Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.

CourtListener 10595764CalctappMay 30, 2025

Full text

Filed 5/12/25; certified for publication 5/30/25 CA6 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

RICHARD BARTEL, H052083
(Santa Cruz County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 16CV02814)

v.

CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY,

Defendant and Appellant.

This title insurance action centers on the scope of an insurer’s duty to
defend a policy holder in litigation when it is not clear whether the policy
covers the underlying dispute.
Plaintiff Richard Bartel bought a property in rural Santa Cruz County
to enjoy a quiet retirement. The property was so rural that no public roads
connected to it. Bartel accessed the nearest public road by using a private
road that traversed the property of his neighbors to the west. Bartel believed
the private road terminated at his western property line. However, Bartel’s
neighbor to the east believed he, too, had access to the private road using a
route that crossed Bartel’s property.
This disagreement became acute when the property of the eastern
neighbor became a site for marijuana cultivation, serviced by trucks driving
through Bartel’s property during the night. Bartel installed security devices
and informed his easterly neighbor that he had no right to cross Bartel’s
property.
Bartel’s neighbor twice brought suit against Bartel, asserting a right to
use the private road that crossed Bartel’s property. The neighbor dismissed
both suits without prejudice. The trucks continued driving by Bartel’s house,
and Bartel in turn brought suit against his neighbor to quiet title. The
neighbor cross-complained, alleging a right to an easement over the private
road crossing Bartel’s property. The matter eventually went to trial. It
resulted in a judgment (affirmed on appeal in this court) that the neighbor
had an express easement over the private road through Bartel’s property,
based on a deed executed at the time the properties were subdivided in 1971.
(See Bartel v. Composti (Aug. 15, 2019, H044464) [nonpub. opn.]).)1
Bartel largely self-funded the litigation against his neighbor using
money from his retirement account. Chicago Title Insurance Company—the
issuer of a title insurance policy Bartel purchased when he bought the
property in 1998—rejected Bartel’s tender for defense in the suits brought by
his neighbor. Chicago Title asserted it had no duty to defend Bartel because
of exclusions in his title insurance policy–one of which was general (carving
out easements not recorded in a public deed) and one of which was specific
(carving out claims arising from a 1970 agreement among the neighbors

1 On this court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of the record and

the opinion in Bartel v. Composti, supra, H044464. (See Evid. Code, §§ 459,
subd. (a); 451, subd. (a), 452, subd. (d); Linda Vista Village San Diego
Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Tecolote Investors, LLC (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
166, 185.)
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about road maintenance)–and because the complaint allegations against
Bartel denied there was a deeded easement.
Bartel disagreed with Chicago Title’s decision and continued to seek
tender based on his title insurance. Chicago Title eventually determined that
it did have a duty to defend Bartel, but only after five years of litigation
between Bartel and his neighbor. Moreover, Chicago Title asserted its duty
to defend Bartel arose when the neighbor filed his cross-complaint, and it had
no duty as to the earlier litigation.
Bartel brought suit against Chicago Title for breach of contract and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The dispute between
Bartel and Chicago Title went to trial in two phases. In the first phase, the
trial court rejected Chicago Title’s statute of limitations defense and held
that the insurer had a duty to defend Bartel as of his initial tender of defense.
In the second phase, the court rejected certain claims by Bartel for damages
for periods outside the litigation but awarded additional damages for the
diminution in value of Bartel’s property. The court further found that
although Chicago Title could have performed its duties better and more
expeditiously in response to Bartel’s tender requests, it did not act in bad
faith.
On appeal, Bartel challenges the trial court’s rejection of his bad faith
claim and request for punitive damages, argues the court erred in denying
reimbursement of his litigation costs and attorney fees for the period between
actions in the underlying litigation, and asserts the court awarded
inadequate prejudgment interest.
In its cross-appeal, Chicago Title asserts that the trial court erred both
in finding it had a duty to defend the easement claim as of the date of Bartel’s

3
first tender and in applying equitable tolling to reject Chicago Title’s statute
of limitations defense.
For the reasons explained below, we agree with Bartel that the trial
court erred in its finding that Chicago Title did not act in bad faith. We
reject all other claims raised by both parties and remand for further
proceedings.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Litigation
The properties at issue belong to a seven-lot subdivision in rural Aptos,
described in detail in Bartel v. Composti, supra, H044464. In 1998, Bartel
obtained a title insurance policy from Chicago Title when he purchased his
parcel, described as Assessor’s Parcel No. (APN) 105-511-6 (“the property” or
“parcel No. 6”), accessed by a private road now known as “Pax Place Court.”
The title insurance policy included a “schedule B,” titled “Exceptions from
Coverage.” (Some capitalization & boldface omitted.) In relevant part,
schedule B stated, “This policy does not insure against loss or damage (and
the Company will not pay costs, attorney’s fees or expenses) which arise by
reason of: [¶] . . . ‘[E]asements, liens or encumbrances, or claims thereof,
which are not shown by the public record[]’ [and] ‘a road maintenance
agreement’ ” (capitalization & italics omitted) recorded on September 2, 1970
(and subsequent amendments).
When Bartel and his wife2 purchased parcel No. 6, they were looking to
retire to a property that was “private, end of road” and “quiet.” They believed

2 Bartel purchased the property and obtained the title insurance policy

with his then-wife, Patricia Bartel. After Patricia’s death, Bartel married
Stok and executed a 2004 grant deed granting Stok a one-half community
property interest in the property. Bartel no longer owns the property, which

4
the property, which is accessed via a private road (Fern Flat Road) that
intersects “Pax Place Court” (another private road, which at the time Bartel
purchased the parcel was an unnamed road), was “an end-of-road property,
and nobody had the right to go by.” The closest public county road is about
five miles from Fern Flat Road.
Rod Composti and Patrice Edwards (together, Composti) owned
properties APN 105-511-08 (parcel No. 8) and APN 105-511-09 (parcel No. 9)
located directly to the east of Bartel’s parcel. Although the then-unnamed
Pax Place Court continued through parcel No. 6 to provide access to parcel
Nos. 8 and 9, Bartel believed that no one to the east of parcel No. 6 had a
legal right to use the road. For the first few years Bartel owned the parcel,
only a few people used the Pax Place road.
In or about 2005, Bartel began noticing increased foot and vehicle
traffic along Pax Place, passing directly in front of his house and occurring
during the night. Bartel learned that the increased traffic was associated
with a marijuana grow on the nearby Composti property. Traffic continued
to increase to the point that Bartel considered it a nuisance and installed
security devices on his property.
1. Composti’s First Complaint (Composti I)
On May 25, 2010, Composti filed a verified complaint in the Santa Cruz
County Superior Court against Bartel, Stok, and other neighbors, initiating
the underlying litigation. (Composti v. Maciel, et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Cruz
County, 2010, No. CV167646). We refer to this first action as “Composti I.”
The complaint in Composti I asserted causes of action for quiet title to
easement; declaratory and injunctive relief; slander of title and breach of

he sold in 2021. Stok was a party to the underlying litigation but is not a
party to this appeal.
5
contract. Composti sought to quiet title to an easement in his favor over a
road referred to as “Lower Road”3 which the complaint alleged “crosses the
lands” of Bartel and Stok. The complaint alleged a right-of-way easement
benefiting Composti’s parcel, established by a recorded map attached to a
“Right of Way and Joint Maintenance Agreement” recorded on September 2,
1970 (1970 agreement) and burdening several of the neighboring parcels.
Alternatively, the Composti I complaint alleged other theories of easement,
including easement by prescriptive use.
The Composti I complaint did not allege a deeded easement pertaining
to the properties and appeared to expressly deny that possibility. It stated,
in the underlined heading to paragraph 11 (which discussed the right of ways
“grounded on the contract” executed by the prior owners of the parcels subject
to the 1970 agreement), that “Neither Parcel has Deeded Easement”
(underscoring omitted). Nevertheless, the Composti I complaint attached
several exhibits, including Exhibit G, referred to by the parties as the “Boyd-
Sluyter deed.” The Boyd-Sluyter deed is a 1971 recorded deed granting title
of the land that was later subdivided into parcel Nos. 6 and 7 and providing
for a 40-foot right-of-way “over an existing road” (further described therein).
Exhibit G bears a handwritten notation to the description of the right-of-way
reservation, which reads “Entire Lower Road” and lists property owners
including “Bartel, Stok.” The Boyd-Sluyter deed is the deed that would later

3 In later correspondence, Composti’s counsel clarified that the

allegations as to “Lower Road” in the Composti I complaint in fact referred to
“the ‘middle’ road” (later renamed “Pax Place Court”). Bartel testified at trial
that although both parties knew there were three roads (sometimes referred
to as “upper road,” “middle road,” and “lower road”) associated with the
Bartel and Composti parcels, the Composti complaint confused matters by
referencing only two roads, corresponding to the recorded map attached to
the 1970 agreement.
6
serve as the basis of the judgment in the underlying litigation that confirmed
that Composti held an express easement over Pax Place Court through
Bartel’s property.
Bartel obtained a copy of the Composti I complaint, which had not yet
been served on him, and retained counsel. By letter dated March 18, 2011,
Bartel’s counsel tendered defense of the Composti I matter to Chicago Title.
The tender of claim referred to Composti’s asserted prescriptive easement
and attached a copy of the Composti I complaint, noting that Bartel and Stok
were named as defendants but had not been served with the lawsuit. On
April 6, 2011, Chicago Title sent an acknowledgement of the claim, stating it
had been assigned to claims counsel for investigation and administration,
and assigned it a claim number.
In May 2011, Chicago Title’s claims counsel exchanged e-mails with
Bartel’s counsel confirming that Bartel had not yet been served with the
complaint. For reasons that are not clear from the record, on June 23, 2011,
Composti dismissed his complaint without prejudice.
2. Composti’s Second Complaint (Composti II)
Approximately two weeks later, on July 8, 2011, Composti filed a new
action naming the same defendants and asserting the same claim to an
easement over Bartel’s property. (Composti v. Maciel, et al. (Super. Ct. Santa
Cruz County, 2011, No. CV171562.) We refer to this second action as
“Composti II.” The complaint in Composti II was identical to the complaint
in Composti I. It, too, attached a copy of the Boyd-Sluyter deed as Exhibit G
and similarly appeared to deny any deeded easement by asserting in the
heading to paragraph 11 that “neither parcel has deeded easement”
(capitalization & underscoring omitted). Bartel was served with the
Composti II lawsuit.
7
By letter dated July 27, 2011, Chicago Title informed Bartel’s counsel
that it had completed its investigation of the claim and declined to accept
tender of the defense. The letter explained its denial of coverage as based
upon the express exceptions from coverage set forth in schedule B of the title
insurance policy. Specifically, it stated that “ ‘Lower Road’ ” identified in the
Composti II complaint is “one of the roads affected by the” 1970 agreement
and thus “excepted from coverage under [s]chedule B, [p]art II, Exception 5.”4
The letter stated that the other theories in the complaint (i.e.,
prescriptive use) were also excluded from coverage under “[s]chedule B, [p]art
I, Exception 3, as they would necessarily not be shown by the public records.”
The letter additionally explained that an insurer’s duty to defend arises “if,
but only if, any of the allegations against the insured could result in a
judgment that the insurer would be obligated to pay.” It invited Bartel to let
Chicago Title know if he had information or documentation that he believed
“gives rise to a covered claim.”
Following Chicago Title’s rejection of Bartel’s tender, Bartel’s counsel
continued to correspond with claims counsel, urging Chicago Title to
reconsider. In a letter dated August 24, 2011, Bartel pointed to incongruities
between the parcel map that accompanied the policy when he received it and
the allegations in Composti II, which alleged “Lower Road” to be the road
subject to the easement claim and equated it with Fern Flat Road. The letter
noted that the policy obtained by Bartel “reflected that Fern Flat Road did
not cross [the] property. However, the [Composti c]omplaint alleges that

4 Although the record on appeal does not appear to contain a tender

request from Bartel for Composti II, the July 27, 2011 denial of coverage sent
by Chicago Title refers to the complaint in Composti II. We infer that Bartel
informed Chicago Title about the second suit, and Chicago Title considered
Composti I and Composti II together when assessing coverage.
8
Fern Flat Road does indeed cross [the] property. Therefore, the status of the
roads as provided in the title report is directly called into question by the
[c]omplaint and our clients are entitled to be defended and indemnified
pursuant to this policy.”
Chicago Title disagreed with Bartel’s interpretation of the maps and
responded in a letter two days later that the Composti complaint’s “obvious
mistake” (misidentifying Lower Road as Fern Flat Road) “does not draw this
claim into coverage.”5 Bartel again requested reconsideration, asserting that
regardless of any purported mistake in the complaint, if Composti were to
prevail in proving his claim, “any such judgment would be within the scope of
the policy” and thus provides a “clear basis for coverage.”
On September 30, 2011, Composti filed a first amended complaint for
declaratory relief and quiet title (Composti II amended complaint). The
Composti II amended complaint realleged that the claimed easement on the
Bartel property was as described in the 1970 agreement (“by virtue of a
record map attached” to the agreement) or by prescriptive rights. The
amended complaint omitted the attached copy of the Boyd-Sluyter deed and
the allegation that there were no express or deeded easements.

5 Chicago Title’s response to Bartel’s request for reconsideration argued

that the Composti complaint incorrectly identified the “Lower Road” as “Fern
Flat Road,” when (according to Chicago Title) in fact, Fern Flat Road “is a
completely different road than the Lower Road” that “lies to the south of the
insured property and does not pass through it.” It further asserted that the
“only roads that provide access to [Composti]’s property are the Lower and
Upper Roads. The only road of the three (Fern Flat, Upper and Lower) that
passes through the insured property is the Lower Road.” By misidentifying
the road passing through the property (later found to be “Pax Place Court”)
as the “Lower Road,” Chicago Title appears to have mistakenly conflated the
“Lower Road” named in the 1970 Agreement with the road at issue in the
easement claim.
9
On October 13, 2011, Chicago Title informed Bartel of new claims
counsel assigned to the matter and rejected Bartel’s prior request (from
September 8, 2011) for reconsideration. Focusing on the question of coverage
“for the plaintiff’s [Composti]’s claim of an easement by way of the Lower
Road,” Chicago Title deemed the issue to be covered by the 1970 agreement
and therefore excepted from coverage. Bartel’s counsel requested
reconsideration of the denial in a letter dated November 3, 2011, which
Chicago Title denied in a letter dated November 16, 2011.
On October 16, 2012, without explanation to Bartel, Composti
dismissed without prejudice the Composti II amended complaint. Bartel
decided he “needed to resolve” the question of easement rights because the
property continued to experience “ongoing issues” as Composti “was
continuing to use [Bartel’s] road to support his marijuana grow.”
3. Bartel’s Action and Composti’s Cross-complaint (Composti III)
On September 10, 2013, Bartel and Stok filed an affirmative action
against Composti and Bank of America, N.A. for quiet title, nuisance,
declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. (Bartel et al. v. Composti, et al.
(Super. Ct. Santa Cruz County, 2013, No. CV177722; see Bartel v. Composti,
supra, H044464.) Bartel alleged in paragraph No. 11 of the verified
complaint that Composti had claimed an adverse interest in Bartel’s property
on Pax Place Court on a variety of grounds, including “that [Composti] [has a]
deeded right-of-way or access across this property” and has “an easement
across this property based on rights contained within” the 1970 agreement.
Composti filed a verified answer to the complaint, admitting the allegations
of paragraph No. 11 describing the claim of deeded access across Bartel’s
property.

10
On October 10, 2013, Composti filed a verified amended answer and on
May 14, 2014, he filed a cross-complaint, naming, among other cross-
defendants, Bartel and Stok. We refer to this third action as “Composti III.”
The verified amended answer reasserted Composti’s claim of an
adverse interest on the grounds specified in paragraph No. 11 of the Bartel
complaint. It further asserted “[e]asement by express grant” as an
affirmative defense, alleging that the easement was established by the 1970
agreement and recorded “thereafter in every grant deed of [p]arcel 6, which is
now known as . . . Pax Place Court.” In his cross-complaint, Composti
reasserted the theory of an easement over Pax Place established by the 1970
agreement and recorded in all subsequent grant deeds. Composti alleged,
“all grant deeds to the described parcels from and after 1970 contained a
nonexclusive easement for utilities and [r]oad which in substance describes
and constitutes Pax Place Court.”
In a letter dated September 5, 2014, Bartel tendered the defense of
Composti III to Chicago Title and attached a copy of the cross-complaint
against him and Stok. Chicago Title acknowledged receipt of the claim notice
and assigned it the same claim number as the prior claims based on
Composti I and Composti II.
On October 28, 2014, Chicago Title denied Bartel’s tender of defense.
Claims counsel reasoned that the “gravamen” of the complaint and cross-
complaint concerned an easement “created under” the 1970 agreement and
excepted from the policy of title insurance. In subsequent e-mail
correspondence, Bartel and claims counsel continued to disagree about
whether Composti’s easement claim was covered by the 1970 agreement.
In January 2015, Bartel sent Chicago Title a copy of a motion for
summary adjudication filed by Composti. The motion for summary
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adjudication asserted that, apart from easement rights created by the 1970
agreement, “early conveyances” contained either reservations or grants of
rights of way over Pax Place. The motion specifically cited the 1971 Boyd-
Sluyter deed, noting the “grant deed of property including [p]arcel 6 to Vern
Sluyter . . . reserved a [r]ight of [w]ay of 40 feet in width ‘over an existing
road’ that describes the current location of Pax Place Court.”
Chicago Title again declined to accept tender, explaining in a letter to
Bartel dated January 27, 2015, that the easement described in the Boyd-
Sluyter deed “was created by the” 1970 agreement. Bartel requested
reconsideration and, in subsequent correspondence, argued that the road
passing through parcel No. 6 was “Middle Road or Pax Place Court” and was
not mentioned in the 1970 agreement.
Claims counsel for Chicago Title responded that it appeared the Boyd-
Sluyter deed and 1970 agreement covered “the same area” and asked “What
am I missing?” Nevertheless, claims counsel continued to investigate the
claim. In a confidential internal claims report dated April 29, 2015, claims
counsel wrote: “Even though the only basis for an easement alleged in the
[c]ross-[c]omplaint is the excepted agreement, we still have a duty to defend
based on the memorandum filed in support of [Composti]’s motion for
summary judgment.”
In a letter dated May 26, 2015, Chicago Title accepted tender of
Bartel’s defense in Composti III “as of January 19, 2015” and otherwise
“st[ood] by its denial of the [t]ender for the period before January 19, 2015.”
Chicago Title based the date of coverage on Bartel’s January 19, 2015 request
for reconsideration after the filing of Composti’s motion for summary
adjudication. Chicago Title explained that the motion for summary
adjudication was “the first time in the litigation that an additional and
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independent basis for [Composti’s] alleged easement across Pax Place Court”
had been asserted based on the Boyd-Sluyter deed and reasoned that because
it “alleges a potentially covered matter—an easement by virtue of the Boyd
Deed—the [c]ompany accepts the [t]ender as of . . . the date the [i]nsured
tendered this matter.”
Bartel challenged Chicago Title’s assessment, asking it to reconsider its
limited acceptance of the tender. In a July 1, 2015 e-mail to claims counsel,
Bartel’s counsel asserted that the easement in the Boyd-Sluyter deed had
been “raised earlier” in Composti I and Composti II. Bartel and Chicago Title
continued to dispute the scope of coverage and amount of reimbursement due
to Bartel, although Chicago Title agreed to reimburse Bartel $62,729.72 for
defense costs incurred between January 19, 2015 and June 4, 2015 (when
Chicago Title retained counsel to represent Bartel) and for the transfer of the
case to the retained counsel.6 Several months later, after a bench trial, the
trial court issued a tentative statement of decision in favor of Composti on
the easement claim, and Bartel tendered a new claim asking Chicago Title to
expand its coverage.
On January 23, 2017, the trial court entered its final statement of
decision and judgment in favor of Composti (Composti III judgment). The
court found that the 1970 agreement and its amendments provided access
rights to “Upper Road” and “Fern Flat Road” but did not grant any right of
access across “Middle Road, now known as Pax Place Court.” Nevertheless,
the court found an express easement and right of access based on the 1971
Boyd-Sluyter deed along Pax Place through Bartel’s property to parcel No. 9.

6 Chicago Title later agreed to reimburse additional amounts related to

the transfer of the case and specified expenses but rejected Bartel’s requests
to extend coverage prior to January 19, 2015.
13
It found each of the subsequently granted chains of title to parcel Nos. 6 and
9 reflected the existence and conveyance of the right-of-way. The court
confirmed the 40-foot wide easement appurtenant to parcel No. 9 for ingress
and egress over Pax Place, which it limited to those uses consistent with the
zoning of parcel No. 9.7
Chicago Title thereafter accepted tender of Bartel’s claim as of
September 5, 2014 (extending coverage to the date Bartel tendered defense of
the Composti cross-complaint). It stated, by letter dated March 9, 2017, that
it “accepts coverage for the deeded easement over the Bartel property, as
determined by the trial court.” Chicago Title sought invoices for the period it
had agreed to cover (between September 5, 2014 and January 18, 2015) and
requested a report from Michael Dunn of Dunn & Associates on the
diminution of value to Bartel’s parcel caused by the easement. Dunn
evaluated the diminution of value at $170,000 as of January 7, 2015. In a
letter dated March 27, 2018, Chicago Title provided Bartel a copy of the
report and included payment of $170,000.
B. The Present Action
On October 27, 2016, while Composti III was pending, Bartel filed a
complaint against Chicago Title, initiating the case before us. The complaint
alleged breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. On March 1, 2018, Bartel filed an amended complaint
asserting the same causes of action and seeking attorney fees, costs, and
litigation expenses incurred for the defense of the claims before January 19,

7 Bartel and Stok independently pursued an appeal of the judgment

after Chicago Title informed Bartel that it had elected not to appeal. As
noted ante, a panel of this court affirmed the judgment in an unpublished
decision. (Bartel v. Composti, supra, H044464.)
14
2015, punitive damages, and interest. Bartel later filed (after completion of
the first phase of trial) the operative, second amended complaint (complaint),
adding details in support of his punitive damages claim. In its answer,
Chicago Title generally denied the allegations and asserted the statute of
limitations as an affirmative defense.
On February 11, 2019, the trial court entered an order based on a joint
application of the parties establishing the sequence for the determination of
preliminary legal issues based upon stipulated facts, including whether the
statute of limitations barred any of Bartel’s claims and, assuming no statute
of limitations bar, whether Chicago Title had a duty to defend Bartel before
September 5, 2014.8
The first phase of the trial addressed Chicago Title’s duty to defend
Bartel in Composti I and Composti II and Chicago Title’s affirmative defense
based on the statute of limitations. Issues reserved for the second phase of
trial included Chicago Title’s duty to defend during a period the parties refer
to as the “ ‘donut hole’ ” period from October 16, 2012 (the dismissal of the
Composti II amended complaint) to September 5, 2014 (the date Chicago
Title accepted coverage of Bartel’s claim under the policy). The bifurcated

8 The issues identified for the phase I trial were: (1) Bartel’s
entitlement to reimbursement for fees and costs incurred paying for the
defense of his spouse, Stok; (2) Bartel’s entitlement to reimbursement under
the title policy for the fees and costs of the appeal of the judgment in
Composti III; (3) whether any of Bartel’s claims are barred by the statute of
limitations; (4) Bartel’s entitlement to reimbursement for tax penalties
incurred by taking early retirement withdrawals to self-fund litigation; and
(5) assuming no statute of limitations bar, whether Chicago Title had a duty
to defend Bartel against defense fees and costs incurred before September 5,
2014.
15
phases were tried before different bench officers due to the intervening
retirement of the judge who tried phase I.
1. Phase I Trial
In February 2019, the trial court conducted a two-day bench trial. Both
parties waived their right to jury trial and submitted the matter based on
their respective trial briefs. The matter was tried on stipulated facts and
joint exhibits, including a copy of the subject title insurance policy issued by
Chicago Title to Bartel, dated December 23, 1998 (the policy).
On March 12, 2019, the trial court entered its interim judgment on first
phase of trial (interim judgment). The court found that the duty to defend
was continuing and existed as of the date of Bartel’s first tender on March 18,
2011 (in relation to Composti I). The court explained that, under controlling
authorities such as Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263 (Gray),
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287 (Montrose),
and Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076 (Horace
Mann), “the bare allegations and theories in a third party’s complaint against
an insured do not alone control the duty to defend. The duty to defend is also
triggered by extrinsic facts of which the insurer is aware, when those facts
show a potential for liability under the policy.” The court reasoned that the
Composti III judgment, establishing the potential for liability under the
policy, was based on the Boyd-Sluyter deed. That same deed “was attached
to Composti’s earliest iterations of his easement claim, and Chicago Title was
aware of the same.”
The trial court concluded that Chicago Title was liable “[a]t a
minimum” for costs, fees, and interest from March 18, 2011, until October 16,
2012, and interest on fees and costs for the period beginning September 5,
2014, which Chicago Title had already reimbursed. It deferred any
16
determination of liability with respect to the period in between to the finder
of fact in phase II. The court found it unnecessary to address Chicago Title’s
duty to conduct a reasonable investigation, noting that evidence on that issue
would be relevant to the question of bad faith to be examined in the second
phase of trial.
The trial court also rejected Chicago Title’s statute of limitations
defense. Under the equitable tolling doctrine set forth in Lambert v.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1072 (Lambert), the
court concluded there was “no merit” to Chicago Title’s contention that
Composti’s prior dismissals of his easement claim in Composti I and
Composti II ended the equitable tolling period because those dismissals
without prejudice did not constitute a final judgment on the claim.
Alternatively, the court explained that even if the dismissal of Composti II on
October 16, 2012 “suspended the equitable tolling period, Composti
reasserted his easement claim less than two years later by way of his cross-
complaint filed on May 4, 2014,” thus resuming equitable tolling as of that
date until the January 23, 2017 entry of judgment.
The trial court also addressed the issue of interest, holding that
prejudgment interest at the rate of 10 percent was recoverable by Bartel and
would be calculated during phase II, when the total amount of damages
would be determined. The court rejected Bartel’s claims for reimbursement
pertaining to his appeal from the Composti III judgment and to the defense of
his spouse, Stok, whom the court found was not an insured under the policy.
The court identified the issues remaining for phase II, including whether
Chicago Title owed coverage for the “ ‘donut hole’ ” period, Chicago Title’s
alleged bad faith, the adequacy and timeliness of the payment for diminution
of value, and total damages, including potential punitive damages.
17
2. Phase II Trial
The second phase of trial proceeded before the trial court without a jury
in May 2023. Following pretrial briefing and motions in limine, the court
granted Bartel’s motion for trial preference based on his age and medical
condition. The parties submitted evidence, including expert witness
testimony, over eight days of trial and written closing arguments. We
describe the evidence more fully where relevant to our analysis, post.
The trial court issued a proposed statement of decision in November
2023, to which Bartel filed objections and Chicago Title filed opposition. In
January 2024, the trial court filed a proposed judgment. Bartel filed an
objection and Chicago Title a response regarding an agreement the parties
had reached on the amount of damages and prejudgment interest after phase
I and disputing the application of that agreement to the amount of
prejudgment interest owed under the judgment. The court held an additional
hearing to allow oral argument on the objections.
On March 5, 2024, the trial court entered a final judgment. The
judgment attached and incorporated the interim judgment and recited the
findings issued by the court after phase I. As to the issues tried in phase II,
the judgment ruled in favor of Bartel on the diminution of value of the
property but found in favor of Chicago Title on the issues of bad faith,
damages arising from the “ ‘donut hole’ ” period, prejudgment interest, and
punitive damages. More specifically, the judgment enumerated six findings.
Four are relevant to the issues in this appeal.
As to Bartel’s bad faith claim, the trial court found that although
Chicago Title could have performed a more expeditious and comprehensive
investigation and provided a decision to defend sooner, the insurer did not,
under the circumstances, act in bad faith. The court reasoned that claims
18
counsel for Chicago Title “placed an inordinate level of significance upon the
Composti [c]omplaint allegations and did not perform the requisite
investigation to determine if other factors existed that would confirm/support
the duty to defend.” At the same time, the court noted factors that made it
“neither equitable, nor legally supportable, that the entire responsibility for
figuring . . . out” the issues rested only with the insurer, including the
difficulty in evaluating the easement claim (ultimately requiring an eight-day
trial to resolve), the uncertainty among all parties concerning the location of
the roads, the relationship between the Composti and Bartel properties, the
significance of the Boyd- Sluyter deed, and the fact that for the first few
years, the Composti complaints “plainly described matters excluded from the
subject policy.”
The trial court relatedly rejected Bartel’s claim for punitive damages.
It found that Chicago Title made errors related to the belated acceptance of
the tenders to defend but that the higher burden of proof applicable to
punitive damages had not been met, noting specifically that “no one knew the
possible significance of the Boyd[-Sluyter] [d]eed, not even the party trying to
obtain an easement, nor his counsel.”
The trial court also rejected Bartel’s request for damages during the
“ ‘donut hole’ ” period of October 16, 2012 to September 5, 2014, finding “there
was no litigation pending against the insured and no litigation to defend”
because the previous lawsuit (Composti II) had been dismissed and Bartel did
not notify Chicago Title of a continuing claim against the property or renew
his tender for defense until the filing of the cross-complaint. As to the
dispute over prejudgment interest, the court found it appropriate to award
prejudgment interest on the difference between the $170,000 that Chicago
Title initially paid in diminution value and the $400,000 that the court
19
ultimately decided was owed, resulting in an award of 10 percent yearly
interest on $230,000, for a total of $96,284 in prejudgment interest.
The judgment awarded a total sum of $326,284 in favor of Bartel,
consisting of $230,000 in additional diminution of value and $96,284 in
prejudgment interest. Bartel appealed and Chicago Title cross-appealed from
the judgment. The parties subsequently filed a stipulation and order
amending the judgment to reflect an agreement between the parties on costs
and motions to tax costs. The amended judgment awarded $287,619.52 in
favor of Bartel, based on a total judgment of $333,980.62 (including pre- and
postjudgment interest), less $46,361.10 in a net cost award to Chicago Title.
II. DISCUSSION
The appeal and cross-appeal each raise several issues. We begin with
the cross-appeal, which challenges the trial court’s findings in phase I
concerning Chicago Title’s duty to defend Bartel prior to his tender of the
cross-complaint in Composti III and the applicability of equitable tolling to
Chicago Title’s statute of limitations defense. We then turn to the issues
raised in Bartel’s appeal, including whether the trial court erred in failing to
award damages for the “ ‘donut hole’ ” period between the underlying actions,
in rejecting Bartel’s bad faith claim and request for punitive damages, and in
calculating the prejudgment interest owed to Bartel.
A. Statute of Limitations
Chicago Title contends the trial court erred in applying equitable
tolling to reject its statute of limitations defense and deciding Bartel’s title
insurance action was timely. Bartel counters that the interim judgment
properly rejected Chicago Title’s statute of limitations defense and applied
equitable tolling consistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1072, and with the primary right doctrine. Bartel
20
asserts in the alternative that, even assuming equitable tolling paused upon
the dismissals of Composti I and Composti II, it resumed when Bartel timely
reasserted tender of defense based on Composti III.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The affirmative defense of statute of limitations “exists to promote the
diligent assertion of claims, ensure defendants the opportunity to collect
evidence while still fresh, and provide repose and protection from dilatory
suits once excess time has passed.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc.
(2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 (Aryeh).) “A plaintiff must bring a claim within
the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon
Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806; see Code Civ. Proc., § 312.) A
cause of action typically “accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is
complete with all of its elements.’ ” (Fox, at p. 806.) “Actions on title
insurance policies are subject to a two-year statute of limitation. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 339, subd. (1).)” (Lee v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 583, 599.) Accrual of a cause of action upon a contract or policy
of title insurance does not occur “until the discovery of the loss or damage
suffered by the aggrieved party thereunder.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, subd.
(1).)
Certain equitable exceptions “may alter the rules governing either the
initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or
both.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) These exceptions exist “[t]o
align the actual application of the limitations defense more closely with the
policy goals animating it.” (Ibid.) Equitable tolling, applied by the trial court
here, “may suspend or extend the statute of limitations when a plaintiff has
reasonably and in good faith chosen to pursue one among several remedies
and the statute of limitations’ notice function has been served.” (Ibid.)
21
In Lambert, our Supreme Court examined whether a cause of action
under a title insurance policy alleging a failure to defend accrues when the
insurer refuses to defend or when the underlying action is terminated by final
judgment. (Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1074.) After considering the
statutory language and policies underlying the duty to defend, the court
concluded that “[a]lthough the statutory period commences upon the refusal
to defend, it is equitably tolled until the underlying action is terminated by
final judgment.” (Id. at p. 1077.)
While resolution of the statute of limitations is normally a question for
the trier of fact, the application of the statute of limitations on undisputed
facts is a purely legal question that we review de novo. (Aryeh, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 1191; see Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112.)
2. Analysis
Chicago Title contends that, under Lambert, the respective dismissals
of Composti I, on June 23, 2011, and Composti II, on October 16, 2012, ended
any tolling of the two-year statute of limitations period for filing a complaint
alleging breach of the duty to defend those actions. Since Bartel did not file
the instant action until October 27, 2016 (more than two years after the
dismissal of Composti II), Chicago Title asserts that Bartel’s claim for breach
of the duty to defend in Composti I and Composti II is time barred.
Chicago Title argues that the trial court misinterpreted Lambert to
mean that only a judgment, and no other form of termination in the
underlying action, can end the tolling of the limitations period. Chicago Title
maintains that the court’s construction of the law ignored the legal
consequences of the prior dismissals and erroneously treated the underlying
Composti actions as though they constituted a single, continuous claim.

22
Bartel counters that Composti’s dismissals without prejudice of his
earlier lawsuits did not amount to a final judgment or bar the filing of
another lawsuit based on the same claim or primary right. Bartel further
maintains that, even assuming each dismissal without prejudice halted or
paused equitable tolling, the tolling resumed upon Composti’s reassertion of
the easement claim by way of his May 4, 2014 cross-complaint, thereby
extending the statute of limitations period and rendering the filing of Bartel’s
complaint timely. Chicago Title does not address this argument in its
respondent’s brief.
We agree with the parties that Lambert guides our resolution of the
application of the statute of limitations here. In that decision, our Supreme
Court explained, “The duty to defend in a title insurance case is governed by
the same principles which govern the duty to defend under general liability
policies. [Citations.] The duty commences upon tender of the defense, and
continues until the underlying lawsuit is concluded.” (Lambert, supra, 53
Cal.3d at p. 1077.) In rejecting a prior appellate decision that had held that
the statute of limitations begins to run upon the rejection of tender, the court
stated that such a rule “would allow expiration of the statute of limitations on
a lawsuit to vindicate the duty to defend even before the duty itself expires.
This grim result is untenable. The insured must be allowed the option of
waiting until the duty to defend has expired before filing suit to vindicate
that duty.” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations begins to run
“upon accrual, which in this case occurs upon the refusal to defend.”
(Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1078.) It further decided that the statute of
limitation should be equitably tolled between accrual and a final judgment.
It reasoned, “the duty to defend is a continuing duty. It is equitable and
23
consistent with the legislative intent to toll the limitations period in which
this duty continues from the date of accrual of a cause of action to final
judgment.” (Id. at p. 1079.)
The Supreme Court emphasized that its decision was grounded in
equitable principles: “It is harsh to require an insured—often a private
homeowner—to defend the underlying action, at the homeowner’s own
expense, and simultaneously to prosecute—again at the homeowner’s own
expense—a separate action against the title company for failure to defend.
‘[T]he unexpected burden of defending an action may itself make it
impractical to immediately bear the additional cost and hardship of
prosecuting a collateral action against an insurer.’ ” (Lambert, supra, 53
Cal.3d at p. 1078.) The court reasoned that this rule would not prejudice the
insurer. “By tendering defense of a third party action to an insurer, the
insured will have put the insurer on notice that it may be required under the
policy to defend the action. Thus, the insured [sic] will be aware that it must
take the steps necessary to prepare and preserve a defense to an action by its
insured.” (Id. at p. 1079.) Moreover, an insured has the option of bringing
suit against the insurer prior to the entry of final judgment in the underlying
litigation. Nothing “prohibits the insured from commencing an action once
the insurer has refused a tender of defense. We merely conclude that the
insured is not required to do so.” (Id. at p. 1080.)
Applying the principles articulated in Lambert to the facts here, we
decide that Bartel’s title insurance action against Chicago Title was timely.
Composti filed Composti I, which asserted a right-of-way easement benefiting
Composti’s parcel over Bartel’s parcel, on May 25, 2010. Bartel tendered
defense to Chicago Title in Composti I on March 18, 2011, triggering Chicago

24
Title’s duty to defend. (See Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 46
(Buss) [stating the duty to defend “arises as soon as tender is made”].)
Upon receipt of tender in Composti I, Chicago Title investigated
whether the claims against Bartel were covered by his policy. We describe
the investigation conducted by Chicago Title’s claims counsel in more detail
in our discussion of Bartel’s bad faith claim, post (pt. II.D.1.).
On July 27, 2011, Chicago Title declined (in connection with Composti
II) to accept tender.9 Bartel’s claim against Chicago Title therefore accrued
on July 27, 2011. Under the principles articulated in Lambert, the claim was
equitably tolled until October 16, 2012, the date on which Composti II was
dismissed without prejudice.10 Beginning on that date, Bartel had two
years—that is, until October 16, 2014—to bring a claim against Chicago Title
for violation of its duty to defend in Composti I and Composti II.
On May 14, 2014 (approximately five months prior to the running of
the statute of limitations), Composti filed his cross-complaint (Composti III)

9 In their arguments on the statute of limitations, the parties do not

distinguish between Composti I and Composti II, which were filed
sequentially (with only about two weeks between the lawsuits) and asserted
identical claims. Chicago Title’s initial rejection of tender, dated July 27,
2011, similarly appears to have combined its consideration of the lawsuits,
referring without distinction to the tender of defense (submitted in
connection with the filing of Composti I) and to the complaint served in
Composti II, and utilizing the same claim number (403738) throughout. We
similarly analyze Composti I and Composti II together in assessing the
application of the statute of limitations.
10 We reject Bartel’s contention that equitable tolling continues after a

dismissal without prejudice. The duty to defend is bound to the pendency of
the underlying action and terminates upon its conclusion. Once dismissed,
there is no pending action on that claim, regardless of whether a future
action arises. (See Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th
650, 666 [“[C]laims that have been dismissed, whether with or without
prejudice, are not ‘pending.’ ”].)
25
against Bartel. Composti III reasserted the theory of an easement that
Composti had made in Composti I and Composti II and as to which Chicago
Title had previously declined to accept tender. On September 5, 2014 (over
one month before the running of the statute of limitations from the dismissal
of Composti II), Bartel again tendered defense to Chicago Title.
Under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Lambert, this tender of defense
triggered Chicago Title’s duty to defend. (See Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at
p. 1077 [“The duty commences upon tender of the defense, and continues
until the underlying lawsuit is concluded.”].) We decide that, on these facts,
Bartel’s tender of the defense equitably tolled the statute of limitations for
bringing suit against Chicago Title as of the date of the tender.
While normally Bartel’s cause of action against his insurer would not
accrue until the rejection of tender by Chicago Title, on the facts here
equitable principles support its application as of the date of Bartel’s tender of
suit in Composti III. Chicago Title treated Composti III essentially as an
extension of Composti I and Composti II. It reopened the tender of the cross-
complaint under the same claim number (403738) assigned to the prior
tender of claims under Composti I and Composti II. Chicago Title’s rejection
of the Composti III tender cited the same reasons previously given based on
the policy exceptions it had used in rejecting tender in the earlier litigation.
Chicago Title had already clearly and repeatedly indicated that it
would not defend Bartel against Composti’s assertion of an easement when
Bartel tendered suit in Composti III. Chicago Title’s declination of tender on
October 28, 2014, and again on January 27, 2015—stating the same reasons
given for the rejection in Composti II—confirmed the accrual of Bartel’s claim
against Chicago Title for its failure to defend him in Composti I, II, and III.
The insurer was fully on notice of Bartel’s belief that it had a duty to defend
26
him in the Composti litigation and had already conducted its own
investigation of the facts underlying the litigation. Applying the principles of
equitable tolling articulated in Lambert, the limitation period for Bartel’s
action against Chicago Title was tolled between September 5, 2014 (the date
of tender by Bartel to Chicago Title of Composti III) and January 23, 2017,
the termination of Composti III.
Bartel brought his suit against Chicago Title on October 17, 2016, well
before the expiration of the tolling period. His suit (based on Chicago Title’s
failure to defend him in Composti I, Composti II, and Composti III) was
therefore not barred by the statute of limitations.11
B. Duty to Defend
Chicago Title challenges the trial court’s ruling on the duty to defend
on two grounds. First, based on language in Bartel’s policy, Chicago Title
contends the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the
insurer had a continuing duty to defend Bartel in the underlying actions. It
cites language in the policy that provides for the duty to defend “litigation,”
not a “claim,” and it argues the voluntary dismissals of Composti I and
Composti II terminated any duty to defend those actions. Second, Chicago
Title contends the trial court erred in basing the duty to defend Composti I
and Composti II “ ‘as of the date of Bartel’s first tender’ ” in March 2011 on
the determination in Composti III and the attachment of the Boyd-Sluyter
deed to the complaint in the first two actions.
Bartel responds that under well-settled California law, the information
known to Chicago Title upon tender of Composti I and Composti II

11 In light of this conclusion, we need not address Bartel’s alternative

arguments that Chicago Title is equitably estopped from relying on the
statute of limitations and that the statute of limitations defense is moot.
27
overwhelmingly supports the trial court’s interim judgment ruling on the
duty to defend. Bartel further argues that because the court did not award
damages for the “ ‘donut hole’ ” time frame or for any periods in which
litigation was not pending, Chicago Title is not aggrieved by the trial court’s
ruling on the insurer’s “continuing” duty to defend and lacks standing to
challenge this issue on appeal.
1. Additional Background
Bartel’s title insurance policy, obtained from Chicago Title in 1998,
states in relevant part as to coverage: “Subject to the exclusions from
coverage, the exceptions from coverage contained in schedule B and the
conditions and stipulations . . . [Chicago Title] insures, as of [the policy date]
against loss or damage . . . sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of:
[¶] 1. Title to the estate or interest described in schedule A being vested
other than as stated therein; [¶] 2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on
the title.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
Regarding the defense and prosecution of actions, the policy states:
“Upon written request by an insured and subject to the options contained in
. . . these [c]onditions and [s]tipulations, [Chicago Title] at its own cost and
without unreasonable delay, shall provide for the defense of such insured in
litigation in which any third party asserts a claim adverse to the title or
interest as insured.”
In the event of any litigation, the policy provides that Chicago Title
“shall have no liability for loss or damage until there has been a final
determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and disposition of all
appeals therefrom, adverse to the title . . . as [i]nsured.”
As to the exceptions from coverage, the policy states: “This policy does
not insure against loss or damage . . . which arise by reason of” certain
28
matters specified in parts I and II of schedule B, including “3. Easements,
liens or encumbrances, or claims thereof, which are not shown by the public
records”; and “5. A road maintenance agreement, including the terms,
covenants, provisions and assessments, as contained in the agreement
entered into [b]y and between: Mary Swafford, et al[.] [¶] Recorded:
September 2, 1970 in Book 2039, Page 369, Official Records of Santa Cruz
County [¶] Instrument No. 23843” (followed by a list of recorded
amendments to the road maintenance agreement).
As described in our summary of the underlying litigation (see ante, part
I.A.), identical complaints in the Composti I and Composti II actions asserted
quiet title to an easement over Bartel’s parcel by prescription and by
operation of the 1970 road maintenance agreement. Specifically, paragraph
Nos. 10 and 11 of both complaints asserted a right-of-way easement by “map”
and “[a]greement,” referring to the “Lower Road” allegedly identified on the
recorded map attached as exhibit B to the 1970 agreement. The complaints
alleged that the 1970 agreement and recorded map “imposed binding
covenants on the use of the properties governed by the contract.” Both
complaints further asserted, in the heading to paragraph 11, that “Neither
Parcel has Deeded Easement.” (Underscoring omitted.)
Composti I and Composti II also alleged, in paragraph 12, as an
alternative to the “express easement established by” the 1970 agreement,
right-of-way easements by prescription based on “long term adverse use.”
The complaints (with the exception of the Composti II amended complaint)
expressly disclaimed easement established by deed, stating in paragraph No.
11 of each that “neither parcel has [a] deeded easement.” (Capitalization &
underscoring omitted.) The complaints in Composti I and Composti II also

29
included a copy of the Boyd-Sluyter deed as exhibit G, but made no specific
allegations pertaining to the deed.
By contrast, in Composti III, as described ante (pt. I.A.3.), Composti
alleged an express deeded easement in the “grant deeds to the described
parcels from and after 1970” and later established, at trial and as affirmed on
appeal, the 1971 Boyd-Sluyter deed as the basis for an express deeded
easement over Pax Place Court through parcel No. 6. (Bartel, supra,
H044464.)
2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“The duty to defend is guided by several well-established principles.”
(Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277,
287 (Hartford).) “An insurer owes a broad duty to defend against claims that
create a potential for indemnity under the insurance policy. (Gray[, supra,]
65 Cal.2d 263, 277–278.) An insurer must defend against a suit even ‘ “where
the evidence suggests, but does not conclusively establish, that the loss is not
covered.” ’ (Montrose[, supra,] 6 Cal.4th 287, 299 [].)” (Ibid.) “Any doubt as to
whether the facts give rise to a duty to defend is resolved in the insured’s
favor.” (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) “[T]he insurer has a duty
to defend the insured as to the claims that are at least potentially covered.”
(Buss, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 49.) “The determination whether the insurer
owes a duty to defend usually is made in the first instance by comparing the
allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy. Facts extrinsic to
the complaint also give rise to a duty to defend when they reveal a possibility
that the claim may be covered by the policy.” (Horace Mann, at p. 1078;
accord Hartford, at p. 287.) “This includes all facts, both disputed and
undisputed, that the insurer knows or ‘ “becomes aware of” ’ from any source

30
[citation] ‘if not “at the inception of the third party lawsuit,” then “at the time
of tender.” ’ ” (Hartford, at p. 287.)
The California Supreme Court has recognized that its opinion in “Gray
made clear that facts known to the insurer and extrinsic to the third party
complaint can generate a duty to defend, even though the face of the
complaint does not reflect a potential for liability under the policy. [Citation.]
This is so because current pleading rules liberally allow amendment; the
third party plaintiff cannot be the arbiter of coverage.” (Montrose, supra, 6
Cal.4th at p. 296.) Stated differently, “ ‘[T]hat the precise causes of action
pled by the third party complaint may fall outside policy coverage does not
excuse the duty to defend where, under the facts alleged, reasonably
inferable, or otherwise known, the complaint could fairly be amended to state
a covered liability.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[i]f any facts stated or fairly inferable
in the complaint, or otherwise known or discovered by the insurer, suggest a
claim potentially covered by the policy, the insurer’s duty to defend arises
and is not extinguished until the insurer negates all facts suggesting
potential coverage.’ ” (Hartford, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 287.)
To determine whether the insurer owed the insured a duty to defend,
the reviewing court examines the insurance policy at issue. (Hameid v.
National Fire Ins. of Hartford (2003) 31 Cal.4th 16, 21 (Hameid).) “Insurance
policy interpretation is a question of law.” (Ibid.; accord, Hartford, supra, 59
Cal.4th at p. 288.) Appellate courts “apply an independent standard of
review to decisions interpreting, constructing, and applying insurance
policies to determine the scope of actual or potential coverage.” (Food Pro
Internat., Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 976, 984–985
(Food Pro); see also Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. J. Lamb, Inc. (2002) 100
Cal.App.4th 1017, 1031.)
31
3. Analysis
Bartel’s title insurance policy provides for the defense of the insured “in
litigation in which any third party asserts a claim adverse to the title or
interest as [i]nsured.” Applying our independent construction of the policy
language (Hameid, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 21; Food Pro, supra, 169
Cal.App.4th at pp. 984–985), Composti’s claim of easement against the
property—once asserted “in litigation” within the meaning of the policy
language—would adversely affect “[t]itle to the estate or interest described
in” the policy.
Indeed, Chicago Title does not dispute that the easement claim
asserted in the Composti I and Composti II complaints qualified as an
adverse claim asserted in litigation and therefore fell within the scope of
policy coverage unless it came within one of the stated exclusions. The
relevant policy exclusions in this case are the exceptions from coverage for an
easement that is either “not shown by the public records” or “contained in
the” 1970 agreement.
Chicago Title contends that there was no basis for Chicago Title to
ascertain coverage because (1) the complaints in Composti I and Composti II
asserted a claim for easement on grounds expressly excepted or excluded
from the policy coverage and (2) each complaint expressly denied the
existence of a deeded easement. Chicago Title argues that neither the
complaints “nor anything else” gave it “even a hint that Composti might later
disavow those allegations and assert a claim for a deeded easement
potentially within coverage of the title insurance policy.”
Chicago Title emphasizes the trial court’s and parties’ recognition in
Composti III that the attachment of the Boyd-Sluyter deed to the earlier
complaints served the function of identifying the location of the easements as
32
alleged and that only “ ‘after reviewing all of the deeds that were created by
Opal Boyd, starting with the Boyd-to-Sluyter Deed’ . . . and by ‘[c]onstruing
the described deeds from Opal Boyd as a whole’ ” did the trial court in
Composti III reach a determination that there existed a deeded easement
over Bartel’s parcel. Chicago Title also points to the testimony of Bartel’s
expert at the Composti III trial as evidence that the Boyd-Sluyter deed could
not be read, without more, as creating the easement ultimately awarded by
the Composti III judgment.12 Chicago Title argues that under these
circumstances, nothing in the record indicated that Composti might later
“reverse course” from its prior verified complaints to claim a deeded
easement, which Composti III ultimately awarded.
By asserting that the Composti I and Composti II complaints gave no
hint of the possibility of a potentially covered claim, Chicago Title ignores the
evidence of the Boyd-Sluyter grant deed attached to both complaints and the
ambiguity created both by the complaint allegations and attached exhibits,
including the recorded map and grant deeds. Further, Chicago Title’s
argument is contrary to well-established principles of insurance law. When
making a coverage decision, the insurer bears the burden of ascertaining
whether the facts alleged or inferable in the complaint, together with the
extrinsic evidence known or discovered by the insurer, could give rise to a
covered complaint. (Montrose, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 296.) Although it is true
that the Composti I and Composti II complaints sought an easement
established by the 1970 agreement, and/or by prescription, and that the

12 Bartel’s expert witness Charles Hansen, who was admitted to testify

on topics including the claims investigation and analysis conducted by
Chicago Title, testified that he did not read the Boyd-Sluyter deed “as
reflecting the necessary intent to create an easement over the Bartel
property.”
33
policy expressly excluded both such theories of easement, this does not end
the court’s inquiry, nor should it have ended that of Chicago Title. The mere
possibility that facts extrinsic to the complaint might reveal a claim that
could be covered by the policy is sufficient to trigger the duty to defend.
(Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1078; accord Hartford, supra, 59 Cal.4th
at p. 287.)
We recognize that resolution of the existence of an easement conveyed
by the Boyd-Sluyter deed was obscured by the general confusion surrounding
the location of unnamed, private roads and the effect of the 1970 agreement,
various deeds, legal descriptions, and land surveys. Neither pleading in
Composti I or Composti II is a model of clarity. While both complaints
alleged a right to quiet title to easement against multiple neighboring
property owners, including Bartel, the allegations (including the heading to
paragraph 11, denying any deeded easement) are imprecise and do not
clearly denote to which “[p]arcel” the denial of deeded easement refers, given
that multiple parcels were at issue in the complaints. The significance of the
denial is further clouded by the inclusion of the Boyd-Sluyter deed as
attachment G, which (as stated in the complaints) “describe[s] and/or
depict[s]” the “Lower Road” (later understood to be Pax Place). The issue was
not resolved until a lengthy court trial and the decision on appeal in Bartel v.
Composti, supra, H044464.
Nevertheless, the difficulty of assessing the legal effect of the deed or of
resolving the facts underlying its description of a 40-foot right-of-way (and
whether it referred to the same right-of-way established by the 1970
agreement) do not negate the insurer’s duty to evaluate the extrinsic
evidence for the potential of a covered claim. (See Howard v. American
National Fire Ins. Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 498, 520 (Howard) [“ ‘If
34
coverage depends on an unresolved dispute over a factual question, the very
existence of that dispute would establish a possibility of coverage and thus a
duty to defend.’ ”].)
The complexity of the underlying facts does not shield the insurer from
the risk of erroneously denying the tender of defense. With regard to the
denials of a deeded easement, the ambiguity in the pleading of Composti I
and Composti II and resulting confusion as to whether the claimed easement
was subject to the exclusion from coverage based on the 1970 agreement
raises considerable doubt as to the legal effect of the denials. As a
consequence, Composti’s disclaimer does not eliminate the possibility of a
covered claim.
While the denials in Composti I and Composti II could arguably be read
to foreclose the possibility of a potentially covered claim (since the allegations
of an unrecorded easement or easement under the 1970 agreement were
already excepted from coverage), the duty to defend is “fixed by the facts
which the insurer learns from the complaint, the insured, or other sources”
(Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 276) and not by the causes of action or theories
pled by the third party complaint. Thus, we decide the arguably ambiguous
denial of a theory of liability in the complaints—especially where potentially
contradicted by facts ascertainable therein—is not dispositive of the duty to
defend. Moreover, “[a]ny doubt as to whether the facts establish the
existence of the defense duty must be resolved in the insured’s favor.”
(Montrose, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 299–300; accord, Horace Mann, supra, 4
Cal.4th at p. 1081; see id. at p. 1084 [noting “we must resolve the uncertainty
in the insured’s favor,” where the factual record is unclear concerning key
facts that might resolve the coverage question].)

35
Chicago Title’s arguments to the contrary conflate its defenses to
Bartel’s later claims of bad faith with its “broad duty to defend against claims
that create a potential for indemnity under the insurance policy” (Hartford,
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 287), even “ ‘ “where the evidence suggests, but does
not conclusively establish, that the loss is not covered.” ’ ” (Ibid.) As our
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, “the duty to defend is broader
than the duty to indemnify; an insurer may owe a duty to defend its insured
in an action in which no damages ultimately are awarded.” (Horace Mann,
supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081; Buss, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 46.)
There is no dispute as to the factual underpinning of the duty to defend
determination in this case. Chicago Title was aware of the Boyd-Sluyter deed
as early as Bartel’s first tender of Composti I and assigned claims counsel to
investigate the claim. Claims counsel had access to the relevant deed and
other documents necessary to evaluate whether any of the referenced
documents created a potential for coverage by referencing a right-of-way not
subject to the policy exceptions. Nevertheless, Chicago Title repeatedly
denied Bartel’s renewed requests for tender. This is not a scenario in which
the nature of Composti’s claim (to establish a legal right-of-way over the
property) was outside the scope of coverage and “[n]o reasonable construction
of the claim could potentially bring it within the coverage of the policy.”
(Montrose, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 302.)
Furthermore, the record establishes (and Chicago Title does not
dispute) that as of Bartel’s initial tender of Composti I, Chicago Title was
aware of facts in the grant deed that, however unlikely, could give rise to the
possibility of a covered claim. As noted by Bartel’s expert (whose testimony
Chicago Title cites in support of its position that the Boyd-Sluyter deed could
not be read to support a deeded easement claim), while he “did not read the
36
Boyd to Sluyter deed . . . as reflecting the necessary intent to create an
easement over the Bartel property, . . . . [t]hat’s very different from saying
that there wasn’t a possibility that a [c]ourt would determine that because, as
you know, when [c]ourts construe deeds, they are basically divining intent of
people who are long gone, and it’s very difficult to rule things out when a
[c]ourt is going to be trying to determine what a grantor and grantee
intended.”
While it may be true that Chicago Title was not required to speculate
about unpleaded theories of easement, it was obligated to investigate
whether the extrinsic facts known to it at tender raised a possibility of
liability within the scope of the policy’s coverage. “[T]he carrier must defend
a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy”
(Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 275) and “cannot construct a formal fortress of
the third party’s pleadings and retreat behind its walls. The pleadings are
malleable, changeable and amendable.” (Id. at p. 276.) Chicago Title’s
citation to Gunderson v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1106
(Gunderson) does not demonstrate otherwise, as the facts known to the
insurer at the time of tender in the underlying quiet title case fell outside of
the policy provisions for coverage for “ ‘property damage’ ” or “ ‘bodily injury’ ”
(id. at p. 1115), and most of the alleged extrinsic evidence of a potential
property damage claim arose after the underlying complaint was filed and
tendered for defense. (Id. at p. 1117.)
Nor are we persuaded by the additional ground advanced by Chicago
Title to challenge the trial court’s duty to defend ruling. Chicago Title
asserts that the court erroneously relied on the January 23, 2017 judgment in
Composti III as the basis for determining Chicago Title’s duty to defend in
the earlier Composti actions. It maintains that in so doing, the trial court
37
misapplied case authority pertaining to the scope of an insurer’s duty to
indemnify versus its duty to defend.
We disagree. The trial court correctly recognized that an insurer in the
subsequent insurance coverage action is bound by the judgment in the
underlying action on the issue litigated. In this case, that issue was the
existence of a deeded easement over parcel No. 6 based on the Boyd-Sluyter
deed. The judgment in Composti III showed that it would have been possible
to assert a covered claim in the earlier actions by amending the complaint to
allege a deeded easement based on the attached exhibit G. This finding by
the court is consistent with case authority providing the “general rule that a
liability ‘ “insurer who has had an opportunity to defend [the underlying
action brought against its insured] is bound by the judgment against its
insured as to all issues which were litigated in the action,” ’ ” provided the
insurer had proper notice of the pendency of that action. (Pruyn v.
Agricultural Ins. Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 500, 515 (Pruyn); see Hogan v.
Midland National Ins. Co. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 553, 564.)
The trial court’s ruling on Chicago Title’s duty to defend, based on the
presence of the Boyd-Sluyter deed in the materials accompanying Bartel’s
first tender of defense, is consistent with this case authority. It confirms only
that an insurer’s duty to defend is based on the information known to the
insurer at the time of the third party lawsuit, as distinguished from issues
not litigated in that action (such as the construction of the policy language).
(See, e.g., Schaefer/Karpf Productions v. CNA Ins. Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th
1306, 1312.) Because the court’s determination of Chicago Title’s duty to
defend was properly based on the matter litigated in Composti III and on the
undisputed fact that Chicago Title was aware of the grant deed attached to
the Composti I and Composti II complaints, Chicago Title’s challenge on that
38
ground is misplaced. We conclude the trial court did not err in finding a duty
to defend Composti I and Composti II “ ‘as of the date of Bartel’s first
tender’ ” in March 2011.
Turning to whether the trial court erred in concluding that the insurer
had a “continuing” duty to defend Bartel in the underlying actions, we
disagree with Chicago Title’s characterization of the trial court’s ruling.
Chicago Title asserts that the court ignored the policy language providing, in
Chicago Title’s words, for a duty to defend “litigation” by erroneously finding
the insurer had a duty to defend “ ‘Composti’s easement claim’ commencing
with the tender of Compost I and ‘continuing’ through Composti III, despite
the dismissals of Composti I and Composti II.”
We do not view the court’s finding regarding “the continuous existence
of the duty to defend from March 18, 2011 forward” as inconsistent with the
policy language distinguishing the insurer’s duty to defend “litigation” from
its options to pay or otherwise settle “claims.” Even as the trial court found
the duty to defend to be a “continuing obligation” beginning with the tender
of Composti I, it did not hold Chicago Title continuously liable without heed
to the period in which there was no litigation pending. Rather, the court
found Chicago Title liable for costs, attorney fees, and interest incurred by
Bartel from the tender of Composti I through the dismissal of Composti II,13
and from the tender of Composti III through judgment. Thus, the court did
not presume or assign liability for the substantial “ ‘donut hole’ ” period

13 Although the trial court did not specify no damages for the

approximately two-week break in litigation between Composti I and
Composti II, Chicago Title does not identify the inclusion of the de minimis
period as error or assert that damages were wrongly quantified as a result.
39
between litigation in Composti II and Composti III but instead reserved that
issue for trial in the phase II trial.
Nor do we agree that the trial court’s language is contrary to
established case law. Chicago Title cites Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857 for the proposition that an insurer
has no duty to defend a “ ‘claim’ ” where the policy provides only for the
defense of a “ ‘suit,’ ” though the insurer retains discretion to settle a
“ ‘claim.’ ” In Foster-Gardner, the California Supreme Court confirmed the
distinction between insurance policy terminology pertaining to a “ ‘suit’ ”
(referring to “actual court proceedings initiated by the filing of a complaint”)
(id. at p. 878) and a “ ‘ “claim” ’ ” (referring to “any number of things” that
“ ‘may ultimately ripen into a suit’ ”) (id. at p. 879). The court held that due
to these differences, a precomplaint notice to an insured party regarding its
responsibility for environmental pollution remediation does not trigger the
insurer’s duty to defend a “ ‘suit.’ ” (Id. at p. 880.)
Foster-Gardner does not render erroneous the trial court’s reference to
“continuing duty.” Chicago Title rejected tender in response to filed
litigation, i.e., a bonafide lawsuit, not a prelitigation letter advising of a
potential “claim.” Nor did the trial court err in referring to the “continuing”
nature of the insurer’s duty to defend, at least when in reference to a pending
action, as discussed in our analysis of the statute of limitations defense, ante
(pt. II.A.2). (See Montrose, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 295.) Moreover, the court’s
reference in the interim judgment to a continuing duty to defend from the
tender of Composti I through the judgment in Composti III does not reflect
the scope of liability ultimately assigned by the judgment, which awarded
Bartel damages solely for the periods of litigation against an asserted claim.

40
We reject Chicago Title’s attack on the judgment based on the trial court’s
resolution of the scope of the insurer’s duty to defend Bartel in litigation.
C. Donut Hole Damages
Bartel contends that the trial court should have awarded damages on
the breach of contract claim for the “ ‘donut hole’ ” period from October 16,
2012 (the dismissal of Composti II) to September 5, 2014 (the date of tender
by Bartel to Chicago Title in Composti III). He argues the damages for this
period are properly recoverable under either the bad faith claim (discussed
post, pt. II.D.) or the breach of contract claim. He asserts that in ruling that
his expenses for that period were not recoverable under the breach of contract
theory, the court contravened case authority assigning risk of liability to the
insurer who wrongfully refuses to provide coverage to its insured and
undercut the interim judgment ruling that the duty to defend was a
continuing obligation. Chicago Title responds that the court correctly refused
to award damages for that period under the plain language of the policy,
which provides for a defense to “ ‘litigation.’ ”
1. Additional Background
The phase I judgment deferred the question of liability for the “ ‘donut
hole’ ” period for resolution at the subsequent bench trial. The trial court
noted that Chicago Title could assert at that time that despite “the
continuous existence of the duty to defend from March 18, 2011 forward, it
[was] not liable for expenses incurred by Bartel from October 16, 2012 to
September 5, 2014 due to a lack of notice or re-tender.” It noted the finder of
fact would “need to address whether, under the facts present, the duty to
defend and/or covenant of good faith and fair dealing required an extra level
of attention and service by Chicago Title, including active participation in

41
resolving Composti’s recurring easement claim regardless of notice, re-tender,
or whether affirmative claims by Composti were currently pending.”
In the judgment following the second phase of trial, the trial court
found that pursuant to section 4 (“Defense and Prosecution of Actions”) (some
capitalization & boldface omitted) of the policy, the insured had to tender a
written request to the insurer for “ ‘the defense of the insured in litigation.’ ”
Because Bartel did not tender defense and there was no litigation after the
dismissal of the Composti II complaint as of October 16, 2012, the court ruled
that expenses for the “ ‘donut hole’ ” period were not reimbursable.
Several sections of the policy are relevant to whether the trial court
erred in this conclusion. Section 4 (“Defense and Prosecution of Actions”)
(some capitalization & boldface omitted), states: “(a) Upon written request
by an insured and subject to the options contained in [s]ection 6 of these
[c]onditions and [s]tipulations, [Chicago Title], at its own cost and without
unreasonable delay, shall provide for the defense of such insured in litigation
in which any third party asserts a claim adverse to the title or interest as
insured.”
Section 6 (“Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims”) (some
capitalization & boldface omitted), states: “In case of a claim under this
policy, [Chicago Title] shall have the following additional options: [¶] . . . [¶]
(b)(ii) to pay or otherwise settle with the insured claimant the loss or damage
provided for under this policy, together with any costs, attorneys’ fees and
expenses incurred by the insured claimant which were authorized by
[Chicago Title] up to the time of payment and which [Chicago Title] is
obligated to pay.”
Section 7 (“Determination and Extent of Liability”) (some capitalization
& boldface omitted), provides: “This policy is a contract of indemnity against
42
actual monetary loss or damage sustained or incurred by the insured
claimant who has suffered loss or damage by reason of matters insured
against by this policy and only to the extent herein described. [¶] . . . [¶] (d)
[Chicago Title] will pay only those costs, attorneys’ fees and expenses
incurred in accordance with [s]ection 4 of these [c]onditions and
[s]tipulations.”
2. Standard of Review
The parties do not address the applicable standard of review. Because
the historical facts do not appear to be in dispute and the court’s inquiry was
predominantly legal, we review its decision de novo. (See Ghirardo v.
Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 801 (Ghirardo).)
3. Analysis
The factual basis for this damages claim arises from Bartel’s continuing
efforts to pursue a resolution of Composti’s escalating use of Pax Place Court
after the dismissal without prejudice of Composti II. Bartel did not notify
Chicago Title of a claim against the property until the filing of the Composti
III cross-complaint. According to the trial court, though “difficult to decipher”
from the spreadsheets, Bartel’s claimed “ ‘donut hole’ ” damages appeared to
total $59,452.55.
Bartel contends that Chicago Title’s abandonment during that period
did not absolve it of liability under the policy, because the title dispute
remained uncured and Composti’s use of the road had escalated. Citing
Pruyn, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at pages 514–515, he maintains that this
abandonment left him free to attempt a reasonable resolution of the
easement problem and later seek reimbursement from Chicago Title.
Bartel asserts that he was not required to renew tender after Chicago
Title denied coverage, because an insurer who wrongfully refuses coverage
43
gives up the right to control the resolution of the problem and must accept
the insured’s reasonable course of action. In support, Bartel cites cases
including Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 220, 238
(Samson), Stalberg v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1223,
1232–1233 (Stalberg), and Moe v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. (1971) 21
Cal.App.3d 289, 302 (Moe). He contends that pending litigation was not a
prerequisite to coverage under the policy, which insured against “any ‘loss or
damage’ sustained from ‘any defect in or lien or encumbrance on the title’ ”
and further provided, in section 6 (“Conditions and Stipulations”), that
Chicago Title “must ‘pay or otherwise settle . . . any claim insured against
under this policy.’ ”
Bartel’s reading ignores unambiguous terms of the policy. Bartel cites
to the first page of the policy that refers to the insurer providing coverage
“against loss or damage . . . sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of:
[¶] . . . [¶] 2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on the title.” However,
the opening section of the policy provides that its coverage is “subject to the
exclusions from coverage, [and] the exceptions from coverage contained in
schedule B and the conditions and stipulations.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The policy specifies in section 7 that the extent of liability for costs, attorney
fees, and expenses is limited to those “incurred in accordance with [s]ection
4,” which provides for a duty to defend actions “[u]pon written request by an
insured” and “for the defense of such insured in litigation in which any third
party asserts a claim adverse to the title” (italics added). With this language,
the insurance contract defines the duty to defend solely in relation to
“litigation” in which an adverse claim is pending.
Bartel also points to language in section 6 and asserts that under that
section, Chicago Title must pay or otherwise settle any claim insured under
44
the policy, including title defects such as easements that were not excepted
from coverage, regardless of whether there is any pending litigation
regarding those defects. This argument fails to recognize that section 6
pertains to the insurer’s “options to pay or otherwise settle claims” (italics
added, capitalization & boldface omitted) and does not define the scope of its
coverage or liability, which is set forth in sections 4 and 7 of the conditions
and stipulations.
The cases cited by Bartel do not assist him because they rely on denial
of tender where the insurer has received notice of a pending action. These
cases reinforce the proposition that an insurer who wrongfully refuses to
provide its insured with a defense will be bound by the outcome based on the
insured’s good faith efforts to resolve the matter. (See Comunale v. Traders
& General Ins. Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 654, 660 [“An insurer who denies
coverage does so at its own risk, and, although its position may not have been
entirely groundless, if the denial is found to be wrongful it is liable for the full
amount which will compensate the insured for all the detriment caused by
the insurer’s breach of the express and implied obligations of the contract.”].)
This was the case in Pruyn, which involved an appeal from the dismissal of
the insured’s complaint against the insurer to enforce a stipulated judgment
entered in her favor after she settled a claim for damages in the underlying
action. (Pruyn, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 509.) The court explained, “It is
the general rule that a liability ‘ “insurer who has had an opportunity to
defend [the underlying action brought against its insured] is bound by the
judgment against its insured as to all issues which were litigated in the
action. . . .” [Citation.] The operation of this rule . . . “depends primarily
upon notice to the insurer of the pendency of the action.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 515,
italics added.) Bartel did not inform Chicago Title of his efforts to oppose
45
Composti’s use of the road across the property after the dismissal of
Composti II until he tendered defense in Composti III. Thus, Pruyn is
inapplicable.
Bartel maintains that he was not required to renew tender after
Chicago Title wrongfully refused to defend him in the first two underlying
actions. The cases cited by Bartel for this point are factually distinguishable
in that they involve a single underlying action, in which the insurer denied
coverage, and the insured was “thereby relieved of his obligation to notify the
insurance company of the progress of the action against him.” (Samson,
supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 238.) The cases cited by Bartel that absolve an insured
of the need to renotify the insurer after the wrongful denial of a tender for
defense do not address circumstances in which the alleged liability for the
insured’s attorney fees and expenses extends to preparations for a separate
action from that in which the insurer had notice. (See, e.g., Samson, at
pp. 238–239; Stalberg, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 1233 [holding that when
insurer refused plaintiffs’ tender of their appeal in the underlying action, it
“gave up the right to control the litigation and could not insist that plaintiffs
use” a specific law firm to cover the attorney’s fees on appeal]; Moe, supra, 21
Cal.App.3d at p. 302 [declining to enforce notice clause in insurance contract
absent a showing of prejudice to the insurer due to the delayed notice and
where insurer was aware of the pending claim].)
Because cases are not authority for propositions not considered
(Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Newsom (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 158, 169),
we decline to construe these cases as imposing a general rule of liability for
defense expenses incurred in a separate or subsequent action from the action
in which the insurer wrongfully rejected the insured’s defense.

46
We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Bartel’s claim
for damages under a breach of contract (title insurance policy) theory for the
“ ‘donut hole’ ” period between Composti II and III.
D. Bad Faith
Bartel contends the trial court erred in finding Chicago Title not liable
for bad faith based on what he characterizes as Chicago Title’s “patently
unreasonable treatment” of his tender for defense in disregard of California
law. (Boldface omitted.) Bartel asserts that the court applied a legally
erroneous standard in its phase II determination of bad faith by ignoring the
interim judgment’s findings on the duty to defend and excusing Chicago
Title’s failure to conduct a reasonable investigation or acknowledge the
possibility of coverage. Chicago Title counters that the trial court applied the
correct legal standards and based its determination on substantial evidence
that Chicago Title did not act unreasonably given the complexity of the fact
pattern concerning the easement, the difficulty of determining which roads
were part of the 1970 agreement, and the fact that Composti specifically
asserted causes of action that were excluded under the policy.
1. Additional Background
In addition to the stipulated facts and joint exhibits submitted for the
phase I trial, the trial court admitted additional evidence and testimony at
the phase II bench trial. The trial record includes letters and e-mails
between Bartel’s counsel and Chicago Title, from each phase of the
underlying litigation from March 2011 through March 2017, addressing
Bartel’s repeated requests for tender and/or reconsideration and the dispute
regarding Chicago Title’s duty to defend Bartel in the Composti actions. The
parties at trial also litigated the issue of damages for the alleged bad faith.
Bartel proffered evidence and testified as to the legal fees he incurred during
47
each phase of litigation, tax payments he incurred based on withdrawals he
made from his retirement account to fund his defense of the easement claims,
and the additional impacts of the litigation (both financial and those related
to health, stress, and quality of life).
As relevant to our analysis, we note the following illustrative
exchanges between Bartel and Chicago Title concerning the duty to defend.
After acknowledging Bartel’s initial tender of Composti I in 2011, Chicago
Title assigned the claim to claims counsel for investigation and to determine
coverage. The assigned claims counsel, Tamar Yellin Schiller, made inquiries
to obtain a copy of the title insurance policy (which initially appeared to be
missing) and other title and survey documents for the subject properties. In
a letter dated July 27, 2011, shortly after Bartel was served in the
Composti II action, claims counsel informed Bartel that Chicago Title
declined to accept the tender of defense for the matter. The letter stated, as
to Composti’s allegations and the policy exceptions, that the alleged easement
affecting the property is the “ ‘Lower Road’ ” and that, after reviewing the
1970 agreement, “[i]t appears that the Lower Road is in fact one of the roads
affected by the [a]greement.” The letter explained its denial based on the
1970 agreement and its corresponding easements as “excepted from coverage”
under the policy’s schedule B, as well as the “alternative theories presented
by” Composti.
Chicago Title twice reaffirmed its denial in response to Bartel’s
requests for reconsideration of the tender, reiterating that Composti was
seeking an easement across the “ ‘Lower Road,’ ” which easement was
excepted from coverage based on the 1970 agreement. Chicago Title repeated
the same reasoning in its letter dated October 28, 2014, denying tender of the
cross-complaint in Composti III. It later accepted tender in May 2015, as of
48
January 19, 2015, based on Composti’s assertion “for the first time in the
litigation” of an additional basis for a deeded easement based on the Boyd-
Sluyter deed. The letter accepting tender explained that Chicago Title “had
no duty to defend prior to this time, . . . because the issue of [the] alleged
Boyd Deed easement, the only potentially covered matter, was not raised
previously.”
At the second phase trial, both parties introduced expert witness
testimony. The trial court admitted testimony by Bartel’s expert witness
Hansen on the claims investigation and analysis conducted by Chicago Title,
the scope of the insured’s defense benefit based on the pleadings and
extraneous facts tendered to Chicago Title, the customary standards of good
faith claim handling, and the “inconsistency with good faith reasonable
claims handling practices of relying on assumptions without investigating the
facts related to those assumptions.” The court similarly heard testimony
from Chicago Title’s expert witness Thomas Alborg on the reasonableness of
the insurer’s investigation.
Additionally, the trial court heard testimony from Bartel, retained real
estate appraisers for both sides, an appraisal expert for Chicago Title,
Schiller (the claims counsel initially assigned to Bartel’s tender of defense of
the Composti I and Composti II actions), and Thomas Hayden, senior claims
counsel assigned to the claim at the time of trial.
Schiller testified about her receipt of Bartel’s initial tender of defense,
documentation related to her review of the relevant exhibits attached to the
complaint (including “[e]xhibit G,” i.e. the Boyd-Sluyter deed), and the
process she followed to obtain additional information about the claim.
Schiller obtained for her investigation a record of survey from 1970, an
assessor’s map from 1971, and the assessor’s tax parcel map for the period
49
contemporaneous with the 1970 agreement. Schiller also had a 45-minute
phone call with Chicago Title’s local title manager in an effort to obtain
“better firsthand information about what it looks like on the ground.” She
used satellite imagery from Google Earth to trace what she saw as a road
onto a copy of the 1971 assessor’s map to identify the road she believed
traversed Bartel’s parcel and was the subject of the easement claim. Schiller
sent a draft of her decision and the underlying documentation to her
managing counsel for the region before issuing the rejection of tender to
Bartel. Schiller did not retain a local surveyor. She testified that it “didn’t
seem necessary” given the record of survey and other maps she had obtained.
After receiving Bartel’s August 2011 request for reconsideration of the
tender, in which Bartel’s counsel pointed out that “the status of the roads as
provided in the title report is directly called into question by the [Composti]
[c]omplaint, and our clients are entitled to be defended and indemnified
pursuant to the policy,” Schiller drafted a response and sent it to another
attorney in the quality assurance group with the relevant background
information so the attorney could review her work and make “a fully
informed decision.” After obtaining the secondary approval, Schiller issued
the rejection letter explaining Chicago Title’s understanding of the roads and
the claim. She wrote, “The Plaintiff [Composti] is incorrect in his mistaken
identification of the Lower Road as Fern Flat Road. As you stated, Fern Flat
Road indeed lies to the south of the insured property and does not pass
through it. Fern Flat Road is a completely different road than the Lower
Road. The recorded map referenced in the [c]omplaint clearly shows only
Fern Flat Road and the Lower Road–not the Lower and Upper Roads as
claimed by [Composti]. . . . The only road of the three (Fern Flat, Upper and

50
Lower) that passes through the insured property is the Lower Road.
[Composti]’s obvious mistake does not draw this claim into coverage.”
2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“The law implies in every contract, including insurance policies, a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co.
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 720.) “ ‘The implied promise requires each contracting
party to refrain from doing anything to injure the right of the other to receive
the agreement’s benefits.’ ” (Ibid.; see Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 818 (Egan).) In other words, it “ ‘imposes upon each
party the obligation to do everything that the contract presupposes they will
do to accomplish its purpose.’ ” (Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn. v.
Associated Internat. Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335, 345 (Chateau
Chamberay).)
“An insurer is said to act in ‘bad faith’ when it not only breaches its
policy contract but also breaches its implied covenant to deal fairly and in
good faith with its insured.” (Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 1062, 1071.) In this context, “the term ‘bad faith’ is used as “a
shorthand reference to a claimed breach by the insurer of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.” (Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. in City of
New York (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1235.) “An insurer’s tortious ‘breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involves something
beyond breach of the contractual duty itself.’ ” (Howard, supra, 187
Cal.App.4th at p. 528.) That is, “an insurer’s responsibility to act fairly and
in good faith in handling an insured’s claim ‘is not the requirement mandated
by the terms of the policy itself—to defend, settle, or pay. It is the obligation
. . . under which the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging
its contractual responsibilities.’ ” (California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe
51
Ins. Co. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1, 15, quoting Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co.
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 566, 573–574.) “In simple terms, an insurer’s tortious bad
faith conduct is conduct that is unreasonable.” (Howard, at p. 529.)
Reasonableness is an objective standard (Bosetti, at p. 1237) and must be
evaluated as of the time of the insurer’s decisions and actions, not “in the
light of subsequent events that may provide evidence of the insurer’s errors.”
(Chateau Chamberay, at p. 347.)
“Ordinarily, reasonableness is a factual issue to be decided by a jury.”
(Fadeeff v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 94, 102.)
However, the reasonableness of an insurer’s conduct “can be decided as a
matter ‘of law where the evidence is undisputed and only one reasonable
inference can be drawn from the evidence.’ ” (Ghazarian v. Magellan Health,
Inc. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 171, 186–187; accord Chateau Chamberay, supra,
90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 346, 350; Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Lopez (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 1385, 1424 (Mt. Hawley).)
The relevant facts related to Bartel’s tender requests and Chicago
Title’s investigation and denials of tender are neither in dispute nor
susceptible to competing reasonable inferences. We therefore review the trial
court’s determination on Bartel’s bad faith claim de novo, and we do not defer
to the trial court’s determination that Chicago Title did not act in bad faith.
Regarding the legal principles governing Bartel’s claim for damages in
relation to Chicago Title’s alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, a finding of bad faith exposes the insurer to a broad range of
possible damages. (See Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co.
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 390, 400 [“The availability of tort remedies in the limited
context of an insurer’s breach of the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing]
advances the social policy of safeguarding an insured in an inferior
52
bargaining position who contracts for calamity protection, not commercial
advantage”].) Such damages include any damages, including attorney fees,
that are the proximate result of the insurer’s breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. (Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d
813, 817 (Brandt); see Civ. Code, § 3333.)
The recovery of attorney fees in this context—often called Brandt
fees—is an exception to the generally applicable rule that parties to a lawsuit
must ordinarily pay their own fees. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33
Cal.4th 780, 806 (Cassim).) “[I]f an insurer fails to act fairly and in good faith
when discharging its responsibilities concerning an insurance contract, such
breach may result in tort liability for proximately caused damages. Those
damages can include the insured’s cost to hire an attorney to vindicate the
insured’s legal rights under the insurance policy. ‘When an insurer’s tortious
conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an attorney to obtain the
benefits due under a policy, it follows that the insurer should be liable in a
tort action for that expense. The attorney’s fees are an economic loss—
damages—proximately caused by the tort. [Citation.] These fees must be
distinguished from recovery of attorney’s fees qua attorney’s fees, such as
those attributable to the bringing of the bad faith action itself.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting Brandt, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 817.)
Stated differently, because the “entitlement to attorney fees as
compensatory damages is premised on an insured’s need to hire an attorney
to vindicate his or her contractual rights under an insurance policy” (Cassim,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 807), our high court has “placed a critical limitation on
the amount of fees recoverable. ‘The fees recoverable, . . ., may not exceed the
amount attributable to the attorney’s efforts to obtain the rejected payment
due on the insurance contract. Fees attributable to obtaining any portion of
53
the plaintiff’s award which exceeds the amount due under the policy are not
recoverable.’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
To the extent the claimed legal fees for both the contract and tort
recoveries are intertwined, the plaintiff bears “the burden of demonstrating
how the fees for legal work attributable to both the contract and the tort
recoveries should be apportioned.” (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 813.)
Further, “to the extent some overlap in legal work occurs, the trial court
should exercise its discretion to apportion the fees” (id. at p. 811) to ensure
that the Brandt fee award reflects only those fees attributable to the
attorney’s efforts to recover under the breach of the insurance contract. (Id.
at p. 813.)
Similarly, while noneconomic damages such as for emotional distress
are available, those damages must flow from the initial breach of the implied
covenant and resulting economic loss. (Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 121, 128–129; see also Major v. Western Home Ins. Co.
(2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1215 (Major).)
Whether a party is entitled to a particular measure of damages is a
question of law. (Atkins v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 696, 738.)
3. Analysis
Bartel contends that Chicago Title not only breached its contractual
duty to defend him in the underlying Composti actions, as established ante,
but did so unreasonably and in bad faith. Bartel proposes “[t]wo main species
of bad faith” by Chicago Title based on its repeated denial of tender:
(1) “ignoring the obvious possibility of coverage shown by the Boyd[-Sluyter]
Deed” and instead relying solely on Composti’s allegations in disregard of
established law; and (2) failing to conduct a reasonable investigation and
relying on assumptions about disputed facts in a manner designed to defeat
54
coverage while ignoring the possibility of coverage that a reasonable
investigation would have shown.
We address both contentions together, considering whether the trial
court misapplied the law on bad faith by allowing the complexity of the
underlying factual and legal issues to serve as an excuse for the insurer’s
breach of its contractual duty. The trial court correctly identified the
governing legal standard for an insurance bad faith claim, stating that the
“duty of an insurer to act in good faith is in relationship to the insurer’s
discharging of its contractual responsibilities” and the “determining factor is
whether the insurer acted without proper cause or unreasonably.” But the
court’s analysis does not reflect the degree to which Chicago Title’s conduct
persistently and unreasonably fell short of its contractual obligation to its
insured.
The trial court’s inquiry focused largely on the complexity of the fact
pattern and difficulty in identifying the roads in the rural property and which
may have been included under the 1970 agreement. Even as the court
observed that claims counsel “placed an inordinate level of significance upon
the Composti [c]omplaint allegations and did not perform the requisite
investigation to determine if other factors existed that would confirm/support
the duty to defend,” the court declined to place “responsibility for this
confusion” solely with the insurer.
This approach misconstrued the nature of the insurer’s obligation to
fairly and in good faith fulfill its contractual duty to defend based on the
possibility of a covered claim. The trial court effectively conflated Chicago
Title’s duty to defend with the duty to indemnify. The latter more narrowly
applies “to claims that are actually covered, in light of the facts proved.”
(Buss, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 46.) Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the
55
complexity of facts associated with the underlying legal claim and difficulty of
ascertaining whether those facts might support a claim under the policy
weigh against the insurer denying coverage in the manner that occurred
here. As our Supreme Court has stated in connection with the duty to
defend, “[a]n insurer must defend against a suit even ‘ “where the evidence
suggests, but does not conclusively establish, that the loss is not covered.” ’ ”
(Hartford, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 287.) Any doubt must be resolved in favor
of the insured (ibid.), such that the insurer is excused from defending against
a third party claim “only when ‘ “the third party complaint can by no
conceivable theory raise a single issue which could bring it within the policy
coverage.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 288, italics added; see also Montrose, supra, 6 Cal.4th
at p. 300, italics omitted [stating, to prevail in an action seeking declaratory
relief on the issue of the duty to defend “the insured need only show that the
underlying claim may fall within policy coverage; the insurer must prove it
cannot”].)
That coverage depended on uncertain facts related to whether the road
traversing the property was one of the unnamed roads subject to the policy
exception for the 1970 agreement was itself the type of unresolved factual
dispute that “ ‘would establish a possibility of coverage and thus a duty to
defend.’ ” (Howard, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 520.) While Chicago Title
was not required to conclusively assess coverage by “figuring out” these
details (which both sides recognize took a lengthy trial with conflicting
surveyor testimony in the underlying action), it was required to accept
Bartel’s tender unless an adequate investigation demonstrated that the
possibility of any coverage was precluded. (Hartford, supra, 59 Cal.4th at
p. 288.) Given these longstanding and established principles, Chicago Title’s
treatment of Bartel’s tender request in Composti I and Composti II, requests
56
for reconsideration, and renewed tender request in Composti III, were
objectively unreasonable. In conducting the investigation into Bartel’s
tender, claims counsel appears to have restricted consideration of the
extrinsic facts to their relationship to the 1970 agreement and the allegations
of the complaint, rather than examining those facts for the potential liability
created by the suit. (See Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 276–277.)
Chicago Title maintains that substantial evidence in the record
supports a finding that claims counsel Schiller conducted an adequate
investigation and, in fact, “went far beyond the allegations of Composti’s
pleadings in attempting to determine the location of the claimed easement
and whether that easement was located on one of the ‘unnamed roads’ shown
on the map attached . . . to the [1970 agreement]” and thereby covered by the
agreement. We agree that the evidence shows that Schiller investigated the
facts that accompanied the Composti complaints by obtaining additional
maps and records, speaking with the local title office, and attempting to
determine the location of the roads as compared to the 1970 agreement. But
Schiller’s actions were limited to assessing the operative theory of the
complaint and exclusion of coverage. This limited investigation, which
precluded the insurer from evaluating whether there was any conceivable
theory by which Composti’s suit could fall within the policy coverage, cannot
establish Chicago Title complied with the fundamental legal principles
governing the duty to defend.
Chicago Title asserts that the fact that the trial court reached a
different conclusion years later, finding that the easement over the property
was not based on the 1970 agreement but on the intent of Boyd as construed
through the Boyd-Sluyter and related deeds, does not render Schiller’s
conclusion or investigation unreasonable. This argument misses the mark.
57
The implied covenant in this context did not require Chicago Title to divine
the outcome or speculate as to unpleaded legal theories. Rather, in the face
of a claim against the property based on ambiguous maps and road
designations, Chicago Title had an implied promise to take reasonable steps
to fulfill the expectations of its insured and provide a defense to the claim
arising from circumstances conceivably within the scope of the policy. (See
Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1081 [“[T]he contract of insurance is unique
in that the purchaser seeks not commercial advantage, but rather peace of
mind and security in the event of unforeseen calamity.”].)
The cases that Chicago Title relies on to defeat Bartel’s claim of bad
faith are distinguishable. Citing Chateau Chamberay, Chicago Title suggests
that an insurer’s denial of or mistaken withholding of policy benefits may be
reasonable when based on a genuine dispute involving factual or legal issues.
But Chateau Chamberay, which involved a homeowners’ association direct
action against its property insurer to recover for bad faith delay in paying a
claim for earthquake damage, is a first party insurer case involving
application of the genuine dispute doctrine. (Chateau Chamberay, supra, 90
Cal.App.4th at p. 346; see Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 922, 949 [genuine dispute doctrine “holds that an insurer does
not act in bad faith when it mistakenly withholds policy benefits, if the
mistake is reasonable or is based on a legitimate dispute as to the insurer’s
liability”].) Numerous state and federal decisions have recognized the
genuine dispute doctrine is not compatible with the principles that govern
third party duty to defend cases, in which the possibility of coverage triggers
the duty. (See, e.g., Mt. Hawley, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1424; Howard,
supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 530; Harbison v. American Motorists Ins. Co.
(E.D. Cal. 2009) 636 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1040.)
58
Chicago Title cites Gunderson for the proposition that when a lawsuit
raises no potential for coverage, the insurer does not have a continuing
burden to investigate whether extrinsic facts might bring the claim into
coverage. (Gunderson, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at. p. 1114.) However,
Composti I not only presented facts creating the potential for coverage, but
the insured requested reconsideration of the decision to reject tender by
pointing out the very uncertainty (over location and identification of the
unnamed roads) that created the possibility of a covered claim.
The reasonableness of Chicago Title’s position must also be viewed in
context of the timeline of the underlying litigation. (Pulte Home Corp. v.
American Safety Indemnity Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1119 (Pulte)
[“The determination of the reasonableness of an insurer’s contractual position
takes into account not only the rules of contract interpretation (e.g.,
construing ambiguity in favor of insured), but also the given factual context
in which the dispute arises.”].) Chicago Title’s failure to construe the facts
presented by the Composti complaint as requiring it to accept the tender of
defense was not an isolated miscalculation but the result of the insurer’s
persistent but misguided belief that it (1) needed only to ascertain whether
the allegations in the complaint could result in a judgment that it would be
obligated to pay, and (2) had deciphered the location of the unnamed roads
referenced in the 1970 agreement to confirm the source of the alleged
easement.
In sum, the undisputed facts establish that Chicago Title repeatedly
disregarded the California standard applicable to the duty to defend. (See
Howard, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 531 [insurer’s refusal to defend insured
in third-party suit “was founded on an unfair and selective reading of” the
facts as falling outside the coverage period]; Pulte, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at
59
pp. 1121–1122 [insurer’s claims handling process disregarded known case
authority in interpreting its policy].) We conclude that Chicago Title not only
violated its contractual duty to defend Bartel but its implied covenant to
fairly and in good faith assess the possibility of coverage based on the
available facts.
We will therefore reverse the judgment with instructions to the trial
court to enter a new judgment holding Chicago Title liable for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Since the parties on appeal
have focused exclusively on the predicate question of the existence of bad
faith and have not addressed the evidence presented at trial on damages, we
shall remand the matter to the trial court to determine in the first instance,
based on the evidence previously admitted at trial, the amount of “ ‘ “any
damages which are the proximate result of that breach” ’ ” (Brandt, supra, 37
Cal.3d at p. 817) and award them to Bartel.14

14 It appears from our review of the record that the damages awarded

and/or amounts paid (as some amounts were agreed upon by the parties, not
ordered by the trial court) thus far are as follows.
First, based on the duty to defend finding, the interim judgment held
Chicago Title “liable for: (1) costs, fees, and interest from March 18, 2011,
until October 16, 2012; and (2) interest on fees and costs from after
September 5, 2014 that were ultimately reimbursed (without interest) by
Chicago Title.” On June 28, 2019, pursuant to the interim judgment, Chicago
Title made a payment of $102,490.68 (an amount agreed upon by the parties
off the record) to Bartel. This amount was in addition to payments made by
Chicago Title to Bartel on September 1, 2015 of $62,729.72, on September 1,
2016 of $11,760.50, on May 1, 2018 of $6,339.75.
Next, based on the trial court’s findings regarding diminution of value,
the court awarded Bartel $230,000, in addition to the $170,000 that Chicago
Title had already paid, for a total diminution in value of $400,000. The court
awarded prejudgment interest on the $230,000 difference, for a total of
$96,284.

60
On remand, the trial court shall consider the evidence pertaining to
both economic and noneconomic damages proximately caused by Chicago
Title’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (See
Major, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215.) The court shall exercise its
discretion to apportion any fee award to reflect only those legal fees
attributable to Bartel’s efforts to recover under the breach of the title
insurance contract. (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 811–813.) The court
should also address the effect of this reversal on its postjudgment order on
the parties’ stipulation for costs and amended judgment.
E. Punitive Damages
Bartel challenges the trial court’s denial of punitive damages on
grounds similar to those he cites as error in the court’s denial of his bad faith
cause of action. He contends that clear and convincing evidence in the record
supports an award of punitive damages against Chicago Title, which would
serve the distinct purpose of deterring future wrongdoing and “discourag[ing]
the perpetuation of objectionable corporate policies.” (Egan, supra, 24 Cal.3d
at p. 820.) Bartel argues that Chicago Title’s “years-long deliberate disregard

The trial court otherwise rejected Bartel’s additional claim for damages
based on Chicago Title’s breach of the duty to defend in relation to the
“ ‘donut hole’ ” period. Because the court rejected Bartel’s claim of bad faith,
it awarded no damages for Chicago Title’s alleged breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It also rejected Bartel’s claim for
punitive damages.
Lastly, after the entry of judgment, the parties filed a stipulation and
proposed order to address Bartel’s pending motion to tax costs requested by
Chicago Title as well as Bartel’s unopposed request for costs. Pursuant to the
parties’ agreement, the trial court signed the order, in which the parties
agreed to an amended judgment. The amended judgment awarded
$287,619.52 in favor of Bartel, based on a total judgment of $333,980.62
(including pre- and postjudgment interest), less $43,361.10 in net cost award
to Chicago Title.
61
of controlling California law while waging scorched-earth war against its
elderly insured who demanded nothing more than reasonable conduct
consistent with the law” is precisely the type of insurance bad faith case for
which punitive damages are appropriate.
“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has
been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the
actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) A plaintiff is never
entitled to punitive damages as a matter of right. (Uzyel v. Kadisha (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 866, 923.) Rather, “[a] claim for punitive damages requires
‘evidence which establishes by “clear and convincing evidence” that the
defendant has been “guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” If a plaintiff is to
recover on such a claim, it will be necessary that the evidence presented meet
this higher evidentiary standard.’ ” (Food Pro, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at
p. 994; see Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)
In the context of failure to properly administer an insurance claim,
punitive damages are ordinarily “based on ‘malice’ or ‘oppression,’ rather
than on the third possible ground for the award, ‘fraud.’ Both ‘malice’ and
‘oppression’ are defined in Civil Code section 3294 as involving ‘despicable
conduct,’ which in the case of malice ‘is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,’ and as to
oppression is ‘conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights.’ ” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins.
Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1286–1287 (Tomaselli).) We review de novo
whether the undisputed facts underlying Chicago Title’s claim handling in

62
this case satisfy the requirements of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a).
(See Ghirardo, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 801.)
As explained in our analysis of the duty to defend, ante, the trial court
correctly determined that the governing principles required Chicago Title,
under the terms of the policy, to defend Bartel, as of his initial tender,
against the easement claim based on facts inferable from the Boyd-Sluyter
deed that gave rise to the possibility of a claim covered by the policy.
(Montrose, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 296; Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at
p. 1078.) Furthermore, we have determined that the manner in which
Chicago Title repeatedly rejected tender in the face of a clear duty to defend
amounted to bad faith. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that Chicago
Title’s bad faith refusal to defend Bartel under the policy until partway
through Composti III rises to the level of malice or oppression within the
meaning of Civil Code section 3294.
The heightened legal standard for imposing punitive damages guides
our determination. “Under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence
must be ‘ “ ‘ “so clear as to leave no substantial doubt” ’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘ “sufficiently
strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.” ’ ” ’ ”
(Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158.) This stringent standard
must be accompanied by evidence of “ ‘[m]alice,’ ” defined as “conduct which is
intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights . . . of others” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)), or
“ ‘[o]ppression,’ ” defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to
cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights” (id.,
subd. (c)(2)). “ ‘Despicable conduct’ is conduct that is ‘ “so vile, base,
contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down
63
upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” ’ ” (Butte Fire Cases, at
p. 1159.)
Applying these standards, courts have held that “ ‘[p]unitive damages
are appropriate if the defendant’s acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in
blatant violation of law or policy. . . . Punitive damages are proper only
when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the
plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ ”
(Tomaselli, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287; see also Food Pro, supra, 169
Cal.App.4th at p. 994.) As such, “simple breach of contract, no matter how
willful and hence tortious, is not a ground for punitive damages. Such
damages are accessible only upon a showing that the defendant ‘act[ed] with
the intent to vex, injure, or annoy.’ ” (Tomaselli, at p. 1286.)
Without more, Chicago Title’s violation of its contractual duty to Bartel
and failure to act fairly and in good faith in the discharge of its contractual
obligation to defend against the possibility of a covered claim does not
demonstrate such blatant or “willful and conscious disregard of” Bartel’s
rights to constitute malice or oppression. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)
The cases that Bartel relies on feature circumstances in which an insurer was
found to have acted maliciously in disregard of the rights of its insured to
secure the upper hand in settlement or other negotiations (see, e.g., Neal v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 923), deceptively by misleading
the insured through the inclusion of erroneous language or standards in the
policy (Moore v. American United Life Ins. Co. (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 610,
637), or dishonestly by engaging in a pattern and practice of issuing specified
coverage with no intent to honor it (Pulte, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1126).
Having carefully considered the record and evidence at trial, we conclude
that, by comparison, Chicago Title’s tortious conduct does not meet the
64
heightened standard for an award of punitive damages. We conclude the
trial court did not err in refusing to award punitive damages.
F. Prejudgment Interest
Bartel challenges the adequacy of the $96,284 in prejudgment interest
awarded in the judgment. He contends the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to award prejudgment interest on the entire diminution of value
amount of $400,000, rather than on only the phase II judgment amount of
$230,000. Bartel’s argument essentially amounts to a disagreement with the
court’s finding that Chicago Title’s initial payment of $170,000 for diminution
in value was not unreasonably delayed.
Bartel also maintains the trial court abused its discretion by selecting a
later date for the accrual of interest based on the December 27, 2019 filing of
the second amended complaint against Chicago Title, rather than on the
filing of Bartel’s initial complaint on October 27, 2016. Bartel argues that
even under the deferential abuse of discretion standard applicable to this
court’s review of the trial court’s decision on prejudgment interest, the record
demonstrates that the court’s award was “irrational and arbitrary.”
Prejudgment interest “ ‘provide[s] just compensation to the injured
party for loss of use of the award during the prejudgment period—in other
words, to make the plaintiff whole as of the date of the injury.’ ” (Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 574 (Hewlett-
Packard).) Code of Civil Procedure section 3287, subdivision (b), applicable
here, “governs cases involving unliquidated contract claims and grants the
court discretion to award prejudgment interest from a date no earlier than
the filing of the action.” (Hewlett-Packard, at p. 574.) We review the court’s
ruling on prejudgment interest under the statute for abuse of discretion.
(Ibid.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s ruling “is ‘so irrational
65
or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747,
773.) Conversely, we will uphold a court’s exercise of discretion “ ‘if it is
based on a “reasoned judgment” and complies with the “legal principles and
policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.” ’ ” (Hewlett-Packard,
at pp. 574–575, quoting Bullis v. Security Pac. Nat. Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d
801, 815.)
Bartel has not persuaded us that the trial court abused its discretion.
He asserts that Chicago Title should be liable for prejudgment interest on the
$170,000 in diminution of value that the insurer paid on March 27, 2018,
because his loss in value began accruing when Composti first began using the
property in 2010 and was confirmed in the judgment on Composti III entered
on January 23, 2017. He points out that the March 2018 payment of
$170,000 came 14 months after entry of the judgment in Composti III, almost
18 months after Bartel filed his lawsuit against Chicago Title, and more than
eight years after use of the easement arose as an issue between Composti and
Bartel. These facts were before the trial court but did not alter its
determination that the payment made by Chicago Title after its diminution
valuation of $170,000 “was not unreasonably delayed.” Moreover, the court
provided a reasoned basis for its decision to award interest on the $230,000
additional diminution value, noting it represented “a significant difference in
what was paid versus what was the actual loss.”
Apart from arguing that the trial court should have exercised its
discretion differently on these facts, Bartel points to nothing in the record
that would suggest the court misunderstood the facts or considered improper
criteria in making this determination. Nor does Bartel suggest the court was
influenced by an erroneous understanding of the applicable law, signaling an
66
abuse of discretion. (See Wade v. Superior Court (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 694,
709.) Bartel has not offered any basis for this court to conclude that the trial
court’s decision to award prejudgment interest only on the $230,000
difference in diminution of value damages owed for Chicago Title’s breach of
contract failed to comport with reasoned judgment or was otherwise arbitrary
or capricious.
As to the date of accrual of prejudgment interest, Bartel asserts that
his filing of the second amended complaint in December 2019, over three
years after his initial complaint, was not substantive in nature and should
not have served as the time point to start accruing interest. He argues it was
arbitrary for the trial court to tie the accrual date to the filing of that
complaint, despite that being the date on which he first included an
allegation seeking damages for the claimed diminution in value. Instead,
Bartel argues the court should have set the accrual of prejudgment interest
“[a]t the very latest” to the date of entry of the Composti III judgment on
January 23, 2017.
This conclusory argument, based on Bartel’s disagreement with the
adequacy of the prejudgment interest award, is insufficient to demonstrate
an abuse of discretion. An award of prejudgment interest on an unliquidated
contractual claim is discretionary under Code of Civil Procedure section 3287,
subdivision (b), including identifying the date from which interest runs, so
long as the date does not precede the filing of the action. (Hewlett-Packard,
supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 574; North Oakland Medical Clinic v. Rogers
(1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 824, 829.) Absent any evidence or indication in the
record that the court failed to properly exercise its discretion, considered
inappropriate factors in making its determination, or exceeded the bounds of
reasonable judgment, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
67
in awarding prejudgment interest to Bartel based on the difference in
diminution of value amount and based on the date of filing of the second
amended complaint against Chicago Title.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. We remand the matter to the trial court
with instructions to enter a new judgment holding Chicago Title liable for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We also
remand the matter to the trial court to determine, based on the evidence
previously admitted at trial, the amount of “any damages which are the
proximate result of that breach” (Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d
813, 817) and award them to appellant Bartel. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed. Bartel is entitled to his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a)(3).)

68
______________________________________
Danner, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Lie, J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H052083
Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Company
Filed 5/30/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

RICHARD BARTEL, H052083
(Santa Cruz County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 16CV02814)

v.

CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY,

Defendant and Appellant.

BY THE COURT:
The opinion in this case filed May 12, 2025, was not certified for
publication. The court has received requests for publication made under
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a). After reviewing the requests, it
appears the opinion meets the standards for publication under California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c). The court therefore orders that the opinion be
published in the Official Reports.

1
______________________________________
Danner, Acting P. J.

_____________________________________
Lie, J.

_____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H052083
Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Company

2
Trial Court: Santa Cruz County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Timothy R. Volkmann
Counsel for Plaintiff and Patton Sullivan Brodehl, LLP, Kevin
Appellant Richard Bartel: R. Brodehl

Counsel for Defendant and Hennelly & Grossfield LLP, Susan J.
Appellant Chicago Title Williams
Insurance Company:

H052083
Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Company

3

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