CourtListener 10590042•In re N.A. CA4/1
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Filed 5/22/25 In re N.A. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re N.A., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D084886
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. CJ1319E)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
N.A. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniela Reali-Ferrari, Judge. Affirmed.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, N.A.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, L.B.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, N.R.
Mansi Thakkar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, Jessica C. (De Facto Parent).
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
Counsel, Indra N. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
To say this case has a complicated procedural history would be an
understatement. It serves as a stark reminder of the difficult task often
faced by the juvenile court in making decisions that affect the relationships of
persons in the dependency system, including between a parent and a
dependent child, the child and his or her siblings, and the child and his or her
foster family, as well as the quality of their lives to follow.
When a child is removed from a parent’s custody at the final stage of
reunification, Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.22, subdivision
(a)(1) requires the juvenile court to “order the return of the child to the
physical custody of their parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to the parent or
guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
In this case, dependent child N.A. (born 2021) (Minor) and
nondependent sibling L.B. (2015) each filed a petition under section 388 in
advance of the repeatedly continued, contested 18-month review hearing
(Contested Hearing). Minor filed her petition about a month before the start
of the Contested Hearing, about 34 months after her removal. She asked the
juvenile court (1) to maintain or limit visitation between Minor and her
natural parent N.R. (Mother) and not to expand overnights as proposed by
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency); (2) to
keep Minor’s service providers in Ventura County, where she lived with L.B.
and his adoptive parents, who were Minor’s foster parents; and (3) to refrain
from introducing Minor to new service providers in San Diego County, where
Mother lived and received services.
L.B. brought his (sibling) petition under section 388, subdivision (b)(1).
He sought (1) to change the juvenile court’s order granting Mother
reunification services, including a 60-day trial visit with Minor; and (2)
permanent placement of Minor in his adoptive home.2
The juvenile court found Minor and L.B. made prima facie showings on
their respective petitions and ruled that evidence of Minor’s bond with her
foster family would not be considered at the Contested Hearing. At the
parties’ request, the court conducted a document trial. The parties stipulated
to the admission of more than 700 pages of documents, including expert
reports prepared on Minor’s behalf. The court allowed L.B. to participate in
the Contested Hearing, but trailed his section 388 petition. After extensive
argument by counsel, on September 17, 2024, the court made a no-detriment
finding by a preponderance of the evidence, ordered Minor returned to
Mother’s custody, and denied the petitions of Minor and L.B.
On appeal, Minor argues the juvenile court denied her due process of
law at the Contested Hearing when it allegedly refused to hear her petition
and allegedly deprived her of the ability to present evidence. She claims this
evidence went to her best interest under section 388 and supported a finding
she would suffer irreparable harm if the court severed the bond between her
and her foster family. L.B. likewise argues the court denied him due process
2 De facto parent Jessica C. also filed her own section 388 petition on the
same day as L.B. but withdrew it before the Contested Hearing.
3
of law including by trailing, and ultimately dismissing, his petition. De facto
parent Jessica C. also appealed, joining the arguments of Minor and L.B. in
their opening briefs.
The Agency makes a series of arguments in response, including: (1) as
a threshold matter, Jessica C. lacks standing to appeal from the order
returning Minor to Mother’s custody; (2) the court did not violate Minor’s due
process rights because the issue at the Contested Hearing was not whether
Minor would suffer detriment if “removed” from her foster family, but rather
whether she could safely “return” to Mother’s custody as set forth in
section 366.22; and the court, in any event, considered the evidence in
support of Minor’s petition; and (3) L.B., as a nondependent sibling seeking
permanent placement of Minor, received the process he was due when the
court allowed him to participate in the Contested Hearing but limited the
evidence he could present.
As we explain, we independently conclude (1) Jessica C., as a de facto
parent, lacks standing on appeal; and (2) the juvenile court deprived neither
Minor nor L.B. of due process of law. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile
court’s order returning Minor to Mother’s physical custody and dismissing
the section 388 petitions of Minor and L.B.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
A. The Petition, Detention, and Reinstatement of Mother’s Services
In October 2021, the Agency filed a petition alleging Minor was a
person described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1), after she and Mother
tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. The petition also
3 We summarize the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the
respondent and the September 17, 2024 order. (See In re Shelley J. (1998)
68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.)
4
alleged Mother and presumed father I.A. (Father)4 had an “extensive history
of domestic violence” and had several other children involved in prior
dependency proceedings, including L.B. Mother and Father were both
homeless at the time and, according to Mother, had planned Minor’s
pregnancy. The juvenile court ordered Minor detained in the Ventura County
home of Jessica C., where nondependent sibling L.B. resided with his
adoptive family.
At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court made a true
finding on the petition and ordered Minor to remain placed with Jessica C.
In July 2022, the court terminated Mother’s reunification services and set the
matter for permanent placement.
In its section 366.26 report, the Agency recommended termination of
parental rights. Mother responded by filing a section 388 petition seeking
reinstatement of reunification services. She claimed she had been in custody
for a minor infraction when the order was issued and in inpatient residential
treatment, where she had remained clean and sober for six months. The
Agency opposed Mother’s petition.
The juvenile court made a prima facie finding on Mother’s petition and
set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. The court subsequently vacated
the order setting the section 366.26 hearing and reinstated Mother’s
reunification services, finding she had met her burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence to show changed circumstances and best
interests of Minor.
4 Father first appeared in the case on the eve of the Contested Hearing,
did not meaningfully participate in that proceeding, and is not a party in this
appeal.
5
B. Initial 18-month Review Hearing
At the continued section 366.22 hearing held in November 2023, the
juvenile court found (1) the Agency did not meet its burden to show it
provided reasonable reunification services to Mother, as an Agency social
worker who specialized in adoptions had been overseeing her services once
they were restored; (2) “overwhelming evidence” Mother had ameliorated the
“original protective issue”; but (3) it would then be detrimental to Minor’s
“emotional well[-]being” to return her to Mother’s custody given their “limited
relationship.” The court continued the 18-month review hearing for six
months to afford Mother additional reunification services, including
structured unsupervised visits with Minor.
C. The Section 388 Petitions of L.B. and Jessica C.
In March 2024, nine-year-old L.B.—then appearing in propria
persona—and his mother Jessica C. each filed a section 388 petition on the
same day. L.B.’s section 388 petition challenged the juvenile court’s March
2023 order extending Mother’s reunification services and giving the Agency
discretion to place Minor with Mother for a 60-day trial visit. L.B. requested
that Minor remain in the care of her foster family so they could “grow up”
together. Thereafter, Minor’s counsel, who had supported the plan for
extended visitation toward a 60-day trial visit, declared a conflict of interest
and withdrew from the case.
Jessica C.’s section 388 petition also asked the juvenile court to vacate
the March 2023 order and hold a full evidentiary hearing under
section 366.22 to determine whether placement of Minor with Mother would
be “detrimental.” In support of her petition, Jessica C. alleged Minor had
undergone significant behavioral changes as a result of her increased visits
with Mother, including self-injurious behavior.
6
At a hearing in late April 2024, Minor’s new counsel expressed “grave[ ]
concerns” about the Agency’s plan to expand Mother’s visitation beyond a
single overnight. Minor also argued L.B. had standing to intervene in the
case and had made a prima facie showing warranting an evidentiary hearing
on his section 388 petition. Jessica C. asked the court to appoint counsel for
L.B. to allow his “voice to be heard.”
The juvenile court declined to make any changes to visitation, noting
Minor’s visits with Mother were “going very well.” The court ruled the
Agency would continue to have discretion to expand visitation, including up
to a 60-day trial visit with the concurrence of Minor’s counsel. It deferred
ruling on the petitions of L.B. and Jessica C., and recognized L.B.’s petition
was brought as a sibling to a dependent child under section 388,
subdivision (b)(1).5
D. The Agency’s Updated Report and L.B.’s Prima Facie Showing
In its May 2024 status review report, the Agency recommended the
juvenile court return Minor to Mother’s custody and provide family
maintenance services. The report noted Mother met all of her case plan
goals; completed her court-ordered services; was employed, financially stable,
and residing in a sober-living home with “ample” support where Minor also
5 Section 388, subdivision (b)(1) provides: “Any person, including a child
or a nonminor dependent who is a dependent of the juvenile court, may
petition the court to assert a relationship as a sibling . . . to a child who is, or
is the subject of a petition for adjudication as, a dependent of the juvenile
court, and may request visitation with the dependent child, placement with
or near the dependent child, or consideration when determining or
implementing a case plan or permanent plan for the dependent child or make
any other request for an order which may be shown to be in the best interest
of the dependent child.”
7
could live; and maintained her sobriety, regularly attending NA/AA meetings
and working closely with a sponsor.
During the reporting period, the Agency observed several visits
between Mother and Minor, including during and after overnights, with no
concerns reported. It noted Mother traveled by train most weekends to
Ventura County to visit Minor; and observed the child to be “comfortable and
happy” in Mother’s care.
At the May 6 hearing, Jessica C. withdrew her section 388 petition.
She spoke on L.B.’s behalf, noting he was “heartbroken over the idea of losing
his sister,” argued he had the right to intervene in the case under section 388,
subdivision (b)(1), and again asked the juvenile court to appoint him counsel.
The juvenile court found L.B. made a prima facie showing on his
petition, but remained uncertain whether he and/or Jessica C. had standing
to participate in the upcoming Contested Hearing.
Toward the end of the hearing, Minor asked the juvenile court to limit
Mother’s visitation to two overnights a week. The Agency opposed that
request. The court again declined to change its visitation order, finding the
Agency had discretion to expand visitation; and commented it was “happy” to
learn that Mother was having two overnights each week. At a hearing later
that month, Jessica C. informed the court that the family would retain
private counsel for L.B.6
At the June status conference hearing, the juvenile court declined the
Agency’s request to modify the visitation order to allow Mother a 60-day trial
visit without Minor’s counsel’s concurrence. Minor’s counsel opposed lifting
6 The juvenile court attempted to appoint L.B. counsel, but Children’s
Legal Services and the Office of Assigned Counsel each declined the
representation due to the terms of their respective contracts, given L.B.’s
sibling relationship with Minor and the timing of his request.
8
the concurrence requirement, noting Minor’s due process rights allegedly
were at stake if placed with Mother for 60 days.
E. Standing
At a July hearing, the parties debated whether Jessica C. and/or L.B.
had standing to participate at the Contested Hearing. As relevant here, the
Agency and Mother argued L.B.’s standing under section 388,
subdivision (b)(1) was “limited” because the Legislature could not have
intended to allow a nondependent sibling to advocate for termination of
reunification services for a dependent-child parent, frustrating the goal of
family reunification during this stage of dependency.
The juvenile court ruled L.B. could introduce evidence at the Contested
Hearing regarding his relationship with Minor if it “relate[d] to the ultimate
issue of detriment,” subject to any objections including on the grounds of
relevancy and undue consumption of time.
F. Minor’s Section 388 Petition
Within weeks of the Contested Hearing, Minor filed a section 388
petition asking the juvenile court to change its March 2023 order giving the
Agency discretion to expand overnights with Mother. Specifically, Minor’s
petition asked the court (1) to require Minor’s counsel’s concurrence before
allowing the Agency to further expand visitation; and (2) to prevent the
Agency from introducing Minor to new service providers in San Diego County
and instead maintain the status quo with her providers in Ventura County.
The Agency opposed Minor’s petition, noting Minor sought to limit
Mother’s visitation at “every” hearing. The Agency argued that, until the
juvenile court terminated Mother’s reunification services, the law required
the Agency to ensure Mother had adequate visitation as part of its effort to
9
reunify the family; and failure to ensure adequate visitation with Minor could
result in another finding of lack of reasonable services to Mother.
The Agency also argued that Minor needed service providers in
San Diego County, as Minor’s request to have providers only in Ventura
County was tantamount to “denying reunification”; that for the Agency to
offer services to Minor in San Diego County, visitation with Mother needed to
increase to four overnights a week; and that the court should deny prima
facie on Minor’s petition because it raised the same issues that would be
addressed at the Contested Hearing. The Agency acknowledged Minor acted
out when she transitioned between her foster family and Mother, but
indicated that once visitation with Mother began, there were no reported
issues and visitation went well.
The juvenile court deferred ruling on whether Minor made a prima
facie showing. In so doing, the court commented Minor was making the same
request she had “made multiple times in numerous hearings where the court
reiterated . . . it was not prepared to change the Agency’s discretion to expand
visits.”
G. The Court’s Interim Order
At the August pretrial conference hearing, the Agency asked the
juvenile court to add one more overnight to Mother’s visitation schedule,
bringing the total to five overnights a week in San Diego County. Minor
objected and requested the court make a prima facie finding on her petition,
arguing if the court granted the Agency’s request it was effectively returning
her to Mother’s custody before the Contested Hearing.
Minor further argued the attachments to her petition, including from a
neuropsychologist specializing in trauma and psychology, confirmed the
dysregulation she experienced during transitions between her foster family
10
and Mother and from increased visits with Mother; her trauma would only
increase if she were introduced to new service providers in San Diego County;
and if the court expanded Mother’s visitation as proposed by the Agency, she
would end up in daycare several days a week “instead of spending that [time]
with her family.” Minor claimed her petition did not seek to stop visitation,
but merely “to slow it down to allow her to adjust.”
The Agency argued the juvenile court should deny prima facie on
Minor’s petition, explaining Mother’s visits were going “fine”; the Agency
social worker who transported Minor between Ventura County and San Diego
County had no concerns; and none were noted by the child’s other service
providers or the residents of Mother’s sober-living home who observed Minor
and Mother together.
Mother argued the neuropsychologist’s report was not trustworthy
because it was based on a series of videos taken by Jessica C. during
transitions between the foster parents and Mother; that none of the videos
showed Mother and Minor together, despite the neuropsychologist’s
conclusion that no “bond” allegedly existed between them; and that the
neuropsychologist had never met Minor or Mother. Mother represented she
then had no intention of introducing Minor to new providers, and she and
Minor had a developmental screening and enhancement program (DSEP)
specialist from Rady Children’s Hospital who reported no concerns based on
the same information relied on by the neuropsychologist.
The juvenile court found Minor made a prima facie showing on her
petition, issued an interim order that visitation between Mother and Minor
was not to increase, and stated it would conduct the section 366.22 hearing
first and then decide the section 388 petitions.
11
H. Contested Hearing
The section 366.22 hearing commenced in late August. At the outset,
Minor asked the juvenile court to clarify the “scope of information in
determining detriment.” The court responded, “[M]y ruling is clear. If the
basis for this person’s testimony is that they see the detriment because of
severing the bond, or the relationship, or however you want to call it from the
caregivers, if that is the basis that they are relying on, this court’s view is it
would be impermissible for the fact finder to consider that.” After hearing
additional argument, the court reiterated that “[e]vidence of bonding with the
foster family at this point of the proceedings—we are in reunification—in this
court’s view, that is not something the court should consider.”
After a brief recess, the parties settled on a documents-only trial.
Other than two exhibits—the resume and accompanying letter of the family
therapist for the foster family, counsel stipulated to the admission of the
exhibits on the joint exhibit list, which included the reports of Minor’s
experts.
1. Document Trial and Argument
The parties provided the juvenile court with over 700 pages of
documents as well as video evidence. The court indicated it would entertain
testimony as well, if deemed necessary by the parties. Given the stipulation
of the parties to admit the exhibits, the Agency rested but indicated its social
worker was available for cross-examination.
The juvenile court admitted the exhibits into evidence, including
Minor’s section 388 petition and accompanying reports, as well as other
evidence to show detriment; took judicial notice of the section 388 petitions of
Jessica C. (which it recognized had been withdrawn) and L.B.; and trailed
L.B.’s petition.
12
The Agency argued for a no-detriment finding, noting there was no
evidence Mother was unsafe with Minor. To the contrary, it noted the
evidence was “exceptionally clear” that Mother was doing “great” caring for
Minor, as also confirmed by the DSEP specialist at Rady Children’s Hospital;
and in a report prepared in August 2024 by a psychologist who conducted a
bonding study. Through personal observation on two occasions, the
psychologist found Mother and Minor engaged in “healthy parent-child
exchanges” that were “positive, reciprocal, and appropriate”; and Minor
sought out and “welcome[d] Mother’s company” and was “relaxed” in her care.
Regarding Minor’s evidence, the Agency noted it would be pertinent at a
section 366.26 hearing, when a dependent child’s need for stability is the
focus, but evidence of Minor’s bond with her foster family was not relevant at
the Contested Hearing, where the focus is on family reunification.
Mother noted the many obstacles she faced during the dependency,
including appointment of an Agency adoption social worker who had failed to
provide Mother with reasonable reunification services, communicated directly
with Jessica C., and advocated against reunification. Mother pointed out the
concerns expressed by Jessica C., as shown in the videos, were not observed
by independent third parties including Agency social workers who
transported Minor for visits. Mother recommended the court review Minor’s
therapy notes from a March 2024 appointment in Ventura County in which
the therapist stated Jessica C. was “seeking medical documentation that
demonstrate[d] a correlation between [Minor’s] behavioral challenges and the
increase in visitation with [Mother].”
13
Mother argued Jessica C. had “attempted to thwart reunification with
exponentially pervasive interference at every stage of this case.”7 For
example, Jessica C. refused to use a “shared backpack” containing
photographs and other items, as recommended by the DSEP specialist, to
alleviate some of Minor’s anxiety during transitions; spoke negatively about
Mother to Minor; and reinforced and perpetuated Minor’s behaviors during
transitions, against the advice of professionals, by giving the child more
instead of less attention.
Mother also argued the juvenile court should give the
neuropsychologist’s report little to no weight because she had never met or
interacted with Minor in person, instead relying on “subjective impressions”
provided by Jessica C.
Mother also discounted an August 2024 report by a psychotherapist
retained by Minor who observed a virtual visit between Mother and Minor.
The psychotherapist concluded Minor was “emotionally detached” during the
call; and, in reliance on the videos taken by Jessica C., opined overnights
were “emotionally harmful” to Minor and causing her “toxic stress” that
would “have lifelong effects on her developing brain.” Like the
neuropsychologist, Mother noted the psychotherapist had had no in-person
observation of Minor and Mother together and had ignored evidence of the
positive attachment between them.
Minor sought to remain in the placement with her foster family and to
terminate Mother’s reunification services. She highlighted the reports of her
primary care physician, therapist, and neuropsychologist to support her claim
7 Jessica C. denied the Mother’s allegations and argued the juvenile
court should terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing
for permanent placement.
14
the dependency system had “failed” her in this case. Minor noted the
neuropsychologist recommended suspending Mother’s unsupervised visits
and instituting supervised visits in Ventura County to reduce the “profound
fear and confusion” she experienced in Mother’s care. According to the
neuropsychologist, the court should maintain Minor’s placement with her
foster family to prevent the potential “lifelong effects” on her developing
brain.
L.B. argued the juvenile court erred when it excluded evidence of the
sibling bond between him and Minor to show severance of that relationship
would be detrimental if Minor was returned to Mother’s custody; and when it
decided to trail his section 388 petition. He requested the court continue
Minor’s placement with his adoptive family.
2. The Ruling
The juvenile court noted the Agency’s position for months was to
recommend returning Minor to Mother’s custody, as the Agency exercised its
discretion to gradually expand visitation; Minor’s counsel refused to give
consent to a 60-day trial visit with Mother and had “repeatedly requested
this court halt any expansion of visitation[ ]”; and the Agency in response
unsuccessfully sought a change to the order requiring consent. The court
further noted Minor “aligned” with Jessica C. in requesting that Minor
remain in the care of her foster family, contending visits with Mother caused
Minor’s dysregulation and evidenced detriment. The court explained it had
reviewed all of the expert reports submitted by Minor, including from the
neuropsychologist.
The juvenile court found the neuropsychologist’s report to be “less
[than] persuasive” in that the neuropsychologist did not view a single in-
person interaction between Minor and Mother, instead basing her opinions on
15
videos and reports provided by Jessica C. The court reached the same
conclusion regarding the psychotherapist’s report, which concluded that
overnight visitation between Mother and Minor was “emotionally harmful”
and recommended prioritizing permanent stability in the foster home,
discontinuing overnight visitation, and pursuing an “open adoption.” The
court also considered the report from Minor’s primary care physician, and
found evidence of Minor’s dysregulation in doctor notes that predated
Mother’s unsupervised visits with the child.
The juvenile court questioned the “veracity as well as the bias” of
Jessica C. in connection with the information she provided Minor’s experts
regarding the child’s dysregulation. The court found Jessica C. had “altered”
Minor’s preschool records, knowing they would be used at the Contested
Hearing. The court also referenced the text messages between Jessica C. and
an Agency social worker that showed the foster parents “were very hopeful
that reunification would not occur.”
Conversely, the juvenile court found no evidence that Minor’s
dysregulation was solely due to visits with Mother or that Mother was not
equipped to manage these behaviors. The court found Mother had “far
exceeded the terms of her case plan” prepared by the Agency; and that
independent observers—including Agency social workers—had dropped in
unannounced during overnight visits and found Minor to be “happy,” “calm,”
and “in good spirits,” without any reports of dysregulation or a child in
distress. The DSEP specialist, who had recently worked with Mother and
Minor and previously had participated in “multiple sessions” with them, also
did not report concerns. Neither did Minor’s court-appointed special
advocate, who observed a visit at Mother’s home and found Minor to be “very
happy” and “talkative” and Mother to be “attentive” to the child’s needs.
16
Based on the voluminous evidence, the juvenile court “simply” could
“not find by a preponderance of the evidence that returning [Minor] to the
custody of her mother would result in a substantial risk of detriment to her
physical or emotional well[-]being.” The court ordered Minor returned to
Mother’s custody under family maintenance and denied the section 388
petitions of Minor and L.B. The court included sibling visitation as part of its
order.
DISCUSSION
I.
Jessica C. and Standing
As a threshold issue, the Agency argues Jessica C. lacks standing to
appeal. We agree.
A. Guiding Principles
“The right to appeal is purely statutory.” (Jennifer T. v. Superior Court
(2007) 159 Cal.App.4th 254, 260.) Code of Civil Procedure section 902
provides in part, “Any party aggrieved may appeal in the cases prescribed in
this title.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 902, italics added.) “The test is twofold—one
must be both a party of record to the action and aggrieved to have standing to
appeal.” (Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1342.)
Thus, notwithstanding an appealable judgment or order, “[a]n appeal may be
taken only by a party who has standing to appeal. [Citation.] This rule is
jurisdictional.” (Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947 (Sabi).)
“One is considered ‘aggrieved’ whose rights or interests are injuriously
affected by the judgment.” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d
730, 737 (Carleson).) “Conversely, ‘[a] party who is not aggrieved by an order
or judgment has no standing to attack it on appeal.’ ” (Conservatorship of
Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67 (Gregory D.); accord, Sabi, supra,
17
183 Cal.App.4th at p. 947 [respondents lacked standing to file a cross-appeal
because they “completely prevailed” in the trial court].) These rules of
appellate procedure apply to appeals from dependency proceedings. (In re
J.B. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 133, 139 (J.B.).)
“De facto parent status does not give the de facto parent the right to
reunification services, visitation, custody, or placement of the minor, ‘or to
any degree of independent control over the child’s destiny whatsoever.’
[Citations.] De facto parent status ‘merely provides a way for the de facto
parent to stay involved in the dependency process and provide information to
the court.’ ” (In re B.S. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 888, 895 (B.S.), italics added.)
B. Analysis
J.B., decided by Division Two of our court, provides meaningful
guidance on the present issue. There, the dependent child had been in the
care of the de facto parent for about two years. The parents filed petitions
under section 388 seeking additional reunification services and increased
visitation. The de facto parent, who sought to adopt the child, opposed the
petitions. The juvenile court granted the parents’ petitions and the de facto
parent appealed from that order. (J.B., supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 135.)
The J.B. court dismissed the de facto parent’s appeal, concluding she
lacked standing because the order did not injuriously affect her rights and
interests “in an immediate and substantial way.” (J.B., supra, 108
Cal.App.5th at p. 139.) “ ‘While de facto parents may feel aggrieved and, no
doubt, may be emotionally affected by court orders affecting the custody of a
minor, a de facto parent has no standing to appeal a custody decision because
they cannot show how their legal rights were injuriously affected.’ ” (Id. at
p. 140, quoting B.S., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 897.)
18
In reaching its decision, J.B. relied on In re P.L. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th
1357 (P.L.), a case also decided by Division Two of our court. In P.L., the de
facto parent appealed from an order removing the dependent child, who had
been in her care for about two years, and placing the child in a prospective
adoptive home. (Id. at pp. 1359–1360.) In dismissing the de facto parent’s
appeal, the P.L. court concluded, “[A]ppellant has no legal standing to
complain of the decision to place the child with the new prospective couple
since she has no right to custody or continued placement as a mere de facto
parent. The order changing physical custody was within the sound discretion
of the court from which appellant cannot appeal because her legal rights were
not impacted.” (Id. at pp. 1361–1362.)
J.B. noted a majority of the Second District Court of Appeal in In re
Vincent M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 943 (Vincent M.) reached a different
conclusion. In that case, the mother had surrendered the dependent child
while the father was unknown. The juvenile court set a section 366.26
hearing with the permanent plan of adoption, placed the child in foster care,
and granted the foster parents de facto status. Several months later, the
father came forward, filed a section 388 petition requesting presumed father
status and seeking reunification services. The court granted the petition and
the de facto parents appealed. (Vincent M., at pp. 949–950.)
The majority in Vincent M. rejected the father’s argument the de facto
parents lacked standing to appeal because they had no right to custody or
placement of the dependent child. (Vincent M., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at
p. 952.) The majority concluded the de facto parents’ rights and interests
were injuriously affected by the juvenile court’s ruling because it took the
case “off the adoption track.” (Id. at p. 953.)
19
The dissent in Vincent M. disagreed. (Vincent M., supra,
161 Cal.App.4th at p. 961 (dis. opn. of Armstrong, J.).) It noted the de facto
parents undoubtedly suffered “emotional pain” and felt aggrieved, but they
lacked standing because they had no legal right to adopt the child during that
stage of dependency. (Id. at pp. 962–964 (dis. opn. of Armstrong, J.).)
The J.B. court also looked to the Third District’s decision in B.S. for
guidance. (J.B., supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 140.) In B.S., the de facto
parents appealed from the order removing the child from their care and
placing her with maternal relatives. (B.S., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.)
The B.S. court examined P.L. and Vincent M. and concluded P.L. was better
decided. (Id. at p. 897.) The B.S. court recognized a de facto parent does not
have the same rights as a biological parent, and such status “ ‘provides a way
for the de facto parent to stay involved in the dependency process and provide
information to the court,’ ” but it does not give the de facto parent “ ‘any
degree of independent control over the child’s destiny whatsoever.’ ” (Id. at
p. 895.)
We agree with the decisions in J.B., P.L., B.S., and the dissent in
Vincent M. Undoubtedly, Jessica C. has been emotionally affected by the
order returning Minor to Mother’s custody, and understandably feels
aggrieved by that ruling because it disrupted the de facto parents’ plan to
adopt Minor, as they had done with sibling L.B. (See J.B., supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 140; P.L., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1361–1362;
B.S., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 897.) But at the reunification stage of
dependency, we conclude Jessica C.’s legal rights were not “injuriously
affected” because she had no legal right to keep Minor in her care. (See
Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 737; accord, Gregory D., supra,
214 Cal.App.4th at p. 67; see also § 396 [providing in part, “It is the policy of
20
the Legislature that foster care should be a temporary method of care for the
children of this state.”].)
Accordingly, we must dismiss Jessica C.’s appeal on jurisdictional
grounds because, as a de facto parent, she lacked standing to appeal from the
September 17, 2024 order returning Minor to Mother’s custody. (See Sabi,
supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.)
II.
Dependency and Due Process
Minor argues the juvenile court denied her due process of law by
refusing to allow her to present additional evidence of her best interest at the
Contested Hearing. L.B. similarly argues he was denied due process,
including as a result of the court’s decision to trail his petition. We reject
these claims of error.
A. Guiding Principles
1. Due Process and the Standard of Review
“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” (Mathews v.
Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333.) In a dependency case, “due process
focuses on the right to notice and the right to be heard.” (In re Matthew P.
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 841, 851; accord In re Armando L. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th
606, 620–621; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.534(g)(1)(D)8 [court must
advise child, parent, or guardian of the right to present evidence to the
court].)
The right to present evidence, however, is not unlimited. “The due
process right to present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of significant
probative value to the issue before the court.” (In re Jeanette V. (1998)
8 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
21
68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 (Jeanette V.); Evid. Code, § 210 [“Evidence is
relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed
fact of consequence to the determination of an action.”].) In addition, a
juvenile court enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative
value of particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice,
confusion, or consumption of time. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
“Where, as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial
court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except
on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious
or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.’ ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124–1125; In re
Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 911 [a juvenile court’s ruling on the
admissibility of evidence will only be disturbed if there is a clear showing of
an abuse of discretion].)
2. Reunification and Visitation
Our dependency law seeks to balance a number of interests:
“[C]hildren’s interests in safe and stable homes; parents’ interests in raising
their children; families’ shared interests in each other’s companionship; and
the state’s interest in protecting society’s most vulnerable members. . . . [¶]
Dependency proceedings span up to four stages: jurisdiction, disposition,
reunification, and permanency.” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023)
14 Cal.5th 609, 623–624 (Michael G.).)
This case concerns reunification. After removal, with certain
exceptions not relevant here, the juvenile court “must order child welfare
services designed to facilitate the reunification of the family. [Citations.]
Such services may, depending on the case, include evaluations and
assessments, counseling, parent education, substance abuse treatment and
22
testing, and other forms of assistance. ‘ “Reunification services,” ’ we have
explained, ‘ “implement ‘the law’s strong preference for maintaining the
family relationships if at all possible.’ ” ’ [Citation.] This is because ‘services
enable [parents] to demonstrate parental fitness and so regain custody of
their dependent children.’ ” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 624.)
As the Supreme Court explained in In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th
295, 308, “At the dispositional hearing, and at each review hearing prior to
permanency planning, there is a statutory presumption that the child will be
returned to parental custody. . . . At 6-, 12-, and 18-month review hearings
the juvenile court must return the child to the custody of the parent unless it
determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that return of the child
would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s physical or
emotional well-being.”
The detriment standard in section 366.22, subdivision (a)(1), “while
vaguely worded to be sure, must be construed as a fairly high one. It cannot
mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit
from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems
less capable than an available foster parent or other family member.”
(David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 789 (David B.).)
“Visitation is an essential component of any reunification plan.” (In re
Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972 (Alvin R.).) “To promote
reunification, visitation must be as frequent as possible.” (Ibid.;
rule 5.695(f)(3) [“If a child is removed from the custody of a parent or
guardian, and reunification services are ordered, the court must order
visitation between the child and the parent or guardian for whom services
are ordered. Visits are to be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-
being of the child.”].) Failure to allow visitation, including up to a 60-day
23
trial visit, can result in reversible error if a parent is denied the “full benefit”
of reunification. (Rita L. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 495, 508
(Rita L.).) “[T]he law is clear that reasonable services, most particularly
visitation, must be provided.” (In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774,
1791 (Elizabeth R.) [concluding the failure of the social service agency to
arrange for visitation following the 18-month period would constitute
sufficient grounds to conclude the services provided a parent, who had been
incarcerated during the final six months of reunification, were
unreasonable].)
The case of Rita L. informs our analysis in this case on two fronts.
First, Rita L. concluded the juvenile court erred when it considered the
quality of the relationship between the dependent child and his de facto
parents in terminating the mother’s reunification services and setting the
case for permanent planning under section 366.26. (Rita L., supra,
128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 498, 507.) In reversing, Rita L. noted it was certainly
“understandable” the court would be concerned about the child’s future and
attachment to his de facto parents, but concluded “that consideration is
simply not pertinent to the determination of whether [the mother’s]
reunification period should be extended.” (Id. at p. 507.) Rita L. observed the
court “jumped the gun a bit” when it considered the child’s relationship with
his de facto parents “as part of its decision to terminate services” (ibid.);
noted “[i]t is only after the court terminates services and orders a hearing
pursuant to section 366.26, that attention turns to assessing the quality of
the child’s relationships with his or her . . . prospective adoptive parents”
(ibid.); and “caution[ed] the juvenile court against allowing such an
impression to take hold” (id. at p. 508).
24
Second, as a separate and independent basis to reverse the order,
Rita L. concluded the juvenile court erred when it precluded the social
services agency from proceeding with the mother’s 60-day trial visit. (Rita L.,
supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 508.) The court noted the agency, through no
fault of its own, was attempting “to carry out the mandate of making
visitation ‘as frequent as possible’ ” when its efforts were stymied by multiple
continuances of the review hearing and by the child’s counsel, who filed an ex
parte motion to prevent the trial visit from commencing, which the court
effectively granted “by temporizing indefinitely.” (Id. at p. 509.) In so doing,
Rita L. concluded the reunification services offered to the mother were
unreasonable. (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
We conclude the juvenile court afforded Minor and L.B. the process
each was due.
1. Minor’s Petition
First, the record shows the juvenile court granted in substantial part
the relief Minor sought in her petition when it refused to allow the Agency to
expand Minor’s visitation to include a 60-day trial visit without the
concurrence of Minor’s counsel, and when it limited the Agency’s discretion
both to include an additional overnight and begin provider services for Minor
in San Diego County. Thus, in advance of the Contested Hearing Minor
obtained much, if not all, of the relief she sought in her section 388 petition.
Second, contrary to her due process claim, the record also shows the
juvenile court carefully considered Minor’s evidence during the Contested
Hearing, including the reports of the neuropsychologist and the
psychotherapist. It found both reports to be less credible than the bonding-
study report prepared by Mother’s expert because unlike Mother’s expert,
25
neither the neuropsychologist nor the psychotherapist met Minor and/or
Mother in person, instead relying on information and videos provided by
Jessica C. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640 [as a court of review,
we do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
resolve evidentiary conflicts,’ ” and will uphold the juvenile court’s
determinations even where substantial evidence to the contrary also exists].)
The court noted it shared the same concern as Mother’s bonding expert
regarding the reliability of experts who based their opinions solely on
information provided by those who have a “major stake” in the outcome.
Third, the evidence considered by the juvenile court was arguably
beyond what due process required, considering the goal of reunification at a
section 366.22 review hearing. Minor’s evidence called for the Agency to stop
Mother’s unsupervised visitation at this late stage of reunification, well past
the 18-month period, and begin supervised visitation in Ventura County with
a de facto parent present (neuropsychiatrist’s recommendation), or to
terminate Mother’s reunification services altogether and set a permanent
plan of adoption of Minor (psychotherapist’s recommendation). These reports
were not based on evidence that Mother could not safely care for Minor if she
was returned to Mother’s custody, but rather the harm Minor might suffer if
removed from her foster family. (See Jeanette V., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at
p. 817 [no due process right to present irrelevant or marginally relevant
evidence].) This conclusion is reinforced by Minor’s counsel’s claims at the
Contested Hearing that the dependency system allegedly had “failed” Minor;
and that Minor was better off in the care of her foster family, who stayed
home with Minor, than with Mother, who needed childcare when she was at
work.
26
But as Rita L. explained, evidence of the bond between the dependent
child and his or her foster family, and the related adjustment for both when
the child is removed and safely returned to the custody of a parent or
guardian, are not relevant at the section 366.22 hearing. Rather, the focus is
squarely on family reunification and whether the parent or guardian can
safely care for the child. (Rita L., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 507–508;
accord, In re Jaden E. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1281 [“The purpose of . . .
reunification services is ‘to facilitate the return of a dependent child to
parental custody.’ ”]; David B., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 788 [whether a
dependent child feels “bonded” to a parent “is simply not the relevant
inquiry” during reunification; “[u]ntil services are terminated, reunification is
the goal and [the parent] is entitled to every presumption in favor of having
[the child] released to his [or her] custody”]; Elizabeth R., supra,
35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1778 [“ ‘The focus during the prepermanent planning
stages is preserving the family whenever possible [citation] whereas the focus
after the permanent planning hearing is to provide the dependent children
with stable, permanent homes.’ ”]; In re Rebecca H. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d
825, 843 [reunification services implement “the law’s strong preference for
maintaining the family relationships if at all possible”].)
Fourth, although Minor’s section 388 petition ostensibly addressed not
expanding Mother’s visitation and keeping her provider services in Ventura
County, a fair, and perhaps more accurate reading of her petition—filed on
the eve of the repeatedly continued Contested Hearing—was to derail
Mother’s effort to reunify with Minor, as the Agency and Mother argued.
Minor used Jessica C.’s videos to show what she claimed was her
dysregulation as a result of increased unsupervised visits with Mother, with
27
the hope of remaining in the care of her foster family and ultimately being
adopted into that family.
Indeed, the evidence supports the finding of a coordinated effort by
Minor, Jessica C., and L.B. to prevent Mother from reunifying with Minor by
focusing on the bond between Minor and her foster family and the perception
she was better off in their care. This included the notes from Minor’s
therapist that Jessica C. was seeking “medical documentation” to support a
correlation between Minor’s behavior and increased visits with Mother; the
report from Minor’s primary care physician expressing growing concern over
Minor’s behavior after visits with Mother; Minor’s request at nearly every
hearing to limit Mother’s visitation and her (new) counsel’s refusal to agree to
a 60-day trial visit before the Contested Hearing, claiming that visit would
violate Minor’s due process rights; and Jessica C.’s repeated arguments that
L.B. had standing to challenge the removal of Minor in a section 388 petition
she helped him prepare, which sought termination of Mother’s reunification
services and permanent placement with de facto parents. For these reasons,
among others, the juvenile court questioned the “veracity as well as the bias”
of the foster parents in this case.9
Minor nonetheless argues that under In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th
398 (Jasmon O.), the juvenile court erred in refusing to consider her
relationship with her foster family and her best interest in remaining in their
care. In Jasmon O., the father sought return of his dependent child when her
9 We mean no disrespect, as there can be no doubt the foster parents love
Minor, provided her a safe and loving home while under their care, and
understandably were upset at the prospect of her returning to Mother’s
custody. But under our dependency law, the legislative goal at this last stage
of reunification requires that a dependent child be returned to the custody of
his or her parent or guardian unless doing so would be detrimental to the
child’s well-being. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).)
28
case was in permanency planning years after her removal. (Id. at pp. 407–
410.) The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision to vacate
the order granting the petition of the social services agency to set aside the
permanency planning order. (Id. at pp. 407–408.)
We conclude Jasmon O. is legally inapposite because it involved the
stage of dependency when “reunifications efforts have ceased and the state’s
purpose is no longer reunification, but to free the child for adoption or other
permanent, out of home placement,” which is not this case. (Jasmon O.,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 425.) Jasmon O. is also factually inapposite because
unlike the no-detriment finding in the instant case, the juvenile court there
found “detriment to the child and parental inadequacy warranted
termination of the father’s parental rights.” (Id. at p. 407.)
In sum, we conclude the juvenile court did not violate Minor’s due
process rights, as the record shows the court considered Minor’s evidence in
support of her section 388 petition in making its no-detriment finding,
including evidence that arguably was beyond what due process requires at
this final stage of reunification. We also conclude Minor’s petition became
moot once the court ordered Minor’s return to Mother’s custody, to the extent
Minor sought any other relief (i.e., termination of reunification services).
(See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.) [“A court is tasked with the
duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment [or order] which can be
carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ ”].)
2. L.B.’s Petition
Our discussion regarding Minor applies with the same force to L.B. and
his petition. Unlike Minor, who ostensibly sought to limit overnights and
29
restrict Minor’s services to her providers in Ventura County, L.B.’s petition
sought to terminate Mother’s reunification services and to permanently place
Minor in his adoptive home. We conclude his requested relief, while certainly
understandable given his sibling bond with Minor, could not deprive Mother
of her right to services and ultimately, to reunite with Minor during this
critically important final-review stage. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1); Rita L., supra,
128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 509–510; Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 972;
Elizabeth R., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1797.)
L.B. nonetheless contends the juvenile court erred in trailing his
petition behind the Contested Hearing, relying on section 388,
subdivision (b)(1) for support. We are not persuaded.
Initially, we question whether L.B. had standing to participate in the
Contested Hearing because he was not seeking “to assert a relationship as a
sibling,” as provided in subdivision (b)(1) of section 388. (Italics added; see
footnote 5 ante.) Instead, as is clear from his petition and the fact Minor had
lived in his adoptive home since being removed just days after her birth, a
sibling relationship already existed when L.B. filed his petition.10 (See In re
A.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 697, 704–705 [well-accepted rules of statutory
construction provide that significance should be afforded “ ‘to every word,
phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose’ ” to avoid
“ ‘making some words surplusage’ ” (italics added)].)
Moreover, the legislative history shows the intent of the Legislature in
enacting subdivision (b)(1) of section 388 was to ensure the juvenile court
considered whether a dependent child had siblings in dependency and if so,
10 We requested supplemental briefing from the parties regarding
whether L.B. had standing under section 388, subdivision (b)(1) to participate
in the Contested Hearing. We have considered that briefing in rendering our
decision in this case.
30
“whether it would be appropriate to keep the siblings together” (Legis.
Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1987 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.)); to require the
juvenile court to assess “the nature of the relationship between the child and
his or her siblings under the court’s jurisdiction when the court reviews the
status of a dependent child in foster care” (ibid., italics added); and for a
social worker to explain “why” “dependent children who are siblings are not
placed together” (ibid.; see Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Lopez (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 1385, 1401 [to ascertain the Legislature’s intent, we may look to
the Legislative Counsel’s summary digests which, although not binding, “are
entitled to great weight”]; see also Becerra v. Superior Court (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 897, 920 [a court has discretion to “look to legislative history”
even if a statute appears unambiguous]).
The legislative history suggests the Legislature did not intend
section 388, subdivision (b)(1) to apply to a child like L.B. because he, unlike
Minor, was not under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court when he filed his
petition. It casts further doubt on whether L.B. had standing to participate
in the Contested Hearing.
But, even if L.B. had standing, which we will assume for purposes of
this case, we note the juvenile court allowed him to participate in the
Contested Hearing, albeit in a limited way due to what we now conclude was
his premature request for permanent placement of Minor in his adoptive
home. But unlike Minor, L.B. did not offer any evidence in support of his
petition. Given the relief sought by L.B. and the circumstances of this case,
we conclude he received the process he was due, and the court did not err in
trailing his section 388 petition and ultimately dismissing it as moot. (See
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276; Jeanette V., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 817
[no due process right to present irrelevant or marginally relevant evidence].)
31
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s September 17, 2024 order returning
Minor to the physical custody of Mother and dismissing the section 388
petitions of Minor and L.B.11
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
11 In light of our decision, we deem it unnecessary to address the Agency’s
alternate contentions including that Minor and L.B. forfeited their claims on
appeal by allegedly failing to object to the juvenile court’s decision regarding
when it would hear their respective petitions.
32
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