People v. Chism CA4/1

CourtListener 10581681CalctappMay 9, 2025

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Filed 5/9/25 P. v. Chism CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083663

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS321078)

WILLIAM RAY CHISM II,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Anastasia Sagorsky, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
A jury convicted William Ray Chism II of assault with a deadly weapon

(Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1), and making a criminal threat
(§ 422; count 2). As to count 2, it found true allegations that Chism
personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon. (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23),
12022, subd. (b)(1).)
In bifurcated proceedings, Chism admitted he suffered prior strike
convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law. The court
sentenced Chism to 25 years to life on count 1 and stayed the count 2
sentence under section 654.
Chism’s sole contention is that the court violated his constitutional
rights to counsel and to remain silent by admitting into evidence certain
statements he made during and after the incident because he was not given
warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 479
(Miranda). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Evidence
A.P. testified that in January 2022, he drove to a store in Santee,
California and, upon leaving his car, Chism approached him and screamed,
“You can’t park here! Move your fucking car!” A.P. did not heed Chism, who
then threatened to “blow up” A.P.’s car, slice his vehicle’s tires, and “bash the
windshields.” Chism told A.P., “I’m going to fucking kill you. I’m going to cut
your fucking throat off. I’m going to fuck you up.” Chism pulled out a
boxcutter and again threatened to kill A.P. He “lung[ed]” at A.P. with the
boxcutter and “swiped” at him with the exposed blade. A.P. dodged and
therefore avoided getting cut. A.P. believed Chism tried to kill him. A.P.
called 911 and grabbed a bat from his car. Chism ran away.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
San Diego County sheriff’s deputies arrived on the scene and met with
A.P., who recounted the incident consistent with the testimony set forth
above.
At the scene, a deputy contacted Chism in the area behind the store,
patted him down for weapons, and handcuffed him either before or after the
pat down. A.P. identified Chism at the scene. Chism said he was going to
start killing people, and threatened physical violence towards A.P. The
deputy described Chism as being “upset,” “serious” and “angry.” The
deputies found no boxcutter on Chism, and stopped searching for it because
the area behind the store was approximately the size of a football field and
covered with high brush.
While Chism was detained, but before he was arrested, he spoke with a
deputy about different matters. The prosecutor redacted Chism’s racial slurs
when the recording was played for the jury:
“[Chism:] So do your fucking job.
“[Deputy:] I am doing my job. Just—
“[Chism:] No sleeping in parking lot like Walmart and Home Depot.
Enforce the laws.
“[Deputy:] All right, look—
“[Chism:] Instead of playing games—
“[Deputy:] I’m trying to do this at the lowest level, right? [A.P. is]
saying that, you’re saying this. Look, we’ll just make sure we’ll go our
separate ways.
“[Chism:] He’s got a baseball bat in the trunk of his car.
“[Deputy:] Okay, well, we’ll go our own separate ways, okay? After
the, we’ll, we’ll just hold on. My friend—

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“[Chism:] [Racial slur used to refer to A.P] better get out of fucking
Santee. I’m on the hunt. I’m on a death run. . . . I ain’t playing no more.
I’m looking for death. Everybody knows it. I’m gonna start killing people.”
At another point, Chism continued his diatribe along the same lines:
“[Chism:] It’s against the law to sleep outside. They’re everywhere.
“[Deputy:] All we’ll talk to him about that—
“[Chism:] So cut the bullshit.
“[Deputy:] We’re gonna talk to him. We’re, my partners are talking.
“[Chism:] Fuck that [racial slur]. The only talking is gonna be me and
my fist through his fucking neck.”
Chism told the deputy, “Look, I respect you guys. I’m a Hell’s Angel-
bred, peckerwood-branded Aryan brother. I don’t fuck with the government,
you guys do your job.”
At another point, Chism stated, “I want a prosecutor.” The deputy
replied, “Okay. Even if you prosecute [A.P.] though, he’s not gonna jail [sic].
You know that, right?” Chism twice replied, “Good. I’ll kill him.”
The deputy later asked Chism, “You okay? You wanna go there to the
sun, dude?” Chism replied, “No, I don’t. I wanna kill that dude. You guys
don’t want, you guys wanna disrespect me. Listen, you wanna disrespect
me?” The deputy denied he was disrespecting Chism.
When the deputies attempted to place Chism in a law enforcement
vehicle, he threatened, “You’re dead.” He added, I already told you on the
record, when I get home, I’m gonna kill the sheriff’s department. It’s on the
record.”
Once Chism was in the vehicle, a deputy told him they were arresting
him for assault with a deadly weapon. Chism said, “No.” When the deputy
attempted to administer Miranda warnings, Chism responded, “Just end it.

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Why isn’t [A.P.] in jail?” The deputy again stated he would administer the
warnings. Chism replied, “No. Fuck You.” The deputy clarified, “You don’t
want me to read you your rights?” Chism reiterated, “Fuck you,” adding,
“You got a green light. That means you’re done.” A deputy testified that
when Chism referred to them as being “green lit,” it meant that “when the
opportunity arises, you will be murdered.” The deputy did not read Chism
his Miranda rights at that time.
The Investigation
Investigators obtained either audio or video of the following matters
that it presented to the jury at trial: the store’s surveillance video of the
incident, A.P.’s 911 call, and a deputy’s body worn camera footage of his
initial interviews at the scene with A.P. and Chism.
Defense Evidence
Chism testified he thought he had previously seen A.P. sleeping in a
store’s parking lot, so he confronted him about it as A.P. exited his vehicle:
“[When A.P. is] close to me, I said, ‘Hey, who the hell are you, or what are you
doing parking in parking lots illegally?’ And I think I called him a piece of
shit.” Chism denied having a weapon. He also denied speaking to A.P. in an
angry tone or raised voice, instead claiming his vocal cords were damaged.
Chism testified regarding his initial encounter with the deputies at the
scene: “And so they patted me down and did all that . . . and then they said,
‘What happened, Chism?’ And I wasn’t cuffed up yet. I said—I told them
what happened, . . . and then [a deputy] said, ‘Do me a favor, Chism. I’m
gonna cuff you up until we find out what happened.’ I said okay. . . . So I
guess I probably talked to [a deputy] for about 12 to 15 minutes.” Chism
denied saying “Fuck you,” when a deputy tried to read him the Miranda

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warnings; rather, he testified he sarcastically said, “I can’t hear you, and I
don’t understand English.”
The prosecutor on cross-examination asked Chism about the incident
and Chism explained his actions in this colloquy:
“[Chism:] . . . This town’s been infested by homeless people for the last
12 years, and, you know, there’s not enough people to—not enough deputy
sheriffs to—even though it’s illegal to sleep outside, the government doesn’t
enforce the laws of the state of California.
“[Prosecutor:] So you believe it’s your job?
“[Chism:] I believe in community service. My job’s just to—I work hard
for a living. . . .
“[Prosecutor:] You would call taking a boxcutter and swiping it at
somebody and threatening to slit their throat community service?
“[Chism:] Number one, ma’am, I didn’t have a boxcutter, and I never
threatened to slit his throat. In that video I said I’d punch him in his throat,
not slit his throat, ma’am.”
DISCUSSION
Chism contends that “as of the time of contact, police were familiar
with [him, as he] had just run from the scene of the incident. As a result,
police clearly had probable cause to arrest [him] . . . . Stated another way,
[he], at the time of police contact, had already been ‘substantially implicated’
in the offense for which he was ultimately arrested, and any later
‘investigation’ would have merely confirmed that fact, and so would not
constitute a ‘general inquiry into an unsolved crime.’ [Citation.] Moreover, it
is evident that he, who had prior experiences with police and contended that
he was being prosecuted vindictively, would not have reasonably believed
that he was free to leave.”

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The People counter that “[Chism] was not in custody. While he was
detained and in handcuffs, and a reasonable person would not have felt free
to leave, based on the totality of the circumstances and weighing all the
factors, [he] was not in custody. As such, his Miranda rights were not
implicated, and the statements were properly admitted.”
I. Background
Chism represented himself at trial and moved in limine to exclude from
evidence his statements to the deputies, “You’re dead,” and, “The Santee
sheriffs are dead.” At the motion hearing, Chism added: “[T]he defense is
requesting [A.P.’s] statements concerning ‘I’ll cut your throat and kill you’ not

be allowed.”2
The prosecutor countered that Chism’s threats towards the deputies
corroborated his state of mind and intent at the time of the incident and was
relevant to his charged criminal threat to A.P. The prosecutor summarized
the transcripts of the deputies’ videos and provided this context: “[Chism]
was immediately cuffed upon contact. They do explain it’s for officer safety.
They do have prior interactions with him. At that point he—they are very
clearly still investigating the crime. They are actively taking statements
from both parties. They tell him, you know, ‘As soon as we figure out what’s
going on, we’re going to take off the cuffs.’ They talked to him about just
walking away after this is all over. [¶] [Chism] makes a variety of
spontaneous statements about what happened. There is a point where one of
the deputies comes and tries to take his side of the story . . . then walks over
and speaks to [A.P.], and there’s back-and-forth in deciding whether this is a

2 The People mistakenly contend that Chism failed to argue below that
his statements related to his threats to slit A.P.’s throat should also be
excluded from evidence.
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chargeable crime, an arrestable crime.” The prosecutor further pointed out
that when deputies decided to arrest Chism and attempted to read him his
rights, he replied, “Fuck you.”
The court admitted into evidence all of the challenged statements,
finding “there’s no violation of your Miranda rights, number one. And
number two, that spontaneous statement comes in because it shows your
state of mind again, which—threatening and angry and corroborates the
state of mind that you had when you confronted [A.P.]”
II. Applicable Law
“The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.’ ” (Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 572.) Miranda held that
statements resulting from custodial interrogation are inadmissible if a
suspect has not received warnings of his rights to remain silent and to
consult with an attorney. (See Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.) The
Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action.” (Ibid.) Miranda advisements are required
when “there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the
degree associated with a formal arrest.” (California v. Beheler (1983)
463 U.S. 1121, 1125.) But “Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply . . .
because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’ ” (Beheler, at
p. 1125.) “ ‘Absent “custodial interrogation,” Miranda simply does not come
into play.’ ” (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 679.) “[T]he term ‘custody’
generally does not include ‘a temporary detention for investigation’ where an
officer detains a person to ask a moderate number of questions to determine

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his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the
officer’s suspicions.” (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 180.)
In determining whether a person was in custody, factors to consider in
the totality of the circumstances include “(1) whether the suspect has been
formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the
location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the
officer, including the nature of the questioning.” (People v. Forster (1994)
29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1753 (Forster).) Additional factors include whether the
officer informed the detained person that he or she was considered a suspect
or a witness, whether the subject’s freedom of movement was restrained,
whether police informed the person that he or she was in custody or under
arrest, whether officers were aggressive, accusatory, and/or confrontational,
whether police expressed the belief that the person was guilty and that they
had proof of that fact, whether police pressured the suspect with
interrogation tactics, and whether police arrested the subject after the
interrogation. (People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162.) No one
factor is controlling. (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404.)
“Rather, we look at the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances
to determine whether on balance they created a coercive atmosphere such
that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to
an arrest.” (Aguilera, at p. 1162.)
For purposes of Miranda, “ ‘interrogation’ ” means “express
questioning” or “words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”
(Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301, fn. omitted.)

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“In reviewing Miranda claims, we ‘accept the trial court’s resolution of
disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are
substantially supported. [Citations.] However, we must independently
determine from the undisputed facts, and those properly found by the trial
court, whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.’ [Citations.]
We review Miranda claims under federal constitutional standards.” (People
v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 578.) The harmless-error test under
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman) applies to erroneous
admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda and involuntary
statements. (See People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1129.) An appellate
court “has the power to review the record de novo in order to determine an
error’s harmlessness. [Citations.] In so doing, it must be determined
whether the State has met its burden of demonstrating that the admission of
the confession . . . did not contribute to” the fact finder’s decision against the
defendant. (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 295–296; see also
Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18 [“Is it clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that a rational [fact finder] would have [reached the same result]
absent the error?”].)
III. Analysis
We need not decide whether Chism was in custody for Miranda
purposes because even assuming arguendo that he was, we would still
conclude he was not subjected to interrogation while in custody.
Chism does not cite evidence showing that the deputies interrogated
him, and we see no indication that they did. Specifically, nothing the
deputies asked or told Chism provoked him to issue the threats that he
sought to exclude from trial. As set forth above, the transcripts of his
interactions with the deputies show that he made numerous unprompted

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threats. “The Fifth Amendment does not bar the admission of ‘[v]olunteered
statements of any kind’ (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 478), nor those
otherwise not resulting from interrogation.” (People v. Cooper (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 642, 650, citing Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at
pp. 299–300.) Therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting Chism’s
statements.
Chism argues that under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18, the court’s
error in admitting his statements was not harmless as he and A.P. provided
contrasting testimony; “both parties were armed with weapons”; the deputies
never recovered any boxcutter; and his statements to police were
inflammatory as he used profanities and racial slurs, claimed “to be a
member of Hells Angels and Aryan Brothers gangs, and . . . threat[ened] to
‘green light’ or kill one or more [deputies].” He contends that if he had
received Miranda warnings, “there is every possibility [he] would have been
more circumspect, and therefore avoided or minimized his criminal liability.”
We conclude that any error in admitting the challenged statements was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18.
A.P.’s testimony regarding the incident was consistent with the surveillance
video, his 911 call, and A.P.’s first interview with the deputy at the scene,
and Chism does not challenge their admission into evidence. Chism’s
belligerent demeanor continued even minutes later when the deputies
arrived. Further, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 301 that the
testimony of only one witness can prove any fact. The threats Chism made
directly to A.P. were independently admissible into evidence through A.P.’s
own testimony.
Moreover, as the jury observed Chism testify and assessed his
demeanor, it could have reasonably concluded he lacked credibility, as his

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testimony conflicted with his statements and actions as recorded by the
deputies’ body-worn cameras. Chism’s own testimony that he did not
threaten to slit A.P.’s throat, but rather to “punch him in his throat” still was
incriminating, and provided an adequate basis for the jury to convict him of
making a criminal threat. The fact the deputies did not find a boxcutter is
not dispositive because, based on one deputy’s testimony, the area behind the
store was sufficiently large and filled with high brush that Chism could have
disposed of the boxcutter there.
Finally, we are not bound by Chism’s speculation that if the deputy had
advised him of his Miranda rights, he might have been more circumspect and
avoided or minimized his criminal liability. As Chism stated on video during
his detention, he has had many encounters with law enforcement officers; yet
those prior experiences did not prevent him from spontaneously making
statements that harmed him in this case.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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