CourtListener 10585023•People v. Denem CA2/3
Full text
Filed 1/16/25 P. v. Denem CA2/3
Review denied 5/14/25: reposted with Supreme Court order and statement
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B333016
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA240172)
v.
ROLLIN DENEM,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Blythe Leszkay and David E. Madeo, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Rollin Denem of special circumstance
murder committed when he was 18 years old. A court sentenced
him to life without parole. Years later, Denem moved for a
hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
(Franklin), which held that a defendant may develop a record for
an eventual Penal Code1 section 3051 youth offender parole
hearing. The trial court denied Denem’s request for a Franklin
hearing because he was ineligible for a youth offender parole
hearing. Denem appeals, contending that section 3051 violates
equal protection because it excludes young adult offenders
sentenced to life without parole and that his sentence is cruel or
unusual punishment under our California Constitution. We
reject his contentions.
BACKGROUND
In 1998, Denem and accomplices participated in an armed
robbery during which an accomplice shot and killed a security
guard. (See generally People v. Denem (Feb. 21, 2023, B318106)
[nonpub. opn.].)2 A jury convicted Denem of murder committed
while he was engaged in the commission of a felony, robbery
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17); count 1) and of robbery
(§ 211; counts 2 & 3) with true findings on principal gun use
(§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d) & (e)(1)) and gang (§ 186.22, subd.
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
We grant Denem’s request for judicial notice of that
opinion. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a).)
2
(b)(1))3 allegations. A court sentenced Denem to life without
parole for the murder plus 25 years to life.
In 2023, Denem moved for a Franklin hearing. In his
motion, Denem acknowledged that because he was 18 years old
when he committed his crimes and was sentenced to life without
parole, he was ineligible for a section 3051 youth offender parole
hearing. However, he argued that excluding youth offenders
from eligibility for relief violated equal protection guarantees
because they are similarly situated to youth offenders sentenced
to de facto life without parole and to juveniles sentenced to life
without parole. Denem also argued that his sentence was cruel
or unusual under the California Constitution, article I, section
17.
On June 14, 2023, the trial court denied Denem’s motion.
The trial court found that Denem was ineligible for section 3051
relief and that denying him relief did not violate equal protection.
The trial court did not address Denem’s cruel or unusual
punishment argument.
DISCUSSION
I. Equal protection
Denem was 18 years old when he participated in the
murder for which he was sentenced to life without parole;
therefore, he was ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing
under section 3051, subdivision (h), and not entitled to a
Franklin hearing. He nonetheless argues that section 3051
violates equal protection by (1) treating young adult offenders
3
The jury found the gang allegations true as to counts 1 and
3 only.
3
sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder
differently from young adult offenders serving parole-eligible life
sentences for other crimes, (2) excluding young adult offenders
sentenced to life without parole from eligibility while including
juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole, and
(3) excluding youth offenders sentenced for special circumstance
murder under section 190.2, subdivision (d), while including
those convicted of nonspecial circumstance first degree felony
murder for the same specified felony offenses per the exact same
standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3). As we now
explain, our California Supreme Court rejected his first argument
in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin), we follow
other Courts of Appeal rejecting the second argument, and we
reject his third argument because Denem’s jury found the special
circumstance allegation true under subdivision (a)(17) of section
190.2, not subdivision (d).
A. Section 3051 and Hardin
Over the past two decades, courts have recognized that
juveniles (persons under 18) are constitutionally different from
adults for sentencing purposes because of juveniles’ diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform. (See generally
Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471.) Accordingly, the
Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing the death penalty on
juveniles (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551), life without
parole sentences on juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses
(Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48), mandatory life without
parole sentences on juveniles (Miller, at p. 489), de facto life
without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders
(People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262), and a sentence of 50
4
years to life for juvenile nonhomicide offenders (People v.
Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 356).
In light of the judicial recognition of juveniles’ lessened
culpability and greater prospects for reform, our Legislature
enacted section 3051. Section 3051 requires the Board of Parole
Hearings to conduct a “youth offender parole hearing” at specified
times during the youth’s incarceration. Generally, persons who
were younger than 26 years old when they committed their
controlling offense are eligible for a youth offender parole hearing
if they were sentenced to a determinate term or a life term with
the possibility of parole. (§ 3051, subd. (b).) Persons sentenced to
life without parole are entitled to a hearing if they were younger
than 18 years old when they committed the controlling offense.
(§ 3051, subd. (b)(4).) However, persons sentenced to life without
parole who committed their controlling offense when they were
18 or older are ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing.4
(§ 3051, subd. (h).) Further, persons who are eligible for a youth
offender parole hearing must have a sufficient opportunity to
make a record of information relevant to that eventual hearing.
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.)
While this appeal was pending, our California Supreme
Court issued Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834, which considered
whether section 3051 violates equal protection. Hardin, at page
850, held that when “plaintiffs challenge laws drawing
distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of persons, on
4
Similarly, persons sentenced under the Three Strikes or
One Strike laws and offenders who, after attaining 26 years of
age, commit an additional crime for which malice aforethought is
an element are ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing.
(§ 3051, subd. (h).)
5
the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal
protection, courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether
the two groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law in
question. The only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged
difference in treatment is adequately justified under the
applicable standard of review,” which is rational basis review.
Under rational basis review, courts “consider whether the
challenged classification ultimately bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate state purpose.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4
Cal.5th 277, 289.)
Hardin then turned to whether there was a rational basis
to exclude persons sentenced to life without parole for a crime
committed when they were 18 or older from a youth offender
parole hearing. The court found that while the Legislature’s
primary purpose in extending section 30515 to young adult
offenders was to give them the opportunity to obtain release
based on growth and rehabilitation, the Legislature balanced this
purpose with other concerns about culpability and the
appropriate punishment for certain very serious crimes. (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 854.) In “designing section 3051, the
Legislature consciously drew lines that altered the parole
component of offenders’ sentences based not only on the age of
the offender (and thus the offender’s amenability to
rehabilitation) but also on the offense and sentence imposed. The
lines the Legislature drew necessarily reflect a set of legislative
judgments about the nature of punishment that is appropriate for
the crime.” (Id. at p. 855.)
5
As originally enacted, only juveniles were eligible for youth
offender parole hearings, but, over the years, the age of eligibility
has been raised to 22 and then to 25. (See generally Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 845–846.)
6
Hardin rejected the argument that there is no rational
basis to distinguish between youthful offenders sentenced to life
without parole for special circumstance murder and youthful
offenders sentenced either to functionally equivalent life without
parole sentences or to indeterminate life terms for first degree
murder. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 858; cf. People v.
Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 [excluding defendants sentenced
under One Strike law from § 3051 relief does not violate equal
protection].) The court observed that “legions of decisions” hold
that “special circumstance murder is sufficiently serious and
morally culpable as to justify imposing the most severe sanctions
available under the law, up to and including death.” (Hardin, at
p. 859.) While the court did not “foreclose the possibility of other
challenges to the distinctions drawn by the special circumstances
statute based on a more robust record or a more focused as-
applied inquiry, Hardin has not carried his burden to
demonstrate that legislative reliance on the special circumstance
murder statute in section 3051, subdivision (h) is categorically
irrational.” (Id. at p. 862.) The court concluded that Hardin had
not shown that the “Legislature’s decision to expand youth
offender parole hearings to most young adult offenders, while
excluding Hardin and others similarly situated, violates equal
protection under a rational basis standard.” (Id. at p. 866.)
B. Hardin precludes Denem’s first claim
Denem acknowledges that Hardin rejected his first
contention, that treating young adult offenders sentenced to life
without parole for special circumstance murder differently from
young adult offenders serving parole-eligible life sentences for
other crimes violates equal protection. We are bound by Hardin.
(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455.)
7
C. A rational basis exists to distinguish between young
adults and juveniles sentenced to life without parole
Denem continues to pursue his second contention, that
excluding young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole
from eligibility while including juvenile offenders sentenced to
life without parole violates equal protection. Although Hardin
declined to address this issue, other appellate courts have
rejected it, finding that age provides a rational basis for the
Legislature to distinguish between offenders with the same life
without parole sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Mason (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 411; People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273,
285–286, review granted Jan. 11, 2023, S277487, reversed on
other grounds by Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834; People v. Sands
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193; People v. Jackson (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 189, 196–198; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
769, 779 (Acosta).) Those cases recognize that Roper and its
progeny apply to juveniles, and not to young adult offenders.
Thus, a life without parole sentence may violate the Eighth
Amendment for juvenile offenders, but “the same sentence does
not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult,
even an adult under the age of 26.” (Sands, at p. 204.) Our
Legislature therefore could “rationally decide to remedy
unconstitutional sentences [of juveniles] but go no further.”
(Ibid.; accord, Acosta, at pp. 779–780 [Legislature declined to
include young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole
presumably because 8th Amend. jurisprudence didn’t compel it].)
D. People v. Briscoe is distinguishable
Denem’s final argument why section 3051 violates equal
protection is based on People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
479 (Briscoe). The defendant in that case was convicted of first
degree murder, robbery, and burglary with a true finding on a
8
special circumstance allegation under section 190.2, subdivision
(d), and was sentenced to life without parole. (Briscoe, at p. 485.)
The defendant was 21 years old when he committed his crimes.
(Ibid.) He was therefore ineligible for a section 3051 youth
offender parole hearing based on his age and sentence.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that section 3051 violates
equal protection “by excluding youth offenders sentenced for
special circumstance murder under section 190.2, subdivision
(d)— which applies to nonkiller participants in specified felony
offenses during which a murder occurred—while including those
convicted of nonspecial circumstance first degree felony murder
for the same specified felony offenses per the exact same
standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3).”6 (Briscoe, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 485.) Briscoe, at page 491, noted that the
Legislature amended section 189 to “limit felony-murder
liability,” in part by “directly incorporating the section 190.2,
subdivision (d) standard into the definition of first degree felony
murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3).”7
6
Section 190.2, subdivision (d), provides: “Notwithstanding
subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who, with
reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant,
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or
assists in the commission of a felony enumerated in paragraph
(17) of subdivision (a) which results in the death of some person
or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first degree
therefor, shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state
prison for life without the possibility of parole if a special
circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has
been found to be true under Section 190.4.”
7
Section 189, subdivision (e) provides: “A participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in
9
The court then observed that Hardin had found that the
culpability associated with life-without-parole offenses provides a
rational basis to exclude youth offenders sentenced to life without
parole from section 3051 relief. (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th
at p. 492.) However, “this logic falls apart when applied to the
particular special circumstance and the facts at issue here.
Section 190.2, subdivision (d) describes the exact same
circumstances and conduct that is now necessary to support a
conviction for first degree felony murder under section 189,
subdivision (e)(3). The disparate treatment of offenders who
committed murder per these identical provisions during the same
underlying felonies cannot reflect any difference in culpability.”
(Ibid.) Briscoe, at page 495, therefore found that no rational
reason existed “for section 3051 to exclude section 190.2,
subdivision (d) offenders from a parole opportunity provided to
section 189, subdivision (e)(3) offenders convicted under the exact
same standard.”
Briscoe is distinguishable. That case concerned a special
circumstance allegation under section 190.2, subdivision (d). In
contrast, Denem’s jury found true a special circumstance
allegation under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). Subdivision
(a)(17) provides for a penalty of death or life without parole if the
murder “was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or
was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission
of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to
commit” specified felonies, including robbery. Thus, while section
subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if
one of the following is proven: . . . (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.”
10
190.2, subdivision (d), expressly applies only to nonkillers, that is
not necessarily so with section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).
Subdivision (a)(17) applies to actual killers and nonkillers who
commit murder while intending to commit a felony such as
robbery. (See generally CALCRIM No. 730.)
II. Cruel or unusual punishment
Denem alternatively argues that evolving standards of
decency, as exemplified by the expansion of section 3051 to
include persons who committed their controlling offense at the
age of 25 and younger, have made his life without parole sentence
cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution.8
But, as we have said, section 3051 has its genesis in cases
concerning juveniles. That is, Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S.
460 prohibited mandatory life without parole terms for juveniles.
It did not apply to young adults like Denem who were 18 or older
when they committed their crime. (See Acosta, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at p. 782.) Our Supreme Court and numerous
Courts of Appeal have refused to extend Miller, as well as
Graham and Roper, to young adults 18 years of age or older.
(See, e.g., People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429–430
[declining to extend Roper to 18-to-20-year-olds]; People v. Powell
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191 [death penalty for 18 year old with
“intellectual shortcomings” does not violate federal and state
Constitutions]; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 407
[“lengthy confinement under a sentence of death does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment” or violate federal and
state Constitutions]; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427,
437–438 [life without parole for 21-year old offender not grossly
8
Denem does not argue on appeal that his sentence violates
the federal Constitution.
11
disproportionate to his culpability]; see People v. Argeta (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482.) Thus, as Argeta observed, a line
has been drawn about at what age it is cruel or unusual
punishment to impose a life without parole sentence. That line
currently stands at 17 years of age (i.e., those persons who are 17
and younger are considered juveniles). Denem was 18 years old
and not a juvenile when he committed the murders. Accordingly,
his life without parole sentence does not constitute cruel or
unusual punishment.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Rollin Denem’s motion for a Franklin
hearing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J.
ADAMS, J.
12
Filed 5/14/25
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three - No. B333016
S289464
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
En Banc
____________________________________________________________
____________
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ROLLIN DENEM, Defendant and Appellant.
____________________________________________________________
____________
The petition for review is denied.
Liu, Kruger, and Evans, JJ., are of the opinion the petition should be
granted.
(See Dissenting Statement by Justice Liu.)
______________/s/________________
Chief Justice
PEOPLE v. DENEM
S289464
Dissenting Statement by Justice Liu
On November 3, 1998, less than five months after his
eighteenth birthday, defendant Rollin Denem and seven others
robbed a food market in Compton. During the robbery, one of
his co-defendants shot and killed a security guard. Denem was
arrested in 2001 and charged with first-degree murder with a
felony-murder special circumstance. In 2004, he was convicted
and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP),
the mandatory punishment for his crime under Penal Code
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A).
Youth offenders below age 26 are generally eligible for a
youth offender parole hearing pursuant to Penal Code section
3051. But subdivision (h) of that statute excludes individuals
sentenced to LWOP. Denem challenges his LWOP sentence and
his exclusion from a youth offender parole hearing as cruel or
unusual punishment under article I, section 17 of the California
Constitution. The Court of Appeal rejected this claim, reasoning
that LWOP is not cruel or unusual when applied to an 18-year-
old because “a line has been drawn about at what age it is cruel
or unusual punishment to impose a life without parole
sentence,” and “[t]hat line currently stands at 17 years of age.”
To be clear, the question here is not whether an LWOP
sentence may lawfully be imposed on an 18-year-old. The issue
is whether the state constitution permits a mandatory LWOP
sentence for an 18-year-old without any individualized
1
PEOPLE v. DENEM
Liu, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review
consideration. Such consideration here would include the trial
court’s observation that Denem may have been susceptible to
peer pressure: “Without each other, maybe they don’t have the
guts to do it alone. . . . It takes a group, and the group is what’s
dangerous. . . . The group will do something that the individuals
themselves will not do alone.” Further, the fact that Denem
“wore a disguise of a hat and a curly wig” during the robbery
(People v. Denem (Feb. 21, 2023, B318106) [nonpub. opn.] review
den., Apr. 26, 2023) may suggest that his crime was “devoid of
any sophistication” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 896
(dis. opn. of Liu, J.)).
Further, in an individualized inquiry, it would be relevant
that Denem had a difficult childhood. His parents abandoned
him “at a very young age.” He lived with “domestic violence,
drugs, and alcohol in the household,” where “physical, verbal,
and emotional abuse were present.” And yet, as the probation
report indicated, in the years between the crime and his arrest,
Denem worked full-time, took classes, and volunteered in his
community, including “teaching computer classes to kids and
senior citizens.” After his arrest, he maintained a good record
in custody. And in 2002, numerous community leaders noted
Denem’s leadership skills and positive contributions to the
south Los Angeles community.
Denem stands convicted of participating in a tragic and
lethal crime. But “[a]s neuroscience shows and ‘any parent
knows,’ [1] juveniles and younger adults lack maturity and a
sense of responsibility, [2] they are vulnerable to negative
influences over which they have limited control, and [3] their
character is transitory and developing. (Roper v. Simmons
(2005) 543 U.S. 551, [569–570].) ‘Neuroscientists now know that
all three of the “general differences between juveniles under 18
2
PEOPLE v. DENEM
Liu, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review
and adults” recognized by Roper are present in people older than
18.’ ([In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke (Wn. 2021) 482 P.3d
276,] 286; accord, [Commonwealth v. Mattis (Mass. 2024)
224 N.E.3d 410,] 421 [‘the scientific record strongly supports the
contention that emerging adults have the same core
neurological characteristics as juveniles have’].)” (People v.
Powell (Feb. 23, 2024, A167066) [nonpub. opn.], review den.
June 12, 2024, S284418 (dis. stmt. of Evans, J.); see ibid. [noting
that Massachusetts, Michigan and Washington have
interpreted similar state constitutional protections against
cruel or unusual punishment to prohibit a mandatory LWOP
sentence for someone of Denem’s age, and that 22 states and the
District of Columbia do not mandate LWOP under any
circumstance].)
Our Legislature, too, has “repeatedly recognized that
‘youthfulness both lessens a juvenile’s moral culpability and
enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult
and neurological development occurs, these individuals can
become contributing members of society’ (Stats. 2013, ch. 312,
§ 1), and that brain development affecting judgment and
decisionmaking ‘continues beyond adolescence and into the mid-
20’s’.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 866 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).)
The court that sentenced Denem was prohibited from
considering any of this context, and under current law, none of
these considerations, including any rehabilitation he has
demonstrated while incarcerated, will be presented to a parole
board. If he is condemned to die in prison, he will endure nearly
all of his adult life behind bars. In light of the changing
scientific and legal landscape (Powell, supra, review den. (dis.
stmt. of Evans, J.), the mandatory sentence imposed on Denem,
with no individualized consideration, seems in serious tension
3
PEOPLE v. DENEM
Liu, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review
with the state constitutional prohibition on cruel or unusual
punishment and warrants our review.
Yet this court’s inaction does not necessarily spell the end
of the road for Denem, who has been incarcerated for over two
decades and now, at age 44, may well be able to show that he
has significantly matured since age 18. His hope for “a
meaningful chance at life beyond prison walls” (Hardin, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 897 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.)) may hinge on the
Legislature’s enactment of Senate Bill No. 672, the Youth
Rehabilitation and Opportunity Act, which would strike the
LWOP exclusion from Penal Code section 3051 and thereby
grant young offenders like Denem the possibility of parole after
their twenty-fifth year of incarceration.
LIU, J.
I Concur:
EVANS, J.
4
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.