CourtListener 10596697•People v. Johnson CA4/1
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Filed 6/2/25 P. v. Johnson CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085181
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1901247)
MONTA JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Jeffrey J. Prevost, Judge. (Retired Judge of Riverside Sup. Ct. assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Tyler L. Krentz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Monta Johnson of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1
§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true he personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm, causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). He was sentenced to serve a
total of 50 years to life in prison. On appeal, Johnson contends his conviction
must be reversed because the evidence upholding it is inherently improbable
or physically impossible and therefore insufficient. He also contends the trial
court abused its discretion when it failed to dismiss or reduce the firearm
enhancement. We reject both contentions and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
I.
The Prosecution’s Evidence
On March 12, 2019, at approximately 12:15 p.m., deputies from the
Riverside County Sheriff’s Department responded to a report of an
“individual down” at a community park in Moreno Valley. When they
arrived, they found Patrick Malloy lying next to his red Ford sedan in the
parking lot of the park. He was bleeding profusely from a gunshot wound to
the head and later died from his injury at the hospital.
Sandra S. was sitting in her car in the parking lot at the time of the
shooting. She told police she saw a burgundy car and a gray or silver car
enter the parking lot and park next to each other. After hearing a “big boom”
that she believed was a gunshot, she saw a Black man with a bald, shaved
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
head who appeared to be in his 30s get into the car that was parked next to
the red car and leave the park.2
Deputy Brian Sinclair was in his office at the sheriff’s station when he
heard the radio broadcast of an “assault with an injury” at the community
park at 12:15 p.m. He immediately went to the station’s observation room,
which was equipped with stations for retrieving and reviewing citywide
camera system recordings and began reviewing recorded footage.3
From the footage, Deputy Sinclair determined the following events had
occurred: At about 11:32 a.m. that morning, Malloy’s Ford and a two-door
black Mercedes entered the parking lot together and backed into adjacent
stalls almost “simultaneously.” The Mercedes was later determined to be
registered to Johnson.
Both drivers then got out of their respective cars at 11:39 a.m. There
was some activity for about three minutes, after which Malloy “ended up” in
the Ford’s driver seat, and the driver of the Mercedes “end[ed] up just behind
[Malloy]” in the Ford’s backseat on the driver-side. The two men appeared to
settle into these positions for approximately 15 minutes.
At 11:57 a.m., the man in the Ford’s backseat stood up, took a couple of
steps toward the rear of the Mercedes, and “immediately” turned around and
took a couple of steps back to the Ford’s “still-open rear door.” The man
2 As we later discuss, Sandra’s description was generally consistent with
Johnson’s appearance on March 12, 2019.
3 Investigating deputies recovered additional video footage from the
Moreno Valley city surveillance camera system as well as private video
systems installed on a church across from the community park and two
houses on Fir Avenue. The footage was played for the jury, and Deputy
Sinclair testified to his opinions of what the footage depicted.
3
appeared to extend his arm toward the Ford from “about a door length away.”
He then walked around the back of the Mercedes and got into the driver seat.
Within seconds, the Mercedes left the parking lot and traveled westbound on
Fir Avenue, away from the park. Deputy Sinclair radioed a description of the
suspect Mercedes, including the last three digits of its license plate, to other
deputies. From the surveillance footage, it was determined Malloy was shot
at approximately 11:57 a.m.
The Mercedes made a series of U-turns on Fir Avenue. It reentered the
parking lot and parked several stalls away from where it originally parked.
After several minutes, the driver of the Mercedes exited and “positioned
himself behind a tree in a planter with a vantage point towards . . . Malloy.”
Then the driver reentered the Mercedes and left the parking lot, this time
going east on Fir Avenue.
From 12:11 p.m. to 12:17 p.m., the Mercedes could be seen driving on
nearby city streets. At 12:17 p.m., it went out of view for 10 minutes. At
12:27 p.m., it could be seen driving westbound on Fir Avenue. At
approximately 12:28 p.m., the Mercedes drove past the crime scene and
turned onto other streets before going out of view again. From 12:31 p.m. to
12:34 p.m., Johnson could be seen walking on Fir Avenue toward the crime
scene, arrive directly across the street from the crime scene, and then turn
around and walk away.
Around 12:35 to 12:40 p.m., Deputy Josh Patterson and his partner
were driving in an unmarked patrol vehicle westbound on Fir Avenue, when
Patterson noticed Johnson walking eastbound toward the park. Johnson was
looking at his phone and cursing, which drew Patterson’s attention. As the
deputies continued westbound, Patterson spotted a parked Mercedes that
matched the description of the suspect vehicle. Shortly after, Patterson saw
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Johnson again, now walking westbound. Johnson continued past the parked
Mercedes and briefly went out of Patterson’s view.
Deputy Patterson approached Johnson. He agreed to answer questions
and gave Patterson his name, date of birth, and phone number. Johnson said
he was in the area because he was “just being nosy” and was visiting his “side
chick.” When asked if he had any keys in his possession, Johnson voluntarily
pulled out a Mercedes key fob. Patterson pressed the button on the key fob,
which caused the lights on the parked Mercedes to activate. As mentioned,
the Mercedes was registered to Johnson. A wallet holding a debit card with
Malloy’s name was later found inside Johnson’s Mercedes.
Johnson was transported to a sheriff’s station at about 1:00 p.m.
There, a deputy swabbed his hands for gunshot residue. A criminalist
determined there were four characteristic particles of gunshot residue in the
sample taken from Johnson’s right hand, which she considered “highly
indicative” the particles originated from the discharge of a firearm. She
found one characteristic particle of gunshot residue in the sample taken from
Johnson’s left hand. The criminalist explained the presence of characteristic
particles of gunshot residue can mean one of three things: the person
discharged a firearm, the person was around when a firearm went off, or the
person touched or came in contact with a surface that had gunshot residue on
it.
Malloy’s Ford was swabbed for genetic evidence. A DNA analyst
testified there was “very strong support”—quantified as 82 million times
more likely than not—that Johnson was one of four contributors to DNA
collected on a swab of the Ford’s rear center armrest. The analyst stated he
could not determine how long the DNA had been on the armrest and
5
acknowledged it could have been there for 15 seconds, a week, or even three
months before the shooting.
An examination of the cell phones of Johnson and Malloy revealed the
two had been exchanging text messages since December 2017. At the time,
both men were employed by the same shipping company. In a January 2019
text message, Malloy gave Johnson his name, date of birth, and social
security number. Malloy provided this information after Johnson sent him a
text message that said, “What’s the deal, Crip? Shoot that info, Crip. Cuz,
don’t want that free money?”
On the day before Malloy’s murder, there was a phone call between
Johnson and Malloy. That night, Malloy did Google searches “concerning
fraudulent activity” and “being liable for having somebody . . . use your
name.” One of his searches included the question, “Are you liable for a death
that had your name but didn’t occur?” And on the morning of Malloy’s
murder, Malloy texted Johnson, “I’m jumping in the shower and getting
ready. What’s your timeline looking at?” Johnson responded, “11:00 a.m.”
They confirmed the meetup location would be Johnson’s “casa.” Malloy’s final
text to Johnson was “OMW,” meaning “on my way.”
A homicide investigator learned that in 2017 and 2018, Johnson had
made multiple fraudulent attempts to obtain money using his nephew’s
name. One of the attempts had been successful, and the nephew had
reported the fraudulent loan to the police. In March 2019, Johnson was
working for a warehouse company. He had used Malloy’s name and
identifying information to get the warehouse job. Specifically, when applying
for the job, he had used Malloy’s social security card, a fake driver’s license
with Malloy’s name but Johnson’s face, and W-4 forms filled out with
Malloy’s identifying information. In addition to using Malloy’s information to
6
secure a job, Johnson also had “basically an entire wallet” of documents in
Malloy’s name. The investigator opined that Johnson was stealing Malloy’s
identity and “fraudulently using Patrick Malloy’s name in an effort to obtain
a financial benefit with regards to a promissory note.”
A search of Johnson’s residence turned up documents in the name of
not only Johnson but also Malloy. These included correspondence sent to
“Mr. Patrick Malloy”; a letter to Malloy, but with Johnson’s address; and a
letter from a financial institution with Malloy’s name but Johnson’s address.
The search team also found a driver’s license with Malloy’s name but
Johnson’s photograph; a forklift certificate with Malloy’s name but Johnson’s
photograph; and health insurance documents with Malloy’s name.
Ammunition of .40-caliber and .38-caliber wadcutter typically used in a
revolver were found in Johnson’s residence. A homicide detective testified
that a revolver, unlike a semiautomatic firearm, does not eject spent shell
casings when it is fired. No spent shell casings were recovered in this case,
either from the Mercedes or from the homicide scene. However, bullet jacket
fragments recovered from Malloy’s head wound were consistent with being
fired from a .38-caliber, low-velocity firearm. Additionally, a search of
Johnson’s iCloud account uncovered a photograph of an individual holding a
handgun. An investigator opined based on “the tattoos” that Johnson was
the person holding the handgun.
Last, an investigator forensically examined Johnson’s cell phone for cell
tower data and records of calls and texts sent and received from midnight
until 2:00 p.m. on the day of Malloy’s murder. During that time frame, a
total of 202 calls and texts were generated and received by his phone. But
there was no activity on Johnson’s phone between 11:49 a.m. and 12:14 p.m.
The investigator found this significant because the gap coincided with the
7
period before and after the 11:57 a.m. homicide, and it was “a pretty wide gap
in terms of [Johnson’s] actual usage of the device.”
The only location data available for Johnson’s cell phone was “general
sector information,” which was based on the cell tower that was used by the
phone to send or receive particular transmissions. The investigator
explained that a given cell phone will choose a cell tower “that it feels is the
best tower to be able to transmit or receive that data effectively.” This “could
be a tower that’s immediately close to you,” or if “the closest tower . . . is
being overrun” with cell phone traffic, the cell phone may “pick a tower that
is miles away.”
From 11:26 to 11:33 a.m. on the day of Malloy’s murder, Johnson’s cell
phone connected with (or “hit”) a cell tower 1.3 miles southeast of Johnson’s
residence and 2.4 miles southeast of the area of the homicide. The homicide
scene was within this cell tower’s range. At 11:49 a.m. and 12:14 p.m.,
Johnson’s cell phone connected to a cell tower 1.1 miles from Johnson’s
residence and 2.1 miles from the homicide scene. According to the
investigator, “any device can reach that tower from the homicide scene.”
These two cell towers were the towers closest to Johnson’s residence.
At 12:29 p.m., Johnson’s cell phone connected to a cell tower located at
the park where the homicide occurred. At 1:19 p.m., after Johnson arrived at
the sheriff’s station, his cell phone once again connected to the cell tower that
was 1.1 miles from his residence and 2.1 miles from the homicide scene, even
though this tower was “far east of the . . . sheriff’s station.” The investigator
testified this was a “prime example” of a cell phone choosing to connect to
“the best tower no matter what,” even though the tower was one of the towers
furthest away.
8
II.
Defense Evidence
Melvin Vance, a defense investigator, reviewed video footage recovered
from the city camera stationed at the park where the shooting occurred. He
enlarged the images and compared the shooter’s appearance to that of
Johnson as he walked past the crime scene shortly before he was arrested.
Vance opined that Johnson’s skin complexion “appears to be light,”
whereas the shooter’s skin complexion was “dark[ ].” He also opined that the
shooter was “heavier” and “darker” than Johnson and the shooter’s “walk was
totally different from [Johnson’s] walk.” He also noted that whereas Johnson
was wearing a short sleeve shirt and shorts as he walked past the crime
scene, the shooter was dressed in a dark-colored jacket, long-sleeved shirt
and dark pants. Vance agreed, however, that “[t]he purpose of showing the
video to the jury was so that they could look at the shooter and look at
Mr. Johnson themselves.”
DISCUSSION
I.
Sufficient Evidence Supports Johnson’s Conviction
“[I]n reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the
relevant inquiry is whether, on review of the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment, any rational trier of fact could have found the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Young (2005)
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1180.) We do not substitute our own factual determinations
for the factfinder’s (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1078) because
“ ‘[r]esolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive
province of the trier of fact’ ” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 106). We
“presume[ ] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier
9
could reasonably deduce from the evidence. The same standard applies when
the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. Although it is the
jury’s duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence
susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and
the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be
convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the
reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled
with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” (People
v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053–1054 [cleaned up].)
Although he acknowledges the record evidence “has potential to end the
analysis for [his] sufficiency of the evidence challenge on appeal in light of the
standard of review,” Johnson argues there is insufficient evidence to support
the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter. This is
so, he claims, because “the jury’s verdict is based on physically impossible or
inherently improbable evidence.” We reject this claim.
While an appellate court is authorized to overturn a judgment when it
concludes the evidence supporting it is physically impossible or inherently
improbable, “such a finding is so rare as to be almost non-existent.” (People
v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 728 (Ennis).) This is because, “ ‘[e]xcept
in . . . rare instances of demonstrable falsity, doubts about the credibility’ ” in
the evidence are for the jury to resolve, not a court of review. (Ibid. [cleaned
up], quoting People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609.) “To warrant the
rejection of the statements given by a witness who has been believed by a
[factfinder], there must exist either a physical impossibility that they are
true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or
deductions.” (Ennis, at pp. 728–729, italics added [cleaned up].)
10
“The inherently improbable standard addresses the basic content of the
testimony itself—i.e., could that have happened?—rather than the apparent
credibility of the person testifying. Hence, the requirement that the
improbability must be ‘inherent,’ and the falsity apparent ‘without resorting
to inferences or deductions.’ ” (Ennis, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 729,
quoting People v. Huston (1943) 21 Cal.2d 690, 693, overruled on another
ground in People v. Burton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 328, 352.) “In other words, the
challenged evidence must be improbable ‘ “on its face.” ’ ” (Ennis, at p. 729,
quoting People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 150 (Mayberry).) So “we do
not compare it to other evidence (except, perhaps, certain universally
accepted and judicially noticeable facts). The only question is: Does it seem
possible that what the witness claimed to have happened actually happened?”
(Ennis, at p. 729.) Put another way, testimony may be rejected only when it
is “unbelievable per se, physically impossible or wholly unacceptable to
reasonable minds.” (Ennis, at p. 729 [cleaned up].) Thus, “[c]onflicts and
even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the
reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or
jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the
facts upon which a determination depends.” (Mayberry, at p. 150 [cleaned
up]; see Ennis, at p. 729.)
Johnson’s attempt to apply the inherently improbable standard
comports with none of these rules. The flaw in Johnson’s appellate challenge
is that he focuses on asserted conflicts in the evidence, compares the
challenged evidence to other evidence to draw contrary inferences and
deductions, and tries to persuade us of the ways in which the facts and
evidence are consistent with the conclusion he is innocent. Specifically, he
argues it is physically impossible or inherently improbable he was the
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shooter because: (1) the shooter was dressed in different clothing than
Johnson was wearing when he was detained; (2) Vance, the defense
investigator, testified the shooter looked different from Johnson; (3) Sandra’s
description of the shooter “also fit the description of another male” aside from
Johnson; (4) “Johnson’s cell phone was connecting to a tower closer to his
home not the cell tower at the park” when the shooting happened;
(5) Johnson could have gotten the gun residue on his hands by touching a
surface that had gun residue on it and his DNA could have been deposited in
Malloy’s Ford months before the shooting; (6) Johnson visited the homicide
scene after the shooting and voluntarily pulled out his Mercedes key, acts
suggesting it is improbable he was the perpetrator; and (7) text messages
showed Malloy and Johnson planned to meet at 11:00 a.m., half an hour
earlier than when Malloy’s Ford and Johnson’s Mercedes were seen arriving
at the park in the surveillance footage. With these types of arguments,
Johnson fails to persuade us that his is the “rare” case in which the evidence
supporting his conviction is unbelievable per se or wholly unacceptable to
reasonable minds. We nonetheless address each of his arguments in turn.
First, that the shooter was wearing long sleeves and long pants at the
time of the homicide, whereas Johnson was wearing shorts and a t-shirt
when he was detained, does not demonstrate the physical impossibility or
inherent improbability Johnson was the shooter. This is so even if we accept
Johnson’s contention that the 10-minute window (from 12:17 p.m. until 12:26
p.m.) when his Mercedes went out of view of surveillance cameras gave him
“insufficient time” to “go home, discard his clothes and the firearm, clean up
and be back at the park.” The contention is unpersuasive, including because
it assumes, without supporting evidence, that Johnson’s home was the only
place he could have changed his clothing (or discarded the firearm). He fails
12
to eliminate other possibilities, for example that he was wearing shorts and a
t-shirt underneath the long sleeves and long pants and discarded the outer
layers (plus the firearm) somewhere other than his residence. And while
Johnson notes that the clothing and firearm were not found in the Mercedes
or “along the path of travel of the Mercedes,” this also assumes facts not in
the record—namely, that deputies did or could search the Mercedes’ complete
path of travel. Contrary to Johnson’s assumption, and as Johnson himself
acknowledges, there was a 10-minute period when the path of travel of the
Mercedes was unknown.
Second, that Vance believed the shooter had a darker complexion than
Johnson or looked different from Johnson because he appeared heavier or
walked with a different gait does not demonstrate that it is physically
impossible for Johnson to have been the shooter. The jury heard Vance’s
testimony, inspected the same images and video footage as he, and reached a
different conclusion. We have reviewed the photographs and video exhibits
transmitted to us at Johnson’s request, and agree with the People the images
of the individuals depicted in them are not clear. The exhibits do not
persuade us the jury unreasonably rejected Vance’s testimony.
Similarly, his third argument that Sandra’s description of the
perpetrator was arguably consistent with another male in the video footage
ignores the ways in which it was also consistent with Johnson, whose
appearance the jury could see for itself and consider.
Fourth, Johnson’s contention the cell tower evidence was exonerating
because it showed his phone connected to cell towers closer to his home than
to the park at the time of the shooting, whereas it connected to the cell tower
at the park when he walked by the crime scene, ignores the prosecution
evidence that cell phones do not always connect to the closest cell tower.
13
While the cell tower evidence may support a reasonable inference in
Johnson’s favor, it does not demonstrate the physical impossibility of the
inference against him.
The same is true of the gun residue and DNA evidence, his fifth
argument. Johnson focuses on possibilities consistent with his innocence (he
could have acquired the gun residue by surface contact; the DNA evidence
could have gotten there months before the shooting), while failing to
eliminate the possibilities consistent with his guilt (he could have acquired
the gun residue by shooting a gun; his DNA could have been in Malloy’s back
seat because Johnson was the perpetrator seen in the video emerging from
Malloy’s car just before the shooting).
Johnson’s sixth argument is equally unavailing, particularly given the
magnitude of his burden on appeal. He asserts that it is “highly improbable”
he would return to the homicide scene after the shooting. But it is
undisputed the actual perpetrator returned to the scene of the crime almost
immediately after shooting Malloy, where he parked the Mercedes and stood
behind a tree staring at Malloy. If anything, Johnson’s appearance directly
across the street from the homicide scene roughly half an hour later, after
having parked his Mercedes nearby, is consistent rather than inconsistent
with the known behavior of the shooter. And to the extent Johnson points to
the fact that he admitted the Mercedes was his and voluntarily handed
Deputy Patterson the Mercedes key fob, we reject the notion that it is
unreasonable to infer guilt from a criminal defendant’s voluntary, otherwise
inculpatory admissions. At best these facts disclose “an unusual
circumstance,” which is not a basis for reversing a conviction. (Mayberry,
supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 150.)
14
And finally, although it is true Johnson and Malloy’s text messages
showed they agreed to meet at 11:00 a.m., half an hour before the shooting,
the messages also showed the meeting was planned for Johnson’s “casa.”
Although Johnson observes there was no evidence the duo sent text messages
agreeing to meet later, he fails to eliminate other alternatives, such as that
the duo met as planned and then verbally agreed to go to the park.
In short, Johnson fails to meet his heavy burden to establish this is one
of those rare cases in which the facts and evidence upholding his conviction
are insufficient because they are physically impossible or inherently
improbable. Moreover, the authorities he cites do not persuade us differently.
(Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 150; People v. Headlee (1941) 18 Cal.2d 266,
267–268 (Headlee); Ennis, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 729.) Mayberry and
Ennis reached the opposite conclusion from the one Johnson would have us
reach here, and they did so by rejecting arguments that had flaws like those
raised by Johnson. (See Mayberry, at pp. 149–150 [rejecting challenge to
sexual assault victim’s testimony as inherently improbable where the jury
“could well have concluded [the victim’s] fear was not unreasonable” and that
an action assertedly demonstrating the victim’s lack of fear “discloses at most
an unusual circumstance”]; Ennis, at pp. 728–730 [rejecting challenge to sex
abuse convictions based on inconsistencies in victim and witness testimony;
the inconsistencies suggested only that the jury could have inferred the
witnesses were lying, not that it would have been impossible for the
defendant to have committed the offenses].)
This leaves Headlee, the only case Johnson cites in which a judgment
was overturned. However, Headlee, which was decided in 1941, is readily
distinguishable. There the defendant’s challenge was based on a comparison
of the statements and actions of a victim who claimed to have been sexually
15
assaulted. The Headlee court noted the victim “[c]oncededly” did not
physically resist the claimed assault. (Headlee, supra, 18 Cal.2d at p. 274.)
It also remarked that “although unmarried” the victim testified “she had
previously engaged in acts of sexual intercourse.” (Ibid.) In the Court’s view,
it was “highly improbable that she did not consent . . . , particularly in view of
the fact she offered no objection or resistance.” (Id. at p. 275.) We question
whether this antiquated reasoning continues to have relevance today, but
whatever force it may still have, we do not find it to be applicable here.
In sum, Johnson fails to establish the evidence and facts against him
are physically impossible or inherently improbable, and so we reject his
insufficiency of the evidence claim. Consequently, we also reject his related
contentions that his conviction violates state and federal due process because
it is unsupported by substantial evidence.4 (See People v. Westerfield (2019)
4 In the same section of the opening brief in which Johnson challenges
his conviction as based on physically impossible or inherently improbable
(and thus insufficient) evidence, Johnson refers to his new trial motion and
insinuates the trial court erred by denying the motion. Johnson does not,
however, challenge the denial in a developed argument under a separate
heading. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [an appellant’s opening
brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading
summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible,
by citation of authority”].) And although a trial court’s ruling on a new trial
motion asserting the verdict is contrary to the evidence (§ 1181, subd. (6)) is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211,
1260–1261), Johnson does not reference this standard of review or argue that
the court abused its discretion. Any potential challenge to the denial of the
new trial motion has been forfeited. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764,
793; see Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179 [argument
forfeited where it was neither presented under a separate heading nor
developed with reasoned argument and citation to relevant authority].) Still,
our determination the evidence supporting the verdict was not insufficient
would compel us to reject such a challenge had it been asserted.
16
6 Cal.5th 632, 713 [under the state and federal Constitutions, a criminal
conviction must be supported by substantial evidence].)
II.
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Failing to Dismiss or Reduce
Johnson’s Firearm Enhancement
The jury found true Johnson personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing death pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d), and the
trial court sentenced Johnson to serve a prison term of 50 years to life,
consisting of 25 years to life for the murder conviction plus 25 years to life for
the firearm enhancement.
Johnson asks us to remand for resentencing, claiming the trial court
violated section 1385 in two ways. First, he claims the trial court was
required to dismiss the firearm enhancement because the length of his
sentence after applying the enhancement’s 25-year-to-life term exceeds 20
years. (See § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).) Second and alternatively, he argues the
court was unaware of its discretion to dismiss his firearm enhancement
under section 1385, subdivision (c), or to reduce it to a lesser firearm
enhancement under People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado).5
5 Section 12022.53, subdivision (h), gives sentencing courts authority to
strike the firearm enhancements. (§ 12022.53, subd. (h) [“The court may, in
the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and at the time of sentencing,
strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by this
section.” ].) In Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688, the California Supreme Court
held that sentencing courts have discretion under subdivision (h) of section
12022.53 to strike or dismiss a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement
and impose one of the lesser enhancements in subdivisions (b) or (c) of section
12022.53 even where, as here, the lesser enhancements were not charged in
the information or found true by a jury. (Tirado, at pp. 696, 700.)
17
The People respond that Johnson’s contentions are meritless as well as
forfeited.6 We agree with the People. Our review is for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298; Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th
at p. 694.)
As amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), section 1385,
subdivision (c), provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. [¶] . . .
In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider
and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that
any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in
favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1), (2).)
Subparagraphs (A) to (I) of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), are a list of
mitigating circumstances. Relevant here, one of the mitigating
circumstances is, “The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be
dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).)
Johnson contends the mitigating circumstance in subdivision (c)(2)(C)
of section 1385 applied to him and required the trial court to dismiss the
firearm enhancement because the length of his sentence after applying the
enhancement’s 25-year-to-life term results in a sentence over 20 years. In his
6 The People’s unopposed motion for judicial notice of the Assembly Floor
Third Reading Analysis for Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) is
granted. (Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering,
Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 32 [legislative committee reports and
analyses are judicially noticeable].)
18
opening brief, he relied on People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 391,
review granted March 22, 2023, S278309, which held that when a listed
mitigating circumstance is present, section 1385 “erects a rebuttable
presumption that obligates a court to dismiss the enhancement unless the
court finds that dismissal of that enhancement . . . would endanger public
safety.” He argued because the trial court made no express finding that
dismissal of the firearm enhancement would endanger public safety, the
rebuttable presumption was not overcome and the court was required to
dismiss the enhancement, and it abused its discretion by failing to do so.
In his reply brief, however, Johnson appropriately concedes his
argument has been foreclosed by the California Supreme Court’s decision in
People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 (Walker), which was issued while his
appeal was pending. Walker held that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), “does
not erect a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal that can only be
overcome by a finding that dismissal endangers public safety.” (Walker,
supra, at p. 1033.) Instead, “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger
public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss
enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated
mitigating circumstances when they are present. . . . In other words, if the
court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence
of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize
even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of
the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1029, quoting
People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th, 1087, 1098, review granted Apr. 12,
2023, S278894 (Ortiz).)
19
After Walker, even if we assumed there was no forfeiture,7 Johnson
fails to establish an abuse of discretion on the basis a rebuttable presumption
in favor of dismissal mandated dismissal of the firearm enhancement under
section 1385, subdivision (c).
Johnson’s alternative claim that the trial court was unaware of its
discretion to dismiss the firearm enhancement under section 1385,
subdivision (c), or to reduce it to a lesser firearm enhancement under Tirado
also fails. It fails because it is based on the court’s failure to expressly
address its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c), or Tirado. This
argument lacks merit because we do not infer an abuse of discretion from a
silent record. The changes in sentencing law Johnson relies on here were
introduced in January 2022, a full 21 months before Johnson was sentenced.
(See Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1 [enacting the changes to § 1385 introduced by
Sen. Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) eff. Jan. 1, 2022]; Tirado, supra, 12
Cal.5th 688 [decided Jan. 20, 2022].) We presume the court was aware of
current law in effect at the time of sentencing. “[I]n light of the presumption
on a silent record that the trial court is aware of the applicable law, including
statutory discretion at sentencing, we cannot presume error where the record
does not establish on its face that the trial court misunderstood the scope of
that discretion.” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527
(Gutierrez); see People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335,
398 [“A trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the
7 We also assume for the sake of argument that the mitigating
circumstance in subdivision (c)(2)(C) of section 1385 is present here.
Accordingly, while we acknowledge the People’s argument that the mitigator
is not present because Johnson’s sentence for the murder conviction exceeded
20 years, such that imposition of the firearm enhancement did not “result” in
a sentence of over 20 years, we need not and do not address this argument.
20
applicable law.” (Cleaned up.)]; People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th
1511, 1517 [“These general rules concerning the presumption of regularity of
judicial exercises of discretion apply to sentencing issues.”].)
Seeking to avoid the presumption of regularity we must apply on a
silent record, Johnson argues the record in this case is not truly silent. He
points to his trial counsel’s statement—“I know the Court doesn’t have any
discretion with the life charge”—and asserts that the trial court “did not
disagree with defense counsel.” Johnson argues, “This leaves [the] question
whether the court understood and fully considered the scope of its discretion.”
We disagree. Under the presumption of regularity that applies to trial court
sentencing proceedings, we presume the trial court understood the applicable
sentencing laws “[a]bsent evidence to the contrary.” (People v. Ramirez
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042; People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 762, citing
Evid. Code, § 664.) The presumption of regularity holds where “the record
does not establish on its face that the trial court misunderstood the scope of
[its] discretion.” (Gutierrez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) Even if we
were to agree with Johnson that his counsel’s statement showed he believed
the court lacked discretion to dismiss or reduce the Penal Code section
12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement, the statement is evidence of
counsel’s own misunderstanding, not that of the trial court.
And although the trial court did not correct counsel’s asserted
misstatement, Johnson does not cite a published case, nor are we aware of
any, holding a trial court’s silence in response to an attorney’s error is
evidence of the court’s own misunderstanding. Instead, the case law is to the
contrary. For example, in People v. Presley (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1143,
the court held the presumption of regularity was not overcome where the
judge presiding over a bench trial heard inadmissible testimony regarding
21
the defendant. “That the trial court may have heard inadmissible
[testimony] does not overcome the presumption that the trial court . . .
properly ignored such material.” (Ibid.) Similarly, here, we presume from
the court’s silence that it properly ignored the inaccurate statement of
Johnson’s trial counsel. We also observe that the trial court did not impose
concurrent indeterminate terms despite defense counsel’s request that it do
so, which is an affirmative indication the court was not misled by, or under
the same misapprehensions as, Johnson’s trial counsel.
Johnson also points to the fact the trial court did not make an express
finding that dismissal or reduction of his firearm enhancement would
endanger public safety, nor did it expressly find aggravating factors
neutralized the great weight of the mitigating circumstance. Although this is
true, the court’s silence does not demonstrate error because express findings
were not required. Section 1385 requires courts to provide a statement of
reasons for a dismissal. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036, fn. 6.)
However, “the trial court is not required to state reasons for declining to
exercise its discretion under section 1385, and is presumed to have
considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record
to the contrary.” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.)
Further, we agree with the People substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s implied finding that dismissing or reducing the enhancement
would not be in furtherance of justice. (See People v. Dove (2004) 124
Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [“If the trial court imposes a prison sentence, we will imply
the necessary finding.”].) The probation report, which the trial court
expressly considered, provided substantial, relevant, and credible evidence of
seven aggravating factors and only a single nonstatutory mitigating factor
(Johnson’s satisfactory performance on probation). The report also expressed
22
concern about Johnson’s future danger to the public. In addition to noting
the murder “entailed a serious, violent, and vile offense as [Johnson] chose to
take the life of [an] unsuspecting victim,” the report stated Johnson “poses a
reasonable risk to the safety of the community, especially considering that he
has been unable to cease his criminality over two decades.” Although
Johnson argues the report also provided evidence of three additional
mitigating factors (the lack of any prior violent history and his own
“continuous work history” and family support), he does not contend the
report’s finding of seven aggravating factors was unsupported. Under these
circumstances, we agree with the People the court’s implied determination
that dismissal of the firearm enhancement would not be in furtherance of
justice was within the bounds of reason or not “so irrational or arbitrary that
no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 377.)
Johnson’s sentencing challenge also fails for a second reason. Our
analysis so far assumes Johnson took the steps necessary to preserve his
challenge. However, as the People rightly point out, he did not. Johnson
made no reference to the mitigating circumstance in section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(C), in the trial court, and he did not seek dismissal or reduction of the
firearm enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c), or Tirado.
Generally, “complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its
sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.)
Johnson’s failure to object at sentencing to the trial court’s failure to dismiss
or reduce his firearm enhancement forfeits his ability to raise his claims of
sentencing error on appeal. (Id. at pp. 353, 356.) Thus, his sentencing
challenge also fails under the doctrine of forfeiture.
23
In an effort to avoid forfeiture, Johnson contends his counsel was
ineffective for failing to seek dismissal or reduction of the enhancement. To
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant “must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the
defense.” (Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 521, citing Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) To establish prejudice,
“[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” (Strickland, at p. 694.) Further, the defendant “must carry
his burden of proving prejudice as a ‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply
speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel.” (People v.
Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937.)
We reject Johnson’s ineffectiveness claim because he fails to establish
that he was prejudiced. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [“[A] court
need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.”].)
In arguing that he was prejudiced, Johnson asserts that “it cannot be
presumed that the court would find that his current dangerousness . . . would
persist after 25 years.” He refers us to an earlier section of his brief in which
he argued that remand would not be futile because the court could reasonably
conclude, “in light of [his] prior nonviolent record, its recognition that the
evidence did leave at least some question that a third party . . . had been the
perpetrator, the potential of this conviction stemming from a dispute specific
to the individuals involved . . . , and [his] other mitigating circumstances,
that a chance of parole after serving the years imposed . . . would not be a
24
threat to public safety.” He asserts that because a parole board would have
to approve his release, it is “likely that the court would have dismissed or at
least reduced the enhancement.”
We are not persuaded. Johnson’s prejudice argument focuses on the
public safety prong of section 1385, subdivision (c). However, Ortiz held, and
Walker confirmed, that even in the absence of a finding that dismissal would
endanger public safety, a trial court retains the authority to decline to
dismiss an enhancement “based on circumstances long deemed essential to
the furtherance of justice inquiry.” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033
[cleaned up], quoting Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099, review
granted.) Ortiz was decided before Johnson filed his opening brief on appeal,
yet he did not address this ground for denying relief in his prejudice
argument. And as we have discussed, the People argue (and we agree)
substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court’s implied finding
that dismissal or reduction of the enhancement would not serve the interests
of justice. Despite the People’s argument, in his reply brief Johnson does not
attempt to show a reasonable likelihood the court, if prompted by counsel,
would have concluded dismissal of the enhancement would further the
interests of justice.
Moreover, the individual circumstances Johnson relies on to
demonstrate prejudice are not persuasive. To the extent he invokes his prior
nonviolent record, his trial counsel invoked this same circumstance during
the sentencing hearing to no beneficial effect. Although the trial court, in
denying Johnson’s new trial motion, stated it did not disagree with defense
counsel’s assertion there was “some evidence” that would point to a different
person being the shooter, the court nevertheless concluded the evidence was
sufficient to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson was the
25
perpetrator. Given this conclusion, we disagree the court entertained doubts
about Johnson’s guilt or would or could have relied on any such doubts to
lighten his sentence. Johnson’s argument that the crime had a motive
specific to Malloy (concealing fraud) is not persuasive, because it ignores
Johnson’s history of fraud and evidence he defrauded others. As for the
“other mitigating circumstances” in the record, they appeared in the
probation report and the trial court impliedly found they were not sufficient
to support dismissing or reducing the enhancement.
Finally, we reject Johnson’s argument that “public safety would be
protected in any case” because a parole board would have to approve his
release. Section 1385, subdivision (c), requires the trial court to make its own
determination at the time of sentencing whether dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. Further, the court was
presumably aware of the parole procedure and did not view it as a
circumstance that supported sentencing leniency.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
26
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