CourtListener 10587451•People v. Moore CA2/7
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Filed 5/20/25 P. v. Moore CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B334386
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA136315)
v.
REESE DURON MOORE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Blake
Armstrong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_________________
Reese Duron Moore appeals from a postconviction order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 In 2015 Moore pleaded no contest to the
attempted murder of Raynard Hall and admitted he personally
discharged a firearm in the commission of the offense. In 2022
Moore filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing, which the
superior court denied without issuing an order to show cause
after finding Moore was the actual and sole shooter.
On appeal Moore contends the superior court erred because
the record of conviction did not establish he was the actual killer,
and the court could not rely on testimony at the preliminary
hearing. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
issued its decision in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549
(Patton) holding the superior court may consider preliminary
hearing testimony as part of the record of conviction in
determining whether a defendant is eligible for resentencing with
respect to a guilty or no contest plea. Here, the preliminary
hearing testimony shows that Moore was the sole perpetrator and
actual shooter, and the record contains no facts showing he could
have been convicted on a now-invalid theory of imputed malice.
Following the example in Patton, we affirm the superior court’s
order but remand with directions for the court to consider an
amended petition should Moore seek to file one.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Shooting, Information, and Plea
At the preliminary hearing, Los Angeles Police Department
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Detective Sharon Kim testified about a shooting that took place
on December 17, 2014. At about 4:00 p.m. that day, Detective
Kim responded to a call reporting a shooting on the 10100 block
of Beach Street in Los Angeles. When Detective Kim arrived, she
saw Reynard Hall, who had been shot numerous times. She
investigated the shooting, spoke with several witnesses, and
viewed video of the incident captured on cameras at the location.2
When Detective Kim subsequently interviewed Hall at the
hospital, Hall stated he had been walking on a walkway at the
location when a man shot him multiple times, causing him to fall
to the ground. Hall stated he had no idea who shot him, nor did
he know of anyone who had a motive to shoot him. Detective Kim
later determined Hall was a member of the Blue Gate Mafia gang
with the moniker “Rat.”
Derek Christopher testified that he was friends with Hall,
whom he knew as Rat. Christopher described an incident that
took place on December 31, 2014 at a housing complex on East
103rd Street near Beach Street. Christopher was outside talking
on the telephone with his former girlfriend Yashika (who lived in
the complex), when Moore suddenly appeared in front of him.
Christopher could see Moore’s face clearly from a few feet away.
Moore asked, ““Where are you from?’” Before Christopher could
respond, Moore began shooting at him, and Christopher turned
and ran. Moore fired eight or nine shots; five bullets struck
Christopher. At the time of the shooting, Moore was dating
Yashika. Christopher searched social media and found a
2 The video footage was not shown at the preliminary
hearing and was not admitted into evidence. Detective Kim did
not testify about its contents.
3
photograph of Moore.3 Christopher believed Moore was a
member of the Grape Street Crips gang.
After the December 31 shooting, Hall told Christopher
about the events on the evening of December 17 and that he had
been shot that night. Christopher then sent a text message to
Hall with the photograph he had obtained of Moore. Hall told
Christopher, “‘That’s the same person that shot you, the same
person that shot me. . . . That dude shot me.’”4 Hall also told
Christopher, “That’s the guy that messed with Yashika.” Hall
had also previously dated Yashika.
Los Angeles Police Officer Francis Coughlin testified as a
gang expert that the Grape Street Crips gang claimed territory
near the location of the shootings, and the Blue Gate Mafia was a
subsidiary clique within the Grape Street Crips gang. Based on a
hypothetical scenario mirroring the facts of the shootings, Officer
3 The photograph was admitted into evidence. Christopher
identified the man in the photograph as the shooter, and he
identified Moore in the courtroom.
4 The trial court overruled Moore’s attorney’s hearsay
objection, stating Christopher’s testimony contradicted Detective
Kim’s testimony that Hall did not see his shooter, and therefore
the statements were admissible for impeachment. Moore did not
argue in the superior court, and does not contend on appeal, that
Hall’s statements to Detective Kim or Christopher were
inadmissible hearsay. We note the Supreme Court in Patton did
not resolve the question raised by some appellate courts whether
the superior court, in reviewing the preliminary hearing
transcript at the prima facie review stage, may consider
“‘testimony that was admitted at the preliminary hearing under
Proposition 115, codified as subdivision (b) of section 872.’”
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 557, fn. 2.)
4
Coughlin opined the shootings were committed for the benefit of
the Grape Street Crips gang.
Moore was charged in the information with the attempted
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murders of Hall and
Christopher (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 1 & 2) and unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon as to both shootings (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); counts 3 and 4). The information also alleged
Moore’s personal use and intentional discharge of a firearm
causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) &
(d)) and gang allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (C)). The
information further alleged as to counts 1 and 2 that Moore had
suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the
meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12),
which offense was a serious felony under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1).
On September 25, 2015 Moore pleaded no contest to the
attempted murder of Hall under an amended count 1, and the
trial court struck the allegation the attempted murder was
committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. Moore
admitted he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (a
handgun) in the commission of the attempted murder
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). Counsel stipulated to a factual basis for
the plea. The court sentenced Moore to 29 years in state prison,
comprising the upper term of nine years for the attempted
murder and 20 years for the firearm use enhancement. The court
struck the remaining counts and allegations.
B. Moore’s Petition for Resentencing
On October 27, 2022 Moore, representing himself, filed a
form petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. Moore
5
checked a box on the form stating the information allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder,
or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or another theory of imputed malice. He
also checked the box that he could not be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes made to sections 188 and
189 effective January 1, 2019.
The superior court appointed counsel to represent Moore.
The prosecutor filed an opposition arguing Moore had admitted to
personally using a firearm and there were no other perpetrators;
thus, the record of conviction showed Moore was the actual
shooter and was not prosecuted based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. The prosecutor attached the
transcript of the plea hearing. Moore did not file a reply.
On September 26, 2023 the superior court denied Moore’s
petition without issuing an order to show cause. The court stated
it had reviewed the court file and the plea transcript and found
Moore was ineligible for resentencing because he was the actual
shooter. The court explained, “This is not an aiding and abetting
case, there were no other defendants, and he pled no contest to
the charge and admitted the special allegation of personally
using the weapon.”5
5 It is not clear whether the superior court considered the
preliminary hearing transcript in denying Moore’s petition.
Moore’s principal contention on appeal is that a court may not
rely on preliminary hearing evidence in denying a resentencing
petition at the prima facie review stage. The People likewise
focus on the preliminary hearing testimony. We assume for
purposes of the appeal that the superior court relied on the
preliminary hearing transcript in finding “this is not an aiding
6
Moore timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bill No. 1437, Senate Bill No. 775,
and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437), effective January 1, 2019, eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant
guilty of murder and significantly limited the scope of the felony-
murder rule. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 558; People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 443, 448-449; People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong).) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3),
now prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual’s
participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to convict a
principal of murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule
as set forth in section 189, subdivision (e). (Patton, at p. 558;
Curiel, at p. 448.)
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), effective
January 1, 2022, expanded the scope of potential relief by
applying Senate Bill 1437’s ameliorative changes to individuals
convicted of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
(See § 1172.6, subd. (a).) The legislation also extended relief to
defendants convicted of murder under any “other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
and abetting case” and “there were no other defendants.” Even if
the trial court relied only on the information and the transcript
from the plea, “‘“we review the ruling, not the court’s reasoning
and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.”’” (People
v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39.)
7
participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), as amended by
Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; see People v. Antonelli (Apr. 24, 2025,
S281599) ___ Cal.5th ___, 2025 Cal. LEXIS 2303, * 5.)
Section 1172.6 provides a procedure for an individual
convicted of felony murder, or murder or attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, to petition
the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced
on any remaining counts if the individual could not have been
convicted of murder under Senate Bill 1437’s changes to
sections 188 and 189. (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
pp. 449-450; Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
If the petition contains all the required information,
including a declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible
for relief based on the requirements of subdivision (a), the
sentencing court, upon request, must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3); People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 962-963.) The court must direct the
prosecutor to file a response to the petition and permit the
petitioner to file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, the sentencing court
“looks beyond the face of the petition” to the record of conviction,
which “‘necessarily inform[s] the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry . . . , allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.’” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563, quoting People v. Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “[T]he record of conviction the parties may
consult at the prima facie stage includes a preliminary hearing
8
transcript preceding a guilty plea.” (Patton, at p. 568.) As the
Supreme Court explained in Patton, the sentencing court may “in
determining at the prima facie stage whether a petitioner was
convicted under a now-invalid theory, rely on unchallenged,
relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript.”
(Id. at p. 564.) However, “[i]n reviewing any part of the record of
conviction at this preliminary juncture, a [sentencing] court
should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis, at p. 972; accord,
Patton, at p. 567 [“should a trial court encounter a material fact
dispute, the court may not resolve that dispute at the prima facie
stage”].)
If the petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing of
entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause
and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate
the challenged conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
We review de novo the superior court’s denial of a petition
for resentencing at the prima facie review stage, including its
determination that the record of conviction establishes as a
matter of law that the petitioner is not entitled to resentencing.
(People v. Jackson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 128, 145; accord,
People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170.)
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying Moore’s
Petition Without Issuing an Order To Show Cause
In his appellate briefs filed before Patton was decided,
Moore argued that nothing in the record of conviction established
that Moore was the actual shooter, and any reliance by the
superior court on the preliminary hearing transcript at the prima
9
facie review stage was inconsistent with section 1172.6. As
discussed, the Supreme Court in Patton has now clarified that
the preliminary hearing transcript is part of the record of
conviction and may be considered at the prima facie review stage.
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 568.)
The evidence at the preliminary hearing showed Moore was
the actual and sole perpetrator of Hall’s shooting. Detective Kim
testified a single perpetrator shot Hall multiple times on a
walkway near Beach Street. This was based on her investigation
of the scene, hospital interview of Hall, witness interviews, and
review of the video surveillance footage. Although Hall did not
identify his shooter to Detective Kim, after Christopher sent Hall
a photograph of Moore, Hall told Christopher that Moore was the
man who shot him. Hall’s identification of Moore as his shooter
was bolstered by Christopher’s testimony that Moore shot him in
December in the Beach Street area (near where Yashika lived),
and both men dated Moore’s girlfriend Yashika.
Except in narrow circumstances not relevant here, an
actual killer is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law. (See Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710 [“Senate
Bill 1437 relief is unavailable if the defendant was either the
actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life’”]; People v. Muhammad (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 268, 277, review granted Feb. 19, 2025, S288860
[“the natural and probable consequences doctrine applie[s] only
to impose liability on an accomplice, on an aiding and abetting
theory”]; People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 657, affd.
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 [“[a]s the sole and actual perpetrator of the
10
attempted murder of Jackson, Patton is ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law”].)
As in Patton, Moore’s resentencing petition “proffered a
declaration with checkbox allegations of entitlement to relief” on
the basis he had been convicted on a now-invalid theory of
imputed malice. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 556.) These
“conclusory checkbox allegations alone could not create a factual
dispute about whether he played a meaningfully different role” in
the attempted murder of Hall. (Id. at p. 569.) The superior court
could properly consider the preliminary hearing transcript to
refute the conclusory allegations in Moore’s petition and find that
Moore was the actual shooter. Therefore, the court did not err in
finding Moore was ineligible for relief at the prima facie review
stage.
In Patton, as discussed, the Supreme Court “out of an
abundance of caution” granted the defendant’s request at oral
argument for a remand to the superior court so he could plead
additional facts to show a prima facie entitlement to relief under
section 1172.6. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 569-570.) In his
supplemental brief, Moore argued he is similarly situated to the
Patton defendant and requested we direct the superior court to
consider an amended petition should Moore seek to file one. We
note that in Patton, as here, the evidence at the preliminary
hearing showed the defendant was the actual shooter: In this
case Hall identified Moore as the shooter; in Patton there was
testimony that the defendant was depicted on a surveillance
video firing his gun at the victim. (Id. at p. 557.) Given the
similar fact patterns and requests, we see no reason to deny
Moore’s request.
11
DISPOSITION
The superior court is directed to consider an amended
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 should Moore,
within 30 days of remand, seek to file one. The order denying
Moore’s petition for resentencing is otherwise affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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