Escamilla v. Perry CA4/3

CourtListener 10593099CalctappMay 27, 2025

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Filed 5/27/25 Escamilla v. Perry CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

DANIEL ESCAMILLA,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G063857

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-01321288)

MICHAEL RAYMOND PERRY et al., OPINION

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Deborah C. Servino, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
with instructions.
Law Offices of Seth M. Goldberg and Seth M. Goldberg for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
The Perry Law Firm, Matthew J. Bertolucci, and Larry M.
Roberts for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
This case arises from a judgment of dismissal following an anti-
SLAPP motion. The litigation history giving rise to the anti-SLAPP motion is
somewhat convoluted. Its genesis was an explosion at a restaurant in which
one of the owners was badly injured. Defendants are long-standing attorneys
for the owners of the restaurant. Plaintiff Escamilla had an intermittent
working relationship with the owners in various capacities. After the
explosion, Escamilla attempted to take over the owners’ media and legal
response. Defendant Perry asserted that Escamilla was engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law and was ultimately able to wrest control of the
owners’ media and legal response from Escamilla.
Escamilla then sued defendants for, among other things, slander.
Defendants responded with a cross-complaint for intentional interference
with economic and contractual relations. Escamilla, in turn, filed an anti-
SLAPP motion (not the one at issue here), which the trial court granted,
dismissing the cross-complaint. We affirmed that dismissal in a prior appeal.
(Perry v. Escamilla (Dec. 16, 2022, G060957) [nonpub. opn.] (Perry I)) We
concluded that defendants had not shown a probability of prevailing on the
merits because defendants, the attorneys, had not been harmed by
Escamilla’s conduct; if anything, they stood to receive additional attorney fees
for having to clean up Escamilla’s “mess.”
Escamilla then turned around and filed the complaint at issue
here for malicious prosecution and abuse of process (a SLAPPback action).
The malicious prosecution claim is based on the filing of the cross-complaint
that was the subject of the prior appeal. The abuse of process claim is based
on a subpoena defendants issued in connection with Escamilla’s prior
complaint (for slander) in which defendants sought Escamilla’s State Bar
records. In response to the SLAPPback action, defendants filed the anti-

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SLAPP motion at issue here. The trial court granted the motion, concluding
that Escamilla had failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing because
he could not show the underlying cross complaint lacked probable cause, and
he could not show defendants had acted with malice. Escamilla appealed.
We reverse in part and affirm in part. With respect to three of the
four defendants (Michael Perry, Larry Roberts, and The Perry Law Firm), the
anti-SLAPP motion was untimely. The court erroneously ruled that it was
timely. Due to its error, the court never considered whether to exercise its
discretion to consider an untimely anti-SLAPP motion. We will remand with
instructions to do so. With respect to defendant Christopher Hoo, the anti-
SLAPP motion was timely.
On the merits, we conclude the court erred in dismissing
Escamilla’s malicious prosecution claims. This court’s prior finding that
defendants’ cross-complaint lacked even minimal merit was sufficient to
establish at least prima facie evidence that defendants lacked probable cause.
Moreover, our high court has held that bringing an action without probable
cause permits an inference of malice. That inference, though it may
ultimately be rejected by the trier of fact, is sufficient to clear the low hurdle
of prima facie evidence. The court erred in concluding Escamilla failed to
establish a probability of prevailing on his malicious prosecution claims.
However, we agree with the court that Escamilla failed to show a
probability of prevailing on his abuse of process claim. Although the
subpoena defendants issued to the State Bar may have been overbroad, it
had a facially legitimate purpose, and there was no evidence that defendants
propounded the subpoena for an improper purpose.

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Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court’s ruling on the
malicious prosecution claims, affirm as to the abuse of process claim against
Hoo, and remand for the court to consider whether to accept the late filing
from the remaining defendants.
FACTS
I.
THE RESTAURANT EXPLODES; PERRY AND ESCAMILLA VIE FOR CONTROL OVER
THE OWNERS’ RESPONSE

On October 5, 2019, three electrical transformers owned and
operated by Southern California Edison (SCE) exploded inside a concrete
vault located at the Old World Restaurant (Old World) in Huntington Beach.
There were multiple injuries, but the most seriously injured was Bern
Bischof, one of the owners of Old World, who suffered third-degree burns and
was rushed to an intensive care unit.
Escamilla claims he arrived minutes after the explosion and
accompanied Bischof in the ambulance together with Bischof’s sister, Cyndie
Kasko. The next morning, Kasko asked Escamilla to give a statement to the
news media, who were congregating in the Old World parking lot. Escamilla
claims he “was specifically asked to be the Old World spokesperson regarding
the incident.” Defendants claim Escamilla was given only “limited authority
on behalf of [Kasko], [Bischof], and [Old World], to make a statement to the
media that the family was appreciative of the outpouring of support, and to
voice support for the other injured individuals.”
Subsequently, Escamilla acted as the “legal liaison” for Old
World. In that capacity, he met with an inspector from the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and representatives of Southern
California Edison (SCE). Escamilla retained a forensic expert to observe

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SCE’s remediation of the explosion area and to ensure the preservation of
evidence.
The following day, Perry arrived at Old World, and with
profanity-laced shouting, accused Escamilla of practicing law without a
license. (Perry claims he resorted to shouting and profanity because
Escamilla was attempting to prevent him from speaking with Kasko.) From
that point on, Old World and the owners ceased working with Escamilla and
instead had Perry serve as the point person for their media and legal
response.
II.
ESCAMILLA AND PERRY SUE EACH OTHER; PERRY’S CROSS-COMPLAINT IS
DISMISSED AS A SLAPP; THE DISMISSAL IS AFFIRMED
About a month later, in November 2019, Escamilla sued Perry
and his law firm (The Perry Law Firm) for, among other things, slander,
alleging Perry “falsely accus[ed] [Escamilla] of ‘practicing law without a
license’ . . . .” Sometime around March 2019, Perry and his firm filed a cross
complaint against Escamilla, asserting causes of action for intentional
interference with contractual and economic relations.
In response to the cross complaint, Escamilla filed an anti-
SLAPP motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.1 The trial
court granted Escamilla’s motion. On the first step of the anti-SLAPP
analysis, the trial court found Escamilla carried his burden to show
appellants’ claims arose from protected activity. On the second step of the
analysis, the court found appellants had not met their burden to show a
probability of prevailing because they had not demonstrated an existing

1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure

unless stated otherwise.

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contract between Perry and any of the third parties, nor independently
wrongful conduct by Escamilla as required for economic interference claims,
nor evidence of actual harm. Perry and his firm appealed.
In Perry I, a panel of this court affirmed the dismissal of
defendants’ cross-complaint. It was undisputed that Escamilla’s conduct
arose out of protected activity, and thus the focus was on whether Perry and
his firm had demonstrated a probability of success on the merits. This court
concluded they had not because they did not have a viable theory of damages.
The court explained, “The facts alleged have more to do with harm
potentially suffered by the third parties as opposed to appellants, as a result
of the alleged ‘mess’ created by Escamilla. Appellants have not alleged a loss
specific to their business involving a client or retention for services to be
performed. On the contrary, the record is clear appellants’ economic
relationship with the third parties, as it relates to the underlying explosion
incident, proceeded and could even have been galvanized by Escamilla’s
conduct . . . . [¶] Appellants also do not allege a diminution in recovery of
their attorney fees. Indeed, the record could reasonably be read to support the
opposite conclusion—i.e., that the alleged ‘mess’ created by Escamilla
generated additional fees for appellants because of additional attorney
services necessitated by his conduct.”
III.
ESCAMILLA SUES FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND ABUSE OF PROCESS; THE
TRIAL COURT GRANTS AN ANTI-SLAPP MOTION
Subsequently, in April 2023, Escamilla filed the action at issue
here, which he characterized as a “SLAPPback” action under section 425.18.
He asserted causes of action for malicious prosecution (counts 1-3) and abuse
of process (count 4) against Perry, his firm, and two attorneys at his firm

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(Christopher Hoo and Larry M. Roberts). The malicious prosecution counts
were based on the cross-complaint that had previously been dismissed. The
abuse of process count was based on a subpoena duces tecum from the
underlying litigation that defendants had served upon the State Bar of
California. The trial court had quashed the subpoena, concluding it was
overbroad.
The defendants stipulated that defendants Perry, The Perry Law
Firm, and Roberts were served with the complaint on May 10, 2023.
Defendant Hoo agreed to be served via e-mail on June 8, 2023 (these dates
will prove to be important).
In response, defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion on October
6, 2023, which is the subject of this appeal. The court granted the motion.
The court concluded that the 120-day deadline for an anti-SLAPP motion in
response to a SLAPPback action applied and that the defendants’ motions
were timely. The court concluded Escamilla had failed to show a probability
of prevailing on the merits because Perry’s underlying interference claims
were supported by probable cause and there was no evidence that defendants
acted with malice. Escamilla appealed from the ensuing judgment.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Escamilla claims the court erred in granting the anti-
SLAPP motion for three reasons: (1) the motion was untimely, (2) the
“illegality exception” barred the anti-SLAPP motion, and (3) he demonstrated
a probability of prevailing on the merits. We address each in turn.

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I.
THE MOTIONS WERE UNTIMELY AS TO PERRY, PERRY’S FIRM, AND ROBERTS; WE
REMAND FOR THE COURT TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION
Section 425.18 governs special motions to strike filed in response
to a SLAPPback, which is defined as “any cause of action for malicious
prosecution or abuse of process arising from the filing or maintenance of a
prior cause of action that has been dismissed pursuant to a special motion to
strike under Section 425.16.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.18, subd. (b)(1).) An anti-
SLAPP motion to strike a SLAPPback must be filed within 120 days of
service of the complaint, or, at the court’s discretion, within six months. (§
425.18, subd. (d)(1)(A)–(B).) By contrast, a standard anti-SLAPP motion must
be filed within 60 days of service, though the court has discretion to accept a
later filing. (§ 425.16, subd. (f).)
As an initial matter, Escamilla contends that only his malicious
prosecution claims qualify as a SLAPPback, and that his abuse of process
claim is subject to the shorter 60-day deadline. We disagree.
We reject Escamilla’s argument that only part of his complaint
qualifies as a SLAPPback. In his complaint, Escamilla expressly alleged:
“This action is a SLAPPback action under . . . section 425.18 because each
cause of action for malicious prosecution arises from the filing or
maintenance of a prior cause of action that has been dismissed pursuant to a
special motion to strike under Section 425.16.” By this language, Escamilla
identified the entire action—not just specific causes of action—as a
SLAPPback. Although the basis for that designation may have been the
malicious prosecution claims, Escamilla cannot represent to defendants that
the entire lawsuit is a SLAPPback and then later seek to impose a shorter
filing deadline by narrowing that designation. Accordingly, we consider him

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estopped from denying that the entire action is subject to the SLAPPback
framework. (Evid. Code, § 623 [“Whenever a party has, by his own statement
or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular
thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out
of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.”].) Thus, the 120-day
deadline applies.
Even under that longer deadline, however, defendants Perry, The
Perry Law Firm, and Roberts filed their motion late. They were served with
the complaint on May 10, 2023. 120 days later was Thursday, September 7,
but they did not serve their anti-SLAPP motion until October 6, 2023. The
trial court concluded defendants had satisfied the 120-day deadline, but the
court did not explain how it performed that calculation, and we are aware of
no calculation that would support it.
But that is not the end of the analysis. The court had discretion
to accept a late filing from Perry, The Perry Law Firm, and Roberts. (§
425.18, subd. (d)(1)(B).) And there certainly are grounds in this case that
would support the court permitting a late filing. The defendants, who
essentially acted in concert, were served at different times. And Escamilla
never filed a proof of service, but instead resorted to more informal e-mail
agreements. Moreover, there does not appear to be any harm to Escamilla in
accepting a late motion. These circumstances would support the court
exercising its discretion to permit a relatively short extension (less than one
month) of the filing deadline. But it is ultimately the trial court’s decision,
and thus we will remand for the court to exercise its discretion.
The result is different for defendant Hoo. Hoo was served on June
8, 2023. 120 days later was October 6, which was the exact day defendants
filed their motion. Hoo’s motion was thus timely.

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II.
THE ILLEGALITY PROHIBITION DOES NOT APPLY
Escamilla further argues that, beyond being untimely, the anti-
SLAPP motions were barred as a matter of law. Section 425.18 includes a
narrow prohibition on anti-SLAPP motions in SLAPPback actions where the
underlying lawsuit was illegal. Subdivision (h) provides: “A special motion to
strike may not be filed against a SLAPPback by a party whose filing or
maintenance of the prior cause of action from which the SLAPPback arises
was illegal as a matter of law.” To illustrate the statute’s scope, consider a
hypothetical in which a corporation files a lawsuit that is wholly unlawful
and intended solely to chill a protestor’s speech. The court dismisses that
lawsuit as a SLAPP. If the protestor later brings a malicious prosecution
action—the SLAPPback—the corporation would be barred from filing an anti-
SLAPP motion in that subsequent case. In such circumstances, the illegality
of the original action categorically precludes the use of the anti-SLAPP
procedure in the SLAPPback.
However, for the illegality prohibition to apply, the illegality
must either be undisputed or conclusively established as a matter of law.
(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 285 [“if a
defendant’s assertedly protected constitutional activity is alleged to have
been illegal and, therefore, outside the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute, the
illegality must be established as a matter of law either through the
defendant’s concession or because the illegality is conclusively established by
the evidence presented in connection with the motion to strike.”].)
Here, defendants dispute that their cross-complaint was unlawful,
and thus we may apply the illegality prohibition only if Escamilla’s evidence
established that their maintenance of the underlying cross-complaint was

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unlawful as a matter of law. Escamilla points to three statutes that he
contends rendered the defendants’ cross-complaint illegal as a matter of law.
A. Business and Professions Code section 6060.25
Escamilla first relies on Business and Professions Code section
6060.25, which protects the confidentiality of certain information in State
Bar admission records. He contends that defendants’ subpoena for his State
Bar file violated this statute and was therefore illegal (we discuss the
subpoena in detail below). But even assuming the subpoena was improper,
the illegality prohibition bars anti-SLAPP motions only where the “cause of
action” giving rise to the SLAPPback was illegal as a matter of law. (§ 425.18,
subd. (h) (italics added).) A discovery subpoena is not a cause of action. And
section 6060.25 has no bearing on the legal viability of defendants’
underlying tortious interference causes of action. Accordingly, this statute
cannot support application of the illegality prohibition.
B. Labor Code section 1102.5
Next, Escamilla points to Labor Code section 1102.5, which,
broadly speaking, prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee
for whistleblowing. Escamilla contends the entire cross-complaint ran afoul of
this section. What Escamilla never explains, however, is how he and
defendants formed an employment relationship, which is a necessary
condition to applying Labor Code section 1102.5. Escamilla may have had an
employment relationship with the restaurant owners at some point, but there
is nothing to suggest such a relationship with defendants. And defendants’
underlying cross-complaint sought damages for themselves, not to vindicate
any rights of the owners. In the absence of an employment relationship,
Labor Code section 1102.5 does not apply.

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C. Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
Lastly, Escamilla cites Rule 3.1, subdivision (a)(1), of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, which states, “A lawyer shall not: [¶] bring or continue
an action, conduct a defense, assert a position in litigation, or take an appeal,
without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously
injuring any person . . . .”
This argument, too, fails to reckon with the plain language of the
rule. Rule 3.1 is violated only if the lawyer asserts a litigation position “for the
purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person . . . .” Even if we
accept, arguendo, that defendants cannot show the underlying cross-complaint
was supported by probable cause, there is nothing in the record to conclusively
establish that defendants filed their action for the purpose of harassment or
injury, and defendants dispute that allegation.
Because none of the laws relied on by Escamilla rendered the
underlying cross-complaint illegal as a matter of law, the illegality
prohibition under section 425.18, subdivision (h), does not apply.
III.
ESCAMILLA SHOWED A PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING ON THE MERITS
Having concluded defendants’ motions were not barred by the
illegality prohibition, we turn to the merits of the anti-SLAPP motion.
The anti-SLAPP statute provides: “A cause of action against a
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right
of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a
special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) requires the

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court to engage in a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the
defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action
is one arising from protected activity. . . . . If the court finds such a showing
has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a
probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer
Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)
Here, there is essentially no dispute that Escamilla’s SLAPPback
action arises out of protected activity: he sued defendants for having sued
him. We thus proceed to the second phase, which is whether Escamilla has
established a probability of prevailing on his claims.
In the second phase of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the burden
shifts to the plaintiff . . . to establish a probability it will prevail on the claim.
[Citation.] The plaintiff need only state and substantiate a legally sufficient
claim. [Citation.] The plaintiff’s evidence is accepted as true; the defendant’s
evidence is evaluated to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s showing as a
matter of law. [Citation.] The procedure is meant to prevent abusive SLAPP
suits, while allowing ‘claims with the requisite minimal merit [to] proceed.’”
(City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420.) “Put another way,
the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient
and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’”
(Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
We turn now to the elements Escamilla was required to establish
for his causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process.
A. Malicious Prosecution
“To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must
show that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the

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defendant and was pursued to a legal termination favorable to the plaintiff;
(2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.”
(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 292 (Soukup)
“The question of probable cause is ‘whether as an objective matter, the prior
action was legally tenable or not.’ [Citation.] ‘A litigant will lack probable
cause for his action either if he relies upon facts which he has no reasonable
cause to believe to be true, or if he seeks recovery upon a legal theory which
is untenable under the facts known to him.’ [Citation.] ‘In a situation of
complete absence of supporting evidence, it cannot be adjudged reasonable to
prosecute a claim.’” (Ibid.) “‘The “malice” element . . . relates to the subjective
intent or purpose with which the defendant acted in initiating the prior
action. [Citation.] The motive of the defendant must have been something
other than that of bringing a perceived guilty person to justice or the
satisfaction in a civil action of some personal or financial purpose. [Citation.]
The plaintiff must plead and prove actual ill will or some improper ulterior
motive.’” (Ibid.)
Escamilla contends defendants lacked probable cause to bring the
interference claims as demonstrated by the fact that the action was dismissed
as a SLAPP, which was affirmed on appeal on the ground that defendants
had no viable damages theory. Defendants respond by arguing (1) the ruling
dismissing the cross complaint as a SLAPP is “inadmissible,” and (2)
defendants presented evidence in this action (which, they explain, they had to
omit in the prior action for tactical reasons) that demonstrates a viable
damages theory. We conclude Escamilla has at least made a prima facie case
that the underlying cross complaint lacked probable cause.

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Defendants’ argument that the SLAPP ruling is inadmissible is
based on section 425.16, subdivision (b)(3), which states, “If the court
determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that the plaintiff
will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that
determination shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case,
or in any subsequent action . . . .” However, defendants get the statute
backwards. This statute applies if a plaintiff (which, in this case, would be
defendants as cross-complainants below) establishes a probability of
prevailing on the merits. Defendants did the opposite: they failed to establish
a probability of prevailing. As a result, this statute simply does not apply.
Defendants’ argument that subsequent evidence establishes
probable cause for the underlying tortious interference claims is based on a
declaration submitted by Bern Bischof in support of defendants’ anti-SLAPP
motion. Bischof declared, “but for Daniel Escamilla’s actions, I would have
asked The Perry Law Firm . . . to handle the following tasks following the
incident . . . .: discussions with any Cal-OSHA Investigator and/or the media,
communicating with [Southern California Edison] (until I engaged a personal
injury attorney) and the Old World management team, and coordinating
referrals to personal injury attorneys. However, Daniel Escamilla usurped all
of this work from The Perry Law Firm . . . .” As to why Bischof did not
provide similar testimony in the underlying cross-complaint, he attested,
“Previously, Mr. Perry was limited to what he was authorized to provide the
Court regarding his representation of [Old World] and my family members
due to the recently concluded litigation with Southern California Edison. The
matter is now concluded, and I am able to provide full and complete details of
Mr. Perry’s representation of WCSL and my family members while not
waiving the attorney-client privilege.”

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While Bischof’s declaration may be helpful evidence for
defendants as this litigation continues, it does not defeat Escamilla’s showing
as a matter of law. Bischof’s credibility is subject to being attacked. We
cannot simply accept that testimony as conclusive. And the fact of the matter
is, both the trial court and this court made clear findings in the underlying
litigation that defendants’ tortious interference claims lacked even minimal
merit. That evidence is sufficient to clear the low hurdle of prima facie
evidence that defendants’ tortious interference claims lacked probable cause.
As to the malice element, which focuses on defendants’ subjective
intent in bringing the tortious interference claims, Escamilla claims the fact
defendants brought claims against him lacking even minimal merit is itself
evidence of malice. While our high court has held that the dismissal of an
underlying lawsuit as a SLAPP does not “necessarily”—i.e., “by definition”—
establish malice, it also held that, for purposes of a prima facie showing,
“malice can be inferred from the evidence that defendants lacked probable
cause to initiate and maintain the underlying lawsuit . . . .” (Soukup, supra,
39 Cal.4th at p. 296.) In addition to the evidence that defendants maintained
the underlying tortious interference claims without probable cause, there was
also evidence of Perry subjecting Escamilla to profanity-laced shouting, which
suggests a degree of hostility that arguably supports a finding of malice. The
evidence, taken together, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
malice.
Because Escamilla made a prima facie showing of each of the
elements of his malicious prosecution claims, we will reverse the court’s
judgment dismissing those causes of action as a SLAPP.

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B. Abuse of Process
We come to the opposite conclusion regarding Escamilla’s abuse
of process claim.
“The common law tort of abuse of process arises when one uses
the court’s process for a purpose other than that for which the process was
designed. [Citations.] It has been ‘interpreted broadly to encompass the
entire range of “procedures’’ incident to litigation.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he essence of
the tort [is] . . . misuse of the power of the court; it is an act done in the name
of the court and under its authority for the purpose of perpetrating an
injustice.’ [Citation.] To succeed in an action for abuse of process, a litigant
must establish that the defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in
using the process, and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not
proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006)
37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056-1057.)
Escamilla’s abuse of process claim is based on a subpoena
defendants issued to the State Bar of California, seeking records related to
his licensure and disciplinary history.2 Escamilla contends the subpoena ran
afoul of Business and Professions Code section 6060.25, subdivision (a),

2 Specifically, the subpoena sought: “Any and all RECORDS,

including, but not limited to, memoranda, notes, bank statements, quarterly
statements, portfolios, evidence of deposits, deposit detail, cancelled checks,
loan applications, signature cards, credit card applications, financial
statements and/or other requests for extension of credit, which evidence any
attorney records, including, state bar discipline and/or investigation records
and Office of Chief Trial Counsel records, bar exam applications, bar exam
test results, bar membership applications, bar membership results, bar
admission records, certificates of standing, moral character records, fee
arbitration settlement records, records related to any investigations or
disciplinary hearings related to the Unauthorized Practice of Law, and Board
of Trustee records for [Escamilla].”

17
which provides, in relevant part, “any identifying information submitted by
an applicant to the State Bar for admission and a license to practice law and
all State Bar admission records . . . shall be confidential and shall not be
disclosed pursuant to any state law . . . .” The trial court ultimately quashed
the subpoena, finding it overbroad. Specifically, the court reasoned that while
defendants had a legitimate interest in rebutting Escamilla’s slander claim
by showing he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, the subpoena
exceeded that purpose by seeking personal and sensitive records related to
Escamilla’s application to the state bar that went beyond what was necessary
for their defense.
This procedural history is not evidence that defendants utilized
the subpoena for a purpose other than what it was designed for.
On its face, the subpoena had a legitimate objective. Escamilla
claimed defendants committed slander by saying he was engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. One obvious defense to that claim is truth, i.e.,
for defendants to prove that Escamilla was, in fact, engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. A subpoena for State Bar records to establish
that Escamilla was not a licensed attorney at the time was likely to produce
documents relevant to that issue.
The fact that the subpoena was overbroad does not, in and of
itself, suggest an improper purpose. Discovery requests are commonly drafted
broadly, and there is good reason for that: the propounding party often does
not know what records exist, and so the request is cast in broad terms. This
should not, in the ordinary course, subject the propounding party to personal
liability. After the trial court quashed the subpoena, there is no evidence in
the record that defendants pursued it any further, nor that the subpoena was
part of a pattern of discovery harassment. In this context, the fact that the

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subpoena was ruled to be overbroad does not present even prima facie
evidence that defendants acted with an ulterior motive. And Escamilla does
not point to any other evidence of an improper purpose. Accordingly, the
court did not err in granting Hoo’s anti-SLAPP motion as to the abuse of
process claim.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to Escamilla’s malicious prosecution
claims (causes of action 1 through 3) against all defendants.
The judgment is also reversed as to Escamilla’s abuse of process
claim (cause of action 4) against defendants Perry, The Perry Law Firm, and
Roberts. The matter is remanded for the trial court to determine, in its
discretion, whether to consider their untimely anti-SLAPP motion. If the
court elects to do so, it may reinstate its prior order granting the motion as to
the abuse of process claim.
The judgment is affirmed as to the abuse of process claim against
defendant Hoo. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, J.

GOODING, J.

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