Zarut remained unhoused for the five
years preceding the murder, living on the street mostly at 15th Street and
South Van Ness Avenue. Zarut smoked marijuana but did not have
substance abuse issues. He had been arrested twice for assaultive conduct
but had never been charged with a crime.
The memorandum noted the three aggravating circumstances found
true by the jury, then listed 13 aggravating circumstances that did not apply
(rule 4.421(a)(3)–(a)(6), (a)(8)–(a)(12), (b)(2)–(b)(5)) (and had not been

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alleged). The defense urged that six mitigating factors applied. Three of
these related to the crime: First, the victim was “an initiator of, willing
participant in, or aggressor or provoker of the incident” (rule 4.423(a)(2)), in
that the victim engaged in a heated argument with Zarut that resulted in
injuries to Zarut’s face; second, the crime was committed “because of an
unusual circumstance, such as great provocation, that is unlikely to recur”
(rule 4.423(a)(3)), as the jury found Zarut not guilty of murder but guilty of
voluntary manslaughter, which offense the defense characterized as “[b]y its
very nature . . . a result of great provocation—here, a fight”; and third, Zarut,
“with no apparent predisposition to do so, was induced by others to
participate in the crime” (rule 4.423(a)(5)), in that the fight resulted from the
victim coming to the tent that was Zarut’s home and the knife was not
Zarut’s but rather was handed to him by his codefendant after the fight had
started. The other three factors the defense urged related to Zarut: First, he
had no prior record (rule 4.423 (b)(1)); second, he had
“experienced . . . physical . . . trauma . . . [that] was a factor in the
commission of the crime” (rule 4.423(b)(3)), in that his two prior arrests
resulted from incidents in which he was the victim of random attacks that
occurred while he was unhoused and the present incident also involved a
fight while Zarut was unhoused; and third, he “voluntarily acknowledged
wrongdoing before arrest [and] at an early stage of the criminal process”
(rule 4.423(b)(8)), as he was compliant when the police arrived, he
immediately told Officer Lopez he used a knife and the knife was in his tent,
and he was not given an opportunity to resolve the case prior to trial since
the prosecutor did not extend an offer. The memorandum asserted that the

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mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating ones and the court therefore
“may not impose the high term.”10
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel added a mitigating
circumstance not included in the memorandum, that Zarut suffered from “a
physical condition that makes him particularly vulnerable” in that he had
stomach cancer and prison therefore “would not be the same for [him] as it
would be for another individual.” Counsel emphasized that the jury found
Zarut did not act with malice and argued that the offense was “a rare
occurrence” that “by its nature” was “unlikely to recur.”
The prosecutor took issue with the mitigating circumstances the
defense relied on. According to the prosecutor, defense counsel’s assertion
that the victim initiated the incident was not borne out by the evidence.11
The prosecutor described the video of the incident as showing Zarut
“approaching [Wallace] with a long knife” and Wallace “backpedaling,
backpedaling, backpedaling until Mr. Zarut gets close enough to try to stab
him,” and “then, Mr. Wallace[] takes swings to defend himself.” The
prosecutor urged that defense counsel had acknowledged that Zarut was
involved in two prior stabbings, thus contradicting the defense argument that

10 The defense memorandum argued that the sentencing factors listed
in the probation officer’s report were incomplete and inaccurate, identifying
two factors in aggravation although the jury found three, and identifying only
one mitigating factor while the defense identified six.
11 In this regard, the prosecutor pointed to a statement, apparently not
put in evidence at trial, in which Zarut told the police that when the victim
approached him, there was a verbal argument and Zarut immediately
grabbed the knife and swung it five or six times at Wallace. When defense
counsel later began to respond to this point, the court stated it did not think
the People had introduced this statement and it did not actually have the
statement, and defense counsel did not further address it.

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the present offense was committed due to an unusual circumstance unlikely
to recur. The third mitigating factor cited by the defense, that Zarut was
induced by others to participate in the crime, according to the prosecutor,
similarly attempted to ignore the prior stabbing incidents. The prosecutor
acknowledged that Zarut did not have prior convictions but disputed whether
he had experienced physical trauma, stating that the defense argument in
this regard was based on the two prior stabbings and “asking the court to
infer that Mr. Zarut was the victim in those cases,” but there are many
reasons a person might not be charged with a crime, including the victim’s
level of cooperation and the People’s ability to locate victims. The prosecutor
argued that the defense’s reliance on the mitigating factor that Zarut
acknowledged wrongdoing before arrest was based on an inaccurate
representation of the meaning of this factor, as Zarut never accepted his
wrongdoing.
Addressing the aggravating circumstances found by the jury, the
prosecutor argued, “We cannot ask the jurors to make a decision on factors in
aggravation only to then ask the Court to ignore those factors.” The
prosecutor stated his position was that the court was to “essentially presume
the midterm” and the three factors in aggravation justified imposing the
upper term.
B. The Trial Court’s Order
The trial court began by telling Zarut that it accepted that his life had
been challenging, living as he did was difficult and traumatic and the
circumstances that brought him to these circumstances were traumatic. The
court stated that it was taking these mitigating factors into consideration but
found the aggravating circumstances “greatly outweigh[ed]” the mitigating
ones. The court explained, “And in part that is because the [L]egislature has

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determined, as the People have argued, that where a sentence is to be
enhanced, it should be based upon a finding of a unanimous jury. And in this
case, the jury has unanimously found that all three factors in aggravation,
California Rules of Court[, rule] 4.421(a)(1), 4.421(a)(2), and 4.421(b)(1) to be
true, that required them to consider the evidence and to reach that conclusion
unanimously. These are important factors.” The court noted that in addition
to Zarut using a weapon, his codefendant also had a weapon and the victim
was unarmed. The court stated that “perhaps the [factor] that is most
significant in my decision, is that the jury—jury of your peers, our peers—has
concluded that the violent conduct in which you engaged indicates a serious
danger to society.”
The court continued, “We vest the jury with the discretion to make that
determination after considering the evidence, and they have done so.· And so
for me to sentence you as your counsel has asked me to would be to the
contrary to what the jury, which heard all the evidence in a very well-
presented case by your two counsel, who advocated vigorously on your behalf,
presented a vigorous defense on your behalf, concluded.· And so it would be
antithetical to the [L]egislature’s intent for me to find the mitigating factors
that your counsel has identified outweigh the aggravating factors which the
jury has found. [¶] I don’t take those mitigating factors lightly.· I understand
the pain that you’re suffering as a result of your illness. I understand the
trauma you have experienced, but I have to apply the law based upon the
evidence and the finding of the jury.”

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II.
Analysis
A. Governing Legal Principles
Pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b), “ ‘when a sentencing court
chooses a term from a statutory triad, the chosen term shall not exceed the
middle term, unless the facts supporting the aggravating circumstances are
(1) established by the defendant’s stipulation to them, (2) proven to a jury (or
to a court, if jury is waived) beyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) based on prior
convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction.’ ” (People v.
Campbell (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 350, 390, quoting People v. Jones (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 37, 44.)
Within these constraints, “[a] trial court’s sentencing discretion is very
broad.” (People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1031.) “[T]he court is
free to determine facts that, in its judgment, call for a reduction of sentence
to the lower available term.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 767.)
“The current statute also preserves the trial court’s discretion to determine
whether an upper term sentence is in fact justified.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Unless the
record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise, the trial court is deemed to
have considered all the relevant sentencing factors set forth in the rules.’
(People v. Parra Martinez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 317, 322; see also Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.409 [all relevant sentencing factors ‘will be deemed to have
been considered unless the record affirmatively [reflects] otherwise’].)”
(People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765.)
“ ‘ “Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise
of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court
which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more
exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have

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been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s
record.” [Citation.] In such circumstances, we have held that the appropriate
remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]”
that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had
been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2023)
15 Cal.5th 416, 424, quoting People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391;
People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 431-432.)
B. Analysis
Zarut contends that the record here affirmatively demonstrates the
trial court failed to exercise its discretionary authority and sentenced him to
the aggravated term because it believed it was compelled to do so by the
jury’s findings that three aggravating factors were true. As Zarut describes
the trial court’s explanation for its decision, the court “stated that the ‘most
significant factor’ was that the jury found true the factor in
aggravation . . . that defendant engaged in violent conduct that indicated a
serious danger to society,” “stressed the discretion of the jury in making that
determination,” stated that sentencing Zarut to probation or the lower term
would be “ ‘contrary to what the jury concluded,’ ” and “justified its deference
to the discretion of the jury” by stating “ ‘it would be antithetical to the
[L]egislature’s intent for me to find the mitigating factors that [defense
counsel] identified outweigh the aggravating factors which the
jury . . . found.’ ”
We do not see the court’s remarks as indicating it deferred to the jury
and believed it could not impose less than an upper term sentence. Rather, it
appears to us that the court understood “the distinction between the
requirement of properly proven facts and the court’s exercise of its discretion
when determining the significance of those facts.” (People v. Lynch, supra,

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16 Cal.5th at p. 767.) The court’s statement that the Legislature had
determined a sentence should be enhanced only “based upon a finding of a
unanimous jury” recognized that a jury finding on an aggravating factor is a
statutory prerequisite to imposing an upper term sentence, but its
explanation of the decision to impose the aggravated term described the
court’s choice. The court expressly stated that its decision was based on
weighing the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating
circumstances. The court explained that it understood the trauma Zarut had
experienced, and did not take the mitigating circumstances “lightly” and had
taken them into consideration “as mitigating factors to counter the
aggravating factors that the jury found.” But, the court continued, “I have
concluded that the aggravating factors greatly outweigh the mitigating
factors” and “for that reason, I am going to impose the upper term of
11 years.” (Italics added.) The court stated that the jury’s finding that
Zarut’s violent conduct “indicates a danger to society” was the aggravating
factor “perhaps . . . most significant in my decision.” (Italics added.)
As we understand the court’s remarks, its emphasis on the jury having
found the aggravating factors proven beyond a reasonable doubt reflected its
intent to honor the jury’s view of the evidence, not as negating the court’s
reliance on its own discretion and judgment as to the relative weight of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The defense in this case centered
on arguments that the victim was the aggressor and Zarut’s conduct was
justified or excusable. The jury found Zarut guilty of voluntary
manslaughter, not murder, but its findings that the offense involved great
violence and that Zarut used a weapon and engaged in violent conduct
indicating a serious danger to society demonstrated the seriousness of the
conduct the jury found was shown by the evidence. The defense argument at

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sentencing that the circumstances of the offense were unusual, the
occurrence was rare and Zarut’s violent acts were unlikely to recur was
contrary to the jury’s finding that Zarut’s conduct indicated a serious danger
to society, thus explaining the court’s statement that “it would be antithetical
to the [L]egislature’s intent” to find the mitigating factors “outweigh the
aggravating factors which the jury has found.” The court saw the three
aggravating circumstances as “important factors” and further noted that not
only did Zarut use a weapon, but his codefendant also had a weapon and
Wallace was unarmed and walking his dog.
In short, the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that the trial
court failed to exercise its discretionary authority but rather indicates the
trial court recognized the jury’s findings were essential to its authority to
impose an aggravated term and exercised its own discretion in weighing
those factors against those that could mitigate Zarut’s offense and support a
lesser sentence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

DESAUTELS, J.

People v. Zarut (A169317)

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