CourtListener 10590037•People v. Perez CA4/1
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Filed 5/22/25 P. v. Perez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083710
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. FSB12710)
JESSE PEREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
Steve Malone, Judge. Affirmed.
Melanie L. Skehar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers and Elizabeth M. Kuchar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
In 1997, Jesse Perez pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was
sentenced to 19 years to life in prison. Because he is not a citizen, his
conviction renders him deportable under federal law. In 2023, Perez sought
to vacate his plea, claiming the court failed to adequately warn him of the
immigration consequences of his plea as required by Penal Code1
section 1016.5. However, Perez’s plea agreement contained the admonition
required by section 1016.5, and both he and his attorney indicated he had
read and understood the terms of the plea. The trial court properly declined
to vacate his plea on this ground.
Perez also sought recall of his sentence under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A), claiming he qualifies as a youth offender whose
indeterminate sentence is effectively life without parole because he cannot
provide a concrete postrelease plan. Perez, who is eligible for deportation to
Mexico, argues he lacks any familial or other connections in that country, and
therefore has no means of devising realistic parole plans. Perez has not
shown parole has been or will be denied because he lacks ties to Mexico. His
sentence is thus not the functional equivalent of life without parole, and the
trial court correctly found he was ineligible for recall and resentencing under
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A). We affirm the court’s orders.
BACKGROUND2
In 1997, when Perez was 16 years old, he was charged with first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), attempted first degree murder (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)), and two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211). All counts alleged
that a principal in the offense was armed with a firearm (§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1)) and that Perez personally used a firearm in the commission of
each offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Perez requests judicial notice of various documents not submitted to
the trial court. Because these are not relevant to our disposition, the request
for judicial notice is denied.
2
Perez pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder and
admitted the firearm use enhancement allegation. Pursuant to the plea
agreement, the remaining charges and allegations were dismissed, and Perez
was sentenced to 19 years to life in prison.
In 2023, Perez filed a motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw his
plea under section 1016.5, arguing he was not adequately advised of the
immigration consequences of his plea. Perez argued neither the court nor his
counsel warned him that, due to his conviction, he is deportable following
release from prison.
The trial court found Perez did not qualify for relief under
section 1016.5 because he acknowledged in his change of plea form that his
conviction “may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from
admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization,” which is all that
is required under section 1016.5. The court further found the judge presiding
over the change of plea hearing had questioned him and his counsel “with
great detail [to] ensure that [he] had actually read and understand his plea
form and all of [the] declarations.”
The court also addressed Perez’s claim that the “court is vested with
the discretion to vacate his 1997 plea agreement in the interest of justice.”
The court considered, among other factors, the nature of Perez’s offense, his
age at the time of the plea, his claimed traumatic brain injury, and other
circumstances of the plea, and ultimately concluded the interest of justice
would not be served by vacating Perez’s plea.
Perez also filed a petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), arguing his sentence was effectively life
without parole. He claimed he cannot be eligible for parole because he will be
deported after release from prison and cannot show he has realistic plans in
3
Mexico, where he has not lived since he was a young child and no longer has
any connections. After a hearing, the court denied this petition as well.3
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1016.5
Perez argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to vacate his conviction under section 1016.5. Section 1016.5, subdivision (a),
provides:
“Prior to acceptance of a plea of guilty . . . , the court shall
administer the following advisement on the record to the
defendant:
“If you are not a citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of
the offense for which you have been charged may have the
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of
the United States.”
Under section 1016.5, subdivision (b), “If . . . the court fails to advise the
defendant as required by this section . . . , the court . . . shall vacate the
judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty . . . .” The
denial of a motion under section 1016.5 is reviewed for abuse of discretion,
although issues of law must be decided de novo. (People v. Akhile (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 558, 562–563.)
Perez’s change of plea form states: “I understand that if I am not a
citizen of the United States, deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United states or denial of naturalization may result from a conviction of the
offense(s) to which I plead guilty . . . .” Perez initialed next to this paragraph.
3 Perez has also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (In re Perez
(D084947)), in which he challenges his conviction and sentence under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Racial Justice Act, and principles of contract
law. We previously ordered the petition considered with this appeal and
deny the petition by separate order, issued concurrently with this opinion.
4
This admonition in Perez’s plea agreement satisfies the requirement of
section 1016.5, subdivision (a). (See, e.g., People v. Bravo (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1072–1073 [section 1016.5 motion failed where plea
form stated, “If I am not a citizen of the United States, I understand that this
conviction may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from
admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the
laws of the United States”].)
Perez nonetheless argues he should have been personally admonished
by the court at his change of plea hearing. “So long as [a] waiver form
contains sufficient information, and both the defendant and his counsel attest
to its valid execution, the judge may, in his discretion, dispense with further
explanation to the defendant of his rights.” (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d
277, 286.) Here the court questioned Perez extensively about his execution
and understanding of his change of plea form:
“THE COURT: All right. And I do have your form entitled
Declaration by Defendant Change of Plea form. The form has
boxes. Alongside of those in various of those boxes appears “J.P.”
Are those your initials?
“MR. PEREZ: Yes.
“THE COURT: And on the third page of the form there purports
to be a signature of Jesse Perez; is that your signature?
“MR. PEREZ: Yes, your Honor.
“THE COURT: And did you initial the boxes?
“MR. PEREZ: Yes, your Honor.
“THE COURT: Did you sign the form after going over the entire
form with your attorney?
“MR. PEREZ: Yes, your Honor.
“THE COURT: Do you understand everything on the form?
5
“MR. PEREZ: Yes.
“THE COURT: Did you have the opportunity to discuss
everything on there with your attorney?
“MR. PEREZ: Yes.
“THE COURT: And any questions that you had, did he
adequately explain everything on the form to you?
“MR. PEREZ: Yes.
“THE COURT: And you’re satisfied now that you do understand
everything on the form?
“MR. PEREZ: Yes, your Honor.”
The court confirmed Perez had had enough time to discuss the plea terms
with his attorney and his family, offering to give him additional time to weigh
his options.
The court also questioned Perez’s counsel:
“THE COURT: All right. And, Mr. Nascin, you also feel you’ve
had enough time to discuss the matter with Mr. Perez?
“MR. NASCIN: I have, your Honor.
“THE COURT: And per all of your discussion, are you satisfied
that you went over the plea form in detail?
“MR. NASCIN: I explained it all to him at length.
“THE COURT: After doing that, you’re satisfied he does
understand everything on the form?
“MR. NASCIN: Yes.”
Given this colloquy, further oral admonishment was not required.
Perez argues section 1016.5 is outdated, as it merely requires notice
that a conviction may have immigration ramifications when there are now
many more circumstances in which immigration ramifications are not merely
6
possible but certain. He claims “section 1016.5 as written in 1977[ ] did not
adequately address these changes in immigration law.” It is for the
Legislature, not the courts, to amend laws. We are bound to apply the
unambiguous language of section 1016.5 as written.
Perez also contends, contrary to the statements made at his change of
plea hearing, that his counsel failed to advise him “of any immigration
consequences.” He claims counsel’s lack of advice constituted ineffective
assistance under California caselaw and sections 1016.2 and 1016.3.
Section 1016.2 is a statement of legislative intent that counsel must provide
accurate information about immigration consequences when advising a client
in accordance with Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, and California
precedents. Section 1016.3 outlines counsel’s duties but states “[t]his code
section shall not be interpreted to change the requirements of Section
1016.5.” These standards do not apply to section 1016.5, which requires “the
court [to] administer” an immigration admonition. (Italics added.)
“[S]ection 1016.5 does not provide the trial court with jurisdiction to address
a claim that a defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by
counsel’s failure to fully advise him or her of the immigration consequences of
a guilty plea.” (People v. Aguilar (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 60, 71.)
In his reply brief, Perez points to section 1016.5, subdivision (c), which
states:
“With respect to pleas accepted prior to January 1, 1978, it is not
the intent of the Legislature that a court’s failure to provide the
advisement required by subdivision (a) of Section 1016.5 should
require the vacation of judgment and withdrawal of the plea or
constitute grounds for finding a prior conviction invalid. Nothing
in this section, however, shall be deemed to inhibit a court, in the
sound exercise of its discretion, from vacating a judgment and
permitting a defendant to withdraw a plea.”
7
Perez claims the second clause permits a court to “exercise its sound
discretion to vacate a judgment premised on sections 1016.2 and 1016.3 and”
People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470. It appears this clause refers to
the court’s discretion concerning pleas entered prior to January 1, 1978. In
any event, “[t]he mere statement that a statute does not interfere with any
other applicable authority or discretion does not grant additional authority or
discretion.” (People v. Chien (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1288–1289.)
Finally, Perez suggests the warning in his plea agreement was not
sufficient because he was only 16 at the time and had suffered a traumatic
brain injury affecting his capacity to understand the terms of his plea.
Section 1016.5 does not authorize Perez to withdraw his plea based on
claimed lack of capacity. It is a limited statute that only concerns whether
the court gave the statutorily mandated warning.
B. Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A)
Under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), “[w]hen a defendant who was
under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which
the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility
of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may
submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.” Perez
contends his sentence, 19 years to life, is effectively life without the
possibility of parole because the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) will not
grant him parole without “realistic” postrelease plans. He argues he “has no
fathomable means to create a ‘realistic’ parole plan in Mexico where he has
no connection to except the mere fact that he was born there.”
Among the circumstances tending to show suitability for parole, the
Board may consider whether “[t]he prisoner has made realistic plans for
release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon
8
release.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (d)(8).) “The[se]
circumstances are set forth as general guidelines; the importance attached to
any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a particular case is left
to the judgment of the panel.” (Id., subd. (d).) Perez can thus show either
postrelease plans or marketable skills to demonstrate suitability for release
as one factor among many that the Board may consider. (See In re Powell
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1543 [criterion satisfied by “vocational
certificates in furniture upholstery, the mattress factory, and watch repair, as
well as [evidence of] work experience as the lead in the upholstery factory, as
a clerk, and as a porter”].) There is no categorical requirement for Perez to
have detailed plans for a life in Mexico. (See In re Andrade (2006)
141 Cal.App.4th 807, 816–817 [“The entire thrust of the regulation is on
practicality.”].)
Furthermore, the record does not reflect that Perez has been or will be
denied parole because of his lack of connection with Mexico. At his first
parole eligibility hearing in 2014, the Board determined Perez posed a threat
to public safety because he “continued to engage in rules violations” and
commit “serious misconduct while in prison.” The Board found Perez had
“not engaged in institutional activities which would demonstrate . . . [he]
would be able to function within the law upon release.” The Board concluded,
based on his behavior and statements, Perez “lack[ed] insight into [him]self,
into [his] criminality, into [his] gang behavior,” and he did not “really
demonstrate any signs of remorse in regards to the commitment offense.”
The Board encouraged him to gain greater insight into his offense, stating,
“Once you have an understanding of why you did what you did, that can
convince the Panel that you won’t behave that way again in the future.”
9
In 2022, Perez again came before the Board, which again denied parole.
The Board noted Perez had continued to engage in serious misconduct in
prison, including possession of a weapon in 2017 and possession of a cell
phone in October 2022, and “continue[d] to express views and attitudes that
engage in behaviors that demonstrate lack of change.” The Board found he
had not engaged in significant rehabilitative programming and expressed
concern that he had not “internalized” what he had learned. Finally, the
Board found Perez “lack[ed] a concrete realistic parole plan,” because while
he had letters of support from his sister and brother-in-law offering a home
and job, he did not “have acceptance into any type of transition,” had not put
forth “a plan for self-help in the community,” he had not identified a sponsor
to help with his substance use issues, and he did not provide “any relapse
prevention plans.”
In 2023, Perez wrote to the Board, “request[ing] further information in
regard to a hearing panel’s recommendation for him to obtain parole plans.”
The Board replied:
“Having concrete, realistic parole plans addressing community
stability factors that may arise upon release into the community,
such as stable housing, prospective employment, and pro-social
support, could potentially mitigate an individual’s risk for future
violence. Individuals who may be subject to deportation, such as
yourself, could benefit by having parole plans in both their native
country and in California in the event they are not deported.”
The Board’s decisions and clarifying letter do not indicate the Board
has held or will hold Perez to an unattainable standard with respect to his
postrelease plans in Mexico. His sentence is not the effective equivalent of
life without parole.
10
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, J.
DATO, J.
11
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