CourtListener 10593988•In re D.P. CA2/3
Full text
Filed 5/28/25 In re D.P. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re D.P. et al., Persons Coming B336742
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. Nos.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 20LJJP00257C,
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 20LJJP00257D
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Cathy J. Ostiller, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Mother appeals a dependency judgment based on a
jurisdictional finding that she involved her 10-year-old son D.P.
in a scheme to smuggle illicit narcotics into a prison during a
visit with the boy’s father.1 Three days after the visit, father died
from an overdose when a balloon containing methamphetamine
ruptured in his stomach. Mother contends there was insufficient
evidence to authenticate audio and video recordings revealing
the alleged scheme and she argues the juvenile court erred
by admitting secondary evidence of the recordings’ contents.
We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.2
1 After declaring D.P. and his half-brother A.B. dependent
children and removing them from mother’s custody, the juvenile
court terminated jurisdiction over A.B. and issued a custody
order granting A.B.’s father sole physical custody of the child.
Mother does not appear to challenge the orders concerning A.B.
To the extent she does mean to challenge those orders, our
reasons to affirm the judgment with respect to D.P. apply
equally to his half-brother.
2 County Counsel on behalf of the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (the Department)
argues we should dismiss mother’s appeal under the
disentitlement doctrine, citing records showing she
surreptitiously removed D.P. from his foster placement
in violation of the juvenile court’s disposition order. We
decline to dismiss the appeal. “Appellate disentitlement ‘is
not a jurisdictional doctrine, but a discretionary tool that may
be applied when the balance of the equitable concerns make it a
proper sanction.’ ” (In re E.M. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 467, 474.)
“In dependency cases, the doctrine has been applied only in cases
of the most egregious conduct by the appellant, which frustrates
the purpose of dependency law and makes it impossible to protect
the child or act in the child’s best interests.” (Ibid. [cataloguing
cases].)
2
BACKGROUND
On June 20, 2023, prison staff found D.P.’s father dead
in his cell. Two intact bindles of methamphetamine and one
ruptured bindle were recovered from father’s stomach during
an autopsy.3 The coroner determined the cause of death
was methamphetamine intoxication. A search of father’s cell
uncovered another bindle containing methamphetamine
as well as notes indicating the distribution of narcotics.
At the time of his death, father had only four approved
visitors—mother, D.P., D.P.’s half-brother A.B., and another
friend. Mother had visited father four times since his
incarceration in May 2018. The most recent visits had occurred
on June 16 and June 17, 2023 (three days before father’s death).
Mother has requested we take judicial notice of court
records showing that D.P. was subsequently returned to
the Department’s custody and that mother has since been
in compliance with her case plan. We grant the request.
While there is no question that mother’s violation was serious
and likely endangering to her child, the juvenile court was and is
in a far better position to address these matters than we are, and,
in any event, there is nothing to indicate mother remains in “ ‘an
attitude of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts
of this state.’ ” (In re E.M., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 474,
quoting MacPherson v. MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 271, 277.)
Dismissal is not warranted under the current circumstances.
(See In re E.M., at p. 474 [“ ‘Dismissal is not “ ‘a penalty imposed
as a punishment for criminal contempt. It is an exercise of
a state court’s inherent power to use its processes to induce
compliance’ ” with a presumptively valid order.’ ”].)
3 Two other bindles containing toilet paper were also
recovered.
3
Officer Nicholas Rodriguez of the California State Prison-
Sacramento Investigative Services Unit investigated father’s
death. The following facts are taken from his August 23, 2023
memorandum to the prison warden regarding the investigation.
In the month leading up to father’s death, his prison
call log showed he made 238 recorded telephone calls to a
213-area-code number associated with mother. On June 16,
2023, mother and the two children had a visit with father. Later
that day, father placed a series of at least seven calls to mother,
during which they discussed arrangements for mother to meet
with someone named “ ‘Crazy’ ” in exchange for $180. In one call,
mother told father “there is ten of them,” which Officer Rodriguez
interpreted to refer to the bindles of methamphetamine found
in father’s cell and stomach after his death.4 Father told mother,
“ ‘We shouldn’t be having any talk period after we just talked
in the visiting room.’ ”
The next day, on June 17, 2023, mother and the two
children had a second visit with father. A recording from the
prison’s audio-visual surveillance (AVS) system captured what
Officer Rodriguez described as “suspicious activity” during the
visit. The recording showed mother and D.P. enter the women’s
restroom together and stay inside for approximately 10 minutes.
After they returned, D.P. built a fort with cushions. Two minutes
later, he emerged from the fort holding a bag of chips and joined
4 In an interview conducted as part of the investigation,
father’s cellmate recounted that father had said he swallowed
10 balloons of methamphetamine that he received from a recent
visitor. The cellmate said father wanted to sneak drugs into
the facility “ ‘[be]cause it’s bad out there for his family and
his girl[friend] is living in a car.’ ”
4
mother and father in the back of the visiting room. An overhead
screenshot taken from the AVS recording showed D.P. eating
from the bag with what Officer Rodriguez marked as “bindles
wrapped in a light-colored material” inside. D.P. then handed
the chip bag to father, who walked off on his own toward the
front of the visiting area. The AVS recording captured father
lifting the chip bag to his mouth several times “to swallow the
contents” and then “immediately drinking water and/or soda.”
At one point on the recording, Officer Rodriguez observed father
drop, quickly pick up, and swallow “what appear[ed] to be
a bindle” similar to those recovered from his stomach in the
autopsy.
That evening father called mother to tell her he was trying
to “throw up ‘Hard Candies’ ” and “not feeling well.” He said
he had swallowed toilet paper balled up in the finger of a glove
and “ ‘[s]even came out . . . three of them are still in there.’ ”
The next day he called mother to tell her, “ ‘They all went down.
They are in my stomach now.’ ” Mother replied, “ ‘You should
be able to shit it out then. . . . I need you to finish business.’ ”
Two days later, an inmate who referred to himself as “ ‘Janky’ ”
called mother using father’s personal identification number.
Janky told mother that father had passed and she needed
to “stay out the way.”
On November 28, 2023, after concluding mother had
involved her children in a scheme to smuggle narcotics into
the prison, Officer Rodriguez reported his findings to the
Department. Although the video footage had since been
deleted, he offered to provide the Department with his
investigation memorandum, which included a screenshot of D.P.
holding the chip bag containing bindles of methamphetamine.
5
A social worker interviewed mother at her home. She
provided two telephone numbers for contact, including the 213-
area-code number recorded in Officer Rodriguez’s memorandum.
Mother confirmed she last saw father during a visit on June 17,
2023 and she had escorted the children to the restroom during
the visit. She denied she had done anything to smuggle bindles
of narcotics into the prison for father. She said she was aware
father used “synthetic weed” in prison, but denied knowledge
of any other drug use. She said his death from a “ ‘cocaine’
overdose” surprised her.
D.P. also confirmed that mother had taken him to the
restroom during the visit. After returning, he remembered
“ ‘making a doggy fort to hide in it and scare my brother.’ ”
He also recalled that he had a bag of chips in the fort and
that he gave the chips to father. He did not notice anything
“different” or “heavy” about the chip bag when he handled it.
He did not remember mother putting anything in the chip bag
before he gave it to father.
The Department filed a dependency petition on behalf
of D.P. and his half-brother, alleging mother endangered the
children by involving them in “illicit drug trafficking” while
they were under her care and supervision. With respect to D.P.,
the petition alleged mother used the child to smuggle balloons
containing methamphetamine into the prison by concealing
the balloons in a bag of chips he was eating from. The
reports in support of the petition included Officer Rodriguez’s
investigation memorandum and statements regarding his
findings.
Mother filed objections under Evidence Code sections 1401,
1521, and 352 to exclude all evidence referencing or summarizing
6
(1) “audio recordings made of conversations between persons
identified as” father and mother; and (2) “video and audio
recordings of a June 17, 2023 visit” between father, mother,
and the children. At the adjudication hearing, mother’s
counsel argued the screenshot included in Officer Rodriguez’s
memorandum was inadequate to “substantiate” the “destroyed”
video footage of the visit. With respect to the telephone
recordings, she insisted there was “no foundation laid
to determine whether [mother] is the person that’s actually
speaking on the phone.” Counsel emphasized she was “not
making a hearsay objection.” Instead, she objected to the lack
of foundation to introduce the evidence and argued, “if they want
to have any reference to this video and these audio recordings,
they should have provided these audio and video recordings
to the court.”
The juvenile court overruled the objections, concluding the
evidence was sufficient to accept Officer Rodriguez’s summaries
of the video and audio recordings “just as in any other situation
where the court is adopting or relying on statements of an officer
that are in a report.”
The children’s counsel joined the Department’s request
to sustain the petition and remove the children from mother’s
custody. Both relied on Officer Rodriguez’s statements and
memorandum to argue mother placed the children at risk by
using D.P. to smuggle methamphetamine to father in a chip bag.
The juvenile court sustained the petition and entered a
disposition order removing the children from mother’s custody.
This timely appeal followed.
7
DISCUSSION
Mother does not dispute that the evidence admitted
regarding the prison recordings, if credited, was sufficient to
support the court’s jurisdictional finding and disposition order.5
However, she argues the Department failed to establish the
authenticity of the recordings and, therefore, the court erred
in admitting secondary evidence of their contents. Mother
also contends the secondary evidence was unfair and unduly
prejudicial. Because this evidence was the sole basis for the
court’s findings, she insists the judgment must be reversed.
5 In arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the
judgment, mother repeatedly invokes what she labels “legally
admissible evidence,” arguing, for example, that the “legally
admissible evidence introduced at the jurisdictional hearing
overwhelmingly demonstrates Mother was a fit, caring, capable,
nurturing and attentive parent with whom the children were
bonded and felt safe.” At other points she emphasizes that she
“consistently denied all alleged wrongdoing” and says there was
“no evidence Mother had methamphetamine in her possession
at any time.” We thus understand her sufficiency of the evidence
arguments to be premised on her contention that the juvenile
court erroneously admitted evidence of her culpability in the
drug trafficking scheme. To the extent she does mean to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence independently of her
evidentiary objections, we think it should go without saying that
proof of a parent involving her 10-year-old son in a conspiracy
to bring deadly narcotics into a state prison is sufficient to
support dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivision (b). (See, e.g., In re Yolanda L.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 994 [dependency jurisdiction supported
where father was children’s primary caretaker and evidence
suggested his drug trafficking activities sometimes took place
in the family home].)
8
1. Standard of Review and Governing Law
We review challenges to a juvenile court’s ruling on the
admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. (In re K.B.
(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 989, 995.) We will not disturb the
court’s ruling except on a showing that it exercised its discretion
in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (Ibid.) “ ‘ “When
two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,
the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision
for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 319.)
In a dependency proceeding, except as provided in Welfare
and Institutions Code sections 355 and 355.1 and California
Rules of Court, rule 5.684(c) and (d), “the admission and
exclusion of evidence must be in accordance with the Evidence
Code as it applies to civil cases.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.684(b).)6
6 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code, except as otherwise designated. Under section 355, a
social study prepared by the petitioning child welfare agency,
and hearsay evidence contained in it, is generally admissible
and constitutes competent evidence to support a jurisdictional
finding. (§ 355, subd. (b); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.684(c)(1) [“A social study, with hearsay evidence contained in it,
is admissible as provided in section 355.”].) However, if a party
to the jurisdictional hearing raises a timely objection to the
admission of specific hearsay evidence, this evidence will not
be sufficient by itself to support a jurisdictional finding, unless
(as relevant here) the “hearsay declarant is a peace officer.”
(§ 355, subd. (c)(1)(C).) Section 355.1 creates a rebuttable
presumption in favor of dependency jurisdiction in
circumstances not relevant here.
9
2. Substantial Evidence Proves the Authenticity
of the Video and Audio Recordings
Evidence Code section 1401 requires authentication of a
writing, video, or audio recording before the recorded media or
“secondary evidence of its content” may be received into evidence.
(Evid. Code, § 1401, subds. (a) & (b); see id., § 250 [“ ‘Writing’ ”
under the Evidence Code includes every “means of recording
upon any tangible thing.”]; People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th
258, 266 (Goldsmith); Dawkins, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1002.) The proponent of the recorded media has the burden
of producing sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that it is
authentic. (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(3).)
Mother contends Officer Rodriguez’s memorandum and
statements are insufficient to authenticate the audio and video
recordings. Although she acknowledges the evidence “linked
the phone number” in the audio recordings to her, she insists
Officer Rodriguez failed “to provide authenticating information”
sufficient to prove “the voice he heard on the jail recording was
Notwithstanding mother’s objections under Evidence Code
sections 1401, 1521, and 352, the Department argues there
was no need to establish the authenticity of the recordings
because Officer Rodriguez’s statements about what he observed
were admissible under section 355, subdivision (c)(1)(C). This
is plainly incorrect. Section 355 establishes an exception to
the hearsay rule in dependency proceedings—it does not (as
rule 5.684(b) makes clear) displace other rules governing the
admission of evidence. This, of course, includes the Evidence
Code provisions requiring authentication of recorded media.
(See People v. Dawkins (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 991, 1004
(Dawkins) [“the issues of hearsay and authentication are
independent of one another”].)
10
[her] voice.” Likewise, with respect to the video footage, although
she acknowledges the memorandum included a screenshot
from the purported recording, she emphasizes “this still image
bears no date or time stamp,” which she contends is necessary
to “provide sufficient authentication.”
Mother’s contentions are premised on too narrow a view
of what evidence is sufficient to authenticate a video or audio
recording. “Authentication” of recorded media is statutorily
defined as the “introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain
a finding that it is the [recording] that the proponent of
the evidence claims it is” or “the establishment of such facts
by any other means provided by law.” (Evid. Code, § 1400;
Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266.) As our Supreme Court
has explained, this statutory definition ties authentication to
relevance: “ ‘[B]efore any tangible object may be admitted into
evidence, the party seeking to introduce the object must make
a preliminary showing that the object is in some way relevant
to the issues to be decided in the action.’ ” (Goldsmith, at p. 266,
quoting Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 4 West’s Ann.
Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 1400, p. 440.) Accordingly, the
“first step” in assessing authenticity “is to determine the purpose
for which the evidence is being offered.” (Goldsmith, at p. 267.)
“The purpose of the evidence will determine what must be shown
for authentication, which may vary from case to case.” (Ibid.)
The “foundation” for authenticating a recording “requires
that there be sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that
the [recording] is what it purports to be, i.e., that it is genuine
for the purpose offered.” (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 267.)
“This foundation may, but need not be, supplied by the person
[who made the recording] or by a person who witnessed the event
11
being recorded. [Citations.] It may be supplied by other witness
testimony, circumstantial evidence, content and location.” (Id.
at p. 268.) “Essentially, what is necessary is a prima facie case.
‘As long as the evidence would support a finding of authenticity,
the [recording] is admissible. The fact conflicting inferences
can be drawn regarding authenticity goes to the [recording’s]
weight as evidence, not its admissibility.’ ” (Id. at p. 267.)
We begin with the video footage. The Department’s
purpose in offering Officer Rodriguez’s statements about
the footage was to give an account of what happened during
the June 17, 2023 prison visit between father, mother, and D.P.
Thus, to authenticate the footage as the basis for admitting
secondary evidence of its contents, all the Department had to
show was that the video recording Officer Rodriguez reviewed
was in fact a recording of the June 17, 2023 prison visit—i.e.,
that it was “genuine for the purpose offered.” (Goldsmith, supra,
59 Cal.4th at p. 267.) There was more than sufficient evidence
for the juvenile court to find it was authentic for this purpose.
To begin, Officer Rodriguez attested to the recording’s
authenticity by stating in his memorandum that it came from
the prison’s AVS system and that it captured the visit between
father, mother, and D.P. that occurred on “Saturday, June 17th,
2023, at approximately 1018 hours.” There is no dispute that
Officer Rodriguez—as an officer with the California State Prison-
Sacramento Investigative Services Unit—was familiar with
the prison’s AVS system. Nor is there any dispute that he
could positively identify father, whose intake picture and
other identifying characteristics were included in the officer’s
memorandum.
12
Moreover, circumstantial evidence and other witness
testimony corroborated Officer Rodriguez’s account that the
footage he reviewed was in fact a recording of the June 17 visit.
(See Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 267–268.) Perhaps
most compelling, the officer noted in his report that the footage
showed D.P. built a fort with cushions during the visit and
subsequently emerged from the fort holding the bag of chips
that he later passed to father. In an interview conducted more
than four months after Officer Rodriguez transmitted his report
to the prison warden, D.P. confirmed that, during the June 17
visit, he remembered “ ‘making a doggy fort’ ” and that he had
a bag of chips in the fort that he later gave to father. The
consistency between Officer Rodriguez’s observations and D.P.’s
account of the visit support a reasonable inference that what
Officer Rodriguez reviewed was a genuine video recording of the
June 17 visit between father, mother, and D.P. (See, e.g., In re
K.B., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 998 [photographs of juvenile
holding firearm sufficiently authenticated by evidence that he
was arrested wearing the same clothes and in the same location
depicted in the photographs].)
Circumstantial evidence was also sufficient to establish
the authenticity of the recorded phone calls Officer Rodriguez
reviewed. Much like the video footage, the Department’s purpose
in offering secondary evidence of the phone calls was to give
an account of discussions between father and mother about
the alleged scheme to smuggle narcotics into the prison. Thus,
to authenticate the recordings for this purpose, the Department
had to prove only that mother and father were the parties
speaking on the recorded calls. As discussed, mother concedes
the recordings captured calls father made to one of her phone
13
numbers, but she argues the evidence was insufficient to prove
she was the female voice on the calls. The juvenile court astutely
rejected this argument when mother’s counsel advanced it at the
adjudication hearing. As the court noted, according to Officer
Rodriguez’s report, “whoever” it was that was talking to father
on the calls spoke about “coming to the facility, and then within
a short period of time, mother shows up at the facility.” Indeed,
in one of the calls that occurred the evening of mother’s first
prison visit, Officer Rodriguez reported that father told the
other party, “ ‘We shouldn’t be having any talk period after we
just talked in the visiting room.’ ” (Italics added.) Based on
this circumstantial evidence, the court reasonably inferred
that it was in fact mother on the other side of the recorded
phone conversations. We find no error in the court’s admission
of this evidence over mother’s objection to its authenticity.
3. The Record Does Not Compel a Finding that
Admission of Secondary Evidence Was Unfair
Regardless of authenticity, mother argues the court
should have excluded Officer Rodriguez’s statements under the
secondary evidence rule, because the circumstances rendered
admission of this evidence “unfair.” We disagree.
The secondary evidence rule provides that the “content
of a writing may be proved by otherwise admissible secondary
evidence,” except that the court “shall exclude secondary
evidence” of the writing’s content if it determines either
“[a] genuine dispute exists concerning material terms of the
writing and justice requires the exclusion” or “[a]dmission
of the secondary evidence would be unfair.” (Evid. Code, § 1521,
subd. (a)(1) & (2); see People v. Skiles (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1178,
1188; see also People v. Son (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 689, 696
14
[“A video is a writing for purposes of the secondary evidence
rule.”].) A “classic circumstance for exclusion” under the
unfairness exception is if “the proponent” of the evidence
“destroyed the original with fraudulent intent or the doctrine
of spoliation of evidence otherwise applies.” (Cal. Law Revision
Com. com., West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1998 ed.) foll. § 1521.)
Mother contends the circumstances presented to the
juvenile court compelled a finding that it would be unfair to
admit Officer Rodriguez’s statements about the prison recordings.
She insists the deletion of the video footage constituted spoliation
of evidence because “prison authorities” apparently believed
she had violated the Penal Code and thus should have known
“litigation was ‘reasonably foreseeable.’ ” Accordingly, mother
argues these “authorities had a duty to preserve the security
footage” and “their failure to do so resulted in spoliation of
evidence,” compelling a finding that “use of secondary evidence
[would be] unfair.”
The fundamental flaw in mother’s argument is that
the Department—not prison authorities—was the proponent
of the secondary evidence at the adjudication hearing, and it is
undisputed that the Department never had possession or control
of the video footage. (Cf. Victor Valley Union High School Dist.
v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1138–1139
[spoliation occurs “when the party in possession and/or control
of the electronically stored information was objectively aware the
evidence was relevant to reasonably foreseeable future litigation”
and fails to preserve it for another party’s use (italics added)];
Cal. Law Revision Com. com., West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1998 ed.)
foll. § 1521 [exclusion may be warranted under the secondary
evidence rule “if the proponent destroyed the original with
15
fraudulent intent or the doctrine of spoliation of evidence
otherwise applies” (italics added)].) Thus, even if (as mother
insists) prison authorities should have known the video footage
would be relevant to a foreseeable dependency petition, this does
not compel a finding that the Department engaged in spoliation.
The Department requested the video footage from Officer
Rodriguez, but was told it had been deleted and the only record
of its contents was the officer’s memorandum. On this record,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to find
that it would be unfair to admit the secondary evidence offered
by the Department to support the petition’s allegations. (Cf.
Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 864 [exclusion
of testimony under secondary evidence rule was erroneous where
it was undisputed that proponent did “not have possession or
control of the original or a copy of the texts and that they were
not reasonably procurable through the court’s process or other
available means”].)
As for the recorded phone conversations, mother
emphasizes there is nothing in the record to suggest these
recordings were deleted and the Department offered no
explanation for its failure to produce the original recordings
in lieu of or in addition to secondary evidence of their contents.
We agree with mother that the better practice for the
Department was to obtain the recordings and make them
available for the court’s review, especially after mother lodged
objections challenging the introduction of secondary evidence
under Evidence Code section 1521. Be that as it may, we cannot
say the juvenile court acted arbitrarily or otherwise abused
its discretion by admitting the evidence. The statute authorizes
the admission of secondary evidence to prove the “content of a
16
writing” unless the court finds admitting the evidence would be
unfair. (Evid. Code, § 1521, subd. (a)(2).) As we have discussed,
independent evidence—including the date of mother’s visits in
relation to the recorded phone conversations—corroborated the
authenticity of the recordings. This evidence also corroborated
the accuracy of Officer Rodriguez’s account, as did an interview
with father’s cellmate, who reported that father swallowed
10 bindles of methamphetamine (as suggested in one of the
recorded phone conversations) and that he did so to provide
financial support for mother and D.P. (as also suggested in
some of the conversations). (See ante, fn. 4.) On this record,
we conclude the juvenile court reasonably exercised its
discretion to admit the secondary evidence.
4. The Recordings Were Highly Probative of the
Dependency Petition’s Allegations
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
by overruling her objection under Evidence Code section 352.
She argues the challenged secondary evidence was “substantially
more prejudicial than probative” because, in her telling, Officer
Rodriguez’s description of the video footage “did not resemble”
other evidence discussed in his memorandum. Specifically, she
notes Officer Rodriguez described seeing D.P. on the video footage
holding a chip bag with what appeared to be “bindles wrapped in
a light-colored material” inside, while the officer’s memorandum
disclosed the bindles recovered from father’s stomach consisted
of “methamphetamine wrapped in blue nitrile gloves.” Mother
claims this purported inconsistency “demonstrates the lack of
probative value inherent in Officer Rodriguez’s statements,”
rendering this secondary evidence “substantially more prejudicial
than probative.” We disagree.
17
Evidence Code section 352 authorizes the trial court
“in its discretion” to “exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues,
or of misleading the jury.” “ ‘ “Evidence is not prejudicial,
as that term is used in a section 352 context, merely because
it undermines the opponent’s position or shores up that of
the proponent. The ability to do so is what makes evidence
relevant. The code speaks in terms of undue prejudice. Unless
the dangers of undue prejudice, confusion, or time consumption
‘ “substantially outweigh” ’ the probative value of relevant
evidence, a section 352 objection should fail.” ’ ” (People v. Scott
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 490–491 (Scott).)
Mother’s argument incorrectly equates credibility with
probative value. The “probative value” of evidence, as the term
is used in Evidence Code section 352, refers to its “ ‘ “tendency
in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact.” ’ ” (People v.
Rivera (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 353, 362.) In essence, probative
value concerns whether and to what extent evidence is relevant
to a factual issue in dispute. (See Evid. Code, § 210 [“ ‘Relevant
evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the
credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency
in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.”].) Credibility,
although related, is a different concept that concerns the
believability of a witness and whether the witness’s testimony
is true and accurate. (See, e.g., CALCRIM No. 226.)
The purported inconsistency between the “light-colored
material” that Officer Rodriguez observed on the video footage
18
and the “blue nitrile gloves” that were recovered from father’s
stomach is probative of the credibility of the officer’s account, but
this supposed conflict does not render his account irrelevant or
significantly diminish its probative value. (See, e.g., CALCRIM
No. 226 [instructing how to assess conflicting evidence to judge
witness credibility]; Evid. Code, § 210.) On the contrary, the
officer’s account was highly probative of the allegations in the
dependency petition, as it spoke directly to—that is, it tended
to prove or disprove—whether mother involved D.P. in a scheme
to smuggle narcotics into the prison. As the finder of fact, the
juvenile court, upon admission of the evidence, could decide
whether any purported inconsistency or other credibility factor
rendered Officer Rodriguez’s account more or less accurate
or believable. But the fact that this highly probative evidence
might have the effect of undermining mother’s denial of her
involvement in the alleged scheme did not make the evidence
unduly prejudicial. (See Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 490–491.)
Finally, we reject mother’s contention that the juvenile
court failed to weigh the relevant factors. When an objection
is made under Evidence Code section 352, “ ‘the record must
affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice
against probative value,’ ” but the “judge need not expressly
weigh [these factors]—or even expressly state that [s]he
has done so.” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 656.)
Here, the record shows the juvenile court considered mother’s
contentions about prejudice and purported inconsistencies
in their proper context, and the court recognized there were
“some issues that [mother’s counsel] has highlighted that
maybe in a criminal court would lead to an argument that . . .
the mother would not be found guilty.” Given the judge’s
19
frank assessment of the weight of the evidence in relation
to the heightened standard of proof in a criminal case versus
the preponderance of the evidence standard that applies in a
dependency proceeding, we have no trouble inferring that the
juvenile court properly weighed the relevant factors in admitting
this highly probative evidence (even if she did not expressly
state that she had done so).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
20
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.