People v. Ruiz CA2/8

CourtListener 10596695CalctappJun 2, 2025

Full text

Filed 6/2/25 P. v. Ruiz CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B336269

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA439101
v.

JOSE LUIS RUIZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed with corrections.
Steven Schorr, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
The trial court struck a one-year prior prison term from Jose
Luis Ruiz’s sentence but denied further relief. We affirm his
reduced, 17-year sentence. Code citations are to the Penal Code.
I
We state the facts from the probation report, as does Ruiz.
One morning in August 2015, police went to the home Ruiz
shared with his girlfriend of two years and her two sons. Ruiz was
at the scene with blood on his face.
Around 10 p.m. the evening before, Ruiz had returned home
agitated and paranoid. His girlfriend told him to leave so she
could go back to sleep. Ruiz grabbed her from behind and
threatened to kill her if she moved. He had a kitchen knife in his
hand. Ruiz held her in the bedroom for several hours and
threatened to kill her two sons if she yelled or said anything. She
begged him to let her go. Ruiz grew angrier and punched her in
the eye and the mouth, cutting her lip and making her bleed and
swell. He broke furniture in the house. Then he went to the boys’
room and kicked the door open. He ordered the boys to listen and
to hand over their phones or else he would kill their mother. They
were scared and complied. Ruiz told the older boy to stand at the
window and watch for people who were pursuing him. The boys
managed to grab pieces of broken furniture, and they hit Ruiz.
One of them called police.
A December 2015 information charged Ruiz with seven
counts: one count of injuring a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subds. (a–b));
three counts of criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)); and three counts
of false imprisonment by violence (§ 236). The information warned
Ruiz had two prior serious felony convictions and was subject to
sentencing under the Three Strikes law.

2
In October 2018, Ruiz pleaded no contest to the injuring a
cohabitant count. Ruiz further admitted personally inflicting
great bodily injury under circumstances of domestic violence
(§ 12022.7, subd. (e)); serving a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd.
(b)); and having at least one prior “strike” (§ 1170.12; § 667, subds.
(b)-(i)) and one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
In January 2019, the court sentenced Ruiz to an 18-year
prison term pursuant to his plea bargain. This was the upper
term of four years for injuring a cohabitant, doubled due to the
strike, plus four years for the great bodily injury allegation, five
years for the serious felony prior, and one year for one prison prior.
In March 2023, the court struck the prison prior due to
changes in the law invalidating these enhancements. (See People
v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 397, 399 [discussing the
changes and the adoption of section 1172.75].) A new abstract of
judgment was filed, which showed a 17-year sentence but did not
update the custody credits.
Soon after, Ruiz moved to recall his sentence and to set a full
resentencing hearing under section 1172.75. The prosecution
opposed, and Ruiz filed a reply. The trial court permitted a full
resentencing proceeding.
Ahead of this proceeding, Ruiz filed a Petition for
Resentencing asking the court to strike his strike and his
enhancements and to resentence him to the middle or low term.
Ruiz pointed to various laws enacted after his original sentencing
that permitted this relief, including Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.), which amended section 1385 to require courts to give
great weight to mitigating circumstances when considering
dismissing enhancements that are unnecessary for public safety.
(See People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1030; § 1385, subd.

3
(c).) Ruiz also raised Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.),
which amended section 1170 to confine a court’s authority to
impose the upper term in a sentencing triad. (See People v. Lynch
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 773 (Lynch).) Ruiz’s motion discussed
mitigating circumstances, including “Evidence of Changed
Circumstances” in prison, and attached documents showing his
progress and good behavior there.
At the December 2023 hearing, the trial court said it had
considered both sides’ papers and attachments. The court
admitted a certified copy of Ruiz’s rap sheet into evidence and read
his lengthy adult criminal history into the record. The court noted
it already had struck the prison prior. It methodically considered
each ground for striking part of Ruiz’s sentence and declined to
exercise its discretion to reduce his sentence further, leaving Ruiz
with a 17-year sentence.
II
In his first appellate brief, Ruiz argued the court abused its
discretion in refusing to strike his enhancements, and his custody
credits are inaccurate. Ruiz later filed a supplemental opening
brief challenging the reimposition of the upper term. Two of these
attacks fail. We direct the trial court to correct Ruiz’s credits.
A
On his first issue, Ruiz relies upon People v. Gonzalez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 215 (Gonzalez) to argue the trial court applied an
incorrect standard in declining to dismiss his two remaining
enhancements, which added nine years to his sentence. Ruiz
maintains the court failed to consider his future dangerousness
upon striking one or both enhancements and instead looked only
to his past and present dangerousness. He concedes the court did

4
not need to state its reasons for declining to exercise its authority
under section 1385.
Ruiz’s argument mistakes the record and his appellate
burden. He must demonstrate error. (See People v. Giordano
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666.) We presume the court’s order is
correct and further presume the court knew and followed the law,
absent a record showing otherwise. (Ibid.; People v. Ramirez
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042; see also People v. Campbell (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 350, 383 [appellate courts presume the trial court
considered all relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative
record to the contrary].)
Ruiz has not demonstrated the trial court applied the wrong
standard or otherwise abused its discretion. (See Gonzalez, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 225 [abuse of discretion standard applies].)
The court ruled that “imposing a lesser sentence, a further
lesser sentence, that is, would endanger public safety” based on
the extreme violence Ruiz displayed in this case and the increasing
seriousness and number of his prior convictions, as shown by his
certified rap sheet. The court explained these factors outweighed
the “post conviction facts” (his progress in prison and reduction in
his inmate classification score) and the mitigating factors
discussed at the hearing and set out in Ruiz’s briefing. The court
said it was affording great weight to the section 1385 mitigating
circumstances but found “dismissal of any further enhancements
would endanger public safety.” It went on to consider separately
each component of Ruiz’s sentence.
This ruling was forward-looking. As Ruiz concedes, it was
appropriate for the court to consider his current crime and his past
ones, among other factors, in deciding whether shortening his
sentence would endanger the public. Unlike Gonzalez, nothing

5
shows the court assessed only Ruiz’s current dangerousness. (See
Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 224, 228, 230.)
The trial court properly exercised its discretion under
section 1385.
B
Pointing to a recent case with the same name, People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, Ruiz’s supplemental brief
argues the court violated amended section 1170 and his jury trial
rights by reimposing an upper term sentence. Relevant here,
subdivision (b) of this statute generally requires a jury to find
aggravating circumstances used to impose an upper term, where
the circumstances are not based on prior convictions or the
defendant’s stipulation. (See § 1170, subds. (b)(1)–(3).)
The prosecution responds that this provision does not apply
to stipulated sentences like Ruiz’s, and the resentencing statute
here (section 1172.75) permits courts to reimpose the upper term
without additional fact finding.
This issue decides whether Ruiz’s total sentence is 15 or 17
years.
We first detail the relevant proceedings and then explain
why any error in reimposing the upper term was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 761, 768,
775.)
1
At Ruiz’s original sentencing proceeding in 2019, the trial
court said it was sentencing Ruiz to the high term “pursuant to
your plea bargain.” Thus, contrary to Ruiz’s arguments, the record
shows the sentence—including the upper term—was part of the
plea deal.

6
At the resentencing hearing in December 2023, the court
focused on Ruiz’s certified rap sheet. It asked defense counsel why
Ruiz’s criminal history should not be an aggravating factor.
Counsel acknowledged “a certified rap sheet can be used” without
a jury finding or her client’s admission but argued Ruiz’s criminal
record did not “by itself justify high term.” The court observed one
aggravating factor can justify the high term and one such factor
could be prior convictions that are numerous or increasing in
seriousness.
The court then admitted a certified copy of Ruiz’s rap sheet
and read each of his adult convictions into the record. Excluding
the conviction on appeal, these convictions are: carrying a
concealed weapon, with a prior conviction (December 2002);
carjacking (July 2003); brandishing a replica firearm (July 2004);
robbery (April 2008); vandalism (April 2015); and battery of a non-
inmate while in custody (January 2019).
The court invited Ruiz’s counsel to discuss mitigating factors
and asked the prosecution to identify facts relating to the danger
to public safety. The prosecution discussed facts of the underlying
case, and the court intervened, saying, “but you don’t want me to
fall into the trap of finding an aggravating factor that hasn’t been
found true by a jury or proven by acceptable evidence, like, a
certified copy of a rap sheet; right?”
The court ultimately considered each component of Ruiz’s
sentence and declined to “further reduce the defendant’s sentence
beyond striking the one-year enhancement[.]” When considering
the upper term, the court said: “With regard to Penal Code
sections 1170 and 1170.1, I also decline to reduce the Defendant’s
sentence from high term to the mid term based on the finding that
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating

7
circumstances in that the Defendant’s prior convictions are
numerous and are increasing in seriousness as shown in the
certified copy of the Defendant’s rap sheet.”
2
Before addressing harmlessness, we make three
observations. First, the words of the statute through which Ruiz
seeks relief—section 1172.75—seem to permit the court to retain
Ruiz’s upper term. (See § 1172.75, subd. (d)(4), italics added
[“Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may
not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are
circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term
of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have
been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial”].) Second, we question whether Ruiz may use this
section or amended section 1170 to disrupt a term to which he
agreed in exchange for dismissing six counts and other allegations.
Third, the two aggravating factors on which the court relied to
maintain the upper term appear to fit squarely within subdivision
(b)(3) of section 1170, which provides that “the court may consider
the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based
on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.” (See also Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 742
[“Allegations of prior convictions may be tried by the court alone
and proven by certified records of conviction”].)
We sidestep these unsettled issues that divide our courts by
assuming they favor Ruiz, and we conclude any error in retaining
the upper term here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under Lynch, we ask whether the omission of a jury trial
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating

8
fact the trial court used to justify an upper term sentence. (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 775.) The answer here is yes.
Ruiz’s certified record of conviction demonstrates his prior
convictions are numerous, even excluding the prior serious felony
enhancement. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(3) & (5).) This record, in
tandem with Ruiz’s admissions from the time of his plea, also
shows beyond a reasonable doubt that his convictions were
increasingly serious. For good reason, Ruiz never argued
otherwise when the trial court raised this aggravating
circumstance at the resentencing hearing. Ruiz’s prior convictions
were for crimes targeting property or for possessing or showing a
firearm. His current offense of injuring his girlfriend escalated the
level of violence. Ruiz admitted he inflicted great bodily injury on
his partner and used a knife. Moreover, while incarcerated for this
violent crime, he battered someone else.
Beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury would have found both
aggravating circumstances true.
Contrary to Ruiz’s arguments, it is clear the court did not
ground the upper term in any aggravating factor beyond the
multitude and increasing seriousness of his convictions.
Finally, to the extent Ruiz argues the court misunderstood
its authority under section 1170, subdivision (b) because it did not
have the authority to decide whether Ruiz’s convictions were
increasingly serious, the record makes clear the court would have
reached the same conclusion on the upper term based on a sole
factor (Ruiz’s numerous prior convictions), were we to remand the
matter for resentencing again. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 771, 773–774.) This result is permissible. (See id. at pp. 764;
see also id. at pp. 777–778 [on remand, the court “may rely on any
properly proven aggravating facts, including prior convictions . . . .

9
The court retains its discretion to impose an upper term sentence
if it concludes that one or more properly proved circumstances
justify such a sentence”].)
C
Ruiz argues the trial court erred in failing to recalculate
custody credits to account for the time he spent in prison between
his two sentencings. The prosecution concedes the error and notes
this additional period totals 1,801 days. The abstract of judgment
should reflect this omitted custody time.
DISPOSITION
We direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of
judgment reflecting a resentencing date of December 20, 2023 and
an additional 1,801 days spent in custody for a total of 3,234 days.
The court must forward this amended document to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. We otherwise
affirm the judgment.

WILEY, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

10

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.