People v. Glahn CA2/4

CourtListener 10592050CalctappMay 23, 2025

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Filed 5/23/25 P. v. Glahn CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B337251
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. MA083468)

v.

TREVOR GLAHN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
Okabe & Haushalter and Ryan T. Okabe for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Daniel C. Chang,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this appeal, defendant Trevor Glahn challenges the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained following a warrantless
search of his home in April 2022. The officer conducting the search
erroneously believed Glahn was on searchable probation.
In April 2018, Glahn pled no contest to a felony and was placed on five
years’ probation. However, effective January 1, 2021, Penal Code section
1203.11 was amended by Assembly Bill No. 1950 (Reg. Sess. 2019-2020) (AB
1950) to limit the maximum term of probation a trial court is authorized to
impose for most felony offenses to two years. The parties agree that as a
result of AB 1950, Glahn’s probation terminated by operation of law after two
years, and therefore would have terminated upon the effective date of AB
1950, well before the warrantless search in this case. However, Glahn
disputes that reasonable efforts were made to determine he was on probation
prior to the warrantless search. Therefore, Glahn contends the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. We disagree and affirm the
trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. Prior Conviction
On April 12, 2018, Glahn pled no contest to possession of child
pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a)). He was placed on five years’ probation.
Glahn was subject to the following (relevant) probation conditions: (1) submit
his “person and property to search and seizure at any time of the day or
night, by any probation officer or other peace officer, with or without a
warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion”; (2) “submit all electronic

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
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devices including computers, cell phone, iPads, laptops, tablets to search and
seizure any time of the day or night to any probation officer or other peace
officer with or without a warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion”;
and (3) no possession of “any pornography, including child or adult
pornography.”
As noted, effective January 1, 2021, AB 1950 amended section 1203.1 to
limit the maximum term of probation a trial court is allowed to impose for
most felony offenses to two years. (§ 1203.1, subd. (a).)

II. Warrantless Search
On April 20, 2022, Los Angeles County District Attorney Investigator
Robert Estrada checked two sources to confirm Glahn was on formal
probation with search conditions. Investigator Estrada spoke with Officer
Kenneth Huang, Glahn’s probation officer, who confirmed that he was on
active formal probation. Investigator Estrada also checked the Los Angeles
County Superior Court’s computer database. He reviewed the last minute
order in Glahn’s criminal case, dated January 14, 2020, which stated,
“probation in effect.”
On April 21, 2022, Investigator Estrada, Officer Huang, and other
officers conducted a probation compliance search at Glahn’s home. While
conducting the search, Investigator Estrada recovered Glahn’s laptop
computer and multiple cell phones. During a preliminary search of his
laptop, a forensic investigator uncovered an image appearing to be child
pornography, several “anime” type pornographic images, and child erotic
photographs. The next day, Investigator Estrada obtained a search warrant
for Glahn’s electronic devices. Approximately 30 to 50 images of child
pornography were uncovered on Glahn’s laptop computer.

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On October 18, 2022, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office
filed an information charging Glahn with possession of child pornography
(§ 311.11, subd. (a)).

III. Suppression Motion
Glahn moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his
home. (§ 1538.5.) In his motion, he argued that AB 1950 applied
retroactively to his probation grant, and as a result, his probation was
terminated when AB 1950 became effective (Jan. 1, 2021). Therefore, he
argued the warrantless search of his home was unlawful, and the evidence
seized from the search must be suppressed. In opposition, the People
conceded that AB 1950 retroactively terminated Glahn’s probation. However,
the People argued the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied
because Investigator Estrada reasonably relied on the probation officer and
the trial court’s records.
The court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress. After the
matter was submitted, the trial court denied the motion. In its reasoning,
the court noted “it is uncontested that . . . the search here . . . was invalid
because of the passage of AB 1950.” Therefore, “the question then becomes
whether such a constitutional violation is appropriately remedied by
application of the judicially created exclusionary rule which prohibits the
admission at trial of the evidence obtained during an unlawful search.” The
court continued, “So for purposes of application of the exclusionary rule, the
issue becomes whether . . . the District Attorney’s investigator . . . acted in
good faith based on the information provided to him.” The court explained
Investigator Estrada verified that Glahn was on probation. “He goes to the
source . . . the probation officer himself. He even verifies that by going to the

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court file.” The court dispelled the notion that the minute order was “stale”
by stating that “the minute orders in the [court] file are kept chronologically.
So if the last minute order says that probation is in effect and there isn’t a
minute order that says probation has terminated, the . . . absence of a [more
current] minute order . . . does not affirmatively mean that probation is not in
effect.” The court concluded it did not find Investigator Estrada’s conduct
negligent and that he “did everything that we would hope one would do. He
didn’t just assume the defendant was on probation. He went through the
steps to confirm it.” Furthermore, “this is not the type of case where
deterrence, which is what is behind the judicially created exclusionary rule,
would be advanced by excluding the evidence at trial.”

IV. Conviction and Sentence
Glahn later pled no contest to possession of child pornography, and he
admitted a prior conviction allegation. He was sentenced to four years in
state prison.
Glahn appealed.

DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Under the Fourth Amendment, “‘searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’” (People v. Troyer (2011)
51 Cal.4th 599, 602.) “When a defendant raises a challenge to the legality of
a warrantless search or seizure, the People are obligated to produce proof
sufficient to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the search fell
within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.

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[Citations.] A probation search is one of those exceptions. [Citations.]”
(People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 939.)
“Where . . . the search is later found to be invalid,” in this instance
because a probation condition had expired, “a Fourth Amendment violation is
shown and the question thus becomes whether such constitutional violation
is appropriately remedied by the application of the judicially created
exclusionary rule which prohibits the admission at trial of the evidence
obtained during the unlawful search.” (People v. Downing (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1641, 1650–1651 (Downing), citing United States v. Leon (1984)
468 U.S. 897, 906.) Evidence must be excluded “only where it ‘“result[s] in
appreciable deterrence.”’” (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 141
(Herring).) “The Supreme Court has recognized that ‘exclusion “has always
been our last resort, not our first impulse,” [citation] and our precedents
establish important principles that constrain application of the exclusionary
rule.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pritchett (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 355, 360–361
(Prichett).)
“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable
that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. . . . [T]he
exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”
(Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 144.) “[W]hen police mistakes are the result of
negligence . . . , rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of
constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not ‘pay its way.’
[Citation.] In such a case, the criminal should not ‘go free because the
constable has blundered.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 147–148.)

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“In reviewing a trial court’s decision to [deny] a motion to suppress
evidence, we rely on the trial court’s express and implied factual findings,
provided they are supported by substantial evidence, to independently
determine whether the search was constitutional. [Citation.] ‘Thus, while we
ultimately exercise our independent judgment to determine the constitutional
propriety of a search or seizure, we do so within the context of historical facts
determined by the trial court.’ [Citation.] It is the trial court’s role to
evaluate witness credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the
evidence, and draw factual inferences. [Citation.] We review those factual
findings under the deferential substantial evidence standard, considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order.” (People v.
Moore (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 291, 296–297.)

II. Analysis
Glahn argues the trial court erred in concluding the good faith
exception applied because both Investigator Estrada and Officer Huang
should have been aware of the changes made by AB 1950. We disagree.
For purposes of the good faith exception, the question before this court
is “‘whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the
search was illegal’ in light of ‘all of the circumstances.’” (Herring, supra, 555
U.S. at p. 145; Prichett, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 362.) “Police officers[,
including probation officers,] are not legal experts. ‘[W]hat would be
reasonable for a well-trained officer is not necessarily the same as what
would be reasonable for a jurist.’ (United States v. Workman (10th Cir. 2017)
863 F.3d 1313, 1321; see Heien v. North Carolina (2014) 574 U.S. 54, 67–68
[officer’s error of law was reasonable where statute was ambiguous].)
Considering the language of AB 1950 and the limited legal authority

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interpreting it, we do not expect a reasonable officer to know that AB 1950
may have terminated existing probation sentences automatically without a
judicial determination.” (Pritchett, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 363.) Section
1203.1, as amended by AB 1950, does not indicate this on its face. The
statute simply states that “[t]he court . . . in the order granting probation,
may suspend the imposing or the execution of the sentence and may direct
that the suspension may continue for a period of time not exceeding two
years.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (a)), with a limited exception (id., subd. (l)).
Thus, Investigator Estrada’s failure to conduct his own legal analysis of
Glahn’s probation status prior to the search does not undermine the
conclusion that he acted reasonably based on the information he had. The
same logic applies to Officer Huang, Glahn’s probation officer, who assisted
Investigator Estrada in conducting the warrantless search. (See In re Arron
C. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1372 [“if a probation officer becomes
enmeshed in law enforcement activities, such as if he actively participates in
a search, it would be appropriate to conclude he is an ‘“adjunct to the law
enforcement team”’” and therefore the exclusionary rule applies].)
Glahn further argues it was unreasonable for Investigator Estrada to
rely on the trial court’s outdated minute order confirming Glahn’s probation
status. We agree with the trial court’s assessment that the minute order was
not outdated or “stale.” As aptly noted by the trial court, minute orders are
organized chronologically in the case file and the last, most recent minute
order, dated January 14, 2020, stated that “probation in effect.” The absence
of a more current minute order does not affirmatively demonstrate that
probation was not in effect. Rather, it merely demonstrates no judicial action
has been taken since that date. Furthermore, we cannot say that
Investigator Estrada would or should have known that the information in the

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court’s database regarding Glahn’s probation status was incorrect, as
explained above. Investigator Estrada checked Glahn’s probation status just
the day before the search, and it showed that his probation was still active.
There was no reason for the investigator to believe the trial court provided
erroneous information. Based on these facts, Investigator Estrada was acting
in an objectively reasonable manner when he relied on the trial court’s
database. (See Downing, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1657 [reversing order
granting motion to suppress where officer relied on court-maintained data];
Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 [reversing judgment where there
was “no indication that the arresting officer was not acting objectively
reasonabl[e] when he relied upon” incorrect information provided by court
clerk].)
Glahn’s attempt to distinguish Pritchett from the instant case is
unavailing. In Pritchett, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search based on the officer’s
belief she was on searchable probation. (102 Cal.App.5th at p. 358.) This
belief was premised on information the officer gathered from a court
database. However, the defendant, like Glahn, was not in fact on searchable
probation, based on the changes to the probation term limits by way of AB
1950. The Court of Appeal concluded the good faith doctrine applied based on
the officer’s efforts to verify the defendant was on searchable probation. (Id.
at p. 361.) The court made clear the officer’s lack of knowledge of the effect of
AB 1950 did not preclude a finding the officer acted in an objectively
reasonable manner. (Id. at pp. 362–363.) Here, Investigator Estrada
similarly relied on a court database in determining Glahn’s probation status.
He also went a step further in his investigation than the officer in Pitchett by

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speaking with Glahn’s probation officer, who (albeit incorrectly) confirmed his
active status.
We conclude Investigator Estrada and Officer Huang acted in
objectively reasonable good faith, and applying the exclusionary rule in this
case would not serve to promote its purpose of deterring unlawful police
conduct. The trial court therefore did not err in denying the motion to
suppress.

DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Glahn’s motion to suppress is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

COLLINS, J.

MORI, J.

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