Quality Aggregates v. Riverside Mining Limited CA4/1

CourtListener 10594896CalctappMay 29, 2025

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Filed 5/29/25 Quality Aggregates v. Riverside Mining Limited CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

QUALITY AGGREGATES, D084509

Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant, and
Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. CVRI2301434)
v.

RIVERSIDE MINING LIMITED,

Defendant, Cross-Complainant,
and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
O.G. Magno, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Burton & Swett and Thomas M. Swett, for Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant
and Appellant.
Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell, Kerry Shapiro, Susan Allison, and
Dan P. Sedor, for Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Respondent.
In 2017, Quality Aggregates (Quality) and Riverside Mining Limited
(RML) entered into an operating lease agreement under which Quality was to
conduct mining operations on land owned by RML. In 2019, the parties
executed an amendment regarding RML’s right to terminate the agreement.
In 2023, after several disputes arose between the parties, RML purported to
terminate the agreement under the 2019 amendment.
In the action underlying this appeal, Quality and RML asserted
competing claims for declaratory relief regarding their agreement—Quality
sought a judicial determination that RML’s termination was ineffective, and
RML filed a cross-complaint seeking a judicial determination that it had
properly terminated the agreement. In an order granting summary judgment
in favor of RML, the judicial referee appointed by stipulation to decide the
case concluded that RML had met the two express conditions precedent in the
amendment that were required to effect termination, and there were no
additional conditions precedent to termination elsewhere in the agreement.
The referee further found that Quality’s affirmative defenses to RML’s claim
were without merit and RML had therefore properly terminated the
agreement. The trial court thus entered judgment in RML’s favor.
Quality appeals the judgment. Quality does not dispute that RML
satisfied the two express conditions precedent for termination found in the
amendment, but it contends the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment because there were additional conditions precedent in the original
agreement that RML failed to satisfy. Quality further contends it
demonstrated triable issues of fact as to its affirmative defenses of condition
precedent, setoff, and unclean hands, and judgment should be reversed on
that basis as well.
Reviewing the record de novo, we agree with the trial court that RML
satisfied the only two conditions precedent required of it to terminate the
agreement and that Quality’s setoff defense was without merit. We agree
with Quality, however, that triable questions of fact remain as to its unclean

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hands defense. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Operating Lease Agreement and Amendment
RML owns certain real property consisting of approximately 158 acres
in Riverside County (the Property). The Property has historically been used
for surface mining operations. In April 2017, Quality entered into an
operating lease agreement with RML (the Lease) that provided Quality with
“the exclusive and unencumbered right and ability to conduct unimpeded
mining operations” on the Property under the permits owned by RML. The
parties agreed, among other things, that in exchange for the right to conduct
mining operations, Quality would pay monthly royalty fees to RML. The
term of the Lease was 99 years, but it granted RML the right to terminate
the Lease based on certain specified “events of default” by Quality.
In September 2019, the parties executed a First Amendment to
Operating Lease Agreement (the Amendment). The Amendment granted
RML the right to terminate the Lease with six months’ written notice to
Quality and payment of a $2.25 million termination. The Amendment stated
that RML was only entitled to serve a notice of termination if “the following
conditions precedent has [sic] been met: RM has placed the full amount of the
Termination Fee specified in Paragraph 2 of this agreement into a bonded
escrow account with instructions providing that the $2,250,000 may not be
withdrawn by RM and may be withdrawn by [Quality] as specified in
Paragraph 2.” The Amendment further provided that upon delivery of the
notice of termination, Quality would have six months to fully vacate the
Property.

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B. Quality’s First Lawsuit Against RML
In June 2021, Quality filed a lawsuit against RML, alleging that RML
breached the Lease and committed various torts by improperly excluding
Quality from portions of the Property and leasing those areas to third parties
who paid rent to RML (the damages action). It eventually filed a third
amended complaint, alleging claims against RML for breach of contract,
trespass to real property, quiet title to real property, assumpsit, declaratory
relief, forcible entry, and nuisance.
RML filed a cross-complaint against Quality in the damages action,
alleging that Quality breached the Lease and committed various torts in
connection with its mining operations at the Property.
C. RML’s Notice of Termination of Lease
In February 2023, RML sent “unilateral and irrevocable escrow
instructions” to its escrow agent, First American Title Insurance Company
(FATCO), stating that (1) RML would wire the full $2.25 million termination
fee into a FATCO escrow account, and (2) the termination fee may not be
withdrawn by RML but may be withdrawn by Quality per the parties’
Amendment to the Lease. RML sent these instructions under an escrow
agreement it had entered into with FATCO. That same day, RML sent
Quality via email a written notice of termination of the Lease between itself
and Quality, notifying Quality that RML was invoking its right under the
Amendment to terminate the agreement and had deposited the $2.25 million
termination fee into an irrevocable escrow account with FATCO.
In March 2023, Quality sent a letter to RML stating that it had not
complied with the mandatory notice requirements of the Amendment
regarding the purported termination. Two days later, RML sent Quality a

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second written notice of termination of the Lease, this time via overnight
mail and personal delivery.
D. Quality’s Second Lawsuit Against RML
Also in March 2023, Quality filed its verified complaint against RML
for declaratory relief in the action underlying this appeal (the declaratory
relief action). Quality alleged that because RML failed to comply with all
conditions precedent, RML was not entitled to terminate the Lease. It
further alleged that RML improperly excluded Quality from portions of the
Property, attempted to arbitrarily charge Quality additional rent for portions
of the Property it was entitled to occupy, buried minerals that Quality could
have profitably mined, used or leased to others portions of the Property for
purposes that impinged upon Quality’s leasehold, required Quality to assume
direct financial responsibility for the postmining reclamation of the Property,
and financed the purported termination consideration with funds essentially
stolen from Quality. Quality sought a judicial declaration that RML’s
attempt to terminate the Lease was ineffective for its failure to comply with
all conditions precedent.
RML filed its answer and a cross-complaint for declaratory relief
against Quality in May 2023. RML asserted: “This action is a simple dispute
over a lessee’s wrongful refusal to perform its contractual obligations
following its lessor’s termination of the parties’ operating lease pursuant to a
provision that gives the lessor the right, on six months’ notice, to terminate
the lease at any time and without cause, on only one condition – the lessor’s
payment into escrow of a $2.25 million dollar termination fee. RML, the
lessor, gave [Quality], the lessee, the requisite six months’ notice and
deposited the termination fee into escrow. In response, [Quality] failed to
perform its obligations under the parties’ lease, and filed a complaint seeking

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declaratory judgment from this Court that would erase RML’s agreed-upon
termination right and rewrite the lease to permit [Quality] to hold over on
RML’s property after termination, on the grounds that RML has purportedly
breached provisions in the lease unrelated to the termination provision.
According to [Quality], RML’s alleged breaches – which are the subject of
cross-claims between the parties in a separate pending action in this Court –
constitute the failure of an unexpressed and unwritten condition precedent to
RML’s right to terminate the lease without cause that bar RML from
enforcing its termination right. RML seeks by way of this Cross-Complaint a
judgment declaring that [Quality]’s interpretation of the lease and the law is
erroneous as a matter of law, that RML has properly exercised its right to
terminate the parties’ lease and performed all required conditions precedent
thereto, and that the lease is terminated and [Quality] has no legal or other
right to remain on RML’s property.”
RML requested a judicial declaration that it properly terminated the
Lease in accordance with its terms, the Lease was in fact terminated, and
Quality must remove all of its equipment and vacate the Property at the end
of the six-month notice period. It further sought to recover attorneys’ fees
and costs.
E. RML’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the Declaratory Relief Action
In November 2023, RML filed a motion for summary judgment in the
declaratory relief action on Quality’s complaint, RML’s cross-complaint
against Quality, and each of Quality’s affirmative defenses asserted in
response to RML’s cross-complaint. RML argued that it satisfied the only
conditions precedent required for it to terminate the Lease: it deposited the
$2.25 million termination fee into an escrow account and provided the
irrevocable escrow instructions specified in the Lease. Anticipating Quality’s

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counterarguments, RML further argued there were no conditions precedent
to its termination of the Lease in the original agreement.
Quality opposed RML’s motion, contending that RML had not complied
with its contractual conditions precedent to its right to terminate the Lease
and that its history of bad faith, fraudulent, and illegal conduct supported
Quality’s affirmative defenses of unclean hands and setoff, precluding
summary judgment for RML. Quality argued that RML was not permitted to
enforce any covenant in the Lease until it performed all conditions precedent
to Quality’s duty to perform. Because RML had not done so, Quality
asserted, RML’s cause of action was barred and it could not obtain relief.
Specifically, Quality argued that section 13 of the Lease
“unambiguously creates a set of conditions precedent to Quality’s duty to
‘comply with the terms of’ the Lease; not just a few terms, or specific terms—
all of ‘the terms’ of the Lease.” According to Quality, the three conditions
precedent RML had not fulfilled, which precluded it from terminating the
Lease, were: (1) providing Quality with “the exclusive right and ability . . . to
commence mining operations, on the Property . . . with no unreasonable
restrictions”; (2) ensuring that “all warranties and representations set forth
herein [were] true and correct”; and (3) ensuring that “no action, suit, or
proceeding before any court or any government body or authority, pertaining
to the activities contemplated by this agreement . . . [had] been instituted or
threatened.” Further, Quality asserted that although section 13 set forth a
condition precedent requiring that all of RML’s warranties and
representations remain true throughout the term of the Lease, two
representations did not remain true, and RML thus failed to satisfy that
particular condition precedent. The two representations Quality argued were
material to its opposition to RML’s summary judgment motion and had not

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remained true throughout the term of the Lease were: (1) “there are no
existing or outstanding contracts[,] . . . agreements, obligations[,] . . . or
restrictions that preclude” RML from “granting Quality the exclusive right to
conduct mining operations on the Property”; and (2) “there are no existing or
outstanding contracts[,] . . . agreements, obligations[,] . . . or
restrictions . . . that may preclude Quality from its exclusive use of the
Property.”
In reply, RML reiterated that it was undisputed it deposited the $2.25
million termination fee into an escrow account accessible only by Quality,
with irrevocable escrow instructions, and had given Quality notice per the
Amendment. RML contended that nothing further was required to effect the
termination of the Lease. RML argued that when the parties executed the
Amendment, which stated in part that “[e]xcept as modified herein, the
Agreement shall remain in full force and effect,” the only conditions
precedent RML had to fulfill to exercise its newly created termination right
were those stated expressly in the Amendment. RML further contended that
Quality’s interpretation of section 13 as creating a set of conditions precedent
to Quality’s duties would compel the conclusion that Quality’s duties would
not even arise until the 99-year term of the Lease was over—an absurd
result, RML asserted. It also emphasized that conditions precedent are
generally disfavored, and Quality’s “continuing condition precedent” concept
was unsupported by the law. RML argued that the “very notion of a
‘continuing condition precedent’ is a misnomer because, as a matter of law, a
condition precedent is an act or event that must occur before a counter-
party’s duty to perform is triggered. Conditions precedent do not, and cannot,
operate on a continuum. They either occur or do not, and have whatever
attendant consequences that the parties provided in their agreement.”

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Regarding Quality’s affirmative defenses, RML asserted that each
defense was without merit. It argued that Quality’s setoff defense failed
because (1) there were no cross-demands for money in the lawsuit, as
required to apply the doctrine, (2) Quality cannot set off its damages claims
with its own funds, (3) setoff cannot be asserted to obtain affirmative relief,
and (4) Quality’s argument failed to acknowledge RML’s pending claim for
damages in the other lawsuit between the parties. RML argued that
Quality’s unclean hands defense failed on each prong because (1) Quality did
not present analogous case law, (2) RML’s alleged misconduct did not amount
to fraud or unconscionable conduct, and (3) Quality did not establish the
requisite close relationship between RML’s alleged misconduct and Quality’s
asserted injuries resulting from RML’s termination of the Lease.
RML also filed evidentiary objections to two declarations Quality filed
in support of its opposition to RML’s summary judgment motion, as well as
some of the additional facts it submitted in support of its opposition.
F. Summary Judgment Hearing and Order Granting Summary Judgment
Before the hearing on the summary judgment motion, the judicial
referee—who had been appointed by stipulation to oversee and decide both
the declaratory relief action and the damages action—issued a tentative
ruling in RML’s favor. During the hearing, the referee stated that although
he had originally written up the tentative decision in favor of Quality, he
changed his mind because he determined that “the amendment to the lease,
which was written two years after the lease, is clear and unambiguous that
there are only two conditions precedent to terminating the lease, and that’s
the payment of the money and the notice. And to the extent that I am
interpreting the entire agreement as one agreement with the lease and the
amendment as one, I still believe that under -- under the law, under a fair

9
reading of the terms of the contract, that Riverside Mining has performed the
only two conditions precedent; and, therefore, they’re entitled to judgment.”
In February 2024, the judicial referee issued an order affirming its
tentative ruling and granting summary judgment in favor of RML. In sum,
the referee found that “the language of the amendment to the lease is clear
and unambiguous and demonstrates that the parties agreed that Riverside
Mining could terminate the lease at any time by depositing the funds and
giving Quality Aggregates notice. Because Riverside Mining has performed
those two conditions, it is entitled to judgment at this stage.”
Specifically, the judicial referee found that even if it accepted Quality’s
argument that the parties had agreed in section 13 of the Lease that
Quality’s performance was conditioned on RML’s performance of a number of
conditions precedent, those alleged conditions precedent did “not apply to the
termination clause in the amendment because the parties specifically agreed
that there were only two conditions precedent to that provision. And the
amendment was executed after the lease.”
The referee further found that Quality’s additional defenses of unclean
hands and setoff were without merit. First, he found that even if RML
violated the Lease and interfered with Quality’s ability to mine the property
unimpeded, these acts did not rise to the level of unconscionable conduct such
that RML was barred from obtaining declaratory relief; moreover, the
unclean hands arguments was “better suited for the damages actions”
between the parties. Second, the referee found that Quality’s setoff defense
was also an argument better suited for the damages action, where it would be
entitled to recover damages for RML’s alleged breach of the Lease if it could
prove at trial in that action that RML improperly received rent payments

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from third parties for leasing portions of the Property that RML had already
leased to Quality.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of RML on the declaratory
relief action in April 2024. The judgment dismissed Quality’s complaint with
prejudice, ordered the Lease terminated effective immediately, ordered
Quality to vacate and remove all of its equipment from the Property no later
than August 18, 2024, and deemed RML the prevailing party entitled to costs
and reasonable attorneys’ fees in an amount to be determined at a later date.
DISCUSSION
Quality contends that the trial court’s judgment on the order granting
summary judgment was in error and should be reversed because: (1) the
Lease contains conditions precedent to Quality’s duty to perform—in addition
to the conditions specified in the Amendment—that have not been fulfilled by
RML; and (2) there are triable issues of fact as to Quality’s affirmative
defenses of condition precedent, setoff, and unclean hands that preclude
summary judgment.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. (Ryan v.
Real Estate of Pacific, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 637, 642, citing Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860.)
I
The first question we must answer is whether the Lease contains any
conditions precedent other than the two indisputably found in the
Amendment. Quality asserts that section 13 of the Lease sets forth certain
conditions—including that RML must provide Quality with the
unencumbered and unimpeded right and ability to mine the Property—that it
refers to as “continuing conditions precedent,” that RML was required to
comply with before Quality was required to perform any of its duties under

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the Lease. Quality thus argues that RML was not entitled to exercise its
termination right in the Amendment because it failed to comply with all
conditions precedent in the Lease.
A “condition precedent is either an act of a party that must be
performed or an uncertain event that must happen before the contractual
right accrues or the contractual duty arises.” (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313 (Platt Pacific); see also Civ. Code, § 1436 [“A
condition precedent is one which is to be performed before some right
dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is performed.”].)
Conditions precedent are disfavored, and courts will “ ‘not construe a term of
the contract so as to establish a condition precedent absent plain and
unambiguous contract language to that effect.’ ” (Colaco v. Cavotec SA (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1183; see also JMR Construction Corp. v.
Environmental Assessment & Remediation Management, Inc. (2015) 243
Cal.App.4th 571, 594 (JMR Construction) [conditions precedent are not
favored by the law]; (Rubin v. Fuchs (1969) 1 Cal.3d 50, 53–54 (Rubin) [same;
“whenever possible the courts will construe promises in a bilateral contract
as mutually dependent and concurrent”].)
Whether a condition precedent exists depends on the intent of the
parties, which is generally determined by the words used in the contract.
(JMR Construction, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 594.) We thus turn to the
relevant language in the Lease.
Section 13 of the Lease is titled “Conditions to Quality Aggregates
Obligation.” The full text is as follows: “[Quality]’s obligation to execute this
agreement and to comply with the terms of this agreement is subject to the
satisfaction as of the Execution Date and throughout the term of this
agreement of the following conditions and any other conditions contained in

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this agreement. (‘Execution Date’ shall be the date upon which this
agreement is executed by the affixing of the signatures of the parties.) RML
shall use commercially reasonable efforts to cause these conditions to be
satisfied as of the Execution Date and throughout the term of this agreement;
and [¶] a. all warranties and representations set forth herein being true and
correct; and [¶] b. RML has not entered into any operating leases or
otherwise granted the right to conduct mining operations to any other party
with regard to the properties and other mineral properties described in the
recitals of this agreement. [Quality] shall have the exclusive right and
ability, at its sole option, to as soon as it shall determine such to be practical,
to commence mining operations, on the property and on the other mineral
properties, when acquired, in compliance with all governmental mining
regulations with no unreasonable restrictions; and [¶] c. no action, suit, or
proceeding before any court or any governmental body or authority,
pertaining to the activities contemplated by this agreement or to its
Execution, shall have been instituted or threatened; and [¶] d. the parties
agree that unless otherwise agreed between the parties, that there shall be a
minimum baseline sale price (‘baseline sale price’) of [¶] i. Riprap @ $10 per
ton [¶] ii. Small aggregates @ $4 per ton [¶] e. [Quality] shall not sell material
below baseline sale price to one party after which that party sells such
material for additional profit shared with [Quality]; and [¶] f. [Quality] may
import material from off site, to be blended with mined material to produce
additional product lines such as Stabilizer and washed sand to manufacture
Con/Mix; and [¶] g. the parties agree that large dirt importation
requirements will be discussed and agreed upon before hand between the
parties; and [¶] h. [Quality] shall not process any other material on the site
and shall not import material from off site specifically for the purposes of

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‘recycling’; and [¶] i. the parties agree that [Quality] shall pay annual fees
required to maintain the good standing of MSHA, OSHA and Riverside
County agencies; and [¶] j. the parties agree that upon approval of the
required permitting, that an Asphalt Plant may be installed on the site
subject to Agreement between the parties as to the monthly lease structure
and material pricing structure.”
As an initial matter, we agree with the comments in the record from
the judicial referee and RML that the Lease, and particularly section 13, is
not a model of clarity. The judicial referee commented at the summary
judgment hearing that the contract “wasn’t written very well.” He continued:
“You know, I spent hours trying to understand what the parties were
agreeing to and I don’t think, for one second, that they understood that when
in Paragraph 13 they said that Quality Aggregates’ performance was subject
to Riverside Mining[’s] performing all of the terms essentially in Paragraph
13, but arguably in the whole contract, I don’t think they understood that.”
Counsel for RML agreed that “section 13 is confusing, at best.”
Quality disputes this, contending that the parties’ use of the words
“conditions” and “subject to” in section 13 unambiguously compels the
conclusion that the parties intended these previsions to be conditions
precedent. Section 13 sets forth 10 different subsections labeled as
“conditions” to Quality’s obligation to comply with the terms of the Lease, but
Quality focuses on the two subsections it asserts are “most relevant” to the
appeal: (1) Quality “shall have the exclusive right and ability, at its sole
option, as soon as it shall determine such to be practical, to commence mining
operations, on the property . . . with no unreasonable restrictions” (§ 13(b));
and (2) “all warranties and representations set forth herein [are] true and
correct” (§ 13(a)). Quality argues that section 13 requires all of RML’s

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warranties and representations to remain true throughout the term of the
Lease, including the following two representations found in section 14:
(1) “there are no existing or outstanding contracts[,] . . . agreements,
obligations[,] . . . or restrictions that preclude” RML from “granting Quality
the exclusive right to conduct mining operations on the Property”; and
(2) “there are no existing or outstanding contracts[,] . . . agreements,
obligations[,] . . . or restrictions . . . that may preclude Quality from its
exclusive use of the Property.”
Quality contends that because its duties were all “subject to” the
performance of these certain conditions, those conditions are “by definition”
condition precedents, and there is “no other reasonable way to interpret” the
Lease. Quality further argues that because these obligations of RML’s were
conditions precedent, it had “no duty to perform whatsoever unless and until
R[ML] h[eld] up its end of the bargain” in all respects.
We are not persuaded. First, nowhere in section 13, or anywhere else

in the original Lease, does the phrase “condition precedent” appear.1
Instead, the parties’ obligations are variably referred to as “conditions,”
“covenants,” “warranties,” “promises,” “representations,” and items to which
the parties “agree.” By way of contrast, the Amendment explicitly refers to
“conditions precedent” when setting forth the conditions for RML’s right to
terminate the Lease.

1 Quality also sometimes refers to subsections 13(a) and 13(b) as
“continuing conditions precedent.” We have found no case law supporting
such a concept. This is unsurprising, as the idea runs counter to the
definition of a condition precedent, which is some act or circumstance that
must occur “before . . . the contractual duty arises.” (Platt Pacific, supra, 6
Cal.4th at pp. 313–314, italics added; see also Civ. Code, § 1436.)

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We acknowledge that the term “subject to” in a contract is “generally
construed to impose a condition precedent” (Rubin, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 54),
and section 13 of the Lease provides that Quality’s obligations are “subject to
the satisfaction . . . of the following conditions . . . .” (Italics added.) But
“generally” does not mean “always,” and we do not believe this is one of those
general cases.
The main problem we see with Quality’s suggested reading of the Lease
is that even though section 13 purports to set forth “Conditions to Quality
Aggregates[’s] Obligations,” it lists several conditions that Quality, not RML,
is required to satisfy, including selling material at or above a certain baseline
sale price, not processing other material on the site, not importing material
for the purposes of recycling, and paying annual fees to certain agencies,
among others. Section 13 also calls on the parties to agree in advance on
certain items, such as large dirt importation requirements. As RML points
out, under Quality’s interpretation, some subsections of section 13 would be
read as setting forth conditions precedent, but other subsections would be
read as setting forth mere covenants. The law does not permit Quality to
pick and choose which of these subsections are interpreted as conditions
precedent and which are not—they all follow the language stating that
Quality’s obligation to comply with the terms of the agreement is “subject
to . . . the following conditions.”
Accordingly, if we were to accept Quality’s argument that where a duty
is “subject to” the performance of a condition, that condition is by definition a
condition precedent, we must necessarily find that each of the subsections in
section 13 is also a condition precedent. The result would require us to
interpret the Lease to mean that if Quality imported materials from offsite
for the purposes of recycling (section 13(h)) or failed to pay its required

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annual fees (section 13(i)), its own actions in doing so would excuse it from
performing under the Lease. This cannot have been the parties’ intent. We
must avoid contractual interpretations such as this that would “create absurd
or unreasonable results.” (Sequeira v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445; see also Civ. Code, § 1638 [“The language of a
contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit,
and does not involve an absurdity.”].) We therefore conclude that Quality’s
reading of section 13 is not reasonable in light of the language used.
Given that the language in the original agreement is ambiguous at
best, the language regarding conditions precedent in the Amendment is clear,
and the law tends to disfavor conditions precedent, we conclude that the most
reasonable interpretation of the Lease is that it does not impose conditions
precedent on RML with respect to termination other than the two expressly
stated in the Amendment. The trial court thus correctly found that RML had
complied with the only conditions precedent required to effect the
termination of the Lease.
Our analysis does not end here, however. We must still determine
whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in light of
Quality’s affirmative defenses.
II
A. Standard of Review Applicable to Quality’s Affirmative Defenses
As an initial matter, the parties disagree regarding which standard of
review applies to Quality’s affirmative defenses. Quality contends our review
is de novo, while RML argues we must apply an abuse of discretion standard.
We agree with Quality. Where a trial court’s ruling on an equitable defense
is the basis for an order granting summary judgment, we independently
review the ruling. (See Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61,

17
67–68 (Johnson) [concluding Court of Appeal erred in reviewing trial court’s
finding of laches, which was the basis for its order granting summary
judgment motion, under an abuse of discretion standard].)
RML’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. In arguing that
the setoff defense must be reviewed for abuse of discretion, RML relies on a
case where the appellate court reviewed the trial court’s ruling denying an
offset after trial—not an order granting summary judgment on setoff as an
affirmative defense. (See David S. Karton, a Law Corp. v. Musick, Peeler
Garrett LLP (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1040 (David S. Karton).) The case
is therefore inapposite.
As to unclean hands, RML asserts that under Padideh v. Moradi (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 418 (Padideh), the trial court’s determination of some
elements of this defense must be reviewed for abuse of discretion. This is
incorrect. In Padideh, the plaintiff argued there was insufficient evidence to
support the jury’s unclean hands finding, and the court there concluded that
it had to review certain elements of the unclean hands defense for substantial
evidence, not abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 438.) In any event, the Padideh
court, like the David S. Karton court, was reviewing an appeal from an order
issued after trial, not from an order granting summary judgment. (Ibid.) It
is therefore also inapposite. As the Supreme Court has instructed, our
review of the trial court’s ruling on an equitable defense such as unclean
hands at the summary judgment stage is de novo. (Johnson, supra, 24
Cal.4th at pp. 67–68.)
B. Quality’s Affirmative Defense of Condition Precedent
Quality contends that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment as to its condition precedent affirmative defense, because
regardless of whether there were additional conditions precedent in section

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13, a party in material breach of any provision cannot enforce the contract.
Quality argues that it has at least shown a triable issue of fact as to whether
RML materially breached the Lease and Quality was thus excused from
performing.
Quality did not present this argument to the trial court in opposition to
RML’s summary judgment motion. Instead, it characterized its condition
precedent affirmative defense argument as duplicative of its argument
regarding whether section 13 contained conditions precedent rather than
covenants. We decline to consider this argument raised for the first time on
appeal. (Natkin v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2013) 219
Cal.App.4th 997, 1011 [appellate courts generally ignore arguments not
presented and litigated in the trial court].)
C. Quality’s Affirmative Defense of Setoff
Quality also contends that the equitable doctrine of setoff is applicable
here and that it is entitled to a trial on the merits of this defense. It argues
the setoff doctrine requires RML to fulfill all its monetary obligations under
the Lease before RML can enforce the termination clause and Quality can be
considered to have received the $2.25 million termination payment. We
disagree.
“The right to a setoff is based on the equitable principle that when
parties in litigation hold cross-demands for money, one demand should be
applied against the other and the plaintiff may recover the balance due, if
any.” (Morris Cerullo World Evangelism v. Newport Harbor Offices &
Marina, LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1149, 1159; see also Keith G. v.
Suzanne H. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 853, 860–861 [setoff “ ‘is a means by which
a debtor may satisfy in whole or in part a judgment or claim held against him
out of a judgment or claim which he has subsequently acquired against his

19
judgment creditor’ ”].) The doctrine is also partially “codified as section
431.70 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part:
‘Where cross-demands for money have existed between persons at any point
in time when neither demand was barred by the statute of limitations, and
an action is thereafter commenced by one such person, the other person may
assert in the answer the defense of payment in that the two demands are
compensated for so far as they equal each other[].’ ” (Granberry v. Islay
Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744.) A setoff occurs at the end of litigation
and, generally speaking, “ ‘simply eliminates a superfluous exchange of
money between the parties.’ ” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres
Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 500 (Los Angeles Unified).)
Quality alleges in its answer to RML’s declaratory relief cross-
complaint that it “is entitled to offset and recoup against any judgment that
may be entered against it all obligations of [RML] owing to” Quality. But as
RML points out, it did not seek any monetary judgment against Quality in
this action. Rather, it sought a declaration that it had complied with the two
conditions precedent in the Amendment, allowing it to terminate the Lease.
There was therefore never any possibility for a money judgment against
which Quality could offset any amounts owed to it. In other words, there
could be no “ ‘superfluous exchange of money between the parties’ ” at the end
of this litigation that needed to be eliminated. (Los Angeles Unified, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 500.) We therefore agree with RML that the setoff
doctrine is not applicable here, and the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment to RML on this affirmative defense.

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D. Unclean Hands
Finally, we turn to Quality’s contention that it has demonstrated that
there are triable issues of material fact as to its affirmative defense of
unclean hands, and the judgment must therefore be reversed on that basis.
The unclean hands doctrine demands that a litigant act fairly in the
matter for which they seek a remedy. (Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v.
Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 978 (Kendall-Jackson).) The
doctrine “is an equitable rationale for refusing a plaintiff relief where
principles of fairness dictate that the [claimant] should not recover,
regardless of the merits of his claim. It is available to protect the court from
having its powers used to bring about an inequitable result in the litigation
before it.” (Id. at p. 985.) It promotes justice by making a plaintiff answer for
their own misconduct in the action and “prevents ‘a wrongdoer from enjoying
the fruits of [their] transgression.’ ” (Id. at p. 978.)
Courts generally “apply a ‘three-pronged test to determine the effect to
be given to the plaintiff’s unclean-hands conduct. Whether the particular
misconduct is a bar to the alleged claim for relief depends on (1) analogous
case law, (2) the nature of the misconduct, and (3) the relationship of the
misconduct to the claimed injuries.’ ” (Padideh, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 426.) RML argues that Quality failed to demonstrate the existence of any
of the three required elements. We address each prong in turn.
1. Prong One: Analogous Case Law
We first consider whether there is analogous case law establishing that
the unclean hands doctrine is a defense to a declaratory relief action. We find
that there is. In affirming the trial court’s ruling in Fladeboe v. American
Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58, the Court of Appeal stated
that the trial court’s “unclean hands finding pertains to the substance of the

21
complaint and provided a complete defense to the declaratory relief cause of
action.” In MacDonald v. Midland Mining Co. (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 304,
313, the court concluded: “The record also supports the findings of the [trial]
court that the notice of location made by Neubert on behalf of appellant was
made in bad faith and that appellant was not before the court with clean
hands. In view of the fact that an action for declaratory relief is an equitable
action, these findings alone would be sufficient to support the denial of any
relief to appellant.”
RML presents no authority to the contrary. We therefore conclude that
Quality has met the first prong of the unclean hands test.
2. Prong Two: The Nature of the Misconduct
The second prong of the test requires us to examine the nature of the
alleged misconduct. Though “[n]ot every wrongful act constitutes unclean
hands . . . the misconduct need not be a crime or an actionable tort. Any
conduct that violates conscience, or good faith, or other equitable standards of
conduct is sufficient cause to invoke the doctrine.” (Kendall-Jackson, supra,
76 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.)
Quality argues that RML “trespassed upon Quality’s leasehold,
deprived Quality of the majority of the property it is entitled to, and
wrongfully leased that property to third parties for its own economic gain.”
According to Quality, this conduct constitutes contractual breaches, a civil
tort, and criminal trespass.
RML’s response is that we should reject Quality’s argument because
(1) the trial court’s determination here is properly reviewed for abuse of
discretion, and Quality failed to show such an abuse, and (2) Quality’s
assertions in support of the second prong are conclusory. As to the former,
we have already rejected RML’s contention. (See Section II.A, ante.)

22
As to the latter, we are unconvinced. Quality submitted documents,
declarations, and deposition testimony in support of its claim that, among
other things, RML: entered into agreements with multiple third parties to
lease portions of the Property that were already leased to Quality; buried a
large portion of Quality’s leasehold in crushed construction debris and then
allowed the new third-party tenants to park trucks, trailers, and storage
containers on Quality’s leasehold, thus preventing from Quality from mining
areas containing significant rock reserves, depriving it of valuable
operational areas for activities such as material storage and equipment
maintenance, impacting the safety of its operations, and forcing it to move its
operations to other parts of the Property, which increased operational costs
significantly; attempted to charge Quality $67,191.30 for its use of certain
portions of the Property despite those portions already being part of Quality’s

leasehold under the Agreement; and violated local zoning codes.2 These are
not conclusory statements. Rather, they are specific allegations supported at

2 RML mentions in a footnote that it objected to much of Quality’s
evidence in support of its opposition to the summary judgment motion at the
trial court level. The judicial referee, however, did not rule on the objections.
The Supreme Court has held that “if the trial court fails to rule expressly on
specific evidentiary objections, it is presumed that the objections have been
overruled, the trial court considered the evidence in ruling on the merits of
the summary judgment motion, and the objections are preserved on appeal.”
(Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534 (Reid).) Since Reid, the
Legislature has amended Code of Civil Procedure section 437c to provide that
the trial “court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems
material to its disposition of the motion. Objections to evidence that are not
ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q); see 2015 stats., ch. 161, § 1.) RML’s
objections were thus preserved, but it did not argue its objections on appeal
or even request that we address them. We therefore decline to do so. (See
Reid, at pp. 534–535.)

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least in part by evidence tending to show that RML’s conduct violated
conscience, good faith, or other equitable standards of conduct. (See Padideh,
supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 444–445 [substantial evidence of “lack of candor”
in plaintiff’s deposition testimony was sufficient to support jury’s finding of
unclean hands].) RML points to no evidence rebutting these points.
The question before us is not whether Quality has conclusively proven
RML’s misconduct, but rather whether it has made a showing of the existence
of a triable issue of material fact as to RML’s misconduct. We conclude based
on the above facts that it has.
3. Prong Three: The Relationship Between the Misconduct and the Claim
The third prong of the test looks at the relationship between RML’s
alleged misconduct and its claimed injuries to determine whether it would be
unfair to allow RML to recover on its claim. (Padideh, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 446–447.) “The misconduct that brings the unclean hands doctrine
into play must relate directly to the transaction concerning which the
complaint is made. It must infect the cause of action involved and affect the
equitable relations between the litigants.” (Kendall-Jackson, supra, 76
Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) The purpose of this requirement “is to rule out
application of the unclean-hands defense when the plaintiff is ‘merely guilty
of unrelated improper past conduct.’ ” (Padideh, at p. 448.)
Quality contends it raised a triable issue as to the third prong because
it submitted evidence showing RML obtained the funds necessary for the
Lease termination it seeks to enforce through this lawsuit by engaging in the
complained-of misconduct—committing a breach of contract and tort against
Quality and violating local zoning codes. In its opposition to the summary
judgment motion, Quality argued that RML “was practically (if not actually)
insolvent prior to its invasion of Quality’s leasehold for the purpose of

24
wrongfully leasing the same property twice.” Quality further argued that by
wrongfully commandeering Quality’s right to possession of the portions of the
Property it was leasing, RML was able to raise millions of dollars in revenue.
RML then used those ill-gotten profits to attempt to terminate the Lease by
depositing the $2.25 million termination fee into an escrow account. Quality
points to the declaration of its owner Dave Beck in support of its argument
that RML used misappropriated funds to effect the termination of the Lease.
RML contends that Quality failed to demonstrate any connection
between RML’s alleged misconduct and the remedy it seeks in this action—a
declaration that it properly terminated the Lease. It further argues that
Quality’s assertion that RML raised millions of dollars by leasing portions of
the Property that were already leased to Quality is mere speculation.
According to RML, Quality’s arguments regarding the third prong amount to
mere venting, or an effort to distort the case “into a proceeding to try the
general morals of the parties.” (Kendall-Jackson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at
p. 979.)
We believe Quality has the better argument here. RML urges us to
“take[] an unreasonably narrow view of the unclean hands doctrine,” and we
decline to do so. (See Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th
612, 621 (Unilogic); Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter &
Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 681 (Peregrine Funding)
[concluding that plaintiff’s “overly narrow formulation” of the doctrine was
not supported by case law, and “[t]he question is whether the unclean
conduct relates directly ‘to the transaction concerning which the complaint is
made,’ i.e., to the ‘subject matter involved’ [citation], and not whether it is
part of the basis upon which liability is being asserted”]; Kendall-Jackson,

25
supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 985 [rejecting “narrow” application of the doctrine
when analyzing the relationship of the misconduct to claimed injuries].)
Unilogic is instructive. There, plaintiff Unilogic challenged the trial
court’s allowance of defendant Burroughs’s unclean hands defense to
Unilogic’s action for conversion. (Unilogic, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.)
Unilogic argued that its conversion claim, which related to the delivery of
proprietary information by a Burroughs employee to Burroughs, was
unrelated to Burroughs’s unclean hands defense, which was based on
Unilogic’s payment of a bribe to that same employee, its failure to disclose its
financial difficulties, its failure to return software, and its subsequent use of
the software. (Id. at p. 621.) The Court of Appeal concluded that
“Burroughs’s conversion and Unilogic’s misconduct occurred in the same
transaction that forms the subject of this litigation—the joint development
project.” (Ibid.) This was “enough to trigger application of the unclean hands
doctrine.” (Ibid.)
Other courts have similarly concluded that the unclean hands doctrine
is applicable where the misconduct and cause of action relate to the same
“transaction.” (See, e.g., Padideh, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 450 [third
prong was met because the misconduct “occurred in a transaction or matter
directly related to and infecting the one presently before the court, and [] it
has affected the equitable relationship between the litigants”]; Peregrine
Funding, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 681 [same]; Kendall-Jackson, supra,
76 Cal.App.4th at p. 987 [reversing trial court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of claimant as to Kendall-Jackson’s unclean hands defense;
a “jury could find that [claimant]’s inequitable conduct occurred in the
transaction related directly to the matter before the court”].) Here, too, a
factfinder could find that RML’s alleged inequitable conduct was related

26
directly to the “transaction that forms the subject of this litigation”—the
termination of the Lease. (See Unilogic, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.)
We are unpersuaded by RML’s argument that Quality merely seeks to
litigate RML’s “general morals.” This case is unlike others where courts have
found the misconduct insufficiently related to the transaction forming the
subject of the litigation. Examples of such cases as set forth by the Kendall-
Jackson court include Vacco Industries, Inc. v. Van Den Berg (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 34, 50, 52–53 (plaintiff’s wrongful discharge of defendant was
immaterial in a suit regarding defendant’s misappropriation of plaintiff’s
trade secrets) and Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833,
845, 851–852 (plaintiff’s use of falsified immigration documents to obtain
employment was not sufficiently related to her sexual harassment claim).
(Kendall-Jackson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) Quality does not point to
past, unrelated misconduct by RML. Rather, it contends that RML’s
misconduct—improperly excluding Quality from its leasehold and raising
millions of dollars in revenue through its trespass and breach of the Lease—
is the very reason RML was able to deposit the termination fee and effect its
termination of the Lease, which it now seeks to enforce through this action.
This is sufficient. (Unilogic, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.)
For all of the reasons above, we conclude that Quality has raised triable
issues of material fact as to the application of the unclean hands doctrine to
RML’s claim, thus precluding summary judgment. We therefore reverse the
judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions
that the trial court vacate its order granting RML’s motion for summary
judgment, enter a new order denying summary judgment, and rule on RML’s

27
alternative motion for summary adjudication in a manner consistent with
this opinion. Quality Aggregates is entitled to its costs on appeal.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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