Herrera v. Palmore CA2/3

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Filed 5/23/25 Herrera v. Palmore CA2/3
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ARACELI GONZALEZ HERRERA, B331883

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. BC624620,
v. 22STCV31771

JACQUELINE PALMORE,

Defendant and Respondent.

ARACELI GONZALEZ HERRERA, B332793

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. BC624620,
v. 22STCV31771

GLACIAL GARDEN SKATING
ARENAS, LLC,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Herzog Yuhas Fournier & Ardell, Ian Herzog and Evan
D. Marshall for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Koeller, Nebeker, Carlson & Haluck, Maria K. Pleše,
Caroline J. Cordova; Hayes, Scott, Bonino, Ellingson & Guslani,
Mark G. Bonino and Rachel M. Smith for Defendant and
Respondent Glacial Garden Skating Arenas, LLC.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Craig J. Mariam and
Michael J. Dailey for Defendant and Respondent Jacqueline
Palmore.
_________________________

These consolidated appeals involve two separate actions
Araceli Gonzalez Herrera (plaintiff) filed against Glacial Garden
Skating Arenas, LLC (Glacial)1 and, later, against Glacial’s
employee Jacqueline Palmore, related to horrific abuse she
suffered as a child at the hands of her ice skating coach. After
the trial court consolidated the cases for all purposes, it sustained
Palmore’s demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint (FAC).
The court then granted summary judgment in favor of Glacial
as plaintiff’s claims against it were based solely on its vicarious
liability for the alleged actions of Palmore. Plaintiff challenges
both orders.

1 Plaintiff—then a minor, known as Annie G.—filed her
original complaint in 2016 against Donald J. Vincent; Paramount
Iceland Skating Rink, Inc. (Iceland), an ice rink where Vincent
coached plaintiff and abused her; Darlene Sparks, Iceland’s
employee; and the United States Figure Skating Association.
Plaintiff amended her complaint to name as defendants Glacial,
its owner, another ice rink, and the Professional Skaters
Association. We refer to this action as the “Glacial-Iceland”
action.

2
We conclude plaintiff’s allegations against Palmore are
consistent with those a different panel of this court held would be
sufficient to state causes of action for misrepresentation against
Glacial.2 We therefore reverse the judgments with directions.
BACKGROUND3
Glacial operated an ice skating rink that offered classes,
coaching, and competitions for youth figure skaters. Palmore,
the skating director, was responsible for hiring, supervising, and
terminating skating coaches. Vincent was a coach and skating
school instructor for Glacial from June 2007 to August 2008.
During his employment, Vincent had “ ‘boundary issues,’ ”

2 Annie G. v. Glacial Garden Skating Arenas, LLC (Sept. 17,
2020, B293351) [nonpub. opn.] (Annie G.). There, we reversed
the trial court’s order sustaining without leave to amend
plaintiff’s third amended complaint (TAC) in the Glacial-Iceland
action. We issued our remittitur on June 21, 2021.
3 As plaintiff appeals from the sustaining of Palmore’s
demurrer—and the order granting Glacial summary judgment
was based on that ruling—we draw our statement of facts from
the operative pleadings and other matters subject to judicial
notice. (Hanouchian v. Steele (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 99, 103
(Hanouchian).) We take judicial notice of our court file in
Annie G. (case number B293351) for the existence of the
documents and records before us when we decided that related
appeal, and of our unpublished opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); see, e.g., Williams v. Wraxall (1995)
33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130, fn. 7 [court may take “judicial notice
of the existence of judicial opinions and court documents, along
with the truth of the results reached—in the documents such as
orders, statements of decision, and judgments—but cannot take
judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions
or court files”].)

3
and engaged in suspect behavior with minor skating students,
including John S. Doe, a youth Vincent coached. Palmore
became aware of Vincent’s behavior. Glacial reprimanded
Vincent and gave him warning notices for inappropriate behavior
with his minor students. Palmore gave Vincent his “final
warning” in December 2007. In August 2008, Glacial fired
Vincent after another coach caught Vincent in a dark, locked
“ ‘coaches only’ lounge” with a minor skater. The minor was
hiding under a bench where Vincent sat. The coach reported
the incident to Palmore. She fired Vincent on August 1, 2008.
“Vincent then went to . . . Iceland”—bringing John S. Doe
with him—where he was “employed . . . from August 2008
to December 2011.”4 The Iceland skating rink also had youth
programs in both recreational and competitive ice skating.
Sparks was Iceland’s manager and director of skating.
“In 2009, when Vincent was seeking to be put on staff
at [Iceland],” Sparks called Glacial and spoke to Palmore “to
ascertain if there was any reason Vincent should not be allowed
to teach at [Iceland].” Palmore responded, “ ‘No, everything’s
fine.’ ” She did not tell Sparks Glacial had terminated Vincent

4 The operative fourth amended complaint (4AC) against
Glacial alleged Vincent brought John S. Doe with him to Iceland
in early August 2008, “immediately after” Glacial fired him. The
4AC also alleges, “In the beginning of August, 2008, immediately
after Vincent was fired by Glacial . . ., Iceland considered hiring
Vincent as an ice skating coach (to teach group and individual
classes).”

4
“for suspected child molestation and boundary violating behavior”
or mention the incident that led to his firing.5
Vincent began coaching plaintiff at Iceland—and abusing
her—in 2009. Had Palmore “spoken the truth, Sparks and
[Iceland] would not have put Vincent on staff and he would not
have been [p]laintiff’s coach or been able to engage in” the alleged
abusive conduct.6 Iceland fired Vincent in December 2011 for
“suspected molestation of minor skating students.” In January
2014, Vincent was convicted of multiple felonies for his sexual
abuse of plaintiff and another of his minor skating students.
Plaintiff, through her guardian ad litem, sued Glacial and
others for damages she suffered as a result of Vincent’s abuse,
amending her complaint several times. Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint alleged causes of action against Glacial
for negligence, negligent and intentional misrepresentation,
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent hiring and retention, negligent training and
supervision, and failure to warn. The trial court sustained

5 Plaintiff did not learn of this conversation until she had
perfected her appeal in Annie G., discussed below. The FAC
also alleges that, after Glacial fired Vincent, he “applied for
employment” at Iceland, “where his application was vetted by . . .
Sparks,” who called Palmore with whom she had the conversation
alleged above. The 4AC alleged that, when Vincent moved to
Iceland, “Iceland and Sparks performed a background check.
[Sparks] checked the prior rink (Glacial . . .) and was not notified
by Glacial . . . when asked” that it had terminated Vincent for
suspected abusive behavior.
6 The abuse plaintiff endured is set forth in detail in
Annie G.

5
Glacial’s demurrer without leave to amend on the negligent
and intentional misrepresentation causes of action and granted
leave to amend on the others. Plaintiff filed the TAC. Glacial
demurred and the trial court sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend. Judgment was entered in favor of Glacial
and plaintiff appealed.
In February 2019, after the perfection of plaintiff’s appeal,
Sparks gave a deposition at which she testified—as we stated
in Annie G.—“that Palmore had misled her as to Vincent’s
suitability as a coach and withheld vital information which
would have caused Iceland not to employ him.” We denied
plaintiff’s motion to take evidence on appeal and her request
that we take judicial notice of Sparks’s deposition testimony.
We held, however, that plaintiff had demonstrated she could
amend the TAC to state causes of action for negligent and
intentional misrepresentation against Glacial based on Sparks’s
testimony—namely, that “in 2009, when Vincent was seeking
to be put on staff at Iceland, she called Glacial . . . and asked
Palmore if there was any reason she should not hire” him,
and “Palmore responded, ‘No, everything’s fine.’ ” (Annie G.)
Accordingly, we concluded that, although Glacial owed no general
duty of care to plaintiff, “once Sparks inquired about Vincent’s
fitness, [Glacial] had a duty to not misrepresent those facts
because it was reasonably foreseeable that Vincent would engage
in the same behavior at Iceland and that there was a risk of
serious physical harm to his minor skating students, including
[plaintiff].” (Ibid.)
We thus directed the trial court to vacate its order
sustaining Glacial’s demurrer without leave to amend and to
allow plaintiff to amend her causes of action for negligent and

6
intentional misrepresentation against Glacial. We agreed with
the trial court, however, that plaintiff’s other causes of action—
for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress—
failed, and we directed the trial court to sustain the demurrer
without leave to amend as to them. (Annie G.)
On July 29, 2021, plaintiff filed her 4AC against Glacial,
to which Glacial demurred and moved to strike.7 On January 25,
2022, the trial court overruled the demurrer as to the third,
fourth, and fifth causes of action for negligent misrepresentation,
intentional misrepresentation and concealment, and fraud
and intentional deceit, respectively. The trial court found
plaintiff had added the allegations this court had “made clear
. . . were sufficient to state claims for fraud by concealment
and misrepresentation.”
Plaintiff sued Palmore in September 2022. On
December 19, 2022, plaintiff filed the FAC alleging causes of
action for negligence, intentional misrepresentation, fraud and
deceit, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 Palmore
demurred to, and moved to strike, the FAC. As relevant here,
Palmore argued the FAC was a sham pleading that contradicted
allegations plaintiff had made in the TAC in the Glacial-Iceland
action; plaintiff’s misrepresentation claim failed as it could not

7 The 4AC included causes of action against which our
remittitur in Annie G. had directed the court to sustain Glacial’s
demurer without leave to amend. The trial court thus sustained
the demurrer to the 4AC on those claims.
8 Plaintiff does not challenge the court’s order sustaining
the demurrer on her claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

7
allege Sparks relied on Palmore’s alleged statements in deciding
to hire Vincent because he already was working at Iceland
at the time of the alleged call; and plaintiff had abandoned her
statutory fraud claim and failed to plead reliance in any event.
In opposition, plaintiff argued there was no sham pleading.
Rather, plaintiff had discovered new evidence—Sparks’s
testimony about her call to Palmore—and had amended her
allegations accordingly. Plaintiff also argued Palmore assumed
a duty of care to those foreseeably injured by “her negligent
decision to speak falsely,” including plaintiff; and the FAC
sufficiently pleaded causes of action for misrepresentation.
The matter was heard on April 20, 2023.9 The court’s
tentative ruling was to sustain the demurrer, but (1) to
construe the negligence cause of action as one for negligent
misrepresentation and allow plaintiff to clarify the timeline
given plaintiff did not dispute Iceland hired Vincent in 2008;
and (2) on the intentional misrepresentation claim, to allow
plaintiff to show (a) how the conversation between Sparks and
Palmore happened at a time that could have induced reliance,
and (b) how Sparks would have acted differently if Palmore
“had spoken truthfully.”
Palmore’s counsel argued the court should not grant leave
to amend on the misrepresentation causes of action. Counsel
argued the FAC was a sham pleading, and plaintiff could not
allege Sparks relied on Palmore’s 2009 statements in hiring
Vincent because the FAC—and earlier complaints in the Glacial-
Iceland action—alleged Vincent was hired in 2008. The court
asked plaintiff’s counsel to make a proffer as to the facts showing
reliance. Counsel argued Sparks’s call with Palmore resulted in

9 The two actions were consolidated on March 9, 2023.

8
the retention of Vincent, and Sparks would not have kept Vincent
on staff—and he thus “never would have gotten his hands on”
plaintiff—had Palmore not misrepresented his fitness as a coach.
The court noted plaintiff alleged in her TAC in the Glacial-
Iceland action that Sparks witnessed Vincent engaging in
suspicious behavior with minors immediately after Iceland hired
him but did nothing.10 Plaintiff’s counsel noted those allegations
were based on “information” and Iceland had “hotly contested”
them. The factual issue never was decided because plaintiff
settled the part of the case against Iceland. Counsel argued
the FAC’s allegations were based on facts that had developed
after Sparks’s deposition and that testimony had been before
this court. Counsel asserted “the facts as I understand them
as they have been developed, is that after Vincent was at
[Iceland], there was suspicion. A call was made to Palmore
in which . . . Sparks said that she was told by Palmore there
was no problem, and she let Vincent remain. . . . And then
thereafter, [plaintiff] became a student. And but for that,
these atrocious acts would not have occurred.”
The court found “it [was] not possible for the argument
relating to reliance to work” because Vincent worked for Iceland

10 The court took judicial notice of the TAC. The TAC alleged,
“In the beginning of August, 2008, immediately after Vincent was
fired by Glacial . . ., he brought John S. Doe with him to Iceland.
Vincent employed the same patterns of behavior with John S.
Doe at Iceland as he had at Glacial . . . . When Vincent came
to Iceland, Sparks knew about the incident in the coaches[ ] only
room and that Glacial . . . fired Vincent.” It also alleged that
“despite having knowledge of Vincent’s inappropriate conduct
with John S. Doe prior to [plaintiff],” Sparks “failed to intervene,
and instead supported and encouraged the relationship.”

9
from 2008 to 2011, but the call with Palmore took place in 2009.
The court found the argument that Sparks relied on Palmore’s
conversation to retain Vincent was “not supported, especially
in light of the fact that in the same claim, plaintiff alleges that
Sparks noted immediately after Vincent was hired, inappropriate
contact of minors.”11 The court ruled it was not persuaded
by plaintiff’s proffer and therefore sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend. On May 8, 2023, the court entered
final judgment in favor of Palmore. Plaintiff appealed.
On May 30, 2023, Glacial filed a motion for summary
judgment on the ground the judgment in favor of Palmore
established it could not be liable for any misrepresentation
or concealment. Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending
the non-final judgment in favor of Palmore did not support a
preclusion claim, and the law of the case established the pleading
against Glacial was sufficient. The court granted Glacial’s
motion and entered judgment in its favor on August 24, 2023.
Plaintiff appealed.
We consolidated plaintiff’s two appeals for briefing,
argument, and decision.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of review
“We review a judgment of dismissal after an order
sustaining a demurrer de novo, exercising our independent
judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action
as a matter of law. [Citation.] We ‘assume the truth of all facts
properly pleaded by the plaintiffs, as well as those that are

11 That allegation was not in the FAC against Palmore, but
in the TAC in the Glacial-Iceland case.

10
judicially noticeable.’ ” (Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at
p. 106; see also Genis v. Schainbaum (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1007,
1015 [court assumes the truth of “facts that reasonably can be
inferred from those expressly pleaded”].) We “also ‘give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole
and its parts in their context.’ ” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title
Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (Quelimane).) When
a demurrer “is sustained without leave to amend, we decide
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can
be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused
its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse
of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d
311, 318.)
We also review de novo an order granting summary
judgment. (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 338.) Here,
the order granting Glacial summary judgment was based solely
on the judgment of dismissal in favor of Palmore.
2. The sham pleading doctrine does not apply here
a. Applicable law
“When reviewing a demurrer on appeal, appellate courts
generally assume that all facts pleaded in the complaint are true.
[Citation.] In addition, in the interests of justice, on demurrer,
a court will also consider judicially noticeable facts, even if such
facts are not set forth in the complaint. [Citation.] In particular,
appellate courts should judicially notice any fact of which the
trial court took proper judicial notice.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust
Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877, fn. omitted (Cantu).) Thus,
“[b]oth trial and appellate courts may properly take judicial
notice of a party’s earlier pleadings and positions as well as

11
established facts from both the same case and other cases.”
(Ibid.)
“A plaintiff may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts
or positions in an amended complaint that contradict the facts
pleaded in the original complaint or by suppressing facts which
prove the pleaded facts false. [Citation.] Likewise, the plaintiff
may not plead facts that contradict the facts or positions that
the plaintiff pleaded in earlier actions or suppress facts that
prove the pleaded facts false.” (Cantu, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th
at p. 877, italics omitted; Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 408, 425 (Deveny) [“Under the sham pleading
doctrine, plaintiffs are precluded from amending complaints
to omit harmful allegations, without explanation, from previous
complaints to avoid attacks raised in demurrers or motions
for summary judgment.”].) “ ‘ “The principle is that of truthful
pleading.” ’ [Citation.] When the plaintiff pleads inconsistently
in separate actions, the plaintiff’s complaint is nothing more than
a sham that seeks to avoid the effect of a demurrer. [Citations.]
Under such circumstances, the court will disregard the falsely
pleaded facts and affirm the demurrer.” (Cantu, at pp. 877–878.)
The sham pleading doctrine, however, “is not ‘ “intended
to prevent honest complainants from correcting erroneous
allegations . . . or to prevent correction of ambiguous facts.” ’
[Citation.] Instead, it is intended to enable courts ‘ “to prevent
an abuse of process.” ’ ” (Deveny, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at
p. 426; see also Jackson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1949) 95
Cal.App.2d 204, 209 [“It would seem to be a travesty on justice
if a litigant had inadvertently, ignorantly and erroneously stated
as a fact, without fault on his part, an admission against interest,
if he were to become bound thereby and would not be permitted

12
upon proper showing to correct the innocent error and assert
the true fact in that regard.”].) A plaintiff “therefore may
avoid the effect of the sham pleading doctrine by alleging an
explanation for the conflicts between the pleadings.” (Larson v.
UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 344.)
b. Analysis
Palmore contends, as she did in the trial court, the FAC
is a sham pleading that cannot be cured. She argues (1) the FAC
omits “contradict[ory]” allegations about Sparks included in
“prior complaints” filed in the Glacial-Iceland action; and (2) the
allegation in the FAC—and earlier complaints—that Iceland
hired Vincent in August 2008 is inconsistent with Sparks
allegedly having called Palmore in 2009 about hiring Vincent
as a coach. Palmore argues plaintiff gave no justification or
excuse as to why she omitted the earlier factual allegations
against Sparks from her FAC against Palmore.
The procedural posture of this case is unique. In Annie G.,
we held plaintiff could amend her pleading in the Glacial-Iceland
case to state misrepresentation causes of action against Glacial
based on the facts plaintiff had learned from Sparks’s deposition
testimony. In partially overruling Glacial’s demurrer to those
causes of action, the trial court in turn found plaintiff’s new
allegations were “the exact allegations” she had argued on appeal
that we had held were sufficient to state those claims. Yet, in
the later-filed action against Palmore, the trial court found those
same alleged facts12 were a sham pleading inconsistent with the

12 We acknowledge the 4AC’s allegations about the Sparks-
Palmore call are worded somewhat differently than in the FAC.
(See ante, fns. 4 & 5.) The essence of the alleged facts and the

13
earlier-filed pleadings in the Glacial-Iceland case and insufficient
to support misrepresentation causes of action against Palmore.
The court did so even though the sufficiently pleaded 4AC had
omitted the same earlier-pleaded facts about Sparks.
The allegations from the TAC that Palmore asserts are
inconsistent with or contradictory to those in the FAC—including
that Iceland “hired Vincent as an ice skating coach (to teach
group and individual classes)” in the “beginning of August, 2008”
—necessarily were before us in Annie G. when we decided
plaintiff could amend that pleading to state misrepresentation
causes of action against Glacial. Indeed, our opinion specifically
repeated the TAC’s allegations that, “[w]hen Vincent first arrived
at Iceland, . . . Sparks . . . noted that Vincent isolated his student
from other coaches and students,” “knew about the incident
in the locked room” at Glacial, and knew Glacial fired Vincent.
(Annie G.) We also noted plaintiff’s original complaint alleged
Sparks witnessed Vincent isolating his students as early as
2008.13 (Ibid.) As Palmore asserts, the TAC also alleged that
“[s]ince Vincent first arrived at Iceland, Sparks had been
documenting incidents relating to his inappropriate behavior
with his young students.”
Despite the existence of these allegations that
“contradicted” the new facts plaintiff proffered on appeal—
and then successfully alleged in her 4AC—we concluded plaintiff

theory of plaintiff’s case against Glacial and against Palmore
are essentially the same, however.
13 The record in Annie G. included not only the TAC but also
the three earlier versions of plaintiff’s complaint in the Glacial-
Iceland case.

14
could amend her misrepresentation causes of action against
Glacial based on Sparks’s deposition testimony. We did not grant
plaintiff’s motion to take evidence—or to take judicial notice—
of Sparks’s postjudgment deposition testimony. (Annie G.)
Nevertheless, we considered that testimony in concluding
plaintiff could amend her complaint, noting that, “on an appeal
from a judgment after a demurrer has been sustained without
leave to amend, the plaintiff can show, for the first time on
appeal, that the complaint can be amended to state a cause of
action.”14 (Ibid., citing Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business
Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1386.) Accordingly,
as Glacial’s alleged liability to plaintiff is dependent on
Palmore’s actions, those same allegations equally support
misrepresentation claims against Palmore.
Palmore argues that in Annie G. we did not “examine
whether [p]laintiff was engaging in sham pleading that would
foreclose her ability to maintain a viable cause of action.”
Palmore contends Annie G. “merely noted that based on the
incomplete record before it, it was hypothetically possible.”
Although Glacial did not use the term “sham pleading,” it made
a similar argument in Annie G. In its respondent’s brief, Glacial
argued Sparks’s testimony was “inconsistent with the facts
alleged in [plaintiff’s] four complaints”: that “ ‘since Vincent
first arrived at Iceland’ in August 2008, Sparks knew about and
documented incidents of Vincent’s misconduct towards [plaintiff]
and other young students at Iceland,” yet allowed Vincent to

14 In ruling on Palmore’s demurrer, the trial court considered
plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration, which attached Sparks’s
deposition testimony, on the issue of whether leave to amend
should be granted.

15
continue coaching plaintiff.15 Glacial argued that, as a result,
plaintiff could not allege “a viable misrepresentation claim,
which requires [plaintiff] to show that Sparks was ‘ignorant of
the truth’ about Vincent and justifiably relied upon Palmore’s
statement in April 2009, which resulted in [plaintiff’s] damages.”
That is essentially the same argument Palmore makes now.
We implicitly rejected that argument when we concluded
plaintiff could state a misrepresentation cause of action based
on Palmore’s statement to Sparks in 2009 that everything
was fine with Vincent.
Moreover, contrary to Palmore’s contention, plaintiff
explained why she omitted the allegations about Sparks from
the FAC. As Palmore notes, plaintiff filed her first complaint
in these consolidated cases in 2016 and amended that complaint
four times. Nevertheless, as we noted in Annie G., plaintiff did
not learn of the 2009 Sparks-Palmore conversation until after
the trial court had ruled on Glacial’s demurrer to the TAC and
plaintiff had perfected her appeal. Plaintiff’s counsel explained
to the trial court that the earlier allegations about Sparks having
witnessed and known about Vincent’s behavior were based on
information, and the FAC’s allegations were based on facts that
had developed later with Sparks’s deposition. Plaintiff asserts
“Sparks’s testimony about the call to Palmore came as a surprise
to plaintiff,” and “given any uncertainty as to the facts,” she was

15 Glacial also argued plaintiff failed to allege Glacial’s failure
to warn about or to report Vincent was the proximate cause of
her injury because her complaints alleged that, when Iceland
hired Vincent in August 2008, Sparks “ ‘knew about the incident
in the coaches[ ] only room and that Glacial fired Vincent.’ ”
(Quoting from TAC.)

16
“entitled to set forth her case in alternative and inconsistent
counts.”
Plaintiff gave the same explanation in response to Glacial’s
argument in Annie G. In her reply brief in that appeal, plaintiff
argued she had learned of Sparks’s testimony after she drafted
the TAC. Plaintiff described that testimony, as she does now:
that “when Vincent sought to be put on staff at [Iceland],
[Sparks] called . . . Palmore to ask if there was any reason
he should not be allowed to teach at [Iceland],” and “Palmore
responded[,] ‘No, everything’s fine.’ ” Plaintiff also explained
Sparks testified she did not know about the incident at Glacial
until after Iceland fired Vincent. Plaintiff further argued, as
she does here, that the differing allegations were “a matter of
alternative pleading and present[ ] a triable issue.” We impliedly
accepted plaintiff’s explanation when we concluded those facts
were sufficient to state misrepresentation causes of action
against Glacial.
We conclude plaintiff’s explanation is sufficient to avoid
the sham pleading doctrine, especially given our conclusions
in Annie G. about Sparks’s testimony, and the trial court’s
overruling of Glacial’s demurrer to plaintiff’s misrepresentation
claims based on almost the same allegations as were in the FAC.
In essence, plaintiff amended the allegations relating to Sparks
because she learned Sparks had testified she did not know about
the incidents at Glacial and would have alerted Iceland had
Palmore told her the truth about Vincent. Plaintiff thus
amended her pleadings to conform to late-discovered facts.
(Compare Deveny, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 416, 423–424,
426–427 [sham pleading doctrine did not apply where plaintiff’s
counsel amended alleged basis for securities fraud action that

17
drug company failed to disclose negative clinical data to investors
after learning, through further investigation and consultation
with experts, that the data was inconclusive] with Cantu, supra,
4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 868–869, 877–878 [sham pleading doctrine
applied where plaintiff in earlier interpleader action admitted
he knew “defendants faced a multiplicity of claims concerning
the stake” but in malicious prosecution action against defendants
for improperly instigating that action alleged he was “ ‘informed
and believed that there were no competing claims to the funds’ ”;
having made the earlier admission, plaintiff could not “now
inconsistently and falsely allege to the contrary”].) We thus
agree with plaintiff that whether Sparks knew of the Glacial
incident before she spoke to Palmore, or already had observed
Vincent’s abusive behavior, are evidentiary issues not suitable
for resolution on demurrer.
Palmore argues plaintiff “does not explain why she is
ignoring the portion of . . . Sparks’s deposition testimony that
definitively states that she was not vetting Vincent for any
employment or staff position in 2009.” At the deposition, counsel
asked Sparks, “So when it came time a little bit later on for
that show and [Vincent] wanting to be more involved and be
a staff coach, based on knowing that he had been at Glacial . . .,
you called Glacial . . . to speak with . . . Palmore, correct?”
Sparks answered,
“Right. It wasn’t about him being on staff
because I don’t know that it [sic] exact same
time. It was about the competition and
him wanting to be very involved with the
competition and personalities of the people that
were, you know, working toward a common

18
goal. [¶] And he wanted to be more involved
and so I called [Palmore] and said is there any
reason we shouldn’t let him be here? It was
an ISI competition we were putting together
and she said, ‘No. Everything’s fine.’ ”
Minutes before that testimony, Sparks had testified she called
Palmore in 2009 because Vincent “wanted to be involved in the
competition and he was asking to be on staff at the same time
and wanted to be there more frequently, [as] opposed to [a]
once a week or twice a week visiting coach.”
We do not read Sparks’s testimony as precluding plaintiff
from alleging Sparks was “vetting” Vincent for a staff position
when she called Palmore. A reasonable reading of Sparks’s
testimony is that she called Palmore because Vincent wanted
more coaching time at Iceland, and Sparks wanted to know if
Palmore knew of any reason why Iceland should not allow him
to coach. For purposes of demurrer, whether—at that moment—
Sparks was thinking about Vincent’s desire to be an integral part
of the upcoming competition, or his application to be on staff,
does not change the essence of plaintiff’s allegation that had
Palmore answered Sparks truthfully, Iceland would not have
put Vincent on staff, or inferentially, kept him on as a coach
at all. Accordingly, we do not find Iceland’s alleged hiring of
Vincent in 2008 is inherently inconsistent with Sparks’s alleged
conversation with Palmore in 2009 about whether there was
any reason Iceland “should not take Vincent on as a coach”
or “Vincent should not be allowed to teach at [Iceland].”
Moreover, the TAC—before us in Annie G.—and the 4AC—
that survived Glacial’s subsequent demurrer—similarly alleged
“Vincent was the employee” of Iceland from August 2008 to

19
December 2011. We nevertheless found plaintiff could state
negligent and intentional misrepresentation causes of action
against Glacial based on Sparks’s alleged conversation with
Palmore in 2009.16 (Annie G.) Specifically, we explained that,
under Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist. (1997)
14 Cal.4th 1066 (Randi W.), while “ordinarily, a recommending
employer is not liable to a third person for failing to disclose
negative information regarding a former employee, . . .
when the recommendation . . . amounts to an affirmative
misrepresentation that presents a foreseeable and substantial
risk of physical harm to a third person, liability will attach.”
(Annie G., citing Randi W., at p. 1070 [defendant school district
officers’ unreserved recommendations of their former employee,
without disclosing he had been charged with sexual misconduct,
constituted affirmative misrepresentations subjecting defendants
to tort liability for fraud and negligent misrepresentation (but
not general negligence) when those recommendations allegedly
induced another school district to hire the employee, who later
sexually assaulted plaintiff].)
We concluded plaintiff similarly could allege Glacial
had a duty “to not misrepresent Vincent’s fitness as a coach.”
(Annie G.) We reasoned: “When Palmore told Sparks that
everything with Vincent was fine, Palmore knew it to be
otherwise, and had in fact fired Vincent for his inappropriate
behavior with his minor students. [Glacial] could also reasonably
foresee that, had it disclosed Vincent’s conduct with his minor
students, Iceland would not have hired him. It was also

16 Although the 4AC did not specify the call took place
in 2009, we noted the 2009 timing of the call in Annie G.

20
reasonably foreseeable that Vincent might engage in those same
boundary violating behaviors at Iceland, which could eventually
result in a more serious assault, like what occurred here.
We acknowledge these attenuating circumstances, however,
for purposes of demurrer, we assume that [plaintiff’s] injuries
were caused by Glacial’s conduct.” (Ibid., relying on Randi W.,
supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1070–1072, 1078–1079, and Rowland
v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.) Our reasoning equally
applies to plaintiff’s misrepresentation claims against Palmore,
which are based on the same alleged facts.17
3. The FAC sufficiently alleges reliance for plaintiff’s
three misrepresentation-based causes of action
Both intentional and negligent misrepresentation
require a showing of actual and justifiable reliance on the false
representation, concealment, or nondisclosure—the element
Palmore argued plaintiff did not and could not allege. (Borman v.
Brown (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1060; Chapman v. Skype Inc.
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 230–231.) Here, the FAC alleged—
as plaintiff proffered in Annie G.—that, when Sparks spoke
to Palmore “to ascertain if there was any reason Vincent
should not be allowed to teach at [Iceland],” she responded,

17 As we decided Annie G. on an appeal from a separate action
involving different defendants, it isn’t per se “the law of the case”
for plaintiff’s action against Palmore. Nevertheless, the Palmore
action is related to, and consolidated with, the Glacial-Iceland
action. Critically, any liability as to Glacial and Palmore
necessarily is based on the same set of facts. Our reasoning
and holding in Annie G. on plaintiff’s claims against Glacial
therefore equally apply to the same claims plaintiff asserts
against Palmore.

21
“ ‘No, everything’s fine’ ”; Palmore did not mention Vincent
had been found alone with a minor in the coaches only room
or “other boundary violations which had caused Glacial . . . to
fire Vincent”; and “[h]ad Palmore spoken the truth, Sparks and
[Iceland] would not have put Vincent on staff and he would not
have been [p]laintiff’s coach or been able to engage in the conduct
alleged above.” Thus, plaintiff alleged Palmore made a false
statement about Vincent’s fitness as a coach (and concealed
facts demonstrating he was not fit), Sparks relied on that
misrepresentation in putting Vincent on Iceland’s coaching staff,
and Vincent then was able to become plaintiff’s coach and abuse
her. (See Chapman, at pp. 230–231 [elements of intentional
and negligent misrepresentation]; Randi W., supra, 14 Cal.4th
at pp. 1084–1085 [under Restatement Second of Torts, sections
310 and 311, “plaintiff need only allege that her injury resulted
from action that the recipient of defendants’ misrepresentations
took in reliance on them”].)
The trial court found these allegations could not establish
Sparks relied on Palmore’s statements in 2009 to retain Vincent.
The court found the timeline made it impossible, as Vincent
began working for Iceland in 2008—before the call. The court
noted plaintiff’s reliance argument was not supported “especially
in light of the fact that in the same claim, plaintiff alleges that
Sparks noted immediately after Vincent was hired, inappropriate
contact of minors.” That allegation was not in the FAC, however.
As discussed, plaintiff made that allegation in her earlier
pleadings before she learned about the Sparks-Palmore
conversation.
For reasons similar to those we already discussed, we
do not agree the fact that Iceland “hired” Vincent in August 2008

22
precludes Sparks from having relied on Palmore’s 2009 statement
in deciding to put him on Iceland’s staff in 2009. As plaintiff
argues, although Vincent already was working for Iceland,
Sparks relied on Palmore’s assertion that Vincent was “fine”
to teach skating students. Had she known of the incidents
at Glacial—and that he had been fired for them—as the FAC
alleges, Sparks would not have put him on staff. We can infer
that, correspondingly, Iceland would not have kept Vincent on
in whatever capacity he was working.
The FAC does not specifically allege Iceland hired Vincent
in 2008 as a visiting rather than a full-time coach. Similarly,
in alleging that, “[a]s a direct and proximate cause of Palmore’s
misrepresentation as to Vincent’s fitness as a coach for minor
skaters . . . Vincent was hired to coach at [Iceland] and [p]laintiff
became his student . . .,” the FAC does not specify Iceland
“retained” Vincent—i.e., let him stay on—or “hired” him as a
permanent coach, based on Palmore’s assurances. As plaintiff
asserts, Sparks confirmed during her testimony that her
conversation with Palmore was “during the time [Vincent] was a
visiting coach and he was trying to get on staff”—in other words,
be made permanent. As plaintiff notes, Sparks also testified
she “would have gone straight to management and the director”
had she learned of Vincent’s behavior at Glacial. Plaintiff
thus argues “[t]he date of any technical ‘hiring’ is immaterial
if disclosure would have resulted in Vincent’s discharge,
ending or limiting his ability to control and molest [plaintiff].”
We tend to agree.
Moreover, the FAC does specifically allege that, “[i]n 2009
. . . Vincent was seeking to be put on staff.” (Italics added.) As
Vincent already was coaching at Iceland, we reasonably can infer

23
a staff position was a different role from Vincent’s then-current
position. The FAC alleges Sparks spoke to Palmore at that point
to learn “if there was any reason Vincent should not be allowed
to teach at [Iceland].” Accordingly, although Sparks’s deposition
testimony shows plaintiff could amend the FAC to be clearer,
in our view, no amendment is necessary. The FAC’s failure to
allege the precise coaching role Vincent held at Iceland in 2008
versus after Sparks spoke to Palmore in 2009 is not fatal given
the FAC’s allegations that Sparks and Iceland “would not have
put Vincent on staff” had Palmore “spoken the truth.”
Similarly, as the trial court initially noted in its
tentative ruling—and stated in its minute order—plaintiff’s
negligence claim against Palmore is in fact a claim for negligent
misrepresentation. As plaintiff alleged the essential facts
to support a negligent misrepresentation cause of action, the
court can recharacterize it as such. (See Quelimane, supra, 19
Cal.4th at p. 38 [“If the complaint states a cause of action under
any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis
for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against
a demurrer.”].)
We thus conclude the FAC’s allegations—although not
perfectly pleaded—are sufficiently specific to apprise Palmore
of the basis for plaintiff’s misrepresentation claims—that had
Palmore not misrepresented Vincent’s fitness as a coach, Iceland
would not have hired him as a “staff” coach, and he therefore
would not have become plaintiff’s coach at Iceland and abused
her.18 As we noted in Annie G., “the chain of causation between

18 As plaintiff notes, the allegations are no more imprecise
than those alleged in the 4AC against Glacial for the same
causes of action based on Palmore’s statement to Sparks.

24
Palmore’s statement and [plaintiff’s] injuries is attenuated,”
but “we find it can be alleged that [Glacial] had a duty . . . to
not misrepresent Vincent’s fitness as a coach.” Whether or not
Sparks actually and reasonably relied on Palmore’s statement,
or Sparks should have known Vincent was a danger and should
not have retained him despite Palmore’s statement, are questions
not before us on demurrer.
Plaintiff separately pleaded a cause of action for “Fraud
and Deceit (Civil Code § 1710)” based on the same facts as her
negligent and intentional misrepresentation causes of action.
The trial court’s minute order, incorporating its written tentative
ruling, denied plaintiff leave to amend that claim because
plaintiff did not address Palmore’s argument that “when pleading
a statutory claim for fraud and deceit (as opposed to a common
law claim for intentional misrepresentation),” plaintiff “must
plead that she herself relied on the statements made.” Plaintiff’s
opposition did not mention Civil Code section 1709 or 171019 or
address this cause of action separately from her cause of action
for intentional misrepresentation. Rather, plaintiff argued she
alleged the elements necessary to plead fraud under Randi W.
As noted, Randi W. concluded the plaintiff could state a “fraud”
(or negligent misrepresentation) cause of action against the
defendants who recommended the individual who assaulted her

19 Civil Code section 1709 simply codifies the common law tort
of fraud. (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th
1, 39 [section 1709 “enshrine[es] common law ‘fraudulent deceit’
as a cause of action sounding in tort”].) Civil Code section 1710
defines deceit within the meaning of section 1709 to include both
intentional and negligent misrepresentations. (Civ. Code, § 1710,
subds. 1 & 2.)

25
to the school district that hired him. (Randi W., supra, 14
Cal.4th at p. 1070.) Relying on Restatement Second of Torts,
sections 310 and 311, the court held “the writer of a letter
of recommendation owes to prospective employers and third
persons a duty not to misrepresent the facts in describing the
qualifications and character of a former employee, if making
these misrepresentations would present a substantial,
foreseeable risk of physical injury to the prospective employer
or third persons.” (Randi W., at p. 1081, italics added.) We see
no reason why this holding would not apply to a statutory fraud
and deceit claim under sections 1709 and 1710. (See Lacher
v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1038, 1043, fn. 1
[“Although the right to recover damages for fraud is codified in
Civil Code sections 1709 and 1710, . . . these statutes are merely
declarative of the common law.”].) Accordingly, we conclude
plaintiff’s opposition encompassed her fraud and deceit cause
of action, and the FAC sufficiently pleads that cause of action
for the same reasons we have explained the FAC sufficiently
pleads causes of action for negligent and intentional
misrepresentation.20

20 As we held in Annie G., Glacial did not have or assume
a duty to report Vincent’s misconduct. For the same reasons,
Palmore didn’t either. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot base any
of her claims on Palmore’s alleged failure to report Vincent. (See
also Randi W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1070 [holding defendants’
alleged failure to report charges of former employee’s improper
activities “to the appropriate authorities pursuant to state
statutory law fails to afford an alternate basis for tort liability
in this case”].)

26
4. We reverse the summary judgment in favor of Glacial
As we have concluded the FAC states misrepresentation
causes of action against Palmore, there no longer is any basis
to support the court’s order granting summary judgment in favor
of Glacial. Accordingly, we need not address plaintiff’s other
arguments.
DISPOSITION
The judgment against Glacial Garden Skating Arenas,
LLC is reversed. The judgment against Jacqueline Palmore
is reversed, and the trial court is directed to (1) vacate its order
sustaining Palmore’s demurrer without leave to amend and
(2) enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to the first,
second, and third causes of action, and sustaining the demurrer
without leave to amend as to the fourth cause of action.
Plaintiff is awarded her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

27

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