People v. Valdivia CA2/2

CourtListener 10593972CalctappMay 28, 2025

Full text

Filed 5/28/25 P. v. Valdivia CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B332634

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA027737
v.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
FERNANDO VILLANUEVA REHEARING AND MODIFYING
VALDIVIA, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant. [No Change in Judgment]

THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on May 1,
2025, is modified as follows.

1. At page 4, line 6, delete the sentence that begins with “The
prosecutor told Valdivia that . . .” and replace with:
The prosecutor told Valdivia that, if he was not a United
States citizen, he “would” be3 deported, excluded from the
United States, or prevented from becoming a citizen, as a
result of a guilty or no contest plea.
_________________
3 The minute order from the March 20, 1996 plea hearing
states that Valdivia was told his plea “may” result in deportation,
2. At page 11, Discussion, part III.A., second paragraph,
delete the second sentence that begins with “The reporter’s
transcript of the March 20 hearing . . .” and replace with:

The reporter’s transcript of the March 20 hearing confirms
that Valdivia was unambiguously informed he would be
deported, excluded or barred from citizenship as a result of
pleading no contest.

There is no change in the judgment.

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

____________________________________________________________
LUI, P. J. ASHMANN-GERST, J. RICHARDSON, J.

_________________
exclusion or denial of naturalization. We rely on the reporter’s
transcript of the plea hearing showing Valdivia was informed
that his plea “would” lead to these consequences.

2
Filed 5/1/25 P. v. Valdivia CA2/2 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B332634

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA027737)
v.

FERNANDO VILLANUEVA
VALDIVIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher L. Haberman, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
In 1996, defendant Fernando Villanueva Valdivia pleaded
no contest to possessing cocaine base for sale and destroying
evidence, and was sentenced to three years’ probation and time
served. In 2023 he moved to set aside his plea, asserting he did
not understand that his plea exposed him to deportation,
exclusion from the United States and denial of citizenship.
Valdivia now appeals from the order denying his motion, and
we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Valdivia’s Two Pleas
On December 22, 1995, Valdivia and his counsel, Antonio
Bestard, attended a hearing in the superior court. Valdivia was
charged with possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11359; count 1), possession of cocaine base for sale
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5; count 2), and destroying evidence
(Pen. Code, § 1351; count 3). Valdivia pleaded not guilty to
count 1 and no contest to count 2. Valdivia was advised that, if he
was not a United States citizen, his plea may lead to his being
deported, excluded from re-entry into the United States and
denied citizenship.2 On January 12, 1996, for reasons that do not
appear in the record, the court heard and granted the
prosecution’s motion to set aside Valdivia’s guilty plea.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

2 The minute order dated December 22, 1995, states that
Valdivia was informed his plea “may” lead to deportation,
exclusion and denial of citizenship. The record does not include a
reporter’s transcript showing the exact language of the warning
Valdivia received on that date. (See fn. 3, post.)

2
On March 20, 1996, Valdivia (along with codefendants
Nicolas Villanueva and Maria Garibay, Villanueva’s wife) was
charged in a second amended information with possession of
cocaine base with intent to sell (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5;
count 2) and destroying evidence (Pen. Code, § 135; count 3). At a
plea hearing that morning Villanueva’s counsel, who was
standing in for Valdivia in Bestard’s absence, described Valdivia’s
situation in response to a question from the court. “Mr. Valdivia
had previously agreed to a six months sentence and what—he
was hung up apparently on a couple of points. [¶] I thought the
major point, that it had to be a package plea for Mr. Villanueva.
And when Mr. Villanueva backed out, Mr. Valdivia couldn’t get
out on his hundred eighty day plea until Mr. Villanueva’s matter
was resolved. [¶] The district attorney tells me today it also went
to the heart of a statement of fact.”
The March 20, 1996 plea hearing focused on a plea deal for
“the least possible harm” to Garibay, which Villanueva insisted
on before he would agree to his own deal. The dominoes quickly
began to fall once Garibay agreed to 90 days Caltrans work in
lieu of 180 days in county jail, after which Villanueva agreed to
his previously negotiated deal. Once Garibay’s and Villanueva’s
deals were resolved, the district attorney informed the court,
“And Mr. Valdivia basically has time served at this point.” The
court ordered counsel to prepare plea forms and to return at 2:30
that afternoon.
Bestard, assisted by a Spanish interpreter, was present at
the afternoon session. In response to the prosecutor’s questions,
Valdivia confirmed that he wanted to plead to count 2, possession
for sale of cocaine base. Valdivia also confirmed the terms of his
agreed sentence, three years’ probation and 201 days in county

3
jail, with credit for 201 days served. He stated on the record that
he had sufficient time to discuss the case with his attorney, and
that he understood the charges against him and the maximum
possible sentence if convicted. The only question Valdivia asked
was for the prosecutor to repeat the maximum sentence if he was
convicted at trial. The prosecutor told Valdivia that, if he was not
a United States citizen, he “would” be3 deported and excluded
from the United States, and prevented from becoming a citizen,
as a result of a guilty or no contest plea. Asked by the prosecutor,
Valdivia confirmed that he understood. Valdivia pleaded no
contest to counts 2 and 3 and was sentenced to the agreed term.
II. Valdivia Moves to Set Aside His Conviction
On February 16, 2023, Valdivia filed a motion to withdraw
his no contest plea pursuant to section 1473.7. In support of his
motion he submitted his declaration in Spanish with an
accompanying English translation, a declaration from
immigration law attorney Araceli Perez-Brizo, three “character
letters” from relatives and friends, and the reporter’s transcript
of the plea hearing on March 20, 1996.
Valdivia stated in his declaration that he left a small town
in Mexico, where he lived in poverty and with little opportunity.
He was “young” at the time of his crimes, did not understand
English and was not familiar with the legal system in this
country. Although he was charged with possession of drugs, the

3 The minute order from the March 20, 1996 plea hearing
states that Valdivia was told his plea “may” result in deportation,
exclusion or denial of naturalization. We rely on the reporter’s
transcript of the plea hearing showing Valdivia was informed
that his plea “would” lead to these consequences.

4
quantity “was a very small amount” that “a reasonable person
could conclude . . . was for personal use.”
Valdivia’s declaration only discussed the March 1996 plea
hearing. According to Valdivia, Bestard never raised the topic of
immigration, residency or nationality. He asserted, “Mr. Bestard
never bargained with the district attorney for an alternate charge
or offer that did not have immigration consequences.” When
Valdivia asked about possibly pleading to a lesser charge,
Bestard’s response was “something to the effect of, this is the
charge, you can’t plead [guilty] to anything else.”
Valdivia further asserted Bestard never spoke to Valdivia
“about the plea deal as it related to immigration consequences or
have any discussion regarding the long term immigration
implications” of the proposed plea deal, and “never informed me
that this conviction would lead to certain deportation from the
U.S. and complete disqualification from any form of immigration
relief.” Valdivia asserted he did not understand any warnings he
received because they were in English. Even the Spanish
interpreter was no help because “the advisements were provided
at the 11th hour, and I did not have time to process and
understand them.”
Finally, Valdivia asserted that had he been advised “of the
devastating immigration consequences” of the plea deal he
accepted, “I would NOT have accepted the plea offer because
retaining the ability to remain in the United States was and is
the most important thing at the time.” He also declared he had
developed “strong ties to the community” at the time of his arrest,
and he wanted to remain in the United States in order to provide
for his son and his parents.

5
II. The Trial Court Hears, and Denies, Valdivia’s Motion
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Valdivia’s
motion on June 5, 2023. Valdivia did not testify and submitted on
his declaration. Called to testify by the prosecution, Bestard
contradicted much of what Valdivia asserted in support of his
motion. For example, Bestard testified that he spoke Spanish and
was able to communicate with Valdivia in that language. He also
testified that in his absence from the morning session of the
March 1996 plea hearing, codefense counsel, who did not speak
Spanish, was able to converse with Valdivia in English. Bestard
testified that he filled out the Tahl4 waiver form and reviewed
every line in the form with Valdivia, assisted by the Spanish
interpreter.
Bestard took issue with Valdivia’s assertion that the
immigration consequences of the proposed plea deal were only
presented at the 11th hour, or that Valdivia was pressured into
making a hasty decision. Bestard testified that he discussed the
plea deal with Valdivia for 30 to 40 minutes. He also testified
that he told Valdivia that if he went to trial and was convicted,
the result might be a prison sentence. Bestard denied Valdivia’s
assertion he had not discussed the immigration consequences of
the proposed plea deal.
In response to a question from the court, Bestard testified
that the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to
possession of cocaine base was “a gray area” at the time of
Valdivia’s plea. Bestard informed Valdivia that he “would” be
subject to removal and exclusion as a result of his plea, and the

4 In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132.

6
commissioner presiding over the hearing also informed Valdivia
he “would” face deportation and exclusion.
Bestard testified that he, along with other defense counsel,
discussed alternative charges with the district attorney’s office.
He also testified that he raised the possibility of Valdivia
pleading to simple possession. Valdivia was “anxious to get out of
custody” and was “anxious” to resolve his case “so he could get
out.”
After taking the motion under submission, the court issued
a written notice of decision denying the motion on the ground
that Valdivia’s declaration “lacks credibility as it is misleading on
many important points.” In a series of numbered paragraphs, the
court highlighted portions of Valdivia’s declaration it found were
inconsistent with the record. For example, in response to
Valdivia’s assertion that his attorney never discussed potential
immigration consequences of a guilty or no contest plea, the court
found that “Mr. Bestard credibly testified that he advised the
defendant of the potential immigration consequences.” Although
Valdivia asserted that the admonishment given by the prosecutor
“was not clear that [Valdivia] would in fact be deported,” the
court found instead that “[t]he District Attorney advised
defendant that he ‘Would be Deported’ instead of ‘May be
Deported’ . . . . By virtue of the use of the word ‘Would,’ the
defendant was told that his deportation was in fact a certainty.”
The court also took issue with Valdivia’s insistence that Bestard
failed to bargain for a better disposition, finding instead that “the
topic of bargaining in fact took place up to the last minute when
both the District Attorney and, most importantly the court,
indicated that the offer was ‘as good as it was going to get.’ ”

7
The court also disagreed with Valdivia’s characterization of
his crime as involving only a “small amount” of drugs that a
“reasonable person” might believe was consistent with “personal
use.” The court instead reviewed the facts showing that, after
receiving a tip about drug trafficking, deputies conducted
surveillance and “documented traffic consistent with narcotic
sales” as well as purchasing cocaine themselves. When they
served a search warrant, deputies observed Valdivia “handing
plastic baggies containing a white substance to a female co-
defendant who stuffed the baggies in the kitchen sink drain and
turned on the garbage disposal,” after which deputies retrieved
“torn plastic baggies and several white rock-like substances
which tested positive for cocaine.”
Finally, the court was not persuaded by Valdivia’s assertion
that, at age 23, he was unfamiliar with the justice system in the
United States and was unaware of the adverse immigration
consequences he was facing. Instead, the court observed that
Valdivia had no legal status and “could simply be deported for
being in the country without documentation.” Under the
circumstances, the court found instead that “[a]ny reasonable
individual in the shoes of the defendant [] had to have known
that a criminal conviction for a drug trafficking offense would be
devastating to his ability to remain in and obtain lawful status in
the United States.” The court afforded little weight to Valdivia’s
assertion he had formed strong ties to the community, noting
instead that Valdivia “submitted no evidence of how long he had
been in the United States prior to his arrest and what ties to the
community he may have formed.”
Valdivia filed a timely notice of appeal from the June 9,
2023 order denying his motion.

8
DISCUSSION
I. The Legal Standard
Valdivia’s conviction for violating Health and Safety Code
section 11351.5 made him subject to removal and exclusion from
the United States under federal immigration law. Effective
January 1, 2017, the Legislature adopted section 1473.7, which
provides in pertinent part that “[a] person who is no longer in
criminal custody may file a motion to vacate a conviction or
sentence” that is “legally invalid due to prejudicial error
damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand,
defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.”
(§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) The statute further provides that a court
“shall” vacate a conviction or sentence upon a showing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, of prejudicial error. (Id.,
subd. (e)(1).) The focus of the inquiry is on the “defendant’s own
error in . . . not knowing that his plea would subject him to
mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United
States.” (People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1009
(Camacho).)
II. Standard of Review
In People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311 (Espinoza), our
Supreme Court held that a party seeking relief under
section 1473.7 must satisfy a two-part test. “The defendant must
first show that he did not meaningfully understand the
immigration consequences of his plea.” (Espinoza, at p. 319.) If he
establishes that lack of understanding, the defendant must then
show his misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error, which
“ ‘means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the
defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had

9
correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
consequences.’ ” (Ibid.; quoting People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th
510, 529 (Vivar).) Valdivia’s decision to plead no contest is
“ ‘ “viewed at the time of the offer. . . .” ’ ” (People v. Martinez
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 564 (Martinez).)
We independently review whether Valdivia proved, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he did not understand the
immigration consequences of his no contest plea to violating
Health and Safety Code section 11351.5. (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) If we find he proved lack of understanding,
we then independently review whether his lack of understanding
constituted prejudicial error. (Id. at p. 321.) “When courts engage
in independent review, they should be mindful that
‘ “[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of de novo
review . . . .” ’ [Citation.] An appellate court may not simply
second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s
own observations.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527.) Instead,
“[w]hen courts engage in independent review, they must give
deference to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are
based on ‘ “ ‘the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard
and observed.’ ” ’ ” (Espinoza, supra, at p. 320; Vivar, supra, at
pp. 527-528 [“In section 1473.7 proceedings, appellate courts
should . . . give particular deference to factual findings based on
the trial court’s personal observations of witnesses”].) “But when
the trial court’s findings ‘derive entirely from written
declarations and other documents,’ the trial court and the
reviewing court ‘ “are in the same position,” ’ and no deference is
owed.” (Espinoza, at p. 320.) Here, the trial court concluded
Bestard was a credible witness after observing his testimony, and
determined Valdivia’s declaration was not credible. Consistent

10
with Espinoza and Vivar, we defer to the trial court’s finding that
Bestard testified credibly, and we review the record
independently to assess the credibility of Valdivia’s declaration.
III. Valdivia Did Not Establish, by a Preponderance of
the Evidence, That He Did Not Understand the
Immigration Consequences of His Plea
A. Valdivia’s Declaration Is at Odds With the
Record
Addressing Valdivia’s declaration, we begin by noting he
omits any reference to his first plea deal in December 1995. The
minute order from the December 1995 plea hearing shows that
Valdivia was charged with not one but two Health and Safety
Code violations, but was allowed to plead no contest to only the
charge of possessing cocaine base for sale. This suggests that
Bestard was bargaining on Valdivia’s behalf months before
March 20, 1996, and corroborates Bestard’s testimony to that
effect. The December 1995 minute order also shows that Valdivia
was warned of immigration consequences resulting from his plea,
which casts doubt on his assertion that the immigration
consequences of pleading no contest were not called to his
attention until the March 20, 1996 plea hearing.
Valdivia’s version of the events of March 20, 1996, is not
only at odds with Bestard’s testimony, but with the record of that
hearing as well. The reporter’s transcript of the March 20 hearing
confirms that Valdivia was unambiguously informed he would be
deported, excluded and barred from citizenship as a result of
pleading no contest. When asked by the prosecutor, Valdivia
affirmed that he had discussed the charges with Bestard, that he
had had adequate time to do so, and that he understood the
consequences of his plea. Throughout, he had the assistance of a

11
Spanish-language interpreter as well as Spanish-speaking
counsel. We agree with the trial court that Valdivia’s declaration
does not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Valdivia was not advised of the consequences of pleading no
contest, or that he was advised but did not understand the
warnings given him.
B. Valdivia’s Declaration Is Uncorroborated
The next step in our independent review is whether other
evidence accompanying Valdivia’s declaration corroborates his
assertion that he would never have accepted a plea deal that
could lead to his deportation and exclusion from this country.
“[W]hen a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea based on
inadequate advisement of immigration consequences, we have
long required the defendant corroborate such assertions with
‘ “objective evidence.” ’ ” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530;
Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 316 [same].) Examples of such
corroborating “objective evidence” include evidence of Valdivia’s
ties to the United States, whether Valdivia had reason to believe
an immigration-safe plea bargain was possible, and the
probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if he rejected
the plea and went to trial. (Espinoza, at p. 320.) We address
Valdivia’s evidence supporting each of these factors.
“A defendant’s deep and long-standing ties to the United
States are among the totality of circumstances that can support
an inference that immigration consequences were of paramount
concern at the time of the defendant’s guilty plea.” (Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323.) The defendant in Vivar, for example,
was a legal permanent resident who had arrived in the United
States at age six. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 517, 530.) He
had learned English, attended local schools, and participated in a

12
junior officer training program in the hope of following an older
sibling into the United States military. (Id. at pp. 518, 530.) The
defendant in Espinoza had come to the United States at age 13
and had lived in California for 23 years. He had a wife and five
children who were United States citizens, his parents and
siblings lived in this country, and he was the financial provider
for his extended family. “He ran his own business to provide for
his family[,] [h]e volunteered, went to church, and took part in
numerous community organizations.” (Espinoza, at p. 323.) The
defendant in People v. Lopez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 561 (Lopez),
was a legal permanent resident of the United States at the time
of his arrest. Lopez’s immediate family lived in the United
States, including his parents and his four children, all of whom
were citizens. (Id. at p. 569.) Lopez was also the sole source of
support for his girlfriend and one of his minor children. (Ibid.)
By contrast, Valdivia provided almost no evidence to
support his assertion that he had formed strong “community ties”
at the time he entered his plea. Valdivia had no legal status in
the United States at the time of his arrest. There is no evidence
of when he arrived in the United States, other than his counsel’s
statement that “Mr. Valdivia had been in the United States for
only a short period of time when he was arrested.” Valdivia’s
declaration is silent as to his activities while in this country other
than the crimes for which he was arrested. He refers to a son, yet
does not disclose whether his son was born prior to Valdivia’s no
contest plea. Valdivia’s three “community letters” refer to
Valdivia’s “ties to the community” without describing what those
ties were. We see no evidence that at the time of his no contest
plea, Valdivia had formed such deep ties to the United States

13
that he would forego a plea deal that would lead to his release the
same day.
The existence of an alternative, immigration-safe plea is
another factor relevant to assessing Valdivia’s assertion that,
properly advised, he would not have accepted his plea deal. There
is no evidence in the record, other than Valdivia’s uncorroborated
declaration, to support his contention that Bestard failed to
bargain with the prosecution for an immigration-safe plea deal.
We afford little weight to a declaration the trial court found
lacked credibility, written by a declarant who does not
understand English and is unfamiliar with the legal system,
asserting that counsel did not bargain towards an immigration-
safe plea.
Valdivia’s declaration alone is not enough to show that an
immigration-safe plea deal was available, but Valdivia also offers
a declaration by his immigration attorney. In People v. Bautista
(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 229, 238-240, the defendant submitted a
declaration from an immigration law attorney who not only
identified a specific immigration-safe charge to which the
defendant might have pleaded, but informed the court that he
believed the prosecution would have accepted this plea based on
other cases he had handled or in which he had been consulted.
Likewise, in Vivar, “[t]rial counsel’s contemporaneous notes
indicate the prosecution offered a deal under which Vivar would
plead guilty to a single count of burglary [citation] with a
recommendation that he serve the low term of two years in state
prison,” and “the uncontradicted declaration from Vivar’s
immigration expert stated that Vivar could’ve entered such a plea
without subjecting himself to mandatory deportation.” (Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 531.)

14
Valdivia’s reliance on the declaration of his immigration
counsel is misplaced, because nowhere in her declaration does
she discuss alternative immigration-safe pleas. Valdivia’s motion
counsel speculates that “the District Attorney’s office might have
been amenable to an alternative plea agreement given the
relatively small amount of drugs,” without ever explaining why
the prosecutor would reward Valdivia for successfully destroying
most of the evidence of drug trafficking. On appeal, Valdivia
suggests he might have been able to plead to first degree
burglary. That, too, is mere speculation. (People v. Abdelsalam
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 654, 665 (Abdelsalam) [“[defendant’s]
counsel now engages in speculation that he could have pled to
burglary, without any citation from the record indicating that
disposition would have been entertained by the prosecutor”].) We
conclude that Valdivia has not shown that an immigration-safe
plea deal was available at the time he entered his no contest plea.
Still another factor is the probability of obtaining a better
outcome had Valdivia gone to trial, as well as the difference
between the likely outcome and the bargained-for term. Once
again, Valdivia’s evidence falls short. We would expect to see, at a
minimum, an expert declaration setting out the likely range of
outcomes for a first-time offender facing the same charges as
Valdivia. Instead, the record includes the prosecutor’s comment
that Valdivia could expect a sentence of five years six months, as
well as the court’s comments that the prosecution’s offers were
“bottom line” and the best outcome Valdivia and his codefendants
could hope to receive. At the hearing on Valdivia’s motion, the
trial court commented on his contemporaneous experience, when
“back then an 11351.5 conviction you go to state prison for almost
in one hundred percent of the cases” and “back then this was the

15
height of the cocaine and—heavy, heavy sentences were being
handed down.”
Valdivia argues on appeal that the prosecutor’s case may
not have been strong, but that is both speculative and
unpersuasive. Valdivia’s assertion that drugs on the scene were
for personal use ignores the fact that sheriff’s deputies were
apparently ready to testify that they conducted surveillance and
observed traffic consistent with trafficking, and that an
undercover operative actually purchased drugs from Valdivia and
his co-defendants. Valdivia’s assertion that only a small amount
of drugs was found invites us to forget that he and his
codefendants stuffed plastic baggies filled with a white substance
down a garbage disposal when deputies entered with a search
warrant. The case against Valdivia does not sound weak or easily
defensible. “A defendant convinced he or she is unlikely to avoid
conviction thus might have few reservations about accepting a
plea bargain that offers significant benefits over the probable
consequences of proceeding to trial.” (Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th
at p. 564.)
Valdivia is also ignoring the fact he had no legal right to be
in the United States in the first place. He was not facing a choice
between pleading no contest and being deported, and going to
trial and remaining in the United States. Valdivia’s best chance
to remain in the United States was to accept a plea deal
providing for his release from custody that same day, a point the
trial court made during oral argument. “You go to state prison.
You will be deported. You have a chance if you went to county jail
that immigration would not find out because he did go to county
jail and immigration wasn’t waiting for him.” As the court
explained in Martinez, “[t]he defendant thus must convince the

16
court he or she would have chosen to lose the benefits of the plea
bargain despite the possibility or probability deportation would
nonetheless follow.” (Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 565.) The
trial court found it not credible that Valdivia would have chosen
to forego the plea bargain. We conclude the record, viewed
independently, affords us no basis on which to find otherwise.
IV. Valdivia’s Authorities Are Distinguishable
Valdivia cites a number of cases in which similar pleas
were set aside based on a showing of lack of understanding. His
inability to provide credible (or corroborating) evidence to support
his motion shows that his circumstances differ markedly from the
facts of the cases he relies on. For example, the defendant in
Espinoza pleaded no contest in reliance on the assurance of his
counsel’s assistant that “if he pleaded no contest, ‘everything was
going to be fine.’ ” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 318.)
Espinoza’s counsel never advised him about the consequences of
pleading no contest. The trial court advised Espinoza that
conviction “may” have adverse immigration consequences. (Ibid.)
In People v. Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, the
defendant’s counsel advised him that he would have an
immigration hearing following his no contest plea, but not that he
was virtually certain to be deported. (Id. at p. 898.) The
defendant initialed a form stating he understood that “ ‘I must
expect my plea of guilty or no contest will result in my
deportation,’ ” but explained that because of a visual impairment
he was unable to read the form, and only signed it based on his
counsel’s assurance that “it covered everything we had already
talked about.” (Id. at pp. 899, 901.) Camacho is also
distinguishable. There, although the defendant was advised that
his plea “will result” in immigration consequences, defense

17
counsel testified he advised his client that the charge could
subject him to deportation, that he could protect his client by
moving to expunge his record and reduce the charge to a
misdemeanor, that he misunderstood the potential immigration
consequences and the effect of expungement or reductions of
felonies in immigration cases; and that he did not explore
possible alternatives to pleading to an aggravated felony.
(Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003.) Moreover, unlike
our case, where the trial court expressly found Valdivia’s
declaration lacked credibility, the trial court in Camacho made
“no express or implied credibility determination for or against
defendant.” (Id. at p. 1009.) The defendant in People v. Ruiz
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1065-1066, was advised that
pleading guilty to violating Health and Safety Code
section 11351.5—the same charge to which Valdivia pleaded—
“may,” not “will” or “would,” lead to immigration consequences.
Finally, the defendant in People v. Rodriguez (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 995, 1000, had negotiated what should have been
an immigration-safe plea deal, but was subject to being deported
when, without his knowledge, he received a longer sentence than
what was agreed to.
The case most helpful to Valdivia is Lopez. There, the
defendant was advised that his guilty plea would result in
deportation and exclusion, and he initialed a Tahl waiver form
that included a statement to that effect. Unlike our case,
however, trial counsel confirmed he had discussed the Tahl
waiver for only “ ‘a minute or two’ ” and had not discussed the
immigration warning at all before Lopez initialed it. (Lopez,
supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.) Lopez was not assisted by an
interpreter, meaning “[i]t is at best unclear that Lopez read or

18
understood what he was initialing.” (Ibid.) Moreover, not all of
the felony counts Lopez was charged with carried adverse
immigration consequences, but counsel’s lack of understanding of
the immigration consequences of each charge meant he lacked
knowledge to negotiate the best deal from an immigration
standpoint. The Court of Appeal concluded that, had counsel
known the immigration consequences of the various charges,
“there is at least some possibility that he could have negotiated
an immigration-neutral plea offer the prosecution was more
likely to accept.” (Lopez, at p. 565.)
Valdivia’s circumstances are sufficiently distinguishable
from Lopez’s that we reach a different result. First, Bestard
testified that at the March 20, 1996 plea hearing—which was the
second plea hearing with Valdivia—he spent half an hour to
40 minutes explaining the Tahl waiver, and did so with the
assistance of a Spanish interpreter. Thus, the reasons why the
court in Lopez had doubts whether the defendant understood the
immigration warnings he received are not present in Valdivia’s
case. Second, Valdivia pleaded to only one deportable charge, and
while Bestard incorrectly stated that the immigration
consequences of the plea were a “gray area,” he nonetheless
correctly informed Valdivia that a no contest plea “would” lead to
deportation and exclusion. Third, while there were indications in
Lopez that an immigration-safe plea bargain acceptable to the
prosecution could have been reached, there is no similar evidence
in the record before us.
After reviewing the cases cited by both sides, we believe the
facts of Valdivia’s case are closest to those in Abdelsalam. The
defendant in Abdelsalam contended that his attorney did not
explain the immigration consequences of his plea, and that he

19
would not have entered the plea had he known of those
consequences. Affirming the order denying relief, the Court of
Appeal stated, “During the taking of the plea, [the defendant]
was told orally and in writing that he will be deported. Not that
he ‘might’ be deported, or that he ‘could’ be deported. [The
defendant’s] argument that he was not aware of the mandatory
nature of the deportation flies in the face of the mandatory
language used to describe the likelihood of deportation. [The
defendant] is not entitled to simply ignore the admonitions he
was given about the consequences of the plea, and argue that he
unilaterally assumed he would be treated in direct contravention
of what he was advised orally and in writing.” (Abdelsalam,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 663.)5
V. Bestard Was Not Ineffective
Valdivia asserts that Bestard’s representation of him at the
March 20, 1996 plea hearing was ineffective, and resulted in him

5 Following the close of briefing, Valdivia’s counsel called our
attention to People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950. There,
our colleagues in Division Seven reversed an order denying a
section 1473.7 motion by an asylee who pleaded no contest to
carjacking. The Court of Appeal pointed to evidence that the
defendant, a human rights activist from Cuba, was suffering from
PTSD at the time of his plea, including his counsel’s
contemporaneous notes that the defendant was “still going out
nuts.” (Id. at p. 961.) In addition to evidence that the defendant
was unable to understand the immigration consequences of his
plea, the defendant in Padron submitted credible evidence of
significant family ties to the United States, showing that he
would not have accepted a plea deal that would result in
deportation or exclusion had he been able to make an informed
choice. (Id. at pp. 962-963.) Valdivia’s evidence is not comparable
in weight, character or credibility.

20
accepting a plea bargain without fully understanding the
immigration consequences of that bargain. We reject out of hand
Valdivia’s assertions that Bestard performed incompetently by
failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of his no
contest plea, by failing to negotiate an immigration-safe plea, and
by failing to investigate Valdivia’s immigration status. We
address only Valdivia’s assertion he was prejudiced by Bestard’s
failure to investigate the immigration consequences of pleading
no contest to violating Health and Safety Code section 11351.5.
“When a convicted defendant complains of the
ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show
that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
687-688 (Strickland).) If so, we then consider “whether the
defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is,
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
(People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211; see also
Strickland, at p. 694 [“The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”].)
The trial court observed that Bestard was incorrect when
he testified that the consequences of pleading no contest to a
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5 was a “gray
area.” Citing People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470,
Valdivia insists that by failing to investigate, Bestard performed
incompetently, resulting in prejudice. We are not persuaded. “By
her own admission [Soriano’s counsel] merely warned the
defendant that his plea might have immigration consequences.
Had she researched the matter she would have known that his
guilty plea . . . made him deportable.” (Id. at p. 1482.) This

21
obviously differs from the facts before us. Even if Bestard
incorrectly believed the immigration consequences of a no contest
plea were unclear, he advised Valdivia—correctly—that his plea
would lead to deportation and exclusion. Thus, Valdivia suffered
no prejudice from Bestard’s misunderstanding. “When there has
been no showing of prejudice, we need not determine whether
trial counsel’s performance was deficient.” (In re Marquez (1992)
1 Cal.4th 584, 602.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order dated June 9, 2023, denying Valdivia’s
motion for relief under section 1473.7.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

LUI, P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

22

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.