In re T.D. CA2/4

CourtListener 10445457CalctappMay 1, 2025

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Filed 5/1/25 In re T.D. CA2/4
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re T.D., a Person Coming B336267
Under the Juvenile Court Law,
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Nos. 23LJJP00263 and
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 23LJJP00263A)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Debra L. Gonzalez, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
D.D. (father) appeals from the jurisdiction and disposition
orders in dependency proceedings involving his daughter, T.D.
(born 2010). The juvenile court sustained allegations that father,
while living with T.D., communicated over the internet with
someone he believed to be a 14-year-old girl, sent a sexually
explicit photo, and sought to meet her to engage in sexual
intercourse. Father was arrested and charged with crimes
against a minor. The juvenile court sustained allegations that
father’s conduct placed T.D. at risk of physical harm and sexual
abuse. Father argues that substantial evidence did not support
the juvenile court’s findings. We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND1
In July 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) learned that father had
been arrested by the Hermosa Beach Police Department during
an online sting operation that targeted child exploitation. Father
was charged with violations of Penal Code, section 288.2,
subdivision (a)(2) (sending or exhibiting harmful matter to a
minor) and section 288.4, subdivision (a)(1) (arrangement of
meeting with minor for purpose of engaging in lewd and
lascivious behavior). At the time, T.D. was 12 years old and lived
with father.
In August 2023, DCFS filed a dependency petition against
father and T.D.’s mother, P.M. (mother), who is not a party to
this appeal. The initial petition was superseded by a first
amended petition, which later was amended by interlineation.

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the entire factual and procedural
background, as the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and
its procedural history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847,
851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial court’s
decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

2
The operative petition alleged that father, over an approximately
one-month period, communicated over the internet with someone
he believed to be a 14-year-old child. He solicited the ostensible
child to send him “sexually explicit photographs” and to engage in
“illicit sexual acts.” On “multiple occasions,” father requested a
meeting “with the intent to have sexual intercourse” and sent
sexually explicit photographs to his target, including a photo of
his erect penis. This activity led to father’s arrest for violation of
Penal Code, section 288, subdivision (a)(1), endangered T.D., and
placed her at substantial risk of harm and sexual abuse.
T.D. initially was detained from father, but she returned to
his home in October 2023 under an extended visit arrangement
that was conditioned on father’s enrolling in a parenting class
and individual counseling and cooperating with DCFS’s
announced and unannounced visits.
After being continued several times, the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing took place in March 2024. The juvenile court
sustained the allegations against father and declared T.D. a
dependent of the court. T.D. was placed in father’s home under
DCFS’s supervision.
Father appealed from the jurisdiction and disposition
orders. In September 2024, the juvenile court found that the
conditions justifying the initial assumption of dependency
jurisdiction “no longer exist and are not likely to exist if
supervision is withdrawn . . . .”2 The juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction, signed a Juvenile Custody Order, and released T.D.
to father.

2 We grant DCFS’s unopposed motion requesting judicial notice of
the juvenile court’s orders terminating jurisdiction. (Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (d) [authorizing judicial notice of court records]; Richtek USA,
Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 658 [court
may take judicial notice of any orders, findings of facts and conclusions
of law, and judgments within court records].)

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DISCUSSION
Father asserts that the findings underlying the jurisdiction
and disposition orders are not supported by substantial evidence.

A. Mootness
The juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction during the
pendency of this appeal. Though termination of jurisdiction
generally moots an appeal from an earlier order, dismissal for
mootness is not automatic (In re T.R. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206,
214), and “courts may exercise their inherent discretion to reach
the merits of the dispute.” (In re Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
220, 224–225; citing In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 285–286
[factors to consider in exercising discretion to hear a moot appeal
include the egregiousness of the findings against a parent and
whether the findings could impact future dependency
proceedings].)
Father argues we should review the merits because the
jurisdictional findings could result in his inclusion in the Child
Abuse Central Index (CACI), Penal Code, section 11170.3 DCFS
responds that it does not object to our deciding the appeal on its
merits. In light of the nature of the allegations against father
and the absence of an objection from DCFS, we exercise our
discretion to decide the appeal on its merits.

B. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The trial court exercised its jurisdiction over T.D. under
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (d). “The legislatively
declared purpose of these provisions ‘is to provide maximum
safety and protection for children who are currently being

3 California’s Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code,
§ 11164 et seq.) requires DCFS to forward substantiated reports of
severe child abuse or neglect to California’s Department of Justice for
inclusion in the CACI. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278; Pen.
Code, § 11169, subd. (a).)

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physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or
being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical
and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that
harm.’ (§ 300.2[,] [subd. (a)], italics added.)” (In re I.J. (2013) 56
Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).)
“Jurisdictional findings must be made by at least a
preponderance of the evidence.” (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.) In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting jurisdictional findings, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) We review the
record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations
and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support
the findings and orders. (Ibid.) We note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court. (Ibid.) We do not
reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment but
merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the
findings. (Ibid.) We must review the whole record in the light
most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find that the order is appropriate. (Ibid.)
“The appellant has the burden of showing there is no
evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the
findings or orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
To be substantial, the evidence must be of ponderable legal
significance and must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of
solid value. (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602.)

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
Findings Under Section 300, Subdivision (b)(1)
“A child may be adjudged a dependent of the court under
subdivision (b) of section 300 if the ‘child has suffered, or there is
a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her

5
parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.’ (§ 300,
subd. (b)(1).)” (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146
(D.L.).) The three elements for jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b) are: (1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of
the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm
or illness to the child, or a substantial risk of such harm or
illness. (Ibid.) “Although ‘the question under section 300 is
whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the
minor to the defined risk of harm’ [citation], the court may
nevertheless consider past events when determining whether a
child presently needs the juvenile court’s protection.” (In re T.V.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) “‘The court need not wait until
a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and
take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.]” (I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773; In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d
996, 1004 [“The purpose of dependency proceedings is to prevent
risk, not ignore it”].)
Father argues that substantial evidence did not support
any of the elements necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction
under subdivision (b). He argues there was no evidence that T.D.
suffered or was likely to suffer any harm or sexual abuse and
that undisputed evidence established that T.D. was well-adjusted
and thriving in father’s care. Father argues that the juvenile
court failed to focus on risk to T.D., that his online conduct
involved only one fictitious person, and while there were
“numerous communications,” it was a single lapse of judgment
that did not threaten serious harm to T.D.
As he did below, father relies primarily on In re B.T. (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 685 (B.T.) to support his argument that
insufficient evidence supported the jurisdictional findings. In
B.T., the dependent child was an infant who was conceived after
her 38-year-old mother engaged in sexual intercourse with a 14-
year-old boy, Miguel, over a period of months. (Id. at p. 688.)
Mother was arrested and charged with unlawful sexual

6
intercourse and caretaker lewd and lascivious acts. (Id. at
p. 689.) The juvenile court exercised dependency jurisdiction over
B.T., basing “its ruling in part on the lack of judgment and
impulse control demonstrated by [mother’s] relationship with
Miguel, which represented a ‘danger to [B.T.].’” (Id. at p. 691.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, agreeing with mother that
the jurisdictional findings were not supported by substantial
evidence. (B.T., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 687.) There was no
evidence that B.T. suffered any serious physical harm while in
mother’s care (id. at p. 692) and the risk of future harm was
speculative because mother was out on bail, the criminal charges
were still pending, she had no prior criminal record, and her
actions with Miguel did not involve serious harm (id. at p. 693).
Further, the findings evidenced the juvenile court’s “lack of focus”
on B.T. (Id. at p. 693.) Though the juvenile court characterized
mother’s actions with Miguel as demonstrating lapses in
judgment and impulse control, B.T. was unborn when the lapses
occurred, and no evidence indicated that the lapses were
habitual, likely to recur, or threatened harm to B.T. (Ibid.)
In this case, the juvenile court distinguished B.T. Among
other distinctions, the court noted the child in B.T. was an infant,
while T.D. “is almost the same age as the 14-year-old girl that
father believed he was soliciting”—“a very significant difference”
that “supports a current risk.” Further, the lapses of judgment
and impulse control that resulted in the B.T. mother’s having sex
with a minor could not have endangered the infant, who did not
exist when those lapses occurred. In contrast, the risk of harm to
T.D. arose from father’s “soliciting someone he believed was 14
years old . . . at a time when his own daughter of almost the same
age was living in his own home” and his communicating with an

7
ostensible 14-year-old on “many occasions . . . over a months’
time.”4
The juvenile court stated that it “wholeheartedly agree[d]”
with the B.T. court’s statement that “the dependency legislative
scheme is focused on the best interests of the child and not
punishing the parents,” and that its findings “are not in any way
punishment of the father.” Thus, the court correctly indicated
that it was placing its focus on “[T.D.’s] safety, and her best
interest.” The court acknowledged father had enrolled in
individual counseling and parenting classes, but because “it is
very early in that journey,” the court “do[es] not find that at this
stage the risk to [T.D.] has been removed. So, therefore, [the
court] find[s] that there is a current risk to her.”
We agree with the juvenile court that B.T. is
distinguishable from this case and did not require dismissal of
the allegations against father. Here, evidence in the record
indicates that while T.D. was living in his home, father posted on
an online platform that he was a 38-year-old male who was
looking for a “girl to perform sexual acts” in person, including
oral copulation. On June 12, 2023, a detective using an
undercover persona replied to father’s post and received a
response from him that included a photo of an erect penis. In the
following weeks, the two exchanged emails and text messages in
which the detective responded as a 14-year-old who did not have
a driver’s license yet and sent father a photo that appeared to
depict a 14-year-old female. After receiving this information,

4 The juvenile court further distinguished B.T. for reasons with
which we do not agree. It noted the mother in B.T. had a lengthy
preexisting relationship with Miguel before they had sex, and he was a
willing participant. However, Miguel could not legally consent to
having a sexual relationship with the mother. (Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (c)(1); People v. Paz (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 293, 297
[Subdivision (c)(1) reflects “a legislative desire to protect 14– and 15–
year–olds from predatory older adults to the same extent children
under 14 are protected by subdivision (a)”].)

8
father continued to express in graphic detail his desire to engage
in sex acts and stated he wanted to meet in person to perform
these acts. Upon his arrest, father admitted he believed he had
been communicating with a 14-year-old. The juvenile court
reasonably could infer from this evidence that father had a sexual
attraction to girls close in age to the daughter who lived with
him, the attraction motivated him to spend a month soliciting sex
from someone he believed to be a young teenager online, and
there was some risk of harm to T.D., even if no sexual abuse had
yet occurred.
The juvenile court could also reasonably infer that father’s
progress in services at that juncture was not sufficient to
eliminate the risk of harm to T.D. Father began individual
counseling, ordered as a condition of the extended visit
arrangement, in late October 2023. As of the month before the
March 2024 adjudication and disposition hearings, his therapist
reported that they had explored “protective parenting,
communication skills, coping strategies to reduce anxiety and
stress, conflict resolution, and improving self-esteem,” but the
report did not mention discussing any sexual issues. The court
found father’s progress in services to be “substantial,” but it also
found that because father was at the “very early” stage of his
“journey,” there remained a current risk. Its concern that
father’s sexual issues had not yet been fully mitigated is evident
from its approval of a case plan that included “[i]ndividual
counseling to address case issues including . . . addictions,
specifically sexual addictions.” (Italics added.)
The record does not support father’s argument that the
juvenile court made its findings to punish him. To the contrary,
the court’s remarks at the hearing, its order, and case plan
indicate that its priorities were ensuring T.D.’s safety while
carrying out the goal of family reunification. It struck a balance
by releasing T.D. to father while requiring him to address the
behavior that brought the family to DCFS’s attention and comply

9
with unannounced home visits by DCFS. Six months later, the
juvenile court apparently was satisfied with father’s progress
because it terminated jurisdiction.
Thus, substantial evidence supports the findings that
father created a serious risk of physical harm to T.D. through the
activities that led to his arrest and the risk was not eliminated by
the time jurisdiction and disposition orders were issued. Father’s
arguments to the contrary purport to reweigh the evidence in his
favor. It is not this court’s role to reweigh evidence or determine
witness credibility. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)5
In addition to challenging the juvenile court’s exercise of
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), father contests the
court’s findings under subdivision (d). Because we conclude that
substantial evidence supported jurisdiction under subdivision (b),
we need not analyze the sufficiency of the court’s findings
concerning subdivision (d). When “‘a dependency petition alleges
multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the
dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the
juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of
the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the
petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the
reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other
alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the
evidence.’” (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)

5 Father also argues for the first time on appeal that no expert
testimony was presented from which the juvenile court could find that
a father who solicited a 14-year-old child for sex was likely to sexually
abuse his teenage daughter. This argument is forfeited, as father
failed to raise the absence of expert testimony to the juvenile court. (In
re D.P. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282, 1292 [“In dependency proceedings,
as elsewhere, a litigant forfeits an appellate argument by failing to
raise it before the trial court”].)

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders are
affirmed.

MORI, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, Acting P. J.

COLLINS, J.

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