CourtListener 10593975•People v. Mancera CA2/2
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Filed 5/28/25 P. v. Mancera CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B337201
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA078385)
v.
RAYMOND MANCERA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Scott A. Taryle, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Raymond Mancera (defendant)
appeals from the order denying his petition for vacatur of his
attempted murder conviction and for resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Defendant contends the trial court
erred in finding that he was ineligible for relief under the statute
as a matter of law. We agree, reverse the order of denial and
remand for a hearing under subdivision (d) of section 1172.6.
Defendant’s 2008 conviction
In 2008, defendant and codefendants Edward Narvaez,
Joaquin Meza, and Bryant Salas were jointly charged by
amended information with the following felonies committed on
February 23, 2007: murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1); attempted
murder with the allegation the crime was committed willfully,
deliberately and with premeditation (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, count
2); and assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, a knife (§ 245, subd.
(a)(1), count 6). It was further alleged as to Counts 1 and 2 that
both defendant and codefendant Narvaez personally used a knife
in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and as to
all three counts that the offenses were committed for the benefit
of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
Defendant and his three codefendants were jointly tried,
and the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder as
charged in count 1, premeditated attempted murder as charged
in count 2, and guilty of assault with a deadly weapon as charged
1 All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
2
in count 6.2 The jury further found true the knife-use allegations
of counts 1 and 2, and the gang allegation as to all three counts.3
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate total of
103 years to life in prison. On direct appeal, this court found
insufficient evidence to support the enhancement in count 2 that
defendant personally used a knife, and reversed it, reducing
defendant’s sentence by one year, but otherwise affirmed the
judgment. (People v. Mancera (July 22, 2009, B206328)
(Mancera) [nonpub. opn.].)
Section 1172.6 petition
In July 2023, defendant filed a form petition pursuant to
former section 1170.95 (since renumbered as section 1172.6). He
checked the boxes alleging required conditions for relief and
requested the appointment of counsel. The court found the
petition facially sufficient, appointed counsel, received briefing
from both parties,4 and conducted a hearing on whether
defendant had made a prima facie showing pursuant to section
1172.6, subdivision (a). On March 13, 2024, the court denied the
petition upon finding defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of
law.
2 The jury found all codefendants guilty of second degree
murder (count 1), attempted murder (count 2), and assault with a
deadly weapon (count 6). The jury found true as to codefendant
Narvaez that attempted murder was premeditated and
deliberated, and untrue as to Meza and Salas.
3 The knife enhancement attached to count 2 was stricken on
direct appeal due to insufficient evidence.
4 Defense counsel’s brief in reply to the prosecution’s
opposition to defendant’s petition was filed February 1, 2024, in
the form of a memorandum of points and authorities entitled,
“Petition Under Penal Code Section 1172.6.”
3
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order.
Relevant legal principles
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437),
amending sections 188 and 189, the laws pertaining to felony
murder and murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, “to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The 2019
amendments to sections 188 and 189 effectively eliminated
murder liability under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine and changed the requirements for felony murder
liability. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 849 (Gentile).)5
Under current law and with exceptions not relevant here, “in
order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act
with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Senate Bill 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95, now
section 1172.6, which provides a procedure to petition for
retroactive relief for those who could not now be convicted under
sections 188 and 189 as amended. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11
5 Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a
“‘person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty
of not only the intended [target] crime . . . but also of any other
crime the perpetrator actually commits . . . that is a natural and
probable consequence of the intended crime.’” (People v. Medina
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920.)
4
Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The procedure presently provides that
a petition may be filed by a person convicted of felony murder,
murder or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, and any “other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation
in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); see Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.).)
As relevant here, the petition must allege three conditions
under section 1172.6, subdivision (a): the charging document
“allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine”; (2) “The petitioner was convicted of murder [or]
attempted murder . . .”; and (3) “The petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
If the petitioner establishes a prima facie case for relief, the
court must issue an order to show cause, conduct an evidentiary
hearing to decide whether to vacate the murder conviction and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts if it finds the
petitioner is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d); Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) At the prima facie stage, the
allegations of the petition must be accepted as true but, without
engaging in factfinding, the trial court may look to the record of
conviction to determine whether the allegations have been
refuted as a matter of law; and if so, no prima facie showing can
be made and the petition is properly denied. (Lewis, supra, at
pp. 971–972.) The prima facie bar was “‘intentionally and
correctly set very low.’” (Id. at p. 972.) To find ineligibility at the
5
prima facie stage of the proceedings, the facts in the record of
conviction must conclusively refute the allegations of the petition
without resort to factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility
determinations. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14; see
Lewis, supra, at pp. 957, 970–972.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding he was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law, as the jury could have
relied on the now invalid natural and probable consequences
doctrine to convict him of murder and attempted murder. We
independently review the trial court’s prima facie determination
that a petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter
of law. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.)
The natural and probable consequences jury instruction
given at defendant’s trial is as follows:
“One who aids and abets another in the commission of a
crime is not only guilty of that crime, but is also guilty of any
other crime committed by a principal which is a natural and
probable consequence of the crime originally aided and abetted.
“In order to find a defendant guilty of the crime of murder,
attempted murder, or assault with a deadly weapon under the
rule set forth above you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that:
“1. The crime of assault was committed;
“2. That the defendant aided and abetted that crime;
“3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the crime of
murder, attempted murder, or as[s]ault with a deadly weapon;
(Counts 1, 2, 6)
6
“4. Said crime of murder, attempted murder, or assault
with a deadly weapon was a natural and probable consequence of
the commission of the crime of assault.
“In determining whether a consequence is ‘natural and
probable,’ you must apply an objective test, based not on what the
defendant actually intended, but on what a person of reasonable
and ordinary prudence would have expected likely to occur. The
issue is to be decided in light of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident. A ‘natural’ consequence is one which is
within the normal range of outcomes that may be reasonably
expected to occur if nothing unusual has intervened. ‘Probable’
means likely to happen.”
We begin with count 2, attempted murder, as the People
concede the denial of the petition as to that count was erroneous.
The attempted murder instruction given required only the
perpetrator to harbor an intent to kill, and the People concede the
record of conviction does not conclusively establish defendant was
the perpetrator or harbored an intent to kill. The People also
note the prosecutor, in summation, urged the jury to apply the
natural and probable consequences to the attempted murder
count.
The aiding and abetting instruction contained no
requirement the aider and abettor must intend to kill or know
the actual perpetrator intended to kill. Thus the instructions left
room for defendant to be convicted of attempted murder by aiding
and abetting the perpetrator’s assault with a deadly weapon
under the probable consequences doctrine. “[D]efendants . . .
convicted of attempted murder are potentially eligible for relief
under section 1172.6 if the conviction could have been based on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v.
Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865, italics added.)
7
We thus agree defendant made a prima facie showing as to
count 2, which required the trial court to issue an order to show
cause and schedule an evidentiary hearing. (See § 1172.6, subds.
(c), (d)(3).)
As to count 1, defendant’s murder conviction, we recognize
that pursuant to the changes made by Senate Bill 1437, a
conviction for first or second degree murder under a natural and
probable consequences theory is barred. (People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 986, citing Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 846;
see § 188, subd. (a)(3).)
At the prima facie hearing of March 13, 2024, the trial
court acknowledged defendant’s jury had been instructed
regarding the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Although we “review the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning”
(People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 807), we consider
selected findings to the extent they facilitate our discussion.
The court found although the jury was instructed regarding
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, it was limited to
the codefendants. The court stated, “the legal decisions of the
jury in this case make it clear that [the instruction] was not used
in regards to [defendant].” The court appeared to be swayed by
the prosecutor’s argument at the prima facie hearing that
defendant was not convicted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine because in the closing argument at trial
the prosecutor did not argue the theory applied to defendant. On
the contrary, speaking of natural and probable consequences, the
prosecutor argued: “‘Regardless of who the actual stabber is of
[the murder victim], and who was the actual stabber of [the
attempted murder victim], all four of them under the law are
guilty of the murder because they participated and acted together
and they all were aiding and abetting in this assault.” He stated
8
defendant was one of the stabbers and he would discuss evidence
of that later, and then similarly argued, “[R]egardless of who
stabbed who, because they were all acting together in this, and
because there was a natural and probable consequence of that
fistfight, that gang attack, regardless of who the actual stabber
is, they are all guilty of the murder [and] attempted murder . . . .”
The prosecutor failed to tell the jury the natural and probable
consequences doctrine did not apply to defendant. Regardless, if
the prosecutor had told the jury to disregard the natural and
probable consequences instruction with regard to defendant, the
jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 1.00 in which it was told:
“You must accept and follow the law as I state it to you,
regardless of whether you agree with it. If anything concerning
the law said by the attorneys in their arguments or at any other
time during the trial conflicts with my instructions on the law,
you must follow my instructions. [¶] You must not be influenced
by pity for or prejudice against a defendant.”
Moreover, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 1.01 as
follows: “If any rule, direction, or idea is repeated or stated in
different ways in these instructions, no emphasis is intended and
you must not draw any inference because of its repetition. Do not
single out any particular sentence or any individual point or
instruction and ignore the others. Consider the instructions
taken as a whole and each in light of all the others.” The jury
was also instructed: “The word ‘defendant’ applies to each
defendant unless you are instructed otherwise.” (CALJIC
No. 1.11.) We have examined the jury instructions given at
defendant’s trial and find no instruction “otherwise” and nothing
9
else in the record that would indicate to the jury the probable
consequences instruction did not apply to defendant.6
The jury returned a general verdict finding defendant
guilty of first degree murder and finding true defendant
personally used a knife within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (b)(1), as well as the offense was committed for the
benefit of a gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The trial court
determined defendant was the actual perpetrator, in part because
the jury found the murder to be of the first degree, and therefore
deliberate and premeditated, and because defendant personally
used a knife in the commission of the murder. Both findings
were upheld by the appellate court on direct appeal.
Here, the jury did not make a separate finding that
defendant was the actual killer. There were four individuals in
this trial, and only defendant was convicted of first degree
murder. The jury was instructed, “To constitute a deliberate and
premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the
question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice
and, having in mind the consequences, he decides to and does
kill.” (Italics added.) This language did not instruct that if the
6 At the prima facie hearing, the prosecutor argued it was
clear defendant was the actual killer because he was the only one
of the four convicted of first degree murder, “[s]o he couldn’t have
been convicted under a natural and probable consequences theory
because who else would have been the actual killer for him to be
convicted under the natural and probable consequences theory?”
The argument was faulty, as “[n]onmutual collateral estoppel
does not apply to verdicts in criminal cases.” (People v. Superior
Court (Sparks) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 1, 5.) “[A] verdict regarding one
defendant has no effect on the trial of a different defendant.”
(Ibid.)
10
killing was deliberate and premeditated any person found guilty
by whatever theory must be the slayer, which would be the
inverse of the instruction. “‘[I]t is always possible for a jury to
exercise lenity and acquit some of the defendants while
convicting others who are in fact no more guilty.’” (People v.
Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 865.) Thus, it may be that an
aider and abettor could be convicted of first degree murder while
the actual killer was convicted of second degree murder. (See
People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 163–164.)
The personal use of a knife does not conclusively mean
defendant personally premeditated or intended to kill, as an
enhancement for the personal use of a deadly weapon does not
necessarily establish ineligibility. (See People v. Offley (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 588, 598.) In Offley, the appellate court held the
defendant’s admission he personally and intentionally discharged
a firearm did not constitute an admission he was the actual
perpetrator, and “[b]ecause an enhancement under section
12022.53, subdivision (d) does not require that the defendant
acted either with the intent to kill or with conscious disregard to
life, it does not establish that the defendant acted with malice
aforethought.” (Ibid.) The Offley holding has been extended to
enhancements for personal use of a knife, as in this case, alleged
under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). (People v. Estrada (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 328, 338–339.)
The People here posit similar theories, arguing because the
jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, which requires a
premeditated intent to kill, whereas the natural and probable
consequences theory was based upon aiding and abetting an
assault, the jury necessarily did not base its verdict on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, and thus found he
was the actual killer. “[T]he question is not whether it is likely a
11
defendant could have felt and acted in [a certain] way, but
whether the court’s jury instructions foreclose that possibility as
a matter of law.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 470
(Curiel).)
In its 2014 decision in People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155,
167 (Chiu), the Supreme Court held a defendant may no longer
be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Prior to Chiu, such
a defendant need not intend to kill, premeditate or deliberate so
long as the actual killer had those mental states, as they would
be imputed to him. (See id. at pp. 166–167.) Defendant was
convicted in 2008, and we issued our opinion affirming the
judgment in 2009, well before Chiu. (See Mancera, supra,
B206328.) A conviction of first degree premeditated murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine was
permissible at the time defendant’s jury was so instructed and at
the time his conviction was affirmed.7 After Senate Bill 1437
amended section 188, subdivision (a)(3), the doctrine of natural
and probable consequences could no longer support first or second
degree murder liability. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 462.)
In 2008, the jury was instructed: “A person aids and abets
the commission or attempted commission of a crime when he or
she: [¶] (1) With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and [¶] (2) With the intent or purpose of
7 The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6 is analogous
to habeas corpus proceedings. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971.) We find the facts of this case to be comparable to those of
In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797, a habeas corpus case, and
illustrative of an appropriate prima facie analysis under Chiu,
supra, 59 Cal.4th 155.
12
committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the
crime, and [¶] (3) By act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates the commission of the crime.” The instruction did not
require the aider and abettor to intend to kill or to know the
actual perpetrator intended to kill. The jury could thus have
found defendant guilty of murder if the death occurred in the
course of aiding and abetting an assault.8
Direct “‘aider and abettor liability requires proof in three
distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime
committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s
mens rea’—[including] knowledge that the direct perpetrator
intends to commit the crime or life-endangering act, ‘and (c) the
aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor
that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.’” (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 467.) Here, the instructions did not tell the jury
to evaluate defendant’s individual state of mind or to consider
whether he was an aider and abettor who shared the slayer’s
intent to kill. Thus, “‘the relevant language evokes similar
8 The People refer to trial evidence as summarized in
Mancera, supra, B206328 to argue defendant is ineligible for
resentencing on the murder count as a matter of law. The
argument fails as it relies on factfinding, weighing of evidence,
and credibility determinations. (People v. Lopez, supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at p. 14; see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957,
970–972.) Moreover, trial evidence summarized in appellate
opinions may not be considered either at the prima facie stage
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), or the evidentiary hearing
under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). (People v. Beaudreaux
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238; People v. Bratton (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1100, 1113–1114.)
13
concepts’ but ‘it does not cover all of the elements of direct aiding
and abetting.’” (Id. at pp. 464–465.)
In addition, CALJIC No. 3.00 instructed the jury that all
those involved in committing or attempting to commit a crime are
principals in the crime and regardless of the extent or manner of
participation are equally guilty. When considered in light of all
the instructions given, the jury was essentially told a principal,
even the aider and abettor of an assault with no intent to kill and
foreknowledge of the perpetrator’s intent to kill, was as guilty of
murder or attempted murder as the perpetrator.
Defendant’s petition alleged the information allowed the
prosecution to proceed under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, he was convicted of murder or attempted
murder under that theory, and “could not presently be convicted
of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188
or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” We conclude the record
of conviction did not refute the allegations of defendant’s petition
and thus defendant has made a prima showing of eligibility for
relief under section 1172.6.
DISPOSITION
The March 13, 2024 order denying defendant’s section
1172.6 petition is reversed and the matter is remanded with
directions to issue an order to show cause and proceed with an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to subdivision (d) of section 1172.6.
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J. ASHMANN-GERST, J.
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