People v. Scott CA4/3

CourtListener 10518352CalctappMay 5, 2025

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Filed 5/5/25 P. v. Scott CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064475

v. (Super. Ct. No. FSB21004604)

KEVIN ROBERT SCOTT, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Steve Malone, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher Stansell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier, Kathryn Kirschbaum, and Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
In 2022, appellant Kevin Robert Scott pleaded no contest to one
count of possession of child pornography in San Bernardino County Superior
Court while he was already on probation for a similar federal crime. His 2022
plea required him to, amongst other things, “[r]eport to the probation officer
in person immediately or upon release and thereafter as directed.” Upon
appearing at the probation department after sentencing, however, Scott was
taken into custody by federal marshals for violating his federal probation.
After being released from federal custody in early 2023, Scott failed to report
to the probation department in San Bernardino County.
San Bernardino County officials then sought to add sex offender-
related terms to Scott’s probation which had accidentally been omitted from
his original plea. The trial court agreed to add these terms, finding its
jurisdiction had been reopened by Scott’s failure to report to local probation
authorities after release from federal custody.
Scott argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify his
probation terms because he was not required to report upon release from
federal custody because he had already reported immediately after
sentencing. Further, he claims the additional terms imposed are
unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. He also raises technical objections
with his sentence. His arguments are either moot or lack merit, and we
therefore affirm the judgment.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
A felony complaint was filed on December 28, 2021, in San
Bernardino County Superior Court alleging that on or about July 13, 2021,
Scott had possessed “child or youth pornography, in violation of Penal Code
section 311.11(a).”2 At the time of his arrest, Scott was on active supervised
federal probation for a 2010 child pornography offense.
Scott initially pleaded not guilty to the charge, but later accepted
a plea of no contest in exchange for three years’ probation, credit for time
served, and sex offender registration under section 290. The probation
agreement, filed on May 5, 2022, required Scott to do several things. Of note
here are two terms: (1) he had to keep his probation officer notified of his
residence, and any planned changes to his residence; and (2) he had to report
to his probation officer “in person immediately or upon release and thereafter
as directed.”
Scott accepted the terms and conditions of his probation on the
record on May 5, and the court told him to check in with probation either that
same day or the following day. Scott’s counsel asserted that he accompanied
Scott to the probation department that same day. Counsel says he left Scott
at the front door and drove away. However, the next day, counsel received a

1 While the present appeal concerns the modification of terms

pronounced by the trial court on May 10, 2023, Scott has requested that we
take judicial notice of the record in the subsequent appeal he filed relating to
the revocation of his probation, People v. Scott, Case No. G064474. We grant
Scott’s request for judicial notice.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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call from Scott’s brother stating that federal officers had picked Scott up as
he walked out of the probation department.3
The probation department calendared a hearing for May 19,
2022, seeking to add terms and conditions which had mistakenly been
omitted from the original agreement. The sheriff’s department advised the
court that Scott was in federal custody. As a result, the court revoked Scott’s
probation and issued a bench warrant.
When the bench warrant came up for arraignment on September
21, 2022, Scott’s counsel appeared, and advised the court that Scott was still
in federal custody, but that he denied being in violation of his probation in
the state court case. The trial court recalled the bench warrant but kept the
revocation of probation in place. It set a hearing on the revocation issue.
On January 18, 2023, Scott’s counsel advised the court that Scott
was soon to be released to a residential community house. He requested to
put the probation hearing over to May 9. Counsel advised the court that the
federal arrest was related to Scott’s plea in the state matter. The court
requested a supplemental report from probation and continued the hearing to
May 10, ordering Scott to appear.
Scott was released from federal custody on March 3, 2023.
However, San Bernardino County probation officials only found this out on
March 7 after they reviewed the Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator.
Officials contacted Scott on March 9 and “admonished” him “for failing to
report to the San Bernardino County probation office following his release.”
Scott said he had reported to federal probation but was unaware that he also

3 Prosecutors admitted they knew this was likely to happen

because of the nature of Scott’s plea in this case.

4
had to report to local probation officials because he believed the proceedings
were suspended.
The probation hearing was eventually held on May 10, 2023, at
which time the court considered whether to add the terms suggested by the
probation department. Initially, the trial court felt it had no jurisdiction to
add terms omitted as the result of a mere oversight. Rather, the court
thought a change of circumstances was required. When the prosecutor told
the court that Scott had failed to report to probation upon release from
federal custody, the court found this was a sufficient change of circumstances.
Scott’s counsel protested that Scott was never told to report to
probation, and was only contacted by probation officers. But the court said
Scott was told when he entered the plea “to report to probation within two
days of his release from custody or at least once every 14 days.”4
The court went on to review the additional terms it was being
asked to impose and ultimately ordered Scott’s probation reinstated with
certain additional terms. Among those were:
(1) “Do not associate with minors or frequent places where
minors congregate, including but not limited to schoolyards, parks,
amusement parks, concerts, playgrounds, swimming pools, and arcades,
unless in the company of responsible adult over the age of 21 who is approved
by the probation officer or court and knows of your offense(s) and is willing to

4 Scott’s plea agreement required him to report to probation

“immediately or upon release and thereafter as directed.” In its minute order
imposing probation, the trial court had said Scott was to report “to the
Probation Officer in person immediately or within 2 business days and
thereafter as directed.”

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monitor your behavior”5; (2) “Do not frequent massage parlors, live nude
shows or conventions where erotic materials and/or devices are the primary
items sold”; (3) “Neither possess nor have obscene matter; as defined in
[section] 311”; (4) “Neither use nor possess any computer or internet device
except in the course of employment with the employer’s knowledge of the
nature of the offense and with the prior approval of the probation officer”;
(5) “Not be an employee of nor participate in (massage/escort) nor reside in or
at, nor derive any money or other form of consideration from any modeling,
escort, massage, or sauna operation of business, or any outcall operation or
business, or any acupressure or acupuncture operation of business”; (6) “Not
have access to a Post Office Box without prior approval of the probation
officer”; (7) “Not own, use, or possess any form of sexually explicit movie
videos, material, or devices unless recommended by a therapist and approved
by the probation officer. Do not frequent any establishment where such items
are the primary items viewed, or sold at such establishments and do not
utilize any sexually oriented telephone services”; (8) “Not possess or have
access to costumes, masks,[] or other identity-concealing items unless
approved by the probation officer”; (9) “Not possess personal contact
magazines, nor place any ads, [] nor respond to any ads in such publications
unless approved by the probation officer”; (10) “Not use or possess children’s
clothing or any illustrated materials depicting unclothed children.” Scott
sought reconsideration of this ruling in September 2023, and his request was
denied.

5 The court made exceptions for Scott to pass in the vicinity of

certain schools and parks nearby to his residence and a concert venue he
frequented.

6
Several months later, on November 15, 2023, the San Bernardino
County probation department filed a petition for revocation of Scott’s
probation, citing a failure to comply with his terms. Among the terms alleged
to have been violated were the requirement not to frequent places where
minors congregate and the prohibition on unauthorized use or possession of a
computer or internet device.
The trial court ordered Scott’s probation revoked as of November
15, 2023, and set a hearing. On April 5, 2024, the trial court found Scott was
in violation of his probation because he had possessed material prohibited
under section 311.11(a) and he had been in possession of an unauthorized cell
phone. The court imposed the upper term of three years in prison.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are two main issues Scott raises in this appeal. The first is
whether the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the conditions of
his probation. The second is whether the additional terms were
unconstitutionally vague or overly broad.
The first issue is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, (see
People v. Miller (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 348, 353–356), and the second is
subject to a de novo standard. (See People v. Salvador (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
57, 63 (Salvador).)

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II.
APPELLANT’S PLEA AGREEMENT REQUIRED HIM TO REPORT TO PROBATION
AUTHORITIES UPON RELEASE AND HIS FAILURE TO DO SO CONSTITUTED A
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING THE COURT TO MODIFY THE TERMS
OF PROBATION
“A court may revoke or modify a term of probation at any time
before the expiration of that term. (§ 1203.3.)” (People v. Cookson (1991) 54
Cal.3d 1091, 1095.) “A change in circumstances is required before a court has
jurisdiction to extend or otherwise modify probation.” (Ibid.) “An order
modifying the terms of probation based upon the same facts as the original
order granting probation is in excess of the jurisdiction of the court, for the
reason that there is no factual basis to support it.” (In re Clark (1959) 51
Cal.2d 838, 840.) “In this context, a ‘change in circumstance’ requires ‘a fact
“not available at the time of the original order.”’ (Cookson, supra, at p. 1095.)
Thus, a modification order based upon the same facts as the original order is
improper because ‘the court [has] reached a different conclusion based upon
the same facts.’” (People v. Mendoza (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1156.)
(People v. Rogers (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 88, 93.)
Here, Scott’s original plea agreement, which was approved by the
trial court, required him to report to probation “immediately or upon release
and thereafter as directed.” Scott contends he reported immediately after the
plea, and was only thereafter directed to report when county probation

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authorities contacted him on March 9, 2023.6 Thus, he contends, he was not
required to report when he was released from federal custody.
We agree with the trial court that Scott was required to report to
county probation after his release from federal custody. By the plain
language of his plea agreement, he was to report “upon release.” We therefore
conclude the trial court was within its discretion to find a change in
circumstances.
III.
THE ADDITIONAL TERMS THAT WERE IMPOSED AND STILL AT ISSUE WERE NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERLY BROAD
While Scott takes issue with ten of the additional probation
conditions imposed, we need only concern ourselves with two of those: the
ones that he was found to have violated after this appeal was filed. There are
two reasons for this.
First, when Scott and his counsel were presented with the
proposed additional terms and conditions, neither raised any concerns or
objections except as to three of them: the requirement that Scott not frequent
places associated with minors, the polygraph requirement, and the tracking
device requirement. Scott does not appeal the latter two listed conditions.7

6 This was the gist of what Scott’s counsel was trying to tell the

trial court, and we therefore reject the Attorney General’s contention that
this argument has been forfeited.
7 In its brief, the Attorney General asks us to order the trial court

to add the polygraph condition back into Scott’s probation conditions as it is
required for registered sex offenders under section 1203.067, subdivision
(b)(3). However, the People did not raise this issue when Scott objected to the
polygraph condition in the trial court. In any event, we deem this issue moot
because Scott’s probation has been revoked.

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And the trial court addressed Scott’s counsel’s concerns with respect to the
first. He raised no objections to the internet device or obscene material
prohibitions.
“As a general rule, a defendant must first raise the issue in the
trial court to challenge a probation condition on appeal. (See People v. Welch
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.) However, our Supreme Court has held that the
forfeiture rule does not apply to a defendant’s contention that a probation
condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face when the
challenge presents a pure question of law. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th
875, 887 [(Sheena K.)].)” (People v. Quiroz (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1123,
1127.)
Appellant’s challenge to the facial constitutionality of probation
conditions is normally preserved regardless of whether an objection was
raised. But in this case, in addition to the lack of objection, Scott’s counsel,
Attorney Philipson, explicitly represented to the court that Scott was
agreeable to all conditions except the three that were brought to the court’s
attention:
“MR. PHILIPSON: I’ve gone over the sex offender terms with Mr.
Scott. And he has no problem with most of them, mostly because they are
inapplicable to him, such things as massage parlors and stuff like that. He’s
never set foot in one, so he doesn’t care. But there are three that are a
concern to him and I would like to address those three.” By representing that
Scott found most of the conditions “inapplicable to him,” counsel was
indicating that Scott understood what conduct the conditions encompassed,
thus undermining his vagueness and overbreadth arguments.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, we are permitted to
judicially notice court records entered after the appealed judgment if they

10
demonstrate that any issue before us is moot. (See In re M.F. (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 86, 110.) Here, the records in Scott’s second appeal show that his
probation was revoked due to the court’s finding that he had violated the
prohibition on unauthorized devices and possession of obscene material as
defined in section 311. Scott is currently incarcerated due to this finding and
is serving a three-year sentence. The validity of any other terms of his
probation are now therefore irrelevant. Even if we were to reverse the
revocation of probation when we review Scott’s second appeal, the matter
would be remanded to the trial court for resentencing where the issues can be
discussed.
As a result, we will address only the internet device and obscene
material prohibitions.
“‘A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it “(1)
has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2)
relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids
conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality....” [Citation.]
Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which
is not itself criminal is valid if the conduct is reasonably related to the crime
of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.’ (People v. Lent
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. omitted.)” (People v. Harrisson (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 637, 641 (Harrisson).)
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth
“A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the
probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine
whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on
the ground of vagueness. (People v. Reinertson (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 320,
324–325.) A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s

11
constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of
the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. (See
[In re White (1979)] 97 Cal.App.3d [141], 149–150.)” (Sheena K., supra, 40
Cal.4th at 890.)
1. Prohibition on Obscene Material
Scott was to “[n]either possess nor have obscene matter; as
defined in [section] 311.” In his opening brief, Scott took issue with this
condition only on the ground that it lacks any requirement that he know or
reasonably should know that matter is obscene. The Attorney General
countered that the California Supreme Court’s ruling in People v. Hall (2017)
2 Cal.5th 494 (Hall) eliminated the need for any express knowledge
requirement in order for a probation condition to be valid. (Id. at p. 501
[“California case law already articulates not only a general presumption that
a violation of a probation condition must be willful, but also specifically
provides that probation conditions barring possession of contraband should
be construed to require knowledge of its presence and its restricted nature”])
In his reply brief, Scott conceded that Hall controls the analysis and he
withdrew the express knowledge objection. As he has no other objections to
this condition, we have no reason to invalidate it.
2. Internet Device Prohibition
Scott was to “[n]either use nor possess any computer or internet
device except in the course of employment with the employer’s knowledge of
the nature of the offense and with the prior approval of the probation officer.”
He contends that the meaning of the phrase “internet device” is unclear
because an internet device could be anything from a cell phone to a debit card
scanner at the grocery store, and “using” such a device could include

12
innocuous things like checking a smartwatch for messages. We are not
persuaded.
As the Attorney General argues, Hall cautioned courts against
finding a probation condition unconstitutionally vague “‘“‘if any reasonable
and practical construction can be given to its language.’”’” (Hall, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 501.) The reasonable and practical construction of “internet
device” is a device such as a smartphone, smartwatch, tablet, or other
electronic device which could allow Scott to access the internet, not a grocery
store card reader. Using such a device to access the internet outside the scope
of employment without approval would be a violation of probation.
Scott also contends the condition is overly broad because it
effectively bans him from using the internet for any non-employment
purpose. While we recognize the burdens this prohibition imposes, we
ultimately conclude the prohibition was not invalid because it was tailored
towards the conduct in which Scott was engaged.
Two cases discussed by the parties effectively set up the
framework of our analysis. In Harrisson, the defendant was charged with
possession of child pornography after he sent pornographic material to an
undercover police officer posing as a 12-year-old girl, and requested to meet
the girl. (Harrisson, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 639.) Defendant pleaded no
contest and was placed on three years’ probation. The court ordered
defendant not to have any internet access as a condition of his probation or
possess any internet device. Defendant’s therapist reported to police that
defendant had vividly described his plans to kill the deputy district attorney,
and a later search indicated he had violated his probation by using the
internet to look for work and watch adult pornography. At a hearing
regarding probation violations, defendant asked the court to modify the

13
internet restriction because he was unable to find work as a digital
technician without internet access. (Id. at p. 640.) The trial court declined to
do so, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that defendant’s threats
against the prosecutor and his use of the internet for pornographic purposes
justified a broader prohibition. The court reasoned that “a failure to abide by
conditions of release may result in an outright ban on all Internet use. Given
the facts specific to this case, we find the prohibition against Internet usage
reasonably related to defendant's offense and necessary to the important dual
goals of deterrence and protection of the public.” (Id. at p. 647.)
In People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, the defendant
was initially served with a search warrant related to an auto insurance fraud
investigation. (Id. at p. 1344.) Analysis of a computer seized under that
warrant revealed defendant also was in possession of child pornography, and
an additional search warrant was obtained. (Ibid.) The defendant was
charged with a count of possession of child pornography and entered a plea of
nolo contendere. The defendant was given three years’ probation. Amongst
his probation conditions was a prohibition from having access to the internet
“or any other on-line service through use of your computer or other electronic
device at any location without prior approval of the probation officer.” (Ibid.)
In upholding the condition, the Sixth District Court of Appeal observed that
internet restrictions necessarily curtail First Amendment rights, but that
“courts have . . . permitted probation conditions and parole conditions
limiting computer and Internet access in cases where the limitation is not a
blanket prohibition, and in cases where the Internet played a role in the
underlying offense.” (Id. at p. 1349.) The Pirali court held defendant’s
condition was valid because defendant was not faced with a blanket

14
prohibition; he could access the internet with prior approval from his
probation officer. (Id. at pp. 1349–1350.)
Here, too, there is no blanket prohibition. Scott may use or
possess a computer or internet device in the course of his work, so long as his
employer is notified of his status and the use is authorized by his probation
officer. But more significant are two other facts. First, Scott’s criminal
activity took place via electronic devices. Second and most concerning, Scott
was already on federal probation for a similar offense at the time he was
engaging in this activity. His arrest by federal authorities undeniably
demonstrates that his plea in this matter was a violation of his federal
probation, and as such, the trial court was justified in prohibiting all internet
use.
We recognize that in the present era, internet access is perhaps
as central to the exercise of free speech as pen and paper. But the
probationer’s rights must be balanced against the need for protecting the
public, and especially children. “‘The essential question in an overbreadth
challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the
restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional
rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is
impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.’ (In re
E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.)” (Salvador, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th
at p. 63.) We find such practical necessity here.
IV.
SCOTT’S CHALLENGE TO THE EXPIRATION OF HIS PROBATION PERIOD IS MOOT
BECAUSE PROBATION HAS BEEN REVOKED
The minute order issued by the trial court on May 10, 2023, not
only reinstated Scott’s probation and imposed the additional terms requested

15
by the prosecution; it also stated that probation would expire April 25, 2026.
Scott argues that this was improper because he was originally given three
years’ probation, which would expire in 2025. He asks us to correct the trial
court’s minute order.
First, Scott did not object to the extended probation period, even
when he sought reconsideration of the court’s order. Second, in light of Scott’s
current incarceration and the revocation of his probation, we deem this
argument moot. Even if we reverse the trial court in Scott’s second appeal,
the matter will be remanded for resentencing and the issue can be resolved
before the trial court.
V.
SCOTT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO CONDUCT CREDITS AT THE TIME PROBATION
WAS IMPOSED IN MAY 2023
Scott’s plea agreement states that he would get credit for two
days served in presentence custody, as well as conduct credits to be
calculated pursuant to section 4019. Scott argues that he was thus entitled to
two days conduct credit, and the trial court’s minute order is ambiguous as to
whether he was credited this amount because it states: “Credit Time Served 2
Days Actual PC 4019 (1/2)”.
We agree that the order appears to state no conduct credits are
due under section 4019. But as the Attorney General rightly points out,
section 4019 states: “A deduction shall not be made under this section unless
the person is committed for a period of four days or longer.” (§ 4019, subd.
(e).) Because Scott only served two days in presentence custody, he did not
meet the threshold to receive conduct credits under section 4019.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DELANEY, J.

SCOTT, J.

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