People v. Diaz CA2/6

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Filed 6/2/25 P. v. Diaz CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B335366
(Super. Ct. No. SB126040)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

JULIA RODRIGUEZ DIAZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Julia Rodriguez Diaz appeals from the order summarily
denying her petition for resentencing (Pen. Code,1 § 1172.6). She
contends she is eligible for an evidentiary hearing because the
jury may have convicted her of first degree murder based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1979, Diaz was convicted by a jury of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 3). The jury found true an enhancement

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
that she personally used a deadly weapon (a hammer) in the
commission of the murder (§ 12022, former subd. (b)). She was
also convicted of crimes against other victims committed prior to
the date of the murder: assault with a deadly weapon (a hammer)
(§ 245, former subd. (a); count 1) and attempted extortion (§ 524;
count 2). The trial court sentenced Diaz to life imprisonment for
murder with concurrent sentences of four years for count 1 and
three years for count 2. The judgment was affirmed by the Court
of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 1. (People v. Diaz
(Oct. 5, 1981, No. 36128) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2023, Diaz filed a facially sufficient form petition for
resentencing. (§ 1172.6.) Counsel was appointed. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3).) The parties submitted briefs and a hearing was
held. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
The trial court considered the abstract of judgment,
minutes of the verdict and sentence, verdict forms, and jury
instructions. The court denied the petition because “the record of
conviction establishes that Petitioner was the sole perpetrator
and was not convicted based on [the] ‘natural and probable
consequences theory’ or ‘felony murder.’ ”
Judicial notice
The Attorney General requests we take judicial notice of
the clerk’s transcript and reporter’s transcript of the trial. Diaz
opposes the request. Because we review de novo whether Diaz
made a prima facie case for relief, we are not limited to the parts
of the record of conviction considered by the trial court. (People v.
Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170; People v. Lee (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1164, 1174, 1187, fn. 10.) We grant the request for
judicial notice. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(2), 459, subd. (a);
Lee, at p. 1187, fn. 10.)

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Trial evidence
Seven-year-old Javier Angel was last seen alive on
December 2, 1978, before 2:45 p.m., talking to Diaz at her
apartment doorway and entering her apartment. At about 4:00
p.m., police took Diaz to the police station to interview her about
extortion allegations. Javier was reported missing at 5:35 p.m.
Police brought Diaz back to her apartment at about 9:00
p.m. and searched her bedroom. She was in the room during the
search along with M.Z., from whom she rented the room.
An officer found a dark plastic garbage bag under Diaz’s
bed. He asked what it was. Diaz and M.Z. said they did not
know. Before police opened the bag, Diaz “began to cry and grab
her stomach and bend over slightly at the waist.”
Javier’s body was inside the bag. An inner bag was tied
tightly around his neck with a nylon cord. The cause of death
was strangulation by ligature and suffocation from the plastic
bag. Javier also had eight small lacerations on his head and
bruises on the back of his head caused by a blunt instrument.
The head injuries may have knocked him unconscious but did not
cause his death.
Diaz told police she had been alone in the house. She said
Javier knocked on the door but did not come in. Before Javier’s
body was removed from the bags and before police were aware of
his head injuries, Diaz said, “I did not hit that boy.”
Diaz said a delivery man she did not know had walked
around inside her apartment while she was in the bathroom but
she did not see what he did. She also said her son’s father was at
the apartment that day and she falsely told him that Javier, who
was sitting on a chair in her room, was their son.
A hammer with dried human blood on it was found in

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Diaz’s apartment. Blood of Javier’s blood type was found on the
rug in Diaz’s bedroom and on the pants Diaz had worn that day.
A strand of hair consistent with Diaz was found on the back of
Javier’s shirt.
Javier had played with an eight-year-old boy the day of the
murder. The boy testified that he saw a man inside Diaz’s
apartment when Diaz let Javier inside. He said he had seen the
man in a distinctive van on previous occasions, and the van was
in the driveway near the apartment when Javier entered the
apartment.
Jury instructions
Diaz was arrested and tried for murder. The jury was
instructed that persons are guilty of a crime if they “directly and
actively commit . . . the crime,” or “with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the one who does directly and actively
commit . . . the crime, aid and abet in its commission” or “advise
and encourage its commission.” The instruction added: “[One
who aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime that
to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing,
but he is also liable for the natural and reasonable or probable
consequences of any act that he knowingly aided or encouraged.]”
(CALJIC No. 3.00 (1979 revision).)
The jury was also instructed: “The burden is on the State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person
who committed or aided and abetted the commission of the offense
with which she is charged. You must be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who
committed the offense or aided and abetted the commission
thereof before you may convict her.” (Defendant’s special
instruction No. 6, italics added, some capitalization omitted.)

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The court further instructed: “Murder of the first degree is
any murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful,
deliberate and premediated killing with express malice
aforethought. You will recall that malice is express when there is
manifested an intent to unlawfully kill a human being.” The
instruction continued, “If you find that the killing was preceded
and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the
perpetrator to kill, which was the result of deliberation and
premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon
pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or
other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of
the first degree.” (Court’s instruction, italics added.)
Another jury instruction read in part: “[Y]ou may not find
the defendant guilty of the offense of murder in the first degree
unless the proved circumstances not only are consistent with the
theory that she not only had the specific intent to unlawfully kill a
human being, but also that such unlawful killing was
accomplished by such assailant with malice aforethought and
with willfulness, deliberation and premeditation, but cannot be
reconciled with any other rational conclusion.” (Italics added.)
Finally, the court instructed: “Whether some of the
instructions will apply will depend upon your determination of
the facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a
state of facts which you determine does not exist.” (CALJIC No.
17.31.)
Closing argument
In closing argument to the jury, neither attorney
mentioned natural and probable consequences or suggested that
Diaz assisted or encouraged another person to commit another
crime that led to Javier’s death. The prosecution argued that

5
Diaz was alone in her apartment when she lured Javier inside
and killed him. The prosecution also argued there was “no
reasonable, competent evidence that someone else” committed
the crime. The defense argued that Diaz was not the murderer
because if she was, she would not have admitted to police that
Javier had been in her apartment. The defense suggested the
delivery man, the father of Diaz’s child, or the man with the van
killed Javier while Diaz was in the bathroom or at the police
station.
DISCUSSION
Resentencing petitions
Section 1172.6 provides for resentencing a murder
conviction based on an accusatory pleading “that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime,” and “[t]he petitioner could
not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1) & (3).)
If the petition is facially sufficient, the parties have an
opportunity to submit briefs, and the court “shall hold a hearing
to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case
for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) “[A] trial court can rely on the
record of conviction in determining whether that . . . prima facie
showing is made.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970.)
The court may dismiss the petition “ ‘[i]f the petition and record
in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible
for relief.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 450.) “[A]
trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the

6
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion’ ” at the prima
facie stage of section 1172.6 proceedings. (Lewis, at p. 972.)
“We review de novo an order denying a section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie review stage.” (People v. Flores, supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 1170.) Thus, we must determine whether it
is “reasonably likely” the jurors interpreted the jury instructions
as a whole to impute malice to Diaz based on participation in
another crime or on the mental state of an accomplice. (People v.
Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 397; People v. Williams (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1255–1256.) As discussed below, we
conclude Diaz is ineligible for resentencing because the jury
found she was the actual killer and acted with intent to kill.
Actual killer
In Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which
enacted the predecessor to section 1172.6,2 “the Legislature found
it ‘necessary to amend the felony murder rule and the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not
a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 846–847, italics added, abrogated by statute on
another point as noted in People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401,
442.) “[R]elief is unavailable if the defendant was either the
actual killer, [or] acted with the intent to kill.” (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710.)
The aiding and abetting instruction here included a

2 The provision was originally numbered as section 1170.95
and later renumbered as section 1172.6 effective 2022 without
substantive change.

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description of the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
But the jury was also instructed that the prosecution must prove
“the defendant is the person who committed or aided and abetted
the commission of the offense with which she is charged,” i.e.,
murder. Considering the instructions collectively, we conclude it
was “not reasonably likely that jurors imputed malice” to Diaz.
(People v. Allen, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 397; People v.
Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1255–1256.)
Diaz contends evidence that several men were in her
apartment—the deliveryman, the father of her child, and the
man with the van—supports the possibility that one of them was
the actual killer and she was convicted on a theory of natural and
probable consequences. But the prosecution’s closing argument
presented the jury with only one theory: that Diaz was the actual
killer. (See People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 948.)
As in Estrada, no target offense for natural and probable
consequences was identified. (Ibid.; see People v. Prettyman
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 254, superseded by statute as stated in
People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566, 575.) Diaz was
charged with only one crime on December 2, 1978: murder.
Neither side suggested at trial that Diaz participated in a
crime by another person that led to Javier’s death. The defense
argued that some other person committed the crime without
Diaz’s knowledge while she was in the bathroom or at the police
station. Thus, the only scenarios presented to the jury were that
Diaz was the actual killer, or was not involved at all. The jury
accepted the prosecution theory. And the conclusion that Diaz
was the actual killer was corroborated by the jury’s finding that
she personally used a hammer as a deadly weapon in the
commission of the offense. (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th

8
549, 563.) Because there are no “specific facts” to establish that
Diaz aided another killer, Diaz is not entitled to relief based on
“mere latent, speculative possibilities.” (Id. at p. 567.)
Actual malice
Diaz is also ineligible for resentencing because the jury
found she possessed the intent to kill. (People v. Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 710; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp.
846–847.) “By limiting murder liability to those principals who
personally acted with malice aforethought, section 188 (a)(3)
eliminates what was the core feature of natural and probable
consequences murder liability: the absence of a requirement that
the defendant personally possess malice aforethought.” (Gentile,
at p. 849.)
A jury instruction regarding natural and probable
consequences does not entitle a petitioner to section 1172.6 relief
where “jurors would have had to conclude that [the defendant]
harbored the intent to kill.” (People v. Allen, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 395; People v. Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1253–1255.) In Allen, direct aiding and abetting and
conspiracy theories of liability precluded resentencing as a
matter of law because both theories necessarily included the
intent to kill. (Allen, at p. 395.) And in Williams, a special
circumstance jury finding necessarily included an intent to kill.
(Williams, at pp. 1254–1255.) Similarly here, Diaz is not entitled
to relief because the jury found she acted with intent to kill. (Id.
at p. 1256.)
The jury was instructed on only one theory of first degree
murder: a “willful, deliberate and premediated killing with
express malice aforethought,” i.e., “an intent to unlawfully kill a
human being.” To find “the defendant guilty of the offense of

9
murder in the first degree,” the jury had to find that “she . . . had
the specific intent to unlawfully kill a human being.” In our view,
the jury finding that Diaz committed first degree murder
precludes section 1172.6 relief.
People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, superseded by statute
as stated in People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959, fn. 3,
upon which Diaz relies, is not to the contrary. The jury there was
instructed that the defendant could be convicted of first degree
murder if the perpetrator with whom the defendant participated
acted with malice aforethought and premeditation and murder
was the natural and probable consequence of a target offense.
(Id. at pp. 160–161.) Our Supreme Court held that an aider and
abettor cannot be convicted of first degree murder based on the
natural and probable consequences if only the actual “perpetrator
acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.” (Id. at p.
158.) But in contrast here, the jury was instructed that it could
find Diaz guilty of first degree murder only if “she . . . had the
specific intent to unlawfully kill a human being.”
Based on these instructions, we conclude “the jury
necessarily found [Diaz] had acted willfully and with intent to
kill, a finding incompatible with the natural and probable
consequences theory.” (People v. Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1189.) Because the jury found Diaz guilty of first degree
murder, “it necessarily found that [she] acted with intent to kill,
not merely that murder was the natural and probable
consequences of a nonhomicide crime [she] committed.” (People v.
Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 945–946.)
People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433, is not to the
contrary. There, it was undisputed that the defendant seeking
resentencing was not the actual killer. (Id. at p. 445.) The

10
prosecution pursued direct aiding and abetting and natural and
probable consequences theories of liability. (Ibid.) For the latter
theory, target offenses of disturbing the peace and carrying a
concealed firearm were identified. (Id. at p. 466.) The jury was
instructed that the defendant need only intend to aid and abet a
target offense, and need not intend to aid murder. (Id. at p. 470.)
In contrast here, Diaz was the actual killer, the prosecution did
not rely on the natural and probable consequences, and no target
offenses were identified.
Nor is relief supported by People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1, upon which Diaz relies. The defendant there
entered the victim’s apartment with another man and one of
them bludgeoned the victim. (Id. at p. 19.) The verdict did not
specify whether Lopez’s murder conviction was based on malice
aforethought or felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery.
(Id. at p. 14.) In contrast here, the jury found Diaz acted with the
intent to kill. This finding precludes section 1172.6 relief.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Diaz’s petition for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6, entered
February 20, 2024, is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. CODY, J.

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Michael J. Carrozzo, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

David Andreasen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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