CourtListener 10519103•People v. Dorenzo CA3
Full text
Filed 5/5/25 P. v. Dorenzo CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100142
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 20CF02631)
v.
MATTHEW PERRY DORENZO,
Defendant and Appellant.
On the evening of May 22, 2020, two separate groups were camped by a creek in
Butte County. The victim was with one group. Defendant Matthew Perry Dorenzo was
with the other. Defendant’s group played loud music into the night. When the victim
approached defendant’s group and asked defendant’s group to “please shut the fuck up,”
defendant cleaved defendant’s chest with an axe, injuring but not killing him. According
to the victim, both before and after striking him with the axe, defendant said, “I’ve killed
and I’ll do it again . . . I’ll kill you and I’ve done it before.”
1
Defendant was charged with, among other things, criminal threats. It was further
alleged that, in committing that offense, he personally inflicted great bodily injury and he
personally used a deadly weapon. During deliberations, the jury submitted a note to the
trial court asking: “For the special allegations for . . . criminal threats–do the threats have
to have been made prior to the great bodily injury and/or using a deadly or dangerous
weapon? Or does the timeline not matter?” With both parties’ agreement, the court
responded that the “timeline does not matter.” The jury found defendant guilty of
criminal threats and found the enhancement allegations true. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 15 years in prison.
Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in its response to the jury’s question,
and (2) he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s
failure to object to the trial court’s proposed response and to suggest a different response.
We conclude defendant forfeited his first contention and, even if his attorney should have
objected and proposed a different response, defendant has not demonstrated prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Amended Information
An amended information charged defendant with assault with a deadly weapon
(Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1), criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 2), and
attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 3). On counts 1 and 2, the information
alleged defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) On
counts 2 and 3, the information alleged defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous
weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The information also alleged defendant had sustained a
prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that he was subject to the “Three
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Strikes” sentencing law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12). The information also alleged
six circumstances in aggravation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.)
The Prosecution
On May 22, 2020, the victim was camping in Butte County with his wife Lauren,2
their children, his mother Linda, and Linda’s boyfriend Kevin. Another group,
numbering six or seven people according to the victim and even more according to
Lauren, set up camp nearby. They were playing very loud music.
Around 9:30 p.m., Lauren and the children got ready for bed, but the other group
was still playing loud music, yelling, and carrying on. At about 10:00 or 10:30 p.m.,
people from the other group started throwing rocks and beer bottles. At some point, a
beer bottle hit Lauren’s tent.
The victim walked toward the other campsite and said, “Can you please shut the
fuck up? My wife is trying to sleep right here.” Defendant emerged from the shadows
and said, “[W]hat did you say?” and, “I’ve killed and I’ll do it again . . . I’ll kill you and
I’ve done it before.” Defendant said he would kill the victim and his family. Defendant
then struck the victim in the chest with an axe. According to the victim, defendant made
his threats both before and after striking him with the axe. Both before and after,
defendant said he had “done it once before, and he’ll do it again” and that he was going
to kill the victim.
The victim took the axe out of his chest and dropped it to the ground. Inside her
tent, Lauren heard the victim say he had been hit with a shovel. Later, she would learn he
had actually been hit with an axe.
2 To protect their privacy, we will refer to the witnesses and other individuals by
their first names or initials. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10) & (11).) No disrespect
is intended.
3
Defendant and the victim tussled and tumbled downhill to the creek. “[I]t was like
a tumble fight. Like I fell onto the ground. I rolled.” The victim also testified that
defendant and his associates dragged him toward the creek. In the creek, defendant
started beating the victim and shoved his face in the water; according to the victim,
defendant was trying to drown him. The victim testified that a couple of people from
defendant’s group were trying to break up the fight while a couple of other people “were
helping him.” Lauren ran out of her tent and saw the victim in the water surrounded by
three to five people. She did not hear any threats at that time.
Lauren and Kevin both ran towards the altercation. Defendant and the victim
continued to fight. The victim managed to grab a rock and hit defendant in the head with
it several times, knocking defendant unconscious. The victim testified he never choked
defendant. After defendant regained consciousness, he “got back in [the victim’s] face,”
and told the victim “that he killed before and he’s going to do it again.”
Linda fired shots from her .22-caliber rifle into the air to break up the altercation
and everyone scattered. According to Lauren, after the victim returned to their campsite,
defendant said to her that he would kill her and her family, that he had done it before, and
he would do it again. Defendant returned to his campsite and told his children that if they
did not find his keys, he would kill them too.
Lauren drove the victim to the hospital. Medical personnel had to close the
victim’s chest wound with hundreds of stitches and staples.
T.F. knew defendant through his previous work, and he was in the group of people
camping with defendant. That evening they listened to music and drank, and, after a
while, T.F. went to bed. At some point, T.F.’s girlfriend woke him up and said something
was going on outside. T.F. went outside and broke up a fight. He remembered seeing a
man bleeding a lot from his chest. That man was punching defendant, who was on the
ground. As T.F. separated the men, defendant said, “I’m going to kill you” to the
4
bleeding man. The next day, T.F. received a text message from defendant telling him,
“[I]f the cops come, don’t say nothing,” or something similar.
The Butte County Sheriff’s Department located an axe at the campsite and also
found a knife by the creek. The victim and Lauren both testified that the knife was not
the victim’s, and the victim did not recall seeing it on the day of the incident. The
sheriff’s department also collected a .22-caliber rifle from one of the tents left at the
campground.
Detective Zachary Price interviewed defendant on May 23, 2020, and defendant
reported that he had been hit and choked. Defendant had abrasions on his nose and
forehead and a contusion below one of his eyes, but Detective Price did not see any
injuries consistent with defendant being choked.
The Defense
Defendant’s Wife’s Account
Defendant’s wife B.D. testified that she went camping with defendant and three of
their children and several others including acquaintances Michael and M.R. who brought
their baby. After they set up camp, the adults had quite a few drinks. There was music
playing and the group “got a little rowdy” and loud, but it was “nothing major.”
As the evening wore on, B.D. noticed two men staring down at them from a
nearby campsite. At some point, something hit the tent in which Michael and M.R.’s
baby was sleeping. B.D. then saw the two “pretty big” men approaching from across the
creek. The men were yelling, “[W]e told you to shut the fuck up.” B.D. turned to check
on her children, and, when she turned back, she saw a man choking defendant by the
creek. She testified that 30 to 45 seconds elapsed between when she saw the men
approaching them and when she saw the man choking defendant. She also saw the man
hit defendant in the head, and she saw defendant lose consciousness. She did not see
blood on either of the men from the other campsite, and did not see anyone bleeding from
the chest.
5
B.D. went to “get the man off of my husband.” She ran over and reached for the
man, but another man grabbed her and threw her into the creek. Once in the creek, B.D.
felt like she was being sat upon. She was face down, partly underwater, and could not
breathe. After 10 or 15 seconds, she was able to stand up. Defendant meanwhile,
regained consciousness. B.D. did not hear him say, “I’m going to kill you.”
B.D. saw that defendant’s face was very bloody and his nose was bleeding
profusely. The other men started going back up the hill. Defendant and B.D. searched
for their keys and, once they found them, they left. B.D. did not hear defendant threaten
to kill his children, and testified that he would not do so. B.D. did not see anyone using
any weapons that night and did not recall hearing any gunshots.
Defendant’s Account
Defendant, who acknowledged a 2013 felony assault with a deadly weapon
conviction, testified that, when they were sitting around the campfire that night, he heard
a sound and realized someone threw something at them. It sounded like a bottle hitting
rocks. Defendant grew angry and frightened for the safety of his children. According to
defendant, Michael pulled out a pistol and loaded it. This made defendant feel like “we
are under attack.”
Defendant then saw two men approaching. A big man was “screaming at us to
shut the fuck up.” The man was threatening to hurt them. Defendant testified that the
man “had his hand out, looked like he was pointing, but it also looked like he had a stick
or something in his hand.” The man, who defendant later learned was the victim, charged
across the creek at defendant. Defendant “instinctively grabbed what was near” him, an
axe, and told the victim to get back. The victim was running toward him, and defendant
backed up, tripped, stumbled backwards, and “just took a swipe at him.” According to
defendant, there was not “much power behind” his swing, and he did not want to hurt or
kill the victim. Defendant did not remember whether the axe came into contact with the
victim. It did not feel to defendant like he hit anything.
6
The victim “back[ed] off” and then defendant saw Kevin “put his hands on my
wife.” Defendant punched Kevin in the face, Kevin “bear hugged” him, and they both
fell to the ground. According to defendant, “in the chaos,” the victim choked him to
unconsciousness. Defendant did not recall what he might have said when he regained
consciousness, or whether he said, “I’m going to kill you,” but he testified that someone
“waking up from being unconscious can say a lot of things.” Defendant recalled hearing
gunshots.
After the altercation broke up, defendant could not find his keys. Eventually, B.D.
found them and they left. Defendant planned to go to the sheriff’s office the following
day to report the incident, but he got arrested before he could. Defendant acknowledged
sending a text message to T.F. telling him not to tell law enforcement what happened. He
explained that, in his opinion, in “that situation” police are not “your friends.” They will
“use it against you, they’ll ruin your life for the simplest thing.”
The Prosecution’s Rebuttal
Michael testified he did not pull out or load a handgun during the altercation.
Relevant Jury Instructions
The trial court instructed the jury on the great bodily injury enhancement, in
pertinent part, as follows: “If you find the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in
Counts 1, 2, you must then decide whether, for each crime, the People have proved the
additional allegation that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on [the
victim] during the commission of that crime. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The People have the burden
of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.” (CALCRIM No. 3160,
italics added.)
The trial court instructed the jury on the personal use of a deadly weapon
enhancement, in pertinent part, as follows: “If you find the defendant guilty of the crimes
charged in Counts 2, 3, or of attempting to commit those crimes, you must then decide
7
whether, for each crime, the People have proved the additional allegation that the
defendant personally used a deadly weapon during the commission or attempted
commission of that crime. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The People have the burden of proving each
allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must
find that the allegation has not been proved.” (CALCRIM No. 3145, italics added.)
Jury Inquiry No. 3
During deliberations, the jury submitted a note to the trial court, Jury Inquiry No.
3, reading: “For the special allegations for count 2 criminal threats–do the threats have to
have been made prior to the great bodily injury and/or using a deadly or dangerous
weapon? Or does the timeline not matter?”
The trial court informed the parties that it was “inclined to respond that the
timeline does not matter.” The prosecutor responded, “[t]hat would be the People’s
position . . . .” Defense counsel stated: “I looked into this yesterday in the morning. And
I think that the answer is the timeline doesn’t matter. And my reasoning is that if he’s
already injured when the threat is made, then . . . it would more easily place him in
sustained fear. So I agree with the Court.” The trial court responded to Jury Inquiry No.
3: “The timeline does not matter.”
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of criminal threats on count 2 and found true the
allegations that, in the commission of that offense, he personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon and personally inflicted great bodily injury. The jury was unable to
reach a verdict on counts 1 and 3, and the trial court declared a mistrial on those counts.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegation that defendant had
sustained a prior serious felony conviction, and found true the aggravating circumstances.
The trial court denied defendant’s Romero motion to strike his strike prior.
(People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.) The court sentenced
defendant to an aggregate term of 15 years in prison consisting of the upper term of three
8
years on the criminal threats count, doubled to six years based on his prior strike
conviction, three years for the great bodily injury enhancement, one year for the deadly or
dangerous weapon enhancement, and five years for the prior serious felony enhancement.
DISCUSSION
I
The Trial Court’s Response to Jury Question
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in responding to the jury’s question. We
agree with the People that defendant has forfeited his contention.
A defendant forfeits a challenge to the manner in which a trial court responds to a
jury question by failing to request a different response or by agreeing with the response
proposed by the court. (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 616-617 [defendant
forfeited claim of error by assenting to the trial court’s response to a jury inquiry and
failing to request the alternative responses he suggests on appeal]; People v. Rogers
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 877 [defense counsel’s acquiescence in the trial court’s response
to a jury inquiry forfeits the claim of error on appeal]; see also People v. Dykes (2009)
46 Cal.4th 731, 802 [“When the trial court responds to a question from a deliberating jury
with a generally correct and pertinent statement of the law, a party who believes the
court’s response should be modified or clarified must make a contemporaneous request to
that effect; failure to object to the trial court’s wording or to request clarification results in
forfeiture of the claim on appeal”].)
Here, defendant agreed with the trial court’s proposed response to the jury inquiry.
He stated that he thought “that the answer is the timeline doesn’t matter. And my
reasoning is that if he’s already injured when the threat is made, then . . . it would more
easily place him in sustained fear. So I agree with the Court.”
Additionally, in his briefing, defendant does not argue that the response affected
his substantial rights. (See § 1259 [appellate court may review any instruction, even
though no objection was made in the trial court, if the defendant’s substantial rights were
9
affected]; see also People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 66, fn. 12 [discussing the
applicability of § 1259 to the court’s response to a jury inquiry], review granted Nov. 13,
2019, S257844, fully briefed.) Nor does defendant expressly argue that the trial court’s
response was not a generally correct statement of law, only that further elaboration was
required.
By failing to object and to propose a different response, and instead agreeing with
the trial court’s proposed response, defendant forfeited his contention on appeal.
II
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when
his attorney acquiesced to the trial court’s proposed response. He argues that his attorney
should have requested that the court instruct the jurors that the timeline did not matter, so
long as all of the jurors agreed that the great bodily injury and use of a deadly weapon
“related to the same criminal transaction as the criminal threats.” We conclude that, even
if counsel’s performance was deficient, defendant has not demonstrated prejudice.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-692; People v. Ledesma (1987)
43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217.) “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective
assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In
particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient
before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice . . . , that course should be followed.” (Strickland, at p. 697.)
10
“[S]ection 1138 imposes on the trial court a mandatory ‘duty to clear up any
instructional confusion expressed by the jury.’ ” (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
1004, 1016.) “ ‘When a jury asks a question after retiring for deliberation, “. . . [s]ection
1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with information the jury desires
on points of law.” [Citation.] But “[t]his does not mean the court must always elaborate
on the standard instructions. Where the original instructions are themselves full and
complete, the court has discretion under . . . section 1138 to determine what additional
explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
The analogous phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ has been given an expansive, not a
tailored meaning.” (People v. Frausto (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 890, 900 (Frausto).) A
broad construction of this phrase furthers the purposes of both a weapons enhancement
and a great bodily injury enhancement. (People v. Elder (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 411,
422-423 (Elder).) An act or circumstance alleged in an enhancement allegation “ ‘may
be deemed to occur “in the commission of” the offense if it occurred before, during, or
after the technical completion of the felonious . . . act.’ ” (Id. at p. 422, quoting People v.
Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 110.) “Temporal niceties are not determinative,” and the act
contemplated by the enhancement taking place “before, during, or after the felonious act
may be sufficient if it can fairly be said that is was a part of a continuous transaction.”
(Frausto, at p. 902.) Thus, “a firearm is discharged ‘in the commission of’ a felony
within the meaning of section 12022.53[, subdivision] (d) if the underlying felony and the
discharge of the firearm are part of one continuous transaction, including flight after the
felony to a place of temporary safety.” (Ibid.)
Again, defendant argues that his trial attorney should have objected to the
language proposed by the trial court and proposed language instructing the jury that the
timeline did not matter, so long as all of the jurors agreed that the great bodily injury and
use of a deadly weapon “related to the same criminal transaction as the criminal threats.”
While perhaps correct under the case law, that language is not required by any authority.
11
And appellate courts have repeatedly cautioned against using language from appellate
decisions in jury instructions. (See People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal.4th 206, 221, fn.
13; People v. Southard (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 424, 427, 435-436.)
In any event, even if defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness—a finding we do not make here—defendant has not
established resulting prejudice. To show prejudice, defendant must show a reasonable
probability that he would have received a more favorable result had counsel’s
performance not been deficient. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693-694; People v.
Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218.)
The victim’s testimony provided evidence that defendant made criminal threats
both before and after the defendant struck him in the chest with an axe. Both Lauren and
T.F. heard defendant make threats after he struck the victim with the axe. Defendant’s
wife B.D. did not hear defendant threaten anyone, and, for his part, defendant did not
recall making threats but agreed someone might say a lot of things upon regaining
consciousness.
The jury instructions made clear that the jury was required to find that the acts or
circumstances alleged in the enhancements occurred “during the commission” of the
crime of making criminal threats. We conclude that the instructions thus sufficiently
tethered the acts or circumstances alleged in the enhancements to the substantive crime as
a continuous transaction. And because an act or circumstance “ ‘may be deemed to occur
“in the commission of” the offense if it occurred before, during, or after the technical
completion of the felonious . . . act’ ” (Elder, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 422), the trial
court’s response correctly informed the jury, in response to the specific inquiry, that the
“timeline does not matter.”
Defendant has not adequately explained how his acts of personally striking the
victim with a deadly weapon and personally inflicting great bodily injury were not “part
of one continuous transaction” along with his criminal threats which, according to the
12
victim, were made both before and after the axe blow. (Frausto, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th
at p. 902.) Defendant suggests that when the altercation spilled over into the creek it
constituted a separate and distinct transaction, and therefore, if instructed as he proposes,
at least one juror may have concluded that he made criminal threats only after he earlier
struck the victim with an axe, and the threats were part of a separate transaction. This
ignores the victim’s testimony that defendant made threats before and after the axe
attack, and thus before any struggle in the creek, although jurors could have chosen to
reject that testimony.
Defendant also posits that some jurors may have thought he exercised self-defense
in striking the victim with an axe. This argument seems to have less to do with breaking
the transactional connection between the axe strike and the criminal threats and instead
suggests that the axe strike should not support true findings because it was self-defense.
Or perhaps his argument is that any jurors inclined to conclude defendant acted in self-
defense when he cleaved the victim’s chest with an axe would also conclude this alone
established that this act was of such a different character as the subsequent criminal
threats so as to render the two entirely different transactions. We note here that we
decline to join defendant in speculating why the jurors deadlocked on counts 1 and 3.
(See People v. Foy (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 328, 352 [it is not the appellate court’s role to
speculate on the reason for a deadlock, although divergent verdicts suggest a close case].)
In any event, defendant parses the circumstances of this ongoing altercation too
finely in his attempt to divide it into discrete transactions. We are not persuaded that the
testimony describes anything but a single, continuous, and rather brief transaction. Even
assuming the existence of the choking incident defendant described and the victim
denied, according to B.D., this occurred at the creek within 30 to 45 seconds of the men
first approaching them. According to the victim, after defendant struck him in the chest
with an axe, he and defendant tumbled down to the creek, or defendant pulled him down
to the creek, a continuation of the ongoing melee. Defendant himself testified that the
13
victim choked him “in the chaos.” Even putting aside the threats defendant made before
the axe attack, we could not conclude that the threats defendant made during the latter
stages of the fight were “separate from the initial ‘axe’ incident” as characterized by
defendant, and thus a separate transaction from the axe strike.
In his reply brief, defendant raises a slightly different argument than those in his
opening brief. He argues that the act giving rise to the enhancements, the axe attack,
occurred before the underlying criminal threats crime even began (assuming the threats
the victim described before the axe attack are ignored), and, as such, cannot be deemed to
have occurred during the commission of criminal threats. However, in People v.
Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, the Supreme Court concluded that the use of a firearm
that occurred approximately an hour before the defendant committed sex offenses
occurred “in the commission of” those sex offenses. (Id. at pp. 1003, 1011.) Among
other things, the Supreme Court concluded that “a jury could reasonably conclude that
although defendant’s presence with the victims was sporadic, the control and fear created
by his initial firearm display continued throughout the encounter,” including during the
subsequent sex offenses. (Id. at p. 1011.) The court further stated that “the jury could
reasonably conclude that defendant, by his initial display, ‘utilized the gun at least as an
aid in completing an essential element of’ the crimes of rape and sodomy . . . .” (Ibid.)
“In addition, a jury could also conclude that the fear defendant’s initial gun display
instilled continued throughout the encounter and aided defendant in completing an
essential element of the crimes of rape and sodomy.” (Ibid.) Here, even if we ignore the
earlier criminal threats, the fact that defendant had driven an axe into the victim’s chest
moments before making his subsequent threats “aided defendant in completing an
essential element of the crime[]” of criminal threats. (Ibid.) Specifically that act aided
defendant in completing the elements “that the threat actually caused the person
threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate
family’s safety,’ ” and “that the threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the
14
circumstances.” (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 228; see CALCRIM No.
1300.)
The evidence established defendant leveled the same criminal threats at the victim
both before and after the axe attack. The axe attack occurred “during the commission” of
criminal threats (CALCRIM Nos. 3145, 3160) within the meaning of relevant case law
(People v. Jones, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 110; Elder, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 422).
The axe attack was part of the same “continuous transaction” (Frausto, supra,
180 Cal.App.4th at p. 902) as the criminal threats, whether those threats were made
before and after the axe attack or only after.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that defendant has not satisfied his
burden of showing that it is reasonably probable that he would have achieved a more
favorable result had counsel objected and requested the response now proposed by
defendant on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Mauro, Acting P. J.
\s\ ,
Boulware Eurie, J.
15
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.