People v. Lawrence CA2/7

CourtListener 10584097CalctappMay 14, 2025

Full text

Filed 5/14/25 P. v. Lawrence CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B336096

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA142542)
v.

HERBERT LAWRENCE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________________
Herbert Lawrence shot an unarmed man multiple times at
a gas station. (People v. Lawrence (Apr. 10, 2010, B285102)
[2019 WL 1552366] [nonpub. opn.].) A jury convicted him in
August 2017 of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (b)),1 possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)), and attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 192,
subd. (a), 664) as a lesser included offense of attempted murder.
The jury found true allegations Lawrence personally used a
firearm, within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a),
and personally inflicted great bodily injury, within the meaning
of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). In a bifurcated proceeding,
Lawrence admitted that he had a prior conviction for a serious or
violent felony, within the meaning of the three strikes law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and that he served
three prior prison terms, within the meaning of section 667.5,
former subdivision (b).
The trial court sentenced Lawrence to an aggregate prison
term of 35 years four months, consisting of the upper term of
nine years on the conviction for assault with a semiautomatic
firearm, doubled under the three strikes law, plus the upper term
of 10 years for the firearm-use enhancement and three years for
the great-bodily-injury enhancement; one year four months
(one-third the middle term of two years, doubled under the three
strikes law) on the conviction for possession of a firearm by a
felon; and three one-year terms for the prior prison term
enhancements under section 667.5, former subdivision (b). On
the conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter the court
stated, “I’m going to stay it, pursuant to [section] 654.”

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
In November 2022 Lawrence was identified as potentially
eligible for resentencing under amendments to section 667.5,
subdivision (b), that invalidated prior prison term enhancements
for all convictions other than for certain sexually violent offenses.
(See People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 769; People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 320, fn. 6.) The superior
court held a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 and
struck the three one-year prior prison term enhancements.
Counsel for Lawrence asked the court, as part of the
resentencing, to impose the middle term of three years on the
conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm, strike the
prior serious or violent felony conviction under the three strikes
law, and resentence Lawrence to an aggregate prison term of
10 years eight months.
The superior court resentenced Lawrence to the same
prison terms on the convictions for assault with a semiautomatic
firearm and possession of a firearm by a felon, imposed the same
terms for the firearm-use and great-bodily-injury enhancements,
and resentenced Lawrence to an aggregate prison term of
32 years four months. The court did not mention, or impose a
sentence on, the conviction for attempted voluntary
manslaughter. Lawrence timely appealed.
Lawrence makes three arguments on appeal. He is pretty
much right on all of them.
First, Lawrence argues the superior court erred in not
imposing a sentence on his conviction for attempted voluntary
manslaughter. The People concede, and we agree, the court
erred. At the sentencing hearing in 2017 the trial court stated it
was staying the sentence on that conviction under section 654.
The trial court, however, should have imposed a sentence on that

3
conviction and stayed execution of it. (See People v. Jones (2012)
54 Cal.4th 350, 353 [the correct procedure “‘is to sentence
defendant for each count and stay execution of sentence on
certain of the convictions to which section 654 is applicable’”];
People v. Ellis (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 590, 602 [same]; People v.
Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1466 [“when a trial court
determines that section 654 applies to a particular count, the
trial court must impose sentence on that count and then stay
execution of that sentence”].) At the resentencing hearing in
2023 the superior court did not impose a sentence (stayed or
otherwise) on Lawrence’s conviction for attempted voluntary
manslaughter. This, too, was error. (See People v. Martinez
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012 [“[a] sentencing court has a
duty to impose the punishment prescribed by law [citation], and
has no discretion to deviate from the statutorily specified
penalty”]; see also People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365,
373 [“‘“section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing”’”].)
Second, Lawrence argues that at the resentencing hearing
the superior court did not impose any fines or fees, that the
abstract of judgment states the court imposed various fines and
fees, and that the former controls over the latter. The People
concede, and we agree, Lawrence is correct. (See People v. Leon
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855 [“Any discrepancy between the
judgment as orally pronounced and as recorded in the clerk’s
minutes or abstract of judgment is presumed to be the result of
clerical error.”]; People v. Revels (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 376, 387
[“‘Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement
of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment,
the oral pronouncement controls.’”].) The superior court on

4
remand must ensure the abstract of judgment accurately lists the
fines and fees, if any, the court imposes.
Third, Lawrence argues the superior court erred in failing
at the resentencing hearing to recalculate his custody credits.
The People concede, and we agree, this was error. (See People v.
Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29 [“when a prison term already
in progress is modified as the result of an appellate sentence
remand, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against
the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already
served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he
was originally committed and delivered to prison custody”];
People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376, 381 [same]; see also
People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673 [trial court must
“update defendant’s credits for actual time served between the
original sentencing hearing and the resentencing hearing”].)
When counsel for Lawrence stated at the resentencing hearing
“the court has to put on the record the total credit for the time
that [Lawrence has] been sentenced, including the presentencing
credit,” the court stated, “Generally what I’ve done in the past on
these hearings is I say, ‘Department of Corrections [and
Rehabilitation] to determine the defendant’s credits.” The court’s
practice is inconsistent with the law: It is the court, not the
prison or jail authorities, that must calculate the defendant’s
custody credits. (Buckhalter, at p. 41; People v. Saibu (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1012.)
The judgment is reversed. The superior court is directed to
resentence Lawrence, including on his conviction for attempted
voluntary manslaughter; to determine which, if any, fines and
fees the court is imposing and to ensure the abstract of judgment
accurately reflects the court’s judgment; to recalculate

5
Lawrence’s custody credits; and to prepare a new abstract of
judgment and send it to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.

6

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.