CourtListener 10585028•Lehrer-Graiwer v. Shokrian CA2/8
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Filed 5/15/25 Lehrer-Graiwer v. Shokrian CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
JONATHAN LEHRER- B326283
GRAIWER et al.,
Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants Super. Ct. No. BC685351
and Respondents,
v.
JASMIN SHOKRIAN,
Defendant, Cross-
complainant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lawrence Cho, Judge. Affirmed.
Eviction Defense Network and Simon R. Sherred for
Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Appellant.
Ecoff, Campain & Kay, Lawrence C. Ecoff and Alberto
Campain for Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants and Respondents.
_______________________
After a trial by jury, respondents Jonathan Lehrer-Graiwer
and Sarah Lehrer-Graiwer (collectively plaintiffs) recovered a
judgment of $150,904.75 against their tenant Jasmin Shokrian
(Shokrian). Shokrian appeals. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Property
In April 2016 Jonathan1 bought a triplex at 967 Maltman
Avenue in Los Angeles. He and his daughter Sarah are joint
owners of the property which is located on a ridge. The top unit
is on the street level, the middle unit is one level down and there
is a very small studio unit on a lower third level. Outside the
studio unit is a patio above a garden, which are completely
separate from the middle unit. Because the property is on a ridge
and a hill, there are “very nice views of the Santa Monica
Mountains to the west.”
B. Plaintiffs’ Plan for the Property
Plaintiffs planned to renovate the top and middle units for
Sarah to use as her primary residence. Sarah was going to have
a child. Plaintiffs had no remodeling plans for the studio unit
which was rented to a lone tenant. They estimated that
obtaining the permits and approvals for the renovation project
would take roughly a year and a half. Plaintiffs decided to rent
the middle unit to help pay the mortgage and “not to have the
unit just vacant for a year.”
1 We refer to the Lehrer-Graiwers by their first names for
clarity.
2
Sarah placed an ad on Craigslist. Shokrian responded to
the ad. Shokrian indicated she had been self-employed for the
past 15 years and grossed an income of $100,000 per year.
C. The Addendum
Plaintiffs and Shokrian agreed to a reduced monthly rent of
$2,750 in consideration of a one-year only tenancy. (Originally,
plaintiffs were asking for $3,000.) Jonathan presented two
documents for Shokrian to sign: a lease and a separate
settlement and release agreement, which the trial court called
the “Addendum.” Shokrian signed both, acknowledging that the
rental was for one year only. As Jonathan put it, “a critical
condition was that [Shokrian] understood that this was a
temporary rental because of our need to renovate the property,
and [Shokrian] said she understood that. That’s why I gave her
the settlement and release agreement in which she stated that
she understood that I would not rent . . . the apartment to her if
she did not agree to move within the year when given the . . .
60-day notice.”
By signing the Addendum, Shokrian waived tenant
protections under the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance
(RSO). (Gov. Code, § 7060 et seq. [rent control of residential
property]; Civ. Code, § 1946.1 [renewal of lease for a term not
specified].) Jonathan explained that the purpose of the separate
Addendum “was to make it very clear to Ms. Shokrian the
importance of her to understand that we were leasing that unit to
her on a temporary one-year basis and that if she had any
qualms or did not want to agree to that, then we couldn’t lease to
her, and that her agreement to vacate the property after the
60-day notice was a condition to our leasing to her . . . that we
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wouldn’t lease the property to her unless she agreed to that term
because of our need to renovate the property for my daughter.”
When Shokrian first visited the unit, Sarah told her they
intended to rent the apartment for one year only.
D. The Lease Agreement
The Lease Agreement is a form prepared by the California
Apartment Association. The effective date of the lease was
September 1, 2016 and the ending date was August 31, 2017.
Under the Lease Agreement, gas, electricity and trash were
the responsibility of the tenant. Plaintiffs and Shokrian agreed
Shokrian would pay an additional $40 for electricity. Because
there was only one gas meter, Jonathan split the cost at
60 percent for the upper unit, 40 percent for the middle unit
which Shokrian leased, and nothing for the bottom unit because
it had no gas appliances. Sometime in 2018, Shokrian’s unit got
its own gas meter.
When Shokrian signed the lease and Addendum, she posed
no questions about either document. On September 1, 2016,
Shokrian moved in.
E. Housing Services Awarded and Revoked
Because Shokrian “seemed to be a reasonable individual,”
plaintiffs decided to allow her to use the “amenities,” that is, off-
street parking, a laundry room, and garden areas. Plaintiffs
agreed to allow Shokrian parking “as a temporary
accommodation while she was there for the one-year period” and
they also allowed her to use the laundry room. According to
Jonathan, he gave Shokrian the household services “without
charge and as a goodwill gesture.”
4
On November 11, 2017, Jonathan notified Shokrian that
she could no longer use the garage or driveway due to
construction. He also notified her that she could not use the
laundry room (a separate room next to the middle unit) because
the construction required use of the laundry room area. And she
could not use the patio or garden area because Sarah and her
family would be using it exclusively.
According to Jonathan, there is nothing in the Lease
Agreement giving Shokrian the right to use the garage, laundry
room, or garden area. Shokrian acknowledges the Lease
Agreement was silent about household services. The boxes for
parking are not checked in the Lease Agreement and the Lease
Agreement says nothing about the laundry room.
F. Reduction of Rent Because of Revocation of Housing
Services
Shokrian’s response to the notification that she could no
longer use these amenities was to file a complaint with the Los
Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department, Rent
Stabilization Division – Investigation & Enforcement (the City).
The City notified plaintiffs of the complaint by letter dated
December 29, 2017. The letter, signed by Brett Terrell as
“Housing Investigator,” states that when housing services are
reduced, there must be a rent reduction. The letter assessed
$200 per month for loss of use of the garage, $60 per month for
loss of use of laundry facilities, and $20 per month for the loss of
use of the garden/patio area, a reduction totaling $280.
Jonathan disputed these assessments by letter. He
objected, principally on the ground that there had not been a
hearing and no opportunity for him to object. Jonathan asked
5
about appeals procedures and he never got a response. He did
not reduce the rent.
According to Terrell, the City does not have authority to tell
a landlord not to remove a household service; it can only direct a
decrease in rent to reflect the decrease in a household service.
Paragraph 39 of the Lease Agreement states that if there
are any changes in the Lease Agreement, it must be in writing
and signed by both parties. Terrell conceded at trial that the
Lease Agreement did not provide for household services and
admitted that the lease would have to be amended to reflect those
services in order to recover if they were revoked.
G. Soured Relations between Plaintiffs and Shokrian
The relationship between plaintiffs and Shokrian soon
soured. In Jonathan words, “[p]retty soon . . . she first became
very demanding on items within the apartment that she felt were
not adequately fixed, and then she started paying her rent late,
and I several times had to send her notices about her late
payments. And then she became very aggressive and, I would
say, even abusive and threatening when she didn’t like
something or she didn’t like that I had requested her to pay
utilities, even threatening to report me to authorities. [¶] So,
yeah, things turned from a very friendly—what I thought was a
friendly relationship to a very nasty relationship very quickly.”
There was a great deal of litigation between plaintiffs and
Shokrian. According to Jonathan, plaintiffs sued Shokrian four
times. According to Shokrian, it was seven times. Apparently
there were also restraining orders, one of which seems to have led
to Shokrian’s arrest.
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H. Plaintiffs Give Shokrian a 60-day Notice
At the end of one year on August 30, 2017, plaintiffs gave
Shokrian a 60-day notice to quit. Despite receiving the 60-day
notice, Shokrian refused to vacate the property.
Plaintiffs did not hear from Shokrian after the 60-day
notice was served on her. However, in October 2017, respondents
received a notice from the City that plaintiffs were in violation of
the RSO by pursuing an illegal eviction. Shokrian had not told
Jonathan she intended to contact the City.
Jonathan did not think they were evicting Shokrian. “I was
giving her the notice under the agreement that she had agreed to
and notifying her when she needed to move because there was no
set date under our agreement of when I would give her the
60-day notice.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
When Shokrian would not leave, plaintiffs filed a complaint
against her on December 1, 2017, alleging two causes of action.
The first cause of action alleged breach of contract and the second
cause of action alleged fraud in the inducement. The complaint
alleged that plaintiffs and Shokrian entered into a Lease
Agreement on August 31, 2016 for the period of one year “only
inasmuch as Plaintiff wished to do extensive remodeling to the
Subject Property [hereafter the property] that would require that
it be vacant.” Plaintiffs alleged they had served Shokrian with a
60-day notice to quit on August 30, 2017, but Shokrian refused to
vacate the property which resulted in damages to plaintiffs. The
Lease Agreement is attached to the complaint as Exhibit A.
The first cause of action also alleged that Shokrian, by
signing the Addendum, had waived her rights under the RSO.
7
(Gov. Code, § 7060 et seq.; Civ Code, § 1946.1.) The Addendum is
attached to the complaint as Exhibit B.
The second cause of action alleged that Shokrian had
agreed to vacate the property upon 60 days notice in
consideration of which plaintiffs reduced the rent from $3,000 to
$2,750 per month. Plaintiffs alleged that Shokrian had no
intention of “performing under the terms of the contract and
induced Plaintiffs to enter into the contract based upon her false
promises.”
Shokrian answered the complaint, denying liability and
asserting multiple affirmative defenses. She also filed a cross-
complaint alleging causes of action for breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment, declaratory relief, and violations of Los Angeles
Municipal Code section 151.10(A) [liability of person who accepts
rent in excess of RSO] and Civil Code section 1940.9 [landlord
must make arrangement with tenant if there is no separate gas
meter]. Plaintiffs answered the cross-complaint, denying liability
and raising multiple affirmative defenses.
The cause of action for declaratory relief in Shokrian’s
cross-complaint asked the trial court to find that the RSO
governed the tenancy at issue. After plaintiffs stipulated that the
RSO applied to the Shokrian’s unit, the court dismissed this
cause of action as moot.
On September 1, 2022, the trial court granted Shokrian
judgment on the pleadings on the first cause of action (breach of
contract) in the complaint. The court examined the Addendum
and found that expiration of a fixed term was not cause for
eviction under the RSO (L.A Mun. Code, § 151.09) and the waiver
of protections under the RSO set forth in the Addendum was void
as against public policy. The latter provision is found in Los
8
Angeles Municipal Code section 151.10(D). The trial court denied
the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the second cause of
action for fraud in the inducement, ruling that plaintiffs were not
asking the court to enforce any provisions of the Lease
Agreement, but were asking for relief “from having been allegedly
induced into entering the illegal lease agreement. The fact that
provisions of a contract are unenforceable as against public policy
does not excuse a party who fraudulently induced another into
entering into the unenforceable contract in the first place.”
The complaint’s second cause of action for fraud and the
cross-complaint were tried to a jury, which returned a series of
special verdicts on September 15, 2022. At trial Shokrian gave
several reasons why she would not vacate the unit. She testified
that financially she was not in a “good position.” She had paid
over $15,000 in legal fees, which were funds that should have
paid her rent. Moving is expensive and costs $15,000. She also
was of the opinion that she has a right to live there: “I have a
right to live in this apartment, so this isn’t about my right to stay
there.” At another juncture she testified that after she got the
60-day notice, she contacted the City. A person working for City
(whom she did not identify) allegedly told her that she did not
have to move and did not need to tell plaintiffs anything.
Shokrian’s health also seems to have played a role in her
refusal to vacate the unit. She suffered a miscarriage and
discovered a lump in her breast which led to surgery in December
2017. Finally, it appears Shokrian decided to stay because, as
discussed below, she stopped paying rent in October 2019 with
the exception of one payment made in February 2022. Beginning
in October 2019, she was living rent-free.
9
In contrast, Sarah testified it was a red flag that Shokrian
wanted the floors replaced in the bathroom and kitchen. And
Shokrian made demands about the patio and bath that suggested
she wanted to stay longer than one year. Shokrian demanded
$5,200 per month relocation benefits and would not move out
unless she was paid relocation benefits. She stayed during the
remodeling.
On the complaint’s second cause of action for fraud, the
jury concluded that Shokrian, from the very beginning, intended
to stay longer than the one year. The jury found Shokrian made
a promise to plaintiffs that she did not keep or intend to keep and
that plaintiffs were entitled to $150,904.75. On Shokrian’s cause
of action for breach of quiet enjoyment, the jury found plaintiffs
did not interfere with Shokrian’s right to use and occupy the
rental unit. The jury entered special verdicts on utility charges
and the cancellation of housing services, finding that Shokrian
was not entitled to recover anything as a result of the
cancellation of housing services. The damages awarded by the
jury were based on unpaid rent. Shokrian had not paid rent
since October 2, 2019 with the exception of one check on
February 2, 2022 for $3,034.16. (Plaintiffs had refused to accept
checks after that date because they had pending unlawful
detainer actions against Shokrian.)
On October 6, 2022, the trial court entered judgment
conforming with the special verdicts. The judgment awarded
plaintiffs $150,904.75. On December 5, 2022, the court denied
Shokrian’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or,
in the alternative, a new trial. Shokrian filed a timely notice of
appeal.
10
After the trial, plaintiffs filed motions for attorney fees and
rescission of the contract. On November 1, 2022, the trial court
denied both motions. It ruled that the Lease Agreement and the
Addendum were void as a matter of public policy; therefore the
attorney fee provision was not enforceable. Rescission was
unavailable as a remedy since it had not been sought in the
complaint. Rescission was also unavailable after trial because
shortly before trial plaintiffs had declined an invitation to add
rescission by amending their complaint. The court found
plaintiffs’ conduct in seeking to waive the RSO egregious. On
January 11, 2023, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal which they
later abandoned. The only issues before us in this appeal are
those brought by Shokrian.
DISCUSSION
Shokrian presents two contentions on appeal. First she
argues the trial court erroneously allowed plaintiffs to sue on an
illegal contract to obtain their illegal expectations “even if they
use the word ‘fraud’ instead of ‘breach.’ ” Next, she argues the
jury’s verdict of recovery of zero damages for rescission of
household services was inconsistent with the City’s
determination that plaintiffs had illegally revoked household
services. We take each contention in turn.
A. The Trial Court Properly Allowed the Verdict to
Stand on the Cause of Action for Fraud in the
Inducement.
I. The Elements Fraud in the Inducement Were
Met
“Actual fraud, within the meaning of this chapter, consists
in any of the following acts, committed by a party to the contract,
11
or with his connivance, with intent to deceive another party
thereto, or to induce him to enter into the contract: [¶] . . . [¶]
4. A promise made without any intention of performing it.” (Civ.
Code, § 1572.)
Fraud in the inducement occurs when the promisor knows
what he or she is signing but the promisor’s consent was induced
by fraud. (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017)
Contracts, § 298, p. 317.) As the Restatement puts it, “[i]f a
party’s manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent
or a material misrepresentation by the other party upon which
the recipient is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the
recipient.” (Rest.2d, Contacts, § 164, subd. (1).)
There are three requirements, in addition to the
misrepresentation: the misrepresentation must have been either
fraudulent or material; the misrepresentation must have induced
the recipient to make the contract; and the recipient must have
been justified in relying on the misrepresentation. (Rest.2d,
Contacts, § 164, com. a, at p. 445.) “No legal effect flows from
either a non-fraudulent or a fraudulent misrepresentation unless
it induces action by the recipient, that is, unless he manifests his
assent to the contract in reliance on it.” (Id., § 164, com. c, at
p. 446.)
In this case, the jury found in its special verdicts that
Shokrian made a promise to plaintiffs she did not intend to keep;
she intended that plaintiffs rely on her promise; plaintiffs
reasonably relied on Shokrian’s promise; Shokrian did not do as
she promised; and plaintiffs’ reliance on Shokrian’s promise was
a substantial factor in causing them harm.
Shokrian promised plaintiffs she would vacate the
apartment after one year, a promise she did not keep or intend to
12
keep. That the expiration of the term of the tenancy is not
grounds for eviction under the RSO (L.A Mun. Code, § 151.09), as
the trial court found, is a principle that is independent from, and
has no connection with, Shokrian’s agreement with plaintiffs by
which she promised to vacate the apartment after one year. Nor
does the RSO give Shokrian license to make false promises. In
short, her promise to vacate after one year was essential to
plaintiffs’ plans; her promise induced plaintiffs to enter into the
Lease Agreement. As the record of this case confirms, plaintiffs
sustained substantial harm as a result of entering into the Lease
Agreement with Shokrian.
The requirements of fraud in the inducement were met in
this case.
II. Assuming the Lease Agreement was Illegal, Its
Illegality Does Not Defeat the Cause of Action
for Fraud in the Inducement.
Shokrian contends the trial court allowed plaintiffs to sue
on a “contract” it found to be illegal. She makes this argument
without differentiating between the Lease Agreement and the
Addendum. Shokrian contends the “trial court found the contract
was illegal, but it nevertheless allowed [plaintiffs] to proceed with
a fraud claim based entirely upon their expectations under that
illegal contract.” She cites the generally accepted proposition
that “ ‘ “a party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of
law and ask to have its illegal objects carried out.” ’ ” (Wong v.
Tenneco, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 126, 135 (Wong).) While we agree
with the general principle, we disagree that it is implicated here.
Shortly before trial, the trial court granted Shokrian’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings on the first cause of action
for breach of contract. In doing so, the trial court addressed
13
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Addendum which we set forth in the
margin.2
The trial court ruled that paragraph 1 of the Addendum
was void as against public policy and held that plaintiffs’
“assertion of the expiration of a fixed term tenancy as the basis
for an eviction fails because []RSO does not recognize that basis
as a permissible basis for eviction. . . . Thus, the provision of the
Addendum that [plaintiffs] claimed has been breached is
unenforceable as against public policy as it is directly prohibited
by []RSO.” The court went on to rule that to the extent plaintiffs
relied upon paragraph 2 of the Addendum, “that paragraph
purporting waiver of []RSO is itself void as against public policy.
2 “1. After the term of the rental agreement entered into
concurrently between Tenants and Owner, Tenants agree to
voluntarily terminate Tenants’ tenancy, to vacate the Apartment,
and to return possession to Owner within 60 days of Owner’s
personal service of or mailing of written notice by certified mail
requesting that Tenants vacate the Apartment.
“2. Tenants, and each of them, hereby waive, release and
permanently discharge Owner from all of Tenants’ potential
relocation rights and benefits and Owner’s obligations under the
RSO, the Ellis Act, and the Notice Requirement, including, but
not limited to, those rights, benefits, and duties provided in [Los
Angeles Municipal Code sections] 47.06D, 151.09.A.10, 151.09G,
and 151.22 through 151.28, California Government Code
[sections] 7060.2 and 7060.4, and the notice requirements of
California Civil Code [section] 1946.1 to which Tenants may
otherwise be entitled if Tenants did not agree to voluntarily
vacate the Apartment hereunder.”
14
[Los Angeles Municipal Code section] 151.07(F)[3] (‘[a]ny
agreement . . . waiving any of the provisions contained in the
Article shall be void as contrary to public policy’).”
The sole cause of action tried against Shokrian alleged
fraud in the inducement, that is, Shokrian’s false promise to
move out upon 60 days notice when the tenancy expired on
August 31, 2017, which in turn induced plaintiffs to sign onto the
Lease Agreement as well. As the trial court pointed out,
“[d]espite being able to enforce the illegal lease,” plaintiffs sued
on that promise and sought damages for fraud. By this cause of
action they did not try to enforce the lease to obtain possession of
the property.
It appears Shokrian’s argument is that the trial court’s
ruling voiding terms in the Addendum as against public policy
renders the Lease Agreement illegal as well. Thus she argues
that when a “party’s claim for damages depends on proving they
entered an illegal contract, that claim is barred by the illegality
rule.”
For the sake of argument, we will assume the Lease
Agreement is illegal.
First, “[t]here is no doubt that the general rule requires the
courts to withhold relief under the terms of an illegal contract or
agreement which is violative of public policy.” (Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-
Hi Corp. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 199, 218.) Illegality, however, is not
the only factor to consider in deciding whether to grant a party
relief. When the evidence shows that a party seeks to enforce an
illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the
trial court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts
3 The reference should be to section 151.10(D).
15
in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the
consummation or encouragement of what public policy forbids.
(Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 147–
148, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
McBarron v. Kimball (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 218, 220.)
That being said, trial courts are advised to tread carefully
in deciding whether or not to grant relief in cases involving
illegalities. “The rule that the courts will not lend their aid to the
enforcement of an illegal agreement or one against public policy
is fundamentally sound. The rule was conceived for the purposes
of protecting the public and the courts from imposition. It is a
rule predicated upon sound public policy. But the courts should
not be so enamored with the Latin phase ‘in pari delicto’ that
they blindly extend the rule to every case where illegality
appears somewhere in the transaction. The fundamental purpose
of the rule must always be kept in mind, and the realities of the
situation must be considered. Where, by applying the rule, the
public cannot be protected because the transaction has been
completed, where no serious moral turpitude is involved, where
the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault, and
where to apply the rule will be to permit the defendant to be
unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, the rule should
not be applied.” (Norwood v. Judd (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 276,
288–289; see also Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 291
[“ ‘[T]he rule is not an inflexible one to be applied in its fullest
rigor under any and all circumstances. A wide range of
exceptions has been recognized.’ ”], superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in Tufeld Corp. v. Beverly Hills Gateway,
L.P. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 12, 27–29; Kashani v. Tsann Kuen
China Enterprise Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 531, 541-542
16
[California courts have carved out exceptions to the statutory and
judicial language that illegal contracts are void and
unenforceable].)
Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law to be
determined from the circumstances of each particular case.
(Timney v. Lin (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126.) Because the
facts here are undisputed, we apply the independent review
standard to the question of whether the facts present an
exception to the general rule against enforcing illegal contracts.
(Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, 437 [application of
legal principles to undisputed facts invokes de novo review].)
Here the transaction was completed, and no serious moral
turpitude is present. Significantly, Shokrian would be unjustly
enriched with years of rent-free living if plaintiffs were not
permitted to recover their damages for her false promise to them.
And notably, plaintiffs did not seek to take advantage of the
illegal waiver of RSO rights. Those rights act to protect against
and stop unjust evictions, which is not an issue here. In this
cause of action plaintiffs did not try to enforce the Lease
Agreement to evict Shokrian based on her waivers; instead, they
sought to recover damages for her duplicity, separate and apart
from any rights afforded to her by the RSO and other tenant-
protective statutes.
On another front, the cases Shokrian cites in support of her
position are inapt. In Wong v. Tenneco, Wong owned and
operated farms in Mexico when it was illegal for a non-Mexican
citizen like Wong to do so. Wong sued in California on a contract
for damages that were unrecoverable by him under Mexican Law.
(Wong, supra, 39 Cal.3d 128–133.) Our Supreme Court declined
to treat the case as a standard breach of contract claim, instead
17
deciding that Wong could not recover based on the doctrine of
comity, our duty to respect Mexico’s right to determine her own
internal policies. (Id. at pp. 133–134.) Applying comity, the
Court found that Wong’s failure to comply with the requirements
of Mexican law “cast a pall of illegality over all of his business
transactions tied to the Mexican farming operation.” (Id. at
pp. 137–138.)
Lee On v. Long (1951) 37 Cal.2d 499 is also inapposite.
There, gamblers sued the sheriff for money seized from gambling
tables when the sheriff raided their illegal gambling operation.
(Id. at pp. 500–501.) The Court found the money was derived
from a violation of state gambling laws. Because “ ‘a party to an
illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have
his illegal objects carried out’ ” and because plaintiffs had pleaded
guilty to criminal violations of the gaming law, they were not
entitled to use the courts to recover their ill-gotten gains. (Id. at
pp. 502–503.) Here plaintiffs were not seeking to have their
illegal objects, i.e., the RSO waivers, carried out as they were not
seeking to enforce either the Lease Agreement or the Addendum.
In Wallace v. Opinham (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 25, 26,
plaintiff sued to recover money he had lost in the illegal game of
“ ‘Twenty-One.’ ” Huber v. Peek-A-Boot, Inc. (1961)
189 Cal.App.2d 512, 515–516 was a case where plaintiff’s case
was based on perjured testimony. In Goldstein v. Enoch (1967)
248 Cal.App.2d 891, 896–897, plaintiff had to rely on an illegal
transaction to prove his case for fraud. Here, plaintiffs did not
invoke the illegal terms in the documents. Their case hinged on
proving Shokrian’s false promise to move out upon 60 days notice
after the tenancy expired.
18
In Hydrotech Systems Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark (1991)
52 Cal.3d 988, 998, superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Montgomery Sansome LP v. Rezai (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 786, 794, an unlicensed contractor tried to evade
Business and Professions Code section 7031, which precludes
unlicensed contractors from recovery of damages, by alleging a
cause of action for fraud. To the same effect was Waisbren v.
Peppercorn Productions, Inc. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 246, 250–251,
262, where the underlying contract violated the Talent Agencies
Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1700–1700.47). In Yoo v. Jho (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1252, 1254, the store that was sold was
involved in the sale of counterfeit merchandise; the illegal object
of the contract precluded any relief.
In each of these cases recovery of damages required the
court to endorse or enforce an illegal contract, activity or
transaction. Here the principal illegality was the waiver of RSO
rights. That waiver was irrelevant to Shokrian’s false promise to
deliver the premises back to plaintiffs when her lease ended.
B. The Jury’s Answers in the Special Verdict Are Not
Inconsistent and its Decision Not to Award Any
Damages for Reduction in Household Services is
Supported by Substantial Evidence.
Shokrian contends that the jury’s answers in the special
verdict denying Shokrian any recovery for the reduction of
household services are internally inconsistent.
The inconsistent verdict rule is based upon the
fundamental proposition that a factfinder may not make
inconsistent determinations of fact based on the same evidence.
An inconsistent verdict may arise from an inconsistency between
or among answers within a special verdict or irreconcilable
19
findings. Where there is an inconsistency between or among
answers within a special verdict, both or all the questions are
equally against the law. The appellate court is not permitted to
choose between inconsistent answers. (Trejo v. Johnson &
Johnson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 110, 124.) The standard of review
for inconsistency in a special verdict is de novo. (Ibid.) We also
review a jury’s factual findings for substantial evidence and will
reverse only if defendant can show that the evidence was such as
would justify a directed verdict in their favor. (Mathews v. Happy
Valley Conference Center, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 236, 251.)
There was no inconsistency in the special verdict and it was
supported by substantial evidence. In question 1, the jury
acknowledged that the household services in question were
“protected by the rent stabilization ordinance.” This is true as a
general proposition. In question 2, the jury also acknowledged,
consistent with the evidence, that plaintiffs took away the
services. This is also true as a general proposition. In question
3, the jury found that plaintiffs did not provide “a commensurate
reduction in the rent for the reduction in housing services.” That
is true as well. In question 4, the jury concluded that the
plaintiffs did not “demand, accept or retain rent above the
maximum rent.” That is correct—the collected rent remained the
same throughout the tenancy.
The evidence at trial was that there was no provision for
any household services in the Lease Agreement. According to
Jonathan, he gave Shokrian the household services “without
charge and as a goodwill gesture.” Shokrian acknowledged there
was nothing in the Lease Agreement about any of the household
services at issue. The Lease Agreement itself bore this out. The
Lease Agreement also provided that changes in the tenancy
20
needed to be in writing and signed by both parties. And there
was no evidence of such an approved amendment. Under these
facts, Terrell conceded at trial that to enforce a reduction in rent,
the contract would have had to be amended to include those
services. We find the jury’s answers to be internally consistent
and supported by the evidence. We deny as unnecessary
Shokrian’s request that we take judicial notice of the Rent
Adjustment Commission Regulation 630 of the City of Los
Angeles.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs are to recover their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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