CourtListener 10586724•People v. Woods CA2/5
Full text
Filed 5/19/25 P. v. Woods CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B333862
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA033813)
v.
CEDRIC WOODS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los Angeles, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Julie Caleca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and William H.
Shin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Cedric Woods appeals from an order denying his
resentencing petition under Penal Code section 1172.61, arguing
that the trial court erred by refusing to consider testimony
presented at the evidentiary hearing and denying the petition
based only on the jury’s findings in the underlying trial. We
reverse and remand with directions.
II. BACKGROUND2
On August 16, 1997, the murder victim, 12-year-old D.W.
(the victim), and 16-year-old M.H. (the attempted-murder victim)
were sitting in Kennedy Park in Pomona with W.I. and another
companion. The attempted-murder victim saw a large four-door
maroon car in “‘bad shape’” emerge from a nearby housing area.
The front passenger made a gang sign for the Westside Mafia.
The car then turned around, entered the park, and stopped in a
parking lot. When four men exited the car, the attempted-
murder victim told the victim to get on his bicycle and leave. The
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
Defendant filed his petition pursuant to former section
1170.95 which the Legislature renumbered, with no change in
text, as section 1172.6 effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we refer to that section as currently
numbered throughout this opinion.
2 The following is taken from the unpublished opinion in the
direct appeal from the judgment of conviction. (People v. Woods
(Apr. 8, 1999, B121999) [nonpub. opn.].)
2
victim rode away, and the attempted-murder victim ran with
him. At some point, the attempted-murder victim took control of
the bicycle while the victim rode on the handlebars.
The four men returned to the car and followed the two
minors. The victim warned that one of the car’s doors was open,
causing the attempted-murder victim to cross to the opposite side
of the street, where he saw the passenger-side door of the car
open and heard gunfire as the car came about two feet from the
bicycle.
The minors dropped the bicycle and ran down a driveway.
The attempted-murder victim saw blood coming from the victim’s
side and mouth and, when the victim fell, told bystanders across
the street to call the police.
Pomona Police Department Officer Brian Bozarth
responded to a call of a shooting around 2:50 p.m. and found the
two minors, both of whom had gunshot wounds. The victim died
from his wounds at the hospital.
The attempted-murder victim told Officer Bozarth that the
Westside Mafia was responsible for the shooting. When the
officer asked him if he recognized anyone, he replied, “‘Thee
Dog.’” He also told another officer that Thee Dog was the person
with the gun.
Pomona Police Department Detective Greg Guenther
interviewed the attempted-murder victim the day after the
shooting. He admitted that both he and the victim were
members of the Trey57 Sintown Crips and that, after the men in
the car made Westside Mafia gang signs, the victim responded
with Trey57 signs. He also told the detective that he recognized
the right-front passenger as Thee Dog, and he identified Tyrone
Hill from a photographic line-up as Thee Dog.
3
Detective Guenther interviewed the attempted-murder
victim again a few days later and showed him a photograph of
defendant’s car which he confirmed looked like the one involved
in the shooting. At trial, however, he was more equivocal about
the identifications and descriptions.
About a month after the shooting, Detective Guenther
interviewed W.I. who selected a photograph of Tyrone Hill,
known to him as Thee Dog, as the right-front passenger in the
car that chased his two companions from the park. The detective
showed W.I. another set of photographs, and he identified
defendant, whom he knew as “‘Tiny Dot,’” as the driver of the car.
But at trial, W.I. denied making the identifications.
When defendant was interviewed after the shooting, he
claimed his car had been parked at his residence the entire day of
the shooting with a flat tire. According to defendant, he spent
the afternoon at a mall and a park with Hill and another man.
Officer Bozarth testified at trial as an expert on Pomona
street gangs. He explained that the shooting took place inside
territory claimed by the Trey57 Sintown Crips. Defendant and
Hill had previously admitted to Officer Bozarth that they were
members of the Westside Mafia. The officer confirmed that Hill’s
gang name was Thee Dog.
Pomona Police Department Detective Robert Nelson
testified that the Westside Mafia Crips were rivals of the Trey57
gang. He explained that making gang signs in a rival gang’s
territory was a challenge and a gesture of disrespect. Detective
Nelson also explained that gang members were generally
unwilling or reluctant to cooperate with law enforcement because
they preferred to handle matters themselves and because they
did not want to be known as “‘snitch[es].’”
4
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Convictions and Sentencing
On March 27, 1998, a jury found defendant guilty of
premeditated murder and attempted murder and also found true
the allegations that: the murder occurred during a drive-by
shooting within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(21);
both offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street
gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivisions (b)(1)
and (b)(4); and a principal was armed with a firearm in the
commission of both offenses within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (a)(1).
On April 15, 1998, the trial court sentenced defendant to
life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and
to a consecutive term of 17 years, comprised of a nine-year term
for the attempted murder conviction, two three-year terms for the
section 186.22 enhancements, and two one-year terms for the
section 12022 enhancements.3
B. Denial of Resentencing and Appeal
On January 3, 2019, defendant filed his petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. On April 24, 2019, the trial
court issued an order denying the petition because defendant was
not entitled to relief as a matter of law.
Defendant appealed from the order denying his section
1172.6 petition and, on October 21, 2020, we affirmed the order.
3 On April 8, 1999, the Court of Appeal affirmed the
judgment in People v. Woods, supra, B121999.
5
Defendant filed a petition for review in our Supreme Court, and
on December 30, 2020, the Supreme Court granted the petition
and deferred additional briefing until further order of the court.
On October 5, 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill
No. 775. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended
October 5, 2021, p. 3; Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1–2 (Senate Bill
775).) The Supreme Court then transferred the matter back to us
with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in
light of Senate Bill 775 and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952.
We vacated our opinion, and defendant and the Attorney
General then submitted additional supplemental briefs.4 On
June 24, 2022, we affirmed the trial court’s order denying
defendant’s section 1172.6 petition as to his murder conviction,
but reversed as to his attempted murder conviction. We
remanded the matter with directions to issue an order to show
cause and hold a hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision
(d) only as to the attempted murder conviction on either the
instant petition or the new petition filed on or about January 6,
2022, or in the alternative, to consolidate the proceedings on the
original petition with the proceedings on the new petition.
4 On or about January 6, 2022, while his appeal was
pending, defendant filed a new petition for resentencing pursuant
to section 1172.6; and the trial court set a hearing on the petition
for March 8, 2022.
6
C. Proceedings on Remand
1. Evidentiary Hearing
On June 13, 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on defendant’s resentencing petition as to the attempted
murder conviction only under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). At
the outset, the prosecutor advised that she would not be calling
any witnesses, but asked the court to admit the reporter’s and
clerk’s transcripts from the trial proceedings.
Defendant then testified on his own behalf as follows. On
August 16, 1996, defendant was with Andrea Bryant, the mother
of his newborn, at her home in Pomona. Later that evening, he
walked to a location near Mountain View Elementary School and
stayed there for a few hours watching “nice cars” pass by.
Defendant then left that location and went to the mall to see a
movie, but the theater was not showing any movie he wanted to
see, so he went to Mountain View Park where he drank alcohol.
From the park, an acquaintance drove defendant to his
aunt Janet Murphy’s house. He stayed at his aunt’s house for a
while, mowing her lawn. Around 6:00 p.m., he left his aunt’s
house and walked a few blocks to Tyrone Hill’s house where they
smoked marijuana in the front yard.
Fifteen or twenty minutes after defendant arrived at Hill’s
house, Pomona Police Department officers drove up and began to
question Hill about how long the car in the driveway had been
parked there. Defendant told the officers where he had been
earlier that day and did not tell them that he drove an individual
to Kennedy Park and that the individual shot at two people.
7
During cross-examination, after defendant denied that he
owned the maroon vehicle in Hill’s driveway, the trial court made
the following comment: “I’m just going to interject here. [¶] The
jury[ has] already found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the murder of the individual. [W]e’re not talking about [natural]
and probable consequences, felony murder, anything of that
nature. He’s saying he knows nothing about this. [¶] . . . [¶]
[S]o we’re wasting our time here, aren’t we?”
Defendant next called his aunt, Mary Louise Murphy, who
testified that, on the day of the incident, she went with her sister
to defendant’s girlfriend’s house in Pomona. Sometime before
evening, while it was still light outside, she saw defendant at
that location.
Following the close of evidence, the trial court engaged in a
colloquy with counsel during which it made the following
observations: “I don’ t think I need to look at a transcript. The
jury[ has] already spoken on this issue. And basically the defense
here is simply, ‘It wasn’t me. I wasn’t there.’ [¶] . . . [¶] [W]hat
. . . [defendant] and the family [are] alleging is that [the police]
got the wrong guy. And I understand that. But that’s not . . .
something that you challenge pursuant to [section 1172.6]. [¶]
You have to [file a petition for] a writ of habeas corpus or
something else based on . . . testimony that wasn’t provided at
trial. . . . [¶] But at this point, I don’t think that I need to go any
further in denying the [section 1172.6 petition] with regards to
the attempted murder because there has been a jury finding
beyond a reasonable doubt of intent to kill. But . . . I don’t think I
can make that ruling because I have not looked at the transcript.
[¶] But do I need to go take that extra step, notwithstanding the
fact that a jury already convicted him of attempted murder in
8
which they must find a specific intent to kill. [¶] . . . [¶] Well, in
the abundance of caution, I’ll take a look. . . . I think that’s an
important factor in the case, but I will take a look at the
transcript. [T]o just make sure that we’ve covered all bases . . . .”
The court then continued the matter to August 10, 2023, for a
further hearing and decision.
2. Further Hearing and Ruling
At the further hearing, the trial court considered the
arguments of counsel, admitted the transcripts from the trial
proceedings, and denied the petition. The court began its
analysis by explaining that defendant’s evidence did not relate to
the issues raised by the petition and should have instead been
raised in a writ proceeding: “I just want to say that [defendant’s]
testimony is valid testimony, and that’s something that could be
pursued . . . pursuant to . . . a writ of habeas corpus . . . . [¶] But
your testimony, [defendant], and yours, Ms. Murphy, had no
bearing on this issue—on this case here. Had no bearing. And I
just wanted you to know that . . . I’m not discounting what you
had to say, what you said under oath. Both [Ms. Murphy and
defendant] said that it’s a wrong person; that it wasn’t him; he
was getting a haircut and all those things. But this is not what
we’re here to decide. A jury . . . convicted him of . . . the charges
that we’re here now to deal with. [¶] If there’s additional
evidence . . . you can certainly pursue that. [¶] So the reason for
me making these statements is not—because I’m going to deny
his petition. . . . I don’t want you to take that to mean that you
couldn’t pursue other avenues.”
9
The trial court then explained that, based on its reading of
the record, defendant was ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law: “So, on this case, [defendant] was convicted by a jury for
the murder of a 12-year-old and an attempted murder of [a] 16-
year-old. The jury was instructed with the natural and probable
consequences instruction, as well as with CALJIC [No.] 8.66, and
the jury was also instructed with CALJIC [No.] 8.67. [¶] Now,
[CALJIC No.] 8[.]66 deals with attempted murder and what an
attempted murder is—that is a direct but ineffectual attempt to
kill an individual—and CALJIC [No.] 8[.]67, that the crime
attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated and that you
must determine whether this allegation is true or not. [¶] I
believe, if I’m not incorrect, that the jury found that it was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated; is that correct?”
After the prosecutor confirmed that the jury had found
defendant guilty of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder5,
the trial court continued: “That, in and of itself, takes it out of
[section] 1172.6. So because the jury found . . . defendant guilty
of first-degree murder and attempted premeditated murder, the
jury found that . . . defendant acted with a specific premeditated
and deliberate intent to kill. . . . That’s what the jury found.
Therefore, as with his conviction for first-degree murder, he could
not have been convicted on a theory of natural and probable
consequences but instead on his own mental state, not on an
imputed mental state. [¶] So, as such, the court finds that . . .
5 As we explain further below, although the jury was
instructed to determine whether the attempted murder was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated, the verdict form returned
by the jury did not contain a finding on that allegation.
10
defendant is ineligible for relief under [section 1172.6], as a
matter of law.”
But the trial court then provided an alternative factual
basis for its ruling, explaining: “However, as a separate and
independent ground for denial, the court read the trial transcript,
the testimony of [M.H.], the attempted murder victim, and
established that defendant drove his vehicle within . . . several
feet of the two boys, who were both riding on the same bicycle.
Various shots were fired from a car. Both boys were hit. The
reason for . . . defendant and his cohorts pursuing the boys was
an issue of gang signs. [¶] Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
[defendant] is guilty of the attempted, premeditated, and
deliberate . . . murder of [M.H.]; that he aided and abetted the
shooter with the specific intent to kill [M.H.]. [¶] . . . [¶] So, as I
indicated, the [prosecution has] met [its] burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that this attempted murder was
deliberate, premeditated—and [willful.] [¶] . . . [¶] [A]nd that
. . . [defendant] at that time . . . intended to kill these two young
folks because of gang issues.”
The trial court continued: “The evidence presented by . . .
defendant at the hearing has no bearing on the motion under
[section] 1172.6. [¶] The court gave no weight to [defendant’s]
testimony or the testimony of Ms. Murphy. [¶] And, as I
indicated, the issues raised were important but not relevant to
these proceedings so, therefore, once again, the court finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . defendant is guilty of the
attempted, premeditated, willful, and deliberate attempted
murder of [M.H.]. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] And, therefore, the court
denies the [section] 1172.6 petition.”
11
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial
court’s order denying his resentencing petition.
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying
the petition based on the jury’s verdicts and refusing to consider
the alibi evidence he presented at trial. According to defendant,
because the court was acting as an independent factfinder at the
hearing and new evidence was presented, the court was not
bound by the jury’s finding that defendant was the driver of the
vehicle from which the shooting occurred.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part:
“A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter
may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to
have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts . . . .”
“At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
12
2019. The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed
by the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider
evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law, including witness testimony,
stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).)
We review the superior court’s decision to deny the petition
after an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (People v.
Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) But we apply de novo review
to the issue of whether the trial court misapprehended what the
prosecution was required to prove at the evidentiary hearing.
(See ibid.)
B. Analysis
The Attorney General does not contend that defendant was
the actual shooter. Thus, in order to demonstrate that defendant
was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of attempted murder
under the changes to section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019, the prosecution was required to prove that
defendant aided and abetted the attempted murder, that is, he
acted with an intent to kill, or was a major participant in an
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life. Whether defendant was present at the time of the shooting
is relevant to these issues. (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th
1015, 1054 [“‘Among the factors which may be considered in
making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence
at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and
after the offense’”]; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 619
[the United States Supreme Court has “stressed the importance
13
of presence to culpability” in determining whether a defendant
acted with reckless indifference to human life].) We therefore
conclude that the trial court erred by refusing to consider the
evidence presented at the hearing on defendant’s behalf, on the
grounds that the evidence was not relevant. (Evid. Code, § 210
[“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence . . . having any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action”].)6
We next consider the Attorney General’s contention that
any error was harmless because “[t]he evidence at trial strongly
supported a conclusion that [defendant] was indeed the driver of
the car when the shooting occurred.” A witness, W.I., identified
defendant to the police after the shooting as the driver of the
maroon car. But, he recanted his testimony at trial, denying that
he saw the car on the day of the shooting, denying that he told
police that defendant was the driver, and claiming that he had
never seen defendant before. If the trial court had considered the
6 The Attorney General counters that “[b]y virtue of the
jury’s finding that appellant was guilty of attempted murder as a
direct aider and abettor who acted with the specific intent to kill,
the issue of whether appellant was correctly identified was
already resolved.” We disagree with the Attorney General’s
characterization of the record of conviction. Here, the court
instructed the jury that it could find defendant guilty of
attempted murder if it was satisfied that “attempted murder
[was] a natural and probable consequence of the commission of
the crime of shooting from a vehicle at a person.” The court also
delivered instructions on attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder, but the verdict form did not ask the jury to
decide whether the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated. Thus, the jury did not necessarily find that
defendant acted with an intent to kill.
14
testimony of defendant and Ms. Murphy, found it credible, and
weighed it against the prosecution’s inconsistent identification
testimony, there is a reasonable probability it would not have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the driver.
Accordingly, the error was not harmless.
15
V. DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing on his attempted murder conviction is reversed and
remanded with directions to reconsider the petition as an
independent fact finder in light of all of the evidence presented at
the prior hearing to determine whether the prosecution has
proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant is guilty of
attempted murder under current sections 188 and 189.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
16
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.