People v. Morales CA4/1

CourtListener 10594898CalctappMay 29, 2025

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Filed 5/29/25 P. v. Morales CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084603

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. JCF003762)

MARLON ALBERTO MORALES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County,
Poli Flores, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Evan Stele, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

Marlon Alberto Morales appeals the judgment sentencing him to an
additional prison term after a jury found him guilty of assault with a deadly
weapon and possession of a weapon while he was serving a prison term for a
prior conviction. He contends the trial court erred by imposing and executing
a concurrent term on the conviction of possession of a weapon while confined
in prison instead of imposing and staying execution of the term. We disagree
and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
While Morales was serving a prison sentence for murder, he and
another prisoner weaved quickly through a group of prisoners who were
returning from the dining hall to their housing unit. When Morales and the
other prisoner reached a third prisoner, Moises Anthony Salais, they
repeatedly stabbed him with sharp metal objects until prison guards arrived
and stopped the attack. Salais sustained puncture wounds to his head, right
shoulder, chest, and back.
The People charged Morales with assault with a deadly weapon while
confined in prison (Pen. Code, § 4501, subd. (a); subsequent section references
are to this code) and possession of a weapon while confined in prison (§ 4502,
subd. (a)). They alleged Morales’s prior murder conviction constituted a
strike for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12.)
A jury found Morales guilty of both charges. After the jury returned its
verdicts, the court held a trial on the prior conviction allegation and found it
true.
At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed an aggregate prison term
of eight years to be served consecutively to the term Morales was already
serving for murder. The court imposed the middle term of four years on the
conviction of assault with a deadly weapon while confined in prison (§ 4501,
subd. (a)), and doubled that term to eight years based on the prior strike

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conviction (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). The court imposed the
middle term of three years on the conviction of possession of a weapon while
confined in prison (§ 4502, subd. (a)), and doubled that term to six years
based on the prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
Because the “transactional relationship” between the two crimes was “so
close,” the court ordered the six-year term to run concurrently with the eight-
year term. (§ 669, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a)(1).)
DISCUSSION
Morales assigns as error the trial court’s failure to stay execution of the
concurrent six-year prison term imposed on the conviction of possession of a
weapon while confined in prison. He contends section 654 requires a stay
because “[t]he evidence shows [he] possessed the metal weapon only in
connection with his assault on the victim,” and “[t]here was no evidence [he]
had any intent to possess the weapon other than to assault the victim.” We
disagree.
Section 654, as relevant here, provides: “An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.” (Id., subd. (a).) This provision
limits punishment for multiple crimes if they arise out of the same act or
omission or a course of conduct pursued with a single intent or objective.
(People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639 (Beamon).) If the crimes were
completed by a single physical act, the defendant may be punished for only
one of the crimes. (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) If the
crimes involve multiple acts committed with the same intent or objective, the
defendant also may be punished for only one of the crimes. (Beamon, at
p. 637.) If the defendant had multiple intents or objectives that were not

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merely incidental to one another, however, he may be punished for crimes
committed in pursuit of each intent or objective even though they shared
common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. (Id.
at p. 639.) Whether the defendant had a separate intent or objective for each
crime is a factual question for the trial court. (People v. Coleman (1989)
48 Cal.3d 112, 162.) On that issue, we review the court’s express or implied
finding for substantial evidence, consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment, and draw every inference the court reasonably
could have drawn. (People v. Hicks (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 496, 514–515
(Hicks); People v. Andra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 638, 641–642.)
California courts have applied the rules stated above in various
contexts to decide whether section 654 prohibits punishing a defendant for
both unlawful possession of a weapon (often a firearm) and another crime in
which he used the weapon. If “ ‘the evidence shows a possession only in
conjunction with the primary offense, then punishment for the illegal
possession of the firearm has been held to be improper.’ ” (People v. Bradford
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 22.) Section 654 thus prohibits multiple punishment
when the defendant obtained the weapon during the crime in which he used
it, such as when the defendant wrested a revolver from the victim whom he
then shot (Bradford, at pp. 13, 22) or struggled over a gun with the victim
whom he then shot (People v. Venegas (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 820, 821).
But if “ ‘the evidence shows a possession distinctly antecedent and separate
from the primary offense, punishment on both crimes has been approved.’ ”
(Bradford, at p. 22.) Hence, section 654 is inapplicable when the defendant
arrived at the scene of the primary crime already in possession of the
weapon, such as when the defendant drove to the scene with a firearm and
discharged it at an inhabited dwelling (People v. Jones (2002)

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103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1142, 1147 (Jones)) or possessed a nunchaku before he
entered a store where he assaulted the victims with it (People v. Wynn (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218).
In this case, the trial court made no express finding on whether
Morales had separate intents or objectives in possessing the weapon and in
using it to assault Salais. The court found the “transactional relationship”
between the two crimes was “so close” that it imposed on the section 4502
conviction a concurrent prison term rather than a consecutive one. It did not,
however, mention section 654 or stay execution of the concurrent term.
When no reference is made to section 654 at the sentencing hearing, the
court’s imposition of concurrent prison terms is deemed an implied finding
that each crime had a separate intent or objective. (People v. Alford (2010)
180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468; People v. Tarris (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 612,
626.) We must uphold the implied finding if substantial evidence supports it.
(Hicks, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 514–515; People v. Blake (1998)
68 Cal.App.4th 509, 512.)
Substantial evidence supports a finding that Morales had separate
(albeit related) intents or objectives in committing the two crimes of which
the jury found him guilty. The crime of possession of a weapon while
confined in prison was complete when he knowingly carried the sharp metal
object. (§ 4502, subd. (a); People v. Strunk (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 265, 272;
People v. Hudgins (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 174, 185.) Possession with a specific
intent or purpose was not required to commit the crime. (People v. Saavedra
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 571; People v. Steely (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 591,
594 (Steely).) The crime of assault with a deadly weapon while confined in
prison was complete when Morales intentionally used the sharp metal object
in a way he knew would probably and directly result in the application of

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physical force against Salais. (§ 4501, subd. (a); People v. Superior Court
(Mendez) (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 268, 278–279.) As the facts of this case
illustrate, “[w]hat the [prisoner] does with the weapon later is another
separate and distinct transaction undertaken with an additional intent which
necessarily is something more than the mere intent to possess the proscribed
weapon. [Citation.] In other words, in the case here, [Morales’s] intent to
possess the weapon did not import or include the intent to commit the
[assault].” (People v. Ratcliff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1401, 1414 (Ratcliff).)
Morales “arrived at the scene of [the assault] already in possession of the
[weapon],” and his use of the weapon to stab Salais “required a second intent
in addition to his original goal of possessing the weapon.” (Jones, supra,
103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1145, 1147.)
Even if Morales committed the two crimes with a single generalized
intent or objective (i.e., to attack Salais), separate punishment would still be
permissible. Under section 654, “a course of conduct divisible in time,
although directed to one objective, may give rise to multiple violations and
punishment.” (Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 639, fn. 11.) If enough time
elapses after the commission of one crime to allow the defendant to reflect
and to renew his intent before commission of another crime, section 654 does
not prohibit separate punishment. (See, e.g., People v. Gaynor (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 794, 803 [separate punishment for forgery and identity theft
permissible when defendant tried to cash check payable to third party by
presenting credit card with third party’s name on it]; People v. Clair (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 949, 960 [separate punishment permissible when criminal
acts were separated by at least 10 minutes]; People v. Trotter (1992)
7 Cal.App.4th 363, 368 [separate punishment permissible for two assaults
based on gunshots fired “about a minute” apart].) Here, the evidence showed

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Morales carried the sharp metal object while he weaved his way through
other prisoners as they moved from the dining hall to their housing unit, and
he then used the weapon to stab Salais. Although Morales committed the
two crimes close in time, he had enough time after committing the first one
“ ‘to reflect and renew his . . . intent before committing the next one, thereby
aggravating the violation of public security or policy already undertaken.’ ”
(Gaynor, at p. 800.)
Under these circumstances, prohibiting multiple punishment would not
further the purpose of section 654 “to ensure that a defendant’s punishment
will be commensurate with his culpability.” (People v. Correa (2012)
54 Cal.4th 331, 341.) “[T]his concept works both ways. It is just as
undesirable to apply the statute to lighten a just punishment as it is to ignore
the statute and impose an oppressive sentence.” (People v. Monarrez (1998)
66 Cal.App.4th 710, 715.) Section 4502 targets the threat posed to prison
staff and other prisoners by prisoners who possess weapons. (Steely, supra,
266 Cal.App.2d at p. 595.) “We see no reason why a [prisoner] who chooses to
arm himself . . . in violation of section [4502] should escape punishment for
that offense because he . . . uses the [weapon] to commit a second offense.”
(Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148.) Rather, Morales “violated the law
first when as a prisoner he possessed the weapon and again when as a
prisoner he used it to assault [Salais]; he can, and should, be punished for
both violations.” (People v. Coleman (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 853, 859.)
We are not persuaded to reach a different result by People v. Cruz
(1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, on which Morales principally relies. In that case,
the evidence showed Cruz returned to a bar minutes after he had been
refused entrance and shot the doorman and two others. (Id. at p. 314.) He
was convicted of three counts of assault with a deadly weapon (a firearm) and

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one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. (Id. at p. 313.) On appeal, the
People conceded they “failed to prove that [Cruz’s] possession of the handgun
was ‘antecedent [to] and separate’ from his use in the assaults.” (Id. at p.
333.) The Court of Appeal stated that if the same evidence were introduced
on retrial and Cruz were found guilty of any of the assault charges and the
charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, section 654 would bar separate
punishment for the conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon. (Ibid.) In
this case, the People have not conceded the section 654 issue. We agree with
those courts that have stated Cruz “simply failed to address the issue of prior
or subsequent possession of the weapon or . . . reached the wrong result on
the facts.” (Ratcliff, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1412; accord, Jones, supra,
103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

IRION, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

CASTILLO, J.

RUBIN, J.

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