In re C.V. CA2/7

CourtListener 10595696CalctappMay 30, 2025

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Filed 5/30/25 In re C.V. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re C.V. et al., Persons Coming B336483
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP00632A-C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CARLOS V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Natalie Nardecchia, Judge. Affirmed in
part and dismissed as moot in part.
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

Father Carlos V. appeals from the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring his three
children dependents of the court pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (d), and (j), and
removing them from his custody following allegations of sexual
abuse by Carlos of his four-year-old daughter R.V.1 Carlos
contends the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings are based on
uncorroborated and unreliable hearsay statements by R.V. and
are not supported by substantial evidence. Carlos also challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
removal of the children from his custody. While this appeal was
pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction with an exit
order awarding sole physical custody to the children’s mother,
Alexandra. We affirm the jurisdiction findings pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j), and dismiss Carlos’s appeal
from the disposition order as moot.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The 2024 Referral and Initial Investigation
Carlos and Alexandra are the parents of daughter R.V.
(born 2019) and twins C.V. and G.V. (born 2018). Carlos is a
stay-at-home parent and Alexandra largely works from home.
The Los Angeles Department of Children and Family
Services (Department) received a referral on January 17, 2024
alleging sexual abuse of R.V. by Carlos. The referral alleged R.V.
began crying while using the restroom at school where she
attended pre-kindergarten, while accompanied by a staff
member, and said she missed her father. The staff member told
R.V. to wipe herself and pull up her underwear, and that her
father would soon arrive to pick her up. R.V. continued crying
and told the staff member that her father likes to look at her
vagina. The staff member asked if he did it when R.V. “[was]
done” with going to the bathroom, and R.V. said, “No, he likes to
lick it with his tongue.” Another staff member then asked R.V.
about it but R.V. would not say anything and looked away. A
third staff member asked R.V. about it, and R.V. repeated what
she told the first staff member. When asked where the conduct
happens, R.V. stated it happens at home, and when asked, “Do
you do anything to him?” she said, “No, he gives me a doll. I tell
him to stop, I say ‘No’ and he says, ‘Yes.’” R.V. did not know the
date of the incident, how often it occurred, or if her mother was
aware of the situation.
A social worker visited the family home the same day and
spoke to both parents. Alexandra said the allegations against
Carlos were “impossible” and that she uses proper terminology
with the children and has open conversations about not letting

3
anyone touch them. Alexandra stated R.V. got rashes from not
wiping well, and the allegations could be from Carlos touching
her to put cream on her rash. Alexandra said she works at home
and rarely leaves. She said R.V. was seen by a doctor the prior
week due to a methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) pimple on her upper thigh.
Police arrived and two officers (one male, one female) spoke
with R.V., with her maternal grandmother D.M. in the room.
R.V. initially said she did not remember what happened at
school, but after the male officer stepped out of the room, R.V.
said her daddy licked her vagina with his tongue and giggled.
R.V. said she cried when it happened, and that he gave her a toy.
R.V. said it happened in her mother’s room and that her mother
was on a Disney cruise when it happened. D.M. said everyone
was on the Disney cruise together. Carlos was arrested. R.V.
and the twins each told the social worker they felt safe with both
parents and had not been made to do something they were not
supposed to do. D.M. stated she was shocked at the amount of
detail R.V. shared and that she had never seen Carlos being
inappropriate.
Alexandra stated it was frustrating to be asked not to
discuss the allegations with the children prior to a forensic
interview. She stated R.V. had just lied to her about who turned
on the fan. Alexandra stated she knew Carlos did not do
anything inappropriate and R.V. was lying.

B. R.V.’s Forensic Interview
Two days later, a specialist at a child advocacy center
conducted a forensic interview of R.V. The day before the
interview, Alexandra expressed frustration to the social worker

4
about the investigation and stated that R.V. made up stories.
When the social worker said it was highly unlikely for a child
R.V.’s age to fabricate sexual abuse with that level of detail,
Alexandra replied, “Unless you’re [R.V.].”
At the interview, the interviewer explained to R.V. that her
job was “to listen to kids talk about all kinds of things that have
happened” and find out if she is safe and healthy. R.V. then
spontaneously said she eats all the vegetables. The interviewer
explained that R.V. could say “I don’t know” or “I don’t know
what you mean” if she does not know the answer to a question
and could correct the interviewer if the interviewer made a
mistake. To practice, the interviewer asked R.V. if R.V. was
30 years old, and asked, “Did I make a mistake?” and R.V. said,
“Yep.” R.V. then counted on her hands to four and stated she was
“like this,” and “going to five after.”
The interviewer told R.V. she would ask her questions, R.V.
could “use whatever words you need to when you’re in here,” and
the most important thing was that R.V. tell the truth. R.V. said
she knew letters and began to say the alphabet. The interviewer
asked R.V. if she promises to tell the truth, and R.V. said, “I don’t
know the truth.” The interviewer explained that the truth means
something that really happened and asked her if she would tell
things that really happened. R.V. apparently made a nonverbal
gesture for “yes,” and the interviewer asked R.V. to use her words
and asked, “when you go like this, does—what does that mean?”
R.V. replied, “Yes.”
After some general questions about toys, R.V.
spontaneously said, “So my dad likes licking my vagina.” The
interviewer asked R.V. to “tell me everything about that. You
said your dad likes licking your vagina.” R.V. responded, “Isn’t

5
that funny?” R.V. said it happened at home. When asked what
part of the home, R.V. said that she did not know. R.V. said
there is a bed. When asked what room she was in, R.V. said she
was in “my mom’s room.” When asked about the bed, R.V. said,
“And my—I all covered in the blanket and then my dad covered
from my—my legs and then—then now he lick my vagina.” The
interviewer repeated, “You said your dad covered your legs right
here, and you pointed to this part of your legs and down, and
then you said he licked your vagina. Did I get that? Did I make
a mistake?” R.V. nonverbally indicated there was a mistake, and
clarified: “So, my dad was licking my vagina and he just covered
one [leg].” The interviewer asked what her father did with her
clothes, and R.V. said that he threw them away because “it had
poop on them.” R.V. stated she had on a bathing suit that was
“just for licking. . . . (Unintelligible) my vagina.” R.V. said that
she was standing on a bench when this occurred. When the
interviewer said “bed,” R.V. corrected her and again said it was
on a bench—“You got it wrong.” R.V. said her father “was like
laying and then he go under me and then he did that.”
R.V. initially said she did not know what “licking” was.
The interviewer asked R.V. “what did he use on your vagina” and
R.V. said, “Uh, a paintball gadget.” Later the interviewer asked,
“What did he lick your vagina with?” and R.V. answered, “His
tongue.” The interviewer asked R.V. to tell her what licking
means, and R.V. said, “The licking means when you lick food.”
The interviewer asked R.V. what she said when her dad
was licking her vagina, and R.V. stated, “I said no.” She said her
dad then gave her a toy. The interviewer asked how it made her
feel when that was happening, and R.V. said, “Uh, it hurt and
then I pull and twist and then I run away from him. He was

6
trying to catch me.” When the interviewer repeated, “I think I
heard you say it hurt,” R.V. apparently nonverbally indicated
agreement; the interviewer then said, “And then you ran?” and
R.V. replied, “Oh, no, you made a mistake.” R.V. then said, “He
has a spoon.” When asked how many times the licking happened,
R.V. said, “One time.” R.V. said she told her mom about this.
When asked what her mom said, R.V. said, “Um, her said I will
tell my dad a lesson.”

C. Additional Investigation
On January 22, 2024, J.H., Alexandra’s sister-in-law, told
the social worker that she was playing with R.V. over the
weekend and R.V. said her “dad” licks her vagina. J.H. said R.V.
usually refers to Carlos as “daddy” not “dad.” J.H. asked R.V. if
“dad” was “daddy,” and R.V. said “it’s nino (Godfather).”
On January 25, R.V.’s teacher Ms. K. told the social worker
the following conversation occurred:
R.V.: I miss my dad[.]
Ms. K.: He will be picking you up shortly[.]
R.V.: My dad kisses me[.]
Ms. K.: He kisses you because he loves you[.]
R.V.: He looks at my vagina[.]
Ms. K.: To clean it[.]
R.V.: He licks my vagina[.]

Ms. K. said R.V. repeated this to another staff member.
That staff member asked R.V. what she tells daddy when he does
that and that R.V. said she tells him no and he says yes.
R.V.’s medical records from January 10, 2024 documented
MRSA cellulitis on her left thigh. R.V.’s medical records dated

7
January 23, 2024 documented redness and rash around the
buttock and vaginal area for two days, “painful irritation of
vulvar and perianal area with poor hygiene, no dysuria,” and a
diagnosis of vulvovaginitis.2
On January 29, Alexandra called the social worker and said
R.V. had told her “Nino touched my vagina,” and repeated “Nino
Frankie [her godfather and maternal uncle] touched my vagina.”
At a follow-up forensic interview two days later with the social
worker, Alexandra, and a detective present, R.V. did not want to
answer any questions but indicated that “dada” was uncle and
“nino” was brother. During the follow-up forensic interview,
Alexandra stated she believed the allegations could be a
confusion as to the person who did it.
R.V. had a medical exam on January 30, 2024, with normal
genital and anal findings. During the exam, R.V. said she did not
fear anyone and that no one is trying to hurt her. She later said,
“My daddy likes to lick my vagina.” She said it happened on
more than one occasion and that her siblings were at the beach.
She said it occurred on “Mommy’s bed.”
On February 9, 2024, the district attorney informed the
Department it would not pursue a criminal case against Carlos.

2 “Vulvovaginitis in toddlers is the inflammation or swelling
of their vulva and vagina. Symptoms include redness, soreness
and itching in your child's vaginal area. The most common cause
of vulvovaginitis in toddlers are irritants such as harsh soaps,
bubble baths and tight-fitting clothing. Treatment typically
involves eliminating the irritants.”
(<https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/22488-
vulvovaginitis-toddler> [as of May 28, 2025].)

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D. Section 300 Petition and Further Investigation
On February 22, 2024, the Department filed an application
to remove the children from Carlos. The juvenile court
authorized removal of the three children the next day.
On February 27, 2024, the Department filed a dependency
petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j),
regarding the three children. The Department alleged that
Carlos sexually abused R.V.; Alexandra knew or reasonably
should have known of the sexual abuse and failed to protect R.V.;
and R.V., C.V. and G.V. were at risk of harm.
At the initial hearing, the court detained the children from
Carlos and released them to Alexandra. The court ordered
monitored visits for Carlos.
In April 2024, the investigator attempted to interview R.V.,
but R.V. was resistant; she stated she felt safe with her parents
but did not want to sit and talk to the investigator. Alexandra
told the investigator she did not believe that Carlos committed
the act, and she felt comfortable allowing Carlos to see the
children after the district attorney rejected the case. She said she
and Carlos were on a break and focusing on the children.
Alexandra said that although a bench was mentioned, she does
not have a bench. Alexandra said perhaps R.V. saw something
that she should not have, such as the parents’ activity; Alexandra
watched pornography at times so maybe R.V. “saw something.”
She described R.V. as a “storyteller” and said R.V. told a lady at
school that her mother is pregnant and got pregnant on the
Disney cruise.

9
E. Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
On April 5, 2024, the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Counsel for Carlos, counsel
for the children, and counsel for Alexandra requested that the
petition be dismissed. The court sustained the petition as
pleaded.
The court stated R.V. was “very consistent” and told two
different teachers that her father licked her vagina. The court
noted that when R.V. was with the police officers, R.V. told the
female officer that her father always licks her vagina with his
tongue. The court also stated that R.V. said she did not want him
to lick and then she cries and he gives her toys. The court noted
that R.V. spontaneously told the forensic interviewer, “My dad
likes licking my vagina,” and said it happened at home in her
mom’s room. The court stated that R.V. said she told her mother
and that her mother said she would give her dad “a lesson.” The
juvenile court cited In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15, noting
the California Supreme Court provided a list of factors to
consider in determining credibility. (See id. at pp. 29-30
[“nonexhaustive list of factors” includes “(1) spontaneity and
consistent repetition; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use
of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age; and (4) lack
of motive to fabricate”].) The juvenile court did not find credible
Alexandra’s statement that R.V. told her that her “nino”
“touched” her vagina, noting that R.V. did not use the word
“touch” with anyone else. The court found that Alexandra failed
to protect R.V. based upon R.V.’s statements telling her mother
that her father licked her vagina, and that Alexandra said she
would, “[t]ell my dad a lesson.” The court found that the children
were as described by section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (d), and (j).

10
The juvenile court proceeded to disposition. The court
declared the children dependents of the court and removed them
from Carlos’s custody, based on the finding that Carlos engaged
in sexual abuse of R.V. The court placed the children with
Alexandra and ordered family maintenance services and
monitored visits for Carlos. Carlos was ordered to participate in
individual counseling and sexual abuse awareness counseling for
perpetrators, and conjoint counseling with the children if
recommended by the children’s therapists.
Carlos timely appealed from the jurisdiction findings and
disposition order. Alexandra did not appeal and is not a party to
this appeal.

F. Termination of Jurisdiction and Exit Orders
In October 2024, while this appeal was pending, the
juvenile court terminated jurisdiction with a custody and
visitation order (commonly known as an “exit order”) granting
Alexandra sole physical custody of the children, granting
Alexandra and Carlos shared legal custody, and ordering
unmonitored visits for Carlos conditioned on his continued
participation in his court-ordered counseling and sexual abuse
perpetrator programs. Carlos did not appeal from the
termination of jurisdiction and exit orders.

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DISCUSSION

A. We Exercise Our Discretion To Reach the Merits of Carlos’s
Appeal from the Jurisdiction Findings, but not His Moot
Appeal from the Disposition Order
In dependency proceedings, an appeal “becomes moot when
events “‘“render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide
the case in favor of [the appellant], to grant him any effect[ive]
relief.’”” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276; accord, In re
Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 264; In re Damian L. (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 357, 369.) “An order terminating juvenile court
jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an earlier order
moot.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163; see In re
G.Z. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 857, 874; In re C.C. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) But “when a juvenile court’s
finding forms the basis for an order that continues to impact a
parent’s rights—for instance, by restricting visitation or
custody—that jurisdictional finding remains subject to challenge,
even if the juvenile court has terminated its jurisdiction.
[Citations.] Because reversal of the jurisdictional finding calls
into question the validity of orders based on the finding, review of
the jurisdictional finding can grant the parent effective relief.”
(D.P., at pp. 276-277; see In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426,
1431-1432; In re A.R. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 733, 740.)
Here, the jurisdiction findings were the bases of the
custody and visitation order that gave Alexandra sole physical
custody of the children and conditioned Carlos’s unmonitored
visits on completion of a sexual abuse program for perpetrators
and individual counseling. Although Carlos’s visitation was
liberalized from monitored to unmonitored in the exit order

12
(presumably based on maintaining positive visits), the
continuation of his court-ordered case plan and grant of sole
physical custody to Alexandra flowed directly from the juvenile
court’s original jurisdiction findings. But because Carlos did not
appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating its jurisdiction
and from the custody and visitation order, his appeal is moot.
(See In re Gael C., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 225 [“‘in most
cases . . . for this court to be able to provide effective relief, the
parent must appeal not only from the jurisdiction finding and
disposition order but also from the orders terminating
jurisdiction and modifying the parent’s prior custody status’”];
In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164 [“to the extent
an appellant argues, as here, that the challenged jurisdiction
finding resulted in an adverse juvenile custody order . . . , an
appeal from the orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding
custody is necessary”].) Additionally, “where jurisdictional
findings have been made as to both parents but only one parent
brings a challenge, the appeal may be rendered moot.” (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283).
Carlos requests that we exercise our discretion to decide his
moot appeal because of the pernicious nature of “a finding that
the parent sexually abused his . . . child,” a request the
Department does not oppose. A reviewing court has “‘inherent
discretion’” to reach the merits of an appeal even where the case
is moot. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) We decide on a
case-by-case basis whether to reach the merits of a moot appeal,
and among the factors we may consider are “whether the
jurisdictional finding is based on particularly pernicious or
stigmatizing conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285-286.) The “more egregious

13
the findings against the parent, the greater the parent’s interest
in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.)
We exercise our discretion to reach the merits of Carlos’s
appeal from the jurisdiction findings.3 Here, the substantiated
finding of sexual abuse of a four-year-old child constitutes
“particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct,” and the
egregious nature of the findings give Carlos a great interest in
challenging such findings (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 285-286; accord, In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 237;
In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452), particularly
because the district attorney did not pursue criminal charges.
(Cf. In re D.P., at p. 285 [“dismissal of an appeal for mootness . . .
may ‘“ha[ve] the undesirable result of insulating erroneous or
arbitrary rulings from review”’”].)
We decline to exercise our discretion to decide Carlos’s
appeal from the disposition order removing the children from his
custody. Reversing the disposition order would not provide
Carlos any effective relief; it was not the basis for the custody
and visitation order and he would still be bound by the custody
and visitation order because he did not appeal it. The juvenile
court’s exit orders superseded the prior disposition order. (See
Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1165 [“the exit
order ‘shall be a final judgment and shall remain in effect after
[the juvenile court’s] jurisdiction is terminated’”]; see also § 362.4,

3 As explained in the following section, we conclude
substantial evidence supports the jurisdiction findings.
Accordingly, because we affirm, we need not reach the question of
what the appropriate remedy would be if we were to exercise our
discretion to consider a moot appeal and conclude that
substantial evidence did not support the jurisdiction findings.

14
subd. (b) [custody and visitation orders “continue until modified
or terminated by a subsequent order of the superior court”].) An
exit order is a final judgment and is not subject to collateral
attack through an appeal from a previous disposition order. (See
§ 302, subd. (d) [“Any custody or visitation order issued by the
juvenile court at the time the juvenile court terminates its
jurisdiction . . . shall be a final judgment and shall remain in
effect after that jurisdiction is terminated.”]; see also Heidi S., at
p. 1165.) But Carlos is not without a remedy. Under section 302,
subdivision (d), he may seek modification of the exit orders in
family court if he can “demonstrate ‘there has been a significant
change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order
and modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.’”
(In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 165, fn. 7.)

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
Jurisdiction Findings
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Section 300, subdivision (d), provides the juvenile court
may adjudge a child a dependent of the court if “[t]he child has
been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child
will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the
Penal Code, by the child’s parent.”4 As relevant here, sexual

4 “‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for
its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s
jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s
finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory
bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is
supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing
court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged

15
abuse includes “[s]exual contact between the genitals or anal
opening of one person and the mouth or tongue of another
person.” (Pen. Code, § 11165.1, subd. (b)(2); see In re Mariah T.
(2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 439.) Section 300, subdivision (j),
provides the juvenile court may adjudge a child a dependent of
the court if “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as
defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a
substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as
defined in those subdivisions.”
“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting jurisdictional findings . . . , we ‘consider the entire
record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s findings.’ [Citations.] ‘Substantial evidence is
evidence that is “reasonable, credible, and of solid value,” such
that a reasonable trier of fact could make such findings.’” (In re
L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848; accord, In re J.S. (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 678, 685.) In reviewing for substantial evidence,
“a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640; see In re Nathan E. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 114, 122 [“‘In making [a substantial evidence]
determination, . . . we note that issues of fact and credibility are
the province of the trial court.’”].) “The appellant has the burden
of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial
nature to support the findings.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th
195, 206; see In re J.S., at p. 685.)

statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’”
(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773-774.) Subdivisions (d) and
(j) of section 300 are the most relevant here.

16
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
Jurisdiction Findings
Carlos contends substantial evidence did not support the
court’s jurisdiction findings. We conclude there was substantial
evidence supporting the court’s findings under section 300,
subdivision (d), that Carlos sexually abused R.V. and, under
subdivision (j), that R.V.’s siblings were at substantial risk of
abuse.
R.V. told multiple school staff members, police officers, and
social workers that her father “licked” her “vagina.” During her
subsequent forensic interview, R.V. again stated her father licked
her vagina, and indicated she knew what and where her vagina
was. She knew that licking happened with his tongue. She
repeated multiple times that she said “no,” and that it happened
in her mom’s room. Based on this evidence, the court could
reasonably conclude that, based on R.V.’s statements, Carlos had
sexual contact between his tongue and R.V.’s genitals. (See Pen.
Code, § 11165.1, subd. (b)(2); see also In re Carlos T. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 795, 804 [substantial evidence supported the
juvenile court’s finding of sexual abuse where the child said his
father “‘play[ed] with [his] front private part’” multiple times and
touched his “‘butthole’”]; In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339,
1344 [substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction findings where, “although [the child’s] accounts of
[her] father’s abuse varied in the details, each account related
essentially the same two incidents”].) The same evidence
supports the court’s findings under section 300, subdivision (j),
that R.V.’s five-year-old twin siblings, of similar age to her, were
at substantial risk of abuse based on Carlos’s abuse of R.V.

17
R.V. was sometimes reluctant to describe what happened,
and her account varied from “bed” to “bench,” among other
details. But it was up to the juvenile court to determine R.V.’s
credibility and what weight to give her statements in light of her
age and certain inconsistencies in her statements. (See In re
Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [“Weighing evidence,
assessing credibility, and resolving conflicts in evidence and in
the inferences to be drawn from evidence are the domain of the
trial court, not the reviewing court.”]; In re Sheila B. (1993)
19 Cal.App.4th 187, 199 [“an appellate court defers to the trier of
fact . . . and has no power . . . to consider the credibility of
witnesses; or to resolve conflicts in, or make inferences or
deductions from the evidence”].) Further, absolute consistency in
a child’s account of sexual abuse is not required to support a
jurisdiction finding. (See In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 896 [“A
child’s account may reflect uncertainty, and may even contain
some contradictions, and nevertheless warrant the court’s
trust.”].) It is not enough that a different factfinder may have
made a contrary finding. (See In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1218, 1225 [we “will uphold the juvenile court’s determinations
even where substantial evidence to the contrary also exists”];
In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 774 [“‘we do not consider
whether there is evidence from which the dependency court could
have drawn a different conclusion but whether there is
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the court did
draw’”].)
Carlos argues there is not substantial evidence to support
the court’s jurisdiction findings because the sole evidence of
sexual abuse “arises from unsworn statements made by R.V.”
Carlos argues that “[m]ere uncorroborated hearsay does not

18
constitute substantial evidence” (Kevin R. v. Superior Court
(2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 689), and that due process “requires
a showing that ‘“the time, content and circumstances of the
statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability”’ before a
juvenile court may rely exclusively on such a statement in
making its jurisdictional findings.” (In re I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 887.) He argues there were no physical findings that
corroborated sexual abuse, and no family members or other
individuals interviewed witnessed any inappropriate behavior.
Carlos argues that R.V. was unreliable and confused about truth,
and notes the California Supreme Court has held that statements
from a child who cannot tell the truth from a lie may not be relied
on exclusively unless the court finds that “‘the time, content and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability.’” (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1248; see id.
at p. 1246 [noting the “due process problem is compounded in the
case of a child who has been determined to be incompetent to
distinguish between truth and falsehood”].)
As the California Supreme Court in In re I.C. stated:
“‘[T]here are particular difficulties with proving child sexual
abuse: the frequent lack of physical evidence, the limited verbal
and cognitive abilities of child victims, the fact that children are
often unable or unwilling to act as witnesses because of the
intimidation of the courtroom setting and the reluctance to testify
against their parents. [Citation.] Given these realities, the
categorical exclusion of child hearsay . . . will often mean the
exclusion of significant, reliable evidence required for the juvenile
court to assert its jurisdiction over the child and to ultimately
protect him or her from an abusive family relationship.’” (In re
I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 886; see In re Cindy L., supra,

19
17 Cal.4th at p. 29.) For these reasons, “the traditional hearsay
bar has been modified in the juvenile dependency context to allow
courts to consider certain out-of-court statements concerning
suspected abuse.” (In re I.C., at p. 884.) In particular,
section 355 “‘broadly authorize[s] reliance on any hearsay
contained in the social study by a child victim under the age of
12, as long as an objecting party does not prove that the
statement was procured by means of fraud, deceit, or undue
influence.’” (In re I.C., at p. 885; see § 355, subd. (c)(1); In re
Cindy L., at p. 28, fn. 6.) Section 355 also “makes clear” such
hearsay statements “are sufficient to support a jurisdictional
finding.” (In re Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1242 (plur. opn.
of Mosk, J.); see id. at p. 1245 [such statements “can serve as sole
support for a jurisdictional finding”].)
In re I.C. involved an “unusual situation” where, shortly
after a three-year-old child was abused by an older child, the
three-year-old child made allegations against her father
“strikingly similar” to the abuse incident involving the older
child. (In re I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 896.) The three-year-old
child “had a tendency to interweave fantasy with truth” and,
during her forensic interview, made several demonstrably false
statements after promising to tell the truth. (Id. at p. 894.) The
California Supreme Court held “a juvenile court may not base its
findings solely on the hearsay statements of a truth-incompetent
child—that is, a child who may not testify because she is too
young to separate truth from falsehood—unless the child’s
statements bear ‘special indicia of reliability.’” (Id. at p. 875.)
Citing the plurality opinion in In re Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th
1227, the Supreme Court in In re I.C. stated that “‘relying too
heavily on the hearsay statements of incompetent minors to

20
make jurisdictional findings when there has been no opportunity
for cross-examining the minor’ [citation]—and, in particular,
when the minor ‘has been determined to be incompetent to
distinguish between truth and falsehood’ [citation]—raises a
substantial risk of erroneously depriving parents of their
substantial interest in maintaining custody of their children.”
(In re I.C., at p. 887; see In re Lucero L., at pp. 1244, 1246
(conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
Here, as stated, the juvenile court considered the In re
Cindy L. factors in its analysis and credited R.V.’s statements.
And in contrast to In re I.C., “‘the time, content and
circumstances of the statement(s) provide sufficient indicia of
reliability.’” (In re Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1248; see id.
at p. 1246.) R.V. spontaneously disclosed her account of her
abuse to a school staff member while going to the bathroom,
repeated her account in substantially similar detail to additional
school staff, police, and social workers, and spontaneously
disclosed her account to Alexandra’s sister-in-law. The juvenile
court could reasonably believe R.V. was telling the truth. R.V.’s
recounting of events reflected “spontaneity and consistent
repetition,” described specific sexual conduct “unexpected of a
child of a similar age,” and she had no discernable “motive to
fabricate.” (See In re Cindy L, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 30.)
Further, in this case, unlike In re I.C., the juvenile court
could also reasonably believe R.V. was capable of telling the truth
from a lie. R.V. corrected the forensic interviewer, who asked if
R.V. was 30 years old and then further asked “Did I make a
mistake?”; R.V. replied, “Yep” and stated her correct age was four
years old. R.V. also corrected the interviewer verbally and
nonverbally during her account, including that Carlos covered

21
one of her legs, not both, with a blanket while licking her vagina.
R.V. also stated the interviewer made a “mistake” in
summarizing R.V.’s account as “I think I heard you say it
hurt. . . . And then you ran?” R.V. had actually stated, “it hurt
and then I pull and twist and then I run away from him. He was
trying to catch me.”
Additionally, the social workers who interviewed R.V.
concluded that Carlos’s conduct put her well-being and safety at
risk. (See Casey N. v. County of Orange (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1158, 1176 [“[t]he importance of the social worker’s reporting and
recommendations in the dependency process cannot be
overstated”; the court should “‘give due consideration to the social
worker’s determination and the court may properly rely upon the
agency’s expertise for guidance’”]; In re Brian W. (1996)
48 Cal.App.4th 429, 433-434 [“The juvenile court may properly
rely upon a social worker’s report to support a jurisdictional
finding under section 300 as long as the opportunity to cross-
examine the social worker is provided.”].)5 We conclude
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings.
Substantial evidence also supported the court’s finding that
Alexandra’s statements questioning R.V.’s account were not
credible. When the conduct was first reported, Alexandra
immediately said it could not be true and that R.V. was lying.
Alexandra described four-year-old R.V. as a liar and “storyteller.”
R.V. stated she told Alexandra what happened. Alexandra
attempted to shift the blame, suggesting perhaps R.V.’s “nino”

5 The parties did not call any witnesses at the hearing, and
Carlos does not argue he was deprived of the opportunity to call
the social workers as witnesses.

22
was responsible for the abuse, but there is no evidence R.V.
recanted her account or otherwise identified a different
individual abusing her. And as the juvenile court noted, R.V. did
not use the word “touch” in her accounts of what happened,
except for Alexandra’s statement that R.V. told her that her
“nino” “touched” her vagina. Alexandra’s statements do not affect
the substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction findings.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings are affirmed.
Carlos’s appeal from the disposition order is dismissed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.

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