People v. Thorpe CA2/1

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Filed 5/22/25 P. v. Thorpe CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B330878

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA149698)
v.

CHARLES EDWARD THORPE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kelvin D. Filer, Judge. Affirmed.
Mark Yanis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
INTRODUCTION
On July 30, 2019, police went to defendant Charles Edward
Thorpe’s apartment after receiving information that a dead body
was hidden in his bedroom closet. Before entering the residence,
police telephoned Thorpe, who said he was not home but would
return there to meet the officers. When Thorpe failed to show up,
officers entered the apartment without a warrant. Inside the
apartment they found Thorpe; inside Thorpe’s bedroom closet
they found the body of Tracey Castle secreted inside a barrel.
Police then obtained a search warrant, which led to the seizure of
evidence including blood stains from the victim elsewhere in the
apartment and that Thorpe made numerous Internet searches
relating to committing murder and how to dispose of a body.
The People charged Thorpe with the first degree murder of
Castle. (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a).) A jury found Thorpe guilty
as charged and the court sentenced him to 25 years to life in
prison.
Thorpe’s appeal focuses solely on whether the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained
through the search warrant. The trial court found the initial
warrantless search improper but concluded that after excising
information obtained during that warrantless entry from the
affidavit in support of the search warrant, the affidavit still
established probable cause. We agree and also reject several
other arguments Thorpe makes regarding the warrant.
Accordingly, we affirm.

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Searches
In the early morning hours of July 30, 2019, Kelina McNeil
contacted police. She reported that Thorpe, whom she identified
as her ex-boyfriend, had told her approximately four days earlier
that he had a dead body in his apartment and wanted her to help
dispose of it. Police went to Thorpe’s apartment, but no one
answered the door. Police were able to contact Thorpe on his cell
phone, and he indicated he was not home but would meet them at
his apartment. When Thorpe failed to appear after nearly two
hours, police decided to enter the apartment without obtaining
consent or a warrant. Inside they found Thorpe and a dead body
in a container in the bedroom closet. Upon making this discovery
and taking Thorpe into custody, police exited the apartment to
seek a search warrant.
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Detective Dominic
Evans applied for a search warrant that same day (July 30,
2019). The application requested permission to search Thorpe’s
apartment and to seize data and communications contained in
his cell phone.
Evans’s statement of probable cause in support of the
warrant recounted the information initially provided by McNeil,
stating she was Thorpe’s ex-girlfriend and Thorpe had told her
that “three to four days ago” “he had killed an elderly female for
her 2003 red Porsche.” Evans relayed that McNeil had told police
that Thorpe lived at the apartment with his current girlfriend
and was “believed to have violent behavior and a domestic
violence report against him.” Evans recounted that patrol units
went to the apartment “to ascertain the condition of the potential
victim, however patrol units were unable to make contact with

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any occupants.” At approximately 7:00 a.m., LAPD Detective
Oscar Villarreal had a follow up discussion with McNeil, who
“stated that she is in a relationship with . . . Thorpe. Last week
(unknown exact date or time) while in the suspect apartment
Thorpe advised her that he has a dead body in the apartment . . .
and he needed her assistance in disposing the body. He stated
the body was concealed in a drum in his closet bedroom. While
inside Thorpe’s bedroom, McNeil saw a large brown cardboard
box located inside [the] bedroom closet. Thorpe said that the
body was inside the box.” Evans further declared that, “During
this conversation with McNeil, Villarreal called Thorpe on his
cellular telephone number . . . , which was provided by McNeil.
Thorpe answered his cellular telephone” while “officers contained
the residence.” Ten minutes later, “as officers were outside [the
apartment] attempting to have the occupants exit, Thorpe
contacted [LAPD] using his cellular number . . . and said his
name as Charles. He said he wasn’t at his residence but would
drive there from Long Beach in order to meet officers. Thorpe
never arrived at the residence.” At approximately 9:00 a.m.,
officers “forced entry into the residence in order to render aid to
the victim possibly located in the residence. Upon entry to the
bedroom officers observed Thorpe lying facedown on the bed and
[he] was taken into custody without incident. Upon further
search of the residen[ce], officers detected a strong odor of incense
within the bedroom. Officers opened the bedroom closet door and
observed a large cardboard box with a sheet over . . . the top.
After opening the cardboard box, officers located a cardboard
drum (55[-]gallon type). The cardboard drum contained a large
plastic bag which contained a body.” The magistrate issued the

4
warrant as requested, and police conducted the searches
authorized by it.
B. Thorpe’s Initial Motion to Suppress
On September 24, 2019, Thorpe filed a motion pursuant to
section 1538.5 to suppress evidence seized from his apartment as
a result of the warrantless entry and search, as well as from the
later search pursuant to the warrant. Thorpe contended the
warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment because
there were no exigent circumstances given that McNeil had
reported the victim was already dead and officers had no
evidence that anyone else was in danger. He also contended
there was no need for emergency action to avert the destruction
of evidence as the officers did not enter Thorpe’s apartment until
five hours after McNeil’s initial call and, thus, had sufficient time
to obtain a warrant. Thorpe further contended that the later-
obtained warrant was invalid because it was based on
information gathered during the initial, illegal warrantless
search. The People opposed the motion.
On October 18 and 22, 2019, the court (Judge John J.
Lonergan) held a combined preliminary hearing and evidentiary
hearing on the motion to suppress. Janae Harris, Thorpe’s
girlfriend, testified she had been in a relationship with Thorpe
since June 2019. She was aware Thorpe was previously involved
with a woman she knew as “Sunny” who was pregnant with
Thorpe’s child; other evidence established “Sunny” was McNeil.
On July 28, 2019, McNeil called Harris and said she was done
with Thorpe and there was a body in the closet of his apartment;
Harris then hung up the phone. Harris called Thorpe to report
what McNeil had said, and Thorpe told her to disregard McNeil’s
claim.

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McNeil also testified. She said that sometime in mid-July
2019, Thorpe asked her to help him rob a woman for her car, and
McNeil told him no. A couple of days after this conversation, on
July 23, 2019, Thorpe picked McNeil up in a red Porsche that she
had never seen before. They drove to downtown Los Angeles to
buy luggage which Thorpe said was for a body. Thorpe said this
“jokingly” so McNeil “was just hoping it was a joke.”
The following day, July 24, Thorpe told McNeil there was a
female body in his apartment. Thorpe said the dead woman had
been robbed for her car but gave differing accounts of his
involvement in the robbery. Thorpe told McNeil to stay away
from the bedroom where the body was, showed her a barrel in the
bedroom, and told her that was where he was keeping the body.
McNeil called Harris that same day and told her what Thorpe
had said; she was hoping Harris would go with her to see if there
was a body in the apartment.
McNeil said Thorpe told her that he wanted to dump the
body in a field. McNeil searched for places to dispose of the body
and gave Thorpe ideas, but said she did not have any intention of
helping him further. She explained that “[she] was acting like
[she] was going with him wherever he was going, but just to
know where he put the body at basically.” McNeil did not call the
police at that point because she had previously dealt with a
situation where someone who was guilty of a crime was released,
and she “was just being careful.”
McNeil decided to call the police after learning, on July 29,
2019, that Thorpe had taken Harris to a fashion show the
previous day. When asked whether she was jealous of Harris,
McNeil stated, “No, not exactly. Just a little creeped out . . .
[b]ecause I talked to her about it days before and then she’s kind

6
of stalking him at the fashion show.” McNeil explained that she
decided to call the police “[b]ecause the day we were supposed to
go into the field or wherever we were going, I looked into his text
messages and he was inviting her over so I was just like—I was
like maybe I’m in danger.” McNeil “already felt like [she] was in
danger, but even more in danger because [she] thought that
[Harris] had something to do with it also.”
McNeil called the police at around 4:00 a.m. on July 30,
2019, because she felt that she and others were in danger. When
McNeil called the police, she stated that there might be a dead
body at her friend’s house. She later spoke in person to an LAPD
officer and reported that Thorpe had told her a couple of days
before that he may have a dead body at his house. She told the
police that she thought Thorpe might have been joking with her
because he told her several different stories. When asked
whether she told police that she called because Thorpe was
spending time with another woman, McNeil responded, “[n]ot
exactly, but that may have been the first thing that I said.”
McNeil explained, “[i]t was the fact that I had already spoke to
[Harris] and then that [Harris] was, like, there so I was, like, are
they both trying to play me[.] Were they trying to kill me or set
me up for something that they already did together?”
Detective Villarreal testified that he interviewed McNeil at
the police station around 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. on July 30, 2019.
McNeil reported that Thorpe, her boyfriend, had told her a couple
of days earlier that he had killed a woman, the body was inside
his residence, and he needed her help to dispose of the body.
McNeil reported that Thorpe told her the victim was an elderly
female. McNeil told Villarreal that she had not seen a dead body,
did not witness a murder, and was not sure whether there was a

7
dead body in the apartment. Villarreal called Thorpe using the
number provided by McNeil. When Thorpe answered, the
detective identified himself and told Thorpe about the allegations
against him. Thorpe said that he was in the Long Beach area at
least half an hour away and would come home. After the call
ended, the LAPD communications division informed Villarreal
that Thorpe had called them, and analytics showed his phone
was located in the area of his residence (which was not in Long
Beach). This led Villarreal to conclude that Thorpe had lied
about not being at home. Based on his training and experience,
Villarreal believed that it was necessary to enter Thorpe’s
apartment to verify whether there was a victim inside in need of
medical assistance. After interviewing McNeil, Villarreal went
with her to Thorpe’s apartment, and she identified Thorpe as he
was being brought out.
According to LAPD Detective Nathan Kouri, an LAPD
sergeant decided the police would enter the apartment without a
warrant. Once inside, officers discovered human remains inside
a barrel. Kouri ordered them to stop what they were doing and
exit the residence until they obtained a warrant.
Detective Evans testified that when he arrived at the
apartment on the morning of July 30, 2019, he was informed that
there was a body inside the residence. He drafted an affidavit for
a search warrant. The warrant was signed by the magistrate at
about 2:00 p.m.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the
motion to suppress. It concluded that exigent circumstances
excused the police from obtaining a warrant because they
believed there might be a person in need of medical attention in
the apartment, and also because Thorpe could have destroyed

8
evidence. The court then held Thorpe to answer for the murder
charge.
C. The Renewed Motion to Suppress
On November 19, 2019, Thorpe filed a renewed motion to
suppress all evidence seized from his apartment based on the
evidence adduced at the prior motion to suppress hearing.
(§ 1538.5, subd. (i).)2 Thorpe argued that police had adequate
time to obtain a warrant before entering his apartment. He
further argued there were no exigent circumstances because
McNeil reported the possibility of a dead body, not a living victim.
Thorpe challenged the court’s earlier finding that the warrantless
entry was justified to prevent the destruction of evidence by
pointing out that none of the officers testified they were
concerned about potential destruction of evidence.
The trial court (Judge Michael Shultz) heard the renewed
motion on December 16, 2019. In addition to the evidence from
the initial suppression hearing, Evans testified regarding his
preparation of the affidavit in support of the search warrant.
Kouri testified regarding the decision to enter the apartment
without a warrant. Based on the evidence before it, the court
found that the officers’ July 30, 2019 warrantless entry into the
apartment was unlawful and not justified by exigent
circumstances. The court nonetheless largely denied Thorpe’s
motion, finding that the affidavit, with the information obtained

2 Pursuant to section 1538.5, subdivision (i), a defendant
who has been held to answer for a felony and who has made a
motion to suppress which was ruled on at the preliminary
hearing “shall have the right to renew” the motion “at a special
hearing relating to the validity of the search or seizure.”

9
from the warrantless search redacted, supplied probable cause to
search. The court thus suppressed evidence that was obtained
during the warrantless entry and not also obtained during the
later entry pursuant to the warrant, including that the police
found Thorpe in his apartment.
D. Trial
The jury heard evidence on five days from August 2 to 9,
2022. We summarize below key evidence introduced at trial that
was obtained via the search warrant.
1. Castle’s Body
An LAPD criminalist testified that on July 30, 2019, while
inspecting Thorpe’s apartment, he found a large cardboard barrel
in the back of the bedroom closet. The barrel was moved outside,
and the coroner opened it and found a body inside a black trash
bag. The jury was shown photographs of the body, authenticated
by the criminalist. The parties stipulated that the body was
Castle.
A deputy medical examiner testified that she performed an
autopsy of Castle’s body on August 2, 2019. By that time, the
body was already severely decomposed. The deputy medical
examiner determined the cause of death to be multiple sharp
force injuries; she found 27 sharp force wounds on the body,
including five that were fatal or potentially fatal, meaning they
could have led to a relatively rapid death. She also noted injuries
on Castle’s right hand which were consistent with defensive
wounds.

10
2. Additional Evidence Connecting Thorpe with the
Killing
While inspecting Thorpe’s apartment, the LAPD criminalist
found blood stains on the bathtub, a door frame, the bedroom
floor, a bedroom wall, the bottom of the closet door, a pole in the
bedroom, and a light switch in the bathroom. A second LAPD
criminalist testified that a DNA analysis showed Castle could
have been a source for the blood stains found on the closet door
and a wall in Thorpe’s bedroom, and on the light switch in the
bathroom, while Thorpe and McNeil were excluded as potential
sources.
The first LAPD criminalist testified that, when he found
the barrel in the bedroom closet, it was wrapped in green plastic
wrap that matched wrap located in a container in the kitchen.
He also testified that he found cleaning supplies and latex gloves
in the apartment.
3. Castle’s Porsche
After Castle was identified as the victim, police
investigated whether she owned a red Porsche. An auto
dealership employee authenticated a sales document showing
Castle bought a red Porsche at the dealership on July 14, 2019.
The dealership put a tracking device on the vehicle, and a report
was introduced showing the vehicle’s location on various dates.
According to the report, the Porsche was taken from the
dealership to Los Angeles between July 14 and 22, was in Los
Angeles on July 24 and 25, and was at a location in San Diego on
July 28 and 31, 2019.
An auto mechanic in San Diego testified that on or about
July 27, 2019, Thorpe brought a red Porsche to him and asked
whether the vehicle had GPS and, if so, how to uninstall it.

11
Thorpe also asked if the mechanic could help sell the vehicle.
The mechanic told Thorpe he did not know how to get rid of the
GPS and could not help sell the vehicle. During this meeting,
Thorpe appeared very nervous and was pacing back and forth
while on his phone.
4. Cell Phone Information
An LAPD detective authenticated an extraction report
setting forth various data seized from Thorpe’s cell phone
pursuant to the warrant. The report showed Thorpe and Castle
exchanged text messages on July 15, 2019, in which they
discussed their romantic relationship. On July 16, 2019, Castle
texted that she was coming to Los Angeles to see Thorpe. Just
after midnight on July 21, 2019, Thorpe texted Castle accusing
her of being with another man. Castle responded later that
morning, denying that she was involved with another man.
According to the text messages, Castle arrived in Los Angeles in
the evening on July 21, 2019, and Thorpe was on his way to meet
her. There were no texts from Castle on or after July 22, 2019.
On July 22, 2019, McNeil sent videos to Thorpe showing
the inside of a Porsche.
On July 23, 2019, Thorpe sent an unknown person an
image of a certificate for Castle’s Porsche that contained the car’s
unique vehicle identification number (VIN). Thorpe indicated in
following texts that he wanted to sell the vehicle.
The report also listed user Internet searches done through
Thorpe’s phone. On July 3, 2019, there were searches for “will
murder put in hell” and similar topics. On July 19, 2019, there
were searches for methods to kill a person, including “knife
wounds that instantly kills you.” On July 21, 2019, there were
searches for ways to kill a person, and the impact on a person’s

12
life of committing a murder. On July 22, 2019, there were
searches related to disposing of a body, including “what happens
when you burn a body” and “bodies in Las Vegas desert.” On
July 23, 2019, there were searches regarding the value of a 2003
Porsche 911 and the location of VINs on that type of vehicle,
searches for methods to dispose of a body, what happens to bodies
after death, and several variations on “how to get away with
murder.” On July 24, 2019, there were searches regarding
burning bodies, acid, “55-gallon drum near me,” and how to avoid
having a dead body smell. There were additional searches about
how to dispose of a body through July 29, 2019.
DISCUSSION
Thorpe contends, as he did before the trial court, that once
one excises the information obtained from the warrantless search
from Evans’s affidavit there was no probable cause to support
issuing a search warrant for his apartment.
Thorpe also makes three new arguments that he did not
raise below. He contends the search warrant was invalid under
Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [98 S.Ct. 2674, 57
L.Ed.2d 667] because the affidavit Evans submitted to establish
probable cause was materially misleading. Thorpe also argues
the affidavit did not set forth probable cause to search his cell
phone, and that the warrant was overbroad as to what police
could seize from the phone. Anticipating that we might deem
these new arguments forfeited, Thorpe contends his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to move to suppress on
these additional grounds.

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A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“A defendant may move . . . to suppress as evidence any
tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a” warrant
unsupported by probable cause. (§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(B)(iii).)
Determining whether probable cause exists involves “a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Illinois v. Gates
(1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238 [103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527]
(Gates).) “ ‘[O]nly the probability, and not a prima facie showing,
of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’
[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 235.)
Where, as here, “the affidavit supporting the search
warrant . . . contain[s] information derived from unlawful conduct
as well as other, untainted, information . . . the reviewing court
must excise the tainted information, but the warrant remain[s]
valid if the remaining information provided probable cause for its
issuance.” (People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1078.) We
review de novo whether the search warrant affidavit in this case,
excised of information obtained illegally, provided probable cause
for the warrant. (People v. Robinson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232,
241.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion
to Suppress Evidence Obtained from Thorpe’s
Apartment Via the Search Warrant
We agree with the trial court that the statement of
probable cause, excised of the information obtained during the
initial, warrantless entry into Thorpe’s apartment, provided
probable cause to search the residence. The affidavit recounted
that police had received a call from McNeil, who said she was

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Thorpe’s ex-girlfriend, stating he told her that he had killed an
elderly female for her 2003 red Porsche. McNeil indicated the
incident happened three to four days earlier. She provided a
specific address and stated that Thorpe was living there with his
current girlfriend. LAPD patrol units went to that address but
were unable to contact anyone inside. Villarreal then spoke with
McNeil, who told Villarreal that a few days earlier Thorpe had
said there was a dead body in his apartment, and he needed her
help disposing of it. Thorpe said the body was in a drum inside
his bedroom closet and showed the drum to McNeil. Villarreal
called Thorpe at a cell phone number McNeil provided, and
Thorpe answered. Thorpe later called LAPD back and stated he
was not at his apartment but would drive there from where he
was. Officers waited nearly two hours, but Thorpe never arrived.
These facts established a “fair probability that . . . evidence
of a crime,” would be found in Thorpe’s apartment. (Gates, supra,
462 U.S. at p. 238.) McNeil had a personal relationship with
Thorpe, and knew particulars about his address and phone
number, the location of the dead body, and how it was stored.
Thorpe asked NcNeil to help dispose of the body. Thorpe told
police he would meet them at his apartment and then ghosted
them. In totality, these facts established probable cause to
believe there was a dead body in the apartment, or at least
evidence that there had been a dead body stored there.
Thorpe contends the statement of probable cause (as
excised) failed to suffice because it did not contain any facts
establishing McNeil’s “reliability” or “veracity.” Under Gates, an
informant’s “ ‘reliability’ ” and “ ‘veracity’ ” are relevant, but are
only elements of a larger, flexible approach, which requires the
“magistrate . . . to make a practical, common-sense decision

15
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” (Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 233, 238.) As the
Gates court explained, rather than being independent inquiries,
an “informant’s ‘veracity’ or ‘reliability’ and [her] ‘basis of
knowledge’ . . . are better understood as relevant considerations
in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally
has guided probable-cause determinations: a deficiency in one
may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of
a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other
indicia of reliability.”3 (Gates, at p. 233; see United States v.

3 Contrary to Thorpe’s suggestion, Gates did not hold that
corroboration is required whenever probable cause is based on
information provided by a member of the public. Nor does People
v. French (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1307, also cited by Thorpe,
stand for the proposition that reports from informants must
always be corroborated to supply probable cause for a warrant.
Corroboration was necessary in that case because “[t]here [wa]s
little support for a conclusion that any of the three informants
[wa]s reliable, and none of them provided significant information
founded on firsthand observations.” (Id. at pp. 1316-1317.) One
informant provided information after he was arrested, and “the
affidavit state[d] nothing about his reliability.” (Id. at p. 1317.)
The other two informants were put forth by the police as
“confidential reliable informant[s],” but the affidavits failed to
supply sufficient information to establish they had made reliable
tips in the past. (Id. at pp. 1317-1318.) The circumstances
surrounding McNeil’s report in this case are much different, as
she provided personal knowledge of what Thorpe told her and

16
Phillips (5th Cir. 1984) 727 F.2d 392, 395 [after Gates “[n]o
longer do both the informant’s reliability and the basis of his
knowledge have to be set forth” to establish probable cause for a
warrant].)
Here, the information provided in the statement of
probable cause established McNeil had a “basis of knowledge” for
her claim. In addition to the details it contained, McNeil’s report
was sufficiently reliable because she had disclosed her identity to
police (who in turn disclosed it to the magistrate). If McNeil was
lying and the police took action based on falsehoods, McNeil was
exposed to potential criminal and civil liability, as well as
possible retribution from Thorpe. Under these circumstances, it
was unlikely that McNeil was making up her story. (See People
v. Rochen (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 684, 689 [concluding that based
on the totality of the circumstances the police officer and
magistrate “could reasonably conclude the [informant]’s
statements were not part of an elaborate scheme to harass
someone residing on the subject premises”].)4 Thorpe contends
the facts provided in the affidavit showed that McNeil had a
motive to lie, given that she was his ex-girlfriend, and that her

what she saw in his apartment, and the fact she was openly
reporting someone she personally knew suggested her claims
were reliable.
4 Thorpe quotes from United States v. Martin (5th Cir.
1980) 615 F.2d 318, where the court stated, “nothing is added to
the affidavits by the naming of the informants.” (Id. at p. 325,
fn. 9.) This statement is inconsistent with the United States
Supreme Court’s later decision in Gates, which held that probable
cause is to be determined under the “totality-of-the-
circumstances.” (Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 238.)

17
report was suspicious because she apparently waited several days
to contact police. The United States Supreme Court, however,
has held such facts support the reasonable inference that McNeil
was telling the truth and had decided to come forward when her
relationship with Thorpe deteriorated. (See Massachusetts v.
Upton (1984) 466 U.S. 727, 734 [104 S.Ct. 2085, 800 L.Ed.2d 721]
[fact the informant had recently broken up with the defendant
supported the magistrate’s probable cause finding because it
provided a motive for the informant to make her report].)
Thorpe asserts that McNeil was not a “selfless ‘citizen
informant’ or ‘eyewitness-bystander,’ ” which would afford her
report with a presumption of reliability. (See United States v.
Phillips, supra, 727 F.2d at p. 397.) This argument is unavailing
because the magistrate did not need to rely on a presumption
that McNeil’s report was reliable. As discussed above, the
circumstances of McNeil’s report, including her firsthand
knowledge and the fact her report put her at risk of consequences
if it was false, adequately established her report was sufficiently
reliable to establish a fair probability that a crime had been
committed and there would be evidence of the crime in Thorpe’s
apartment. (See People v. Rochen, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at
p. 688 [“Even if doubts are entertained as to an informant’s
motives, an explicit and detailed description of alleged
wrongdoing, along with a statement the event was observed
firsthand, entitles the tip to greater weight than might otherwise
be the case”].)
C. Thorpe Has Forfeited His Remaining Challenges
Thorpe’s appellate brief asserts additional challenges to the
search warrant that he failed to raise before the trial court.
These include that Evans made material omissions in his

18
statement of probable cause rendering the search warrant invalid
(Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156; People v.
Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1297), that Evans’s affidavit did
not provide probable cause to search Thorpe’s cell phone, and
that the warrant was overbroad because it failed to describe with
sufficient particularity what information on his cell phone was
within the scope of the search.
Thorpe forfeited these claims by failing to assert them in
his motions challenging the warrant. “ ‘ “No procedural principle
is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,” or
a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as
civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right
before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590.) “The
rule is designed to advance efficiency and deter
gamesmanship. . . . ‘ “ ‘ “The purpose of the general doctrine of
waiver [or forfeiture] is to encourage a defendant to bring errors
to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or
avoided and a fair trial had . . . .” ’ ” ’ ” (Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc.
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 264.)
Thorpe suggests that we exercise our discretion to consider
these forfeited claims. We decline the invitation. (People v. Tully
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979-980, & fn. 9 [specific claim not raised
in the defendant’s suppression motion in the trial court is
forfeited on appeal]; People v. Tousant (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 804,
817, fn. 5 [declining to address the defendant’s “challenge to the
scope of information sought by the warrant to search [his] cell
phone” because he “failed to raise [the argument] in the trial
court”].)

19
D. Thorpe’s Ineffective Assistance Claims Fail
Given the forfeiture, Thorpe claims his trial counsel
rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to raise
each of the arguments he makes for the first time on appeal. We
disagree with those ineffective assistance claims.
1. Law Governing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims
“A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance
was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction . . . has two
components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 687 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674] (Strickland).)
To demonstrate deficient performance, “the defendant must
show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,” measured “under prevailing
professional norms.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688.)
“ ‘Reviewing courts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions
in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
[citation], and there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th
876, 925.) “[W]e will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on
appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s
. . . omissions.” (Id. at p. 926.)

20
To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, supra, 466
U.S. at p. 694.) “Where defense counsel’s failure to litigate a
Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation
of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth
Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been different absent the
excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.”
(Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 375 [106 S.Ct.
2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305].)
2. Counsel’s Failure to Pursue a Franks Motion
Thorpe’s defense counsel could have reasonably concluded
there was no evidence that Evans “knowingly and intentionally,
or with reckless disregard for the truth” made any false
statements or material omissions in his warrant affidavit as
required for a successful Franks motion. (Franks v. Delaware,
supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156.) “Competent counsel is not
required to make all conceivable motions or to leave an
exhaustive paper trail for the sake of the record. Rather,
competent counsel should realistically examine the case, the
evidence, and the issues, and pursue those avenues of defense
that, to their best and reasonable professional judgment, seem
appropriate under the circumstances.” (People v. Freeman (1994)
8 Cal.4th 450, 509.)
Thorpe’s contention that Evans’s statement of probable
cause falsely characterized what McNeil knew and believed does
not withstand scrutiny. Thorpe argues Evans’s statement of

21
probable cause was misleading because it did not set forth that
McNeil had not seen a body, did not know how the victim was
killed, and was not sure there even had been a murder. However,
the affidavit accurately conveyed that McNeil reported that
Thorpe told her there was a body in a cardboard box in his
bedroom closet, showed her the cardboard box, and asked for her
help in disposing of the body. This is consistent with McNeil’s
testimony about what she told police and, read fairly, does not
suggest she had some independent knowledge of what occurred
other than what Thorpe had told and shown to her.
Thorpe also relies on the omission from the statement of
probable cause of McNeil’s statement to police that she thought
at one point Thorpe “may have been joking with [her] because he
told [her] several different stories” about how the body came to be
in his apartment. But there is no indication that by the time
McNeil decided to contact police she had any reason to believe
Thorpe was not serious about the body being there. McNeil
testified that she believed Thorpe when he told her “[t]hat he had
a dead woman in his place.” Furthermore, the fact that McNeil
decided to come forward demonstrated she took Thorpe’s
statements seriously.
Thorpe further contends the affidavit should have indicated
that McNeil “was reporting [Thorpe] at least in part out of
jealousy.” That is not what she said. McNeil testified she told
police about Thorpe spending time with Harris, but she did not
testify that she was jealous or that she told the police she was
jealous. McNeil instead decided to call the police when she saw
that Thorpe had invited Harris over, which caused her to think
McNeil might be “in danger because [she] thought that [Harris]
had something to do with it also.” In any event, the affidavit

22
included the information that Thorpe was McNeil’s “ex-boyfriend”
and that he was now living with a different woman, which
alerted the magistrate that McNeil might have a personal
motivation such as jealousy for making her report.
In sum, the record does not support a claim that Evans
provided misleading information in his statement of probable
cause or omitted material information from it, much less that he
did so intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth as
required to prevail on a Franks motion. Thus, defense counsel
did not act unreasonably in not pursuing a claim under Franks.
Thorpe likewise fails to show he was prejudiced by his counsel’s
failure to make a Franks motion because such a motion would
have lacked merit. (Kimmelman v. Morrison, supra, 477 U.S. at
p. 375; Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693-694.)
3. Counsel’s Failure to Seek Suppression of Cell Phone
Data Under the Fourth Amendment
Thorpe’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for not
moving to suppress the contents of his cell phone on Fourth
Amendment grounds fails because counsel could have conceivably
concluded there were no grounds for such a motion. Thorpe
makes two basic arguments—that Evans’s affidavit failed to
provide probable cause to search Thorpe’s cell phone, and that
the warrant lacked the required particularity in terms of what
information it authorized police to search for and seize.
Any motion to suppress based on these arguments would
have failed under the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. “Evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable
reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate is ordinarily not excluded under the Fourth
Amendment, even if a reviewing court ultimately determines the

23
warrant is not supported by probable cause.” (People v. Garcia
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715, 723, citing United States v. Leon
(1984) 468 U.S. 897, 900 [104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677].)
To defeat the good faith exception with regard to his lack of
probable cause argument, Thorpe would have had to show “the
affidavit [wa]s ‘ “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” ’ ” that it
would be entirely unreasonable for an officer to believe such
cause existed. (People v. Meza (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 520, 543.)
“ ‘If the officer “reasonably could have believed that the affidavit
presented a close or debatable question on the issue of probable
cause,” the seized evidence need not be suppressed.’ [Citation.]
The absence of any legal authority directly on point and the
existence of arguably supportive legal authority renders the issue
of probable cause debatable. [Citation.]” (People v. Garcia,
supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 723.) The affidavit included facts as
to why evidence might possibly be on the cell phone, and was
certainly not so lacking in evidence that no reasonable person
could have relied on it. Nor does Thorpe cite any binding legal
authority directly on point which supports his claim.5 Thorpe

5 The case most supportive of Thorpe’s position is State v.
Baldwin (Tex.Crim.App. 2022) 664 S.W.3d 122, in which the
Texas high court for criminal appeals held “generic, boilerplate
language about cell phone use among criminals” was insufficient
to establish probable cause, and that “specific facts connecting
the items to be searched to the alleged offense are required for
the magistrate to reasonably determine probable cause.” (Id. at
p. 134.) Putting aside that this case is not binding and no
California court has adopted its reasoning, Baldwin was decided
after the warrant in this case was issued. It is therefore
irrelevant to whether Evans reasonably believed when he
obtained the warrant that it was supported by probable cause.

24
argues the good faith exception does not apply because the
affidavit was materially misleading, but we have rejected that
argument.
Any motion to suppress the cell phone data based on
purported lack of particularity would similarly have failed under
the good faith exception. To defeat the exception, Thorpe would
have had to show the warrant was “so facially deficient—i.e., in
failing to particularize the place to be searched or things to be
seized—that the executing officers c[ould ]not [have] reasonably
presume[d] it to be valid.” (United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S.
at p. 923, italics omitted.) Thorpe could not have satisfied this
standard because the warrant limited the search to data relevant
to the suspected murder and identified the categories of data
subject to search and seizure. Furthermore, even where a
warrant fails to particularize items within one of several
categories, it does not mean “that no reasonable officer could
presume it to be valid.” (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at
p. 1293.)
In sum, Thorpe’s trial counsel could have reasonably
decided against filing a motion to suppress the cell phone data
because such a motion would have lacked merit. Thus, Thorpe
fails to show either deficient performance or resulting prejudice.
(Kimmelman v. Morrison, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 375; Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693-694.)
4. Counsel’s Faliure to Seek Suppression under State
Law
Thorpe lastly argues his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to seek suppression of his cell phone data under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA; § 1546 et seq.).
This argument fails because counsel could have concluded a

25
motion to suppress under ECPA lacked merit, and also because
there is no “reasonable probability” such a motion to suppress
would have succeeded. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)
“Any person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding may move to
suppress any electronic information obtained or retained in
violation of” ECPA. (§ 1546.4, subd. (a).) As relevant here, ECPA
requires that a warrant “describe with particularity the
information to be seized by specifying, as appropriate and
reasonable, the time periods covered, the target individuals or
accounts, the applications or services covered, and the types of
information sought.” (§ 1546.1, subd. (d)(1).) It further provides
“the court may determine that it is not appropriate to specify
time periods because of the specific circumstances of the
investigation, including, but not limited to, the nature of the
device to be searched.” (Ibid.) Thorpe claims the warrant
violated these precepts.
We disagree. The warrant identified Thorpe’s cell phone as
the device to be searched, was limited to evidence relevant to the
suspected murder, identified the applications or functions on the
phone where the data would be located, and identified the types
of information sought, including “communications content,”
“location data,” “photographic/audio/video,” “[I]nternet history,”
“financial information,” and “indicia of ownership.” ECPA only
requires a time limitation “as appropriate and reasonable” and
expressly provides, with respect to warrants such as the one at
issue here, “the court may determine that it is not appropriate to
specify time periods because of the specific circumstances of the
investigation . . . .” (§ 1546.1, subd. (d)(1).) Here, the magistrate
included a time limitation of July 20 to July 30, 2019, for some
data, and could reasonably decide not to specify a time limitation

26
on other data to be seized because the police had just begun their
investigation and did not know any details about the suspected
murder or even the identity of the victim.
Thorpe also contends that the warrant violated ECPA
because “it failed to establish a nexus between the specific things
to be searched and the evidence law enforcement is seeking.” The
plain language of ECPA does not require such a nexus. In any
event, assuming one is required, the warrant here complied. The
statement of probable cause described types of information that
would probably be found on Thorpe’s cell phone. Evans opined,
based on his training and experience, that communications on
several phone applications might contain “direct and indirect
statements” about the crime. The affidavit indicated that Thorpe
had solicited McNeil’s help in disposing of the body, raising the
possibility the phone contained communications between them on
that subject; in addition, the magistrate could reasonably infer
that McNeil had stopped providing any assistance, Thorpe
therefore might ask someone else to help, and that the phone
would contain relevant communications between Thorpe and that
other person. Evans also indicated the phone would probably
have evidence of Thorpe’s historical location, which Evans
explained was important “[b]ecause the evidence in this case
doesn’t indicate where this crime occurred.” Evans also stated
his “belie[f that] the GPS location, financial information, cookies,
bookmarks, web history, search items and [I]nternet search
history on digital devices and cellular devices may contain
relevant evidence such as the interaction of the decedent and
suspect.” Lastly, the affidavit indicated that Villarreal had called
the cell phone and spoken with Thorpe, which confirmed that
Thorpe used his cell phone, and also that the cell phone would

27
contain evidence of the call during which Thorpe lied about where
he was and his willingness to meet with police at his apartment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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