CourtListener 10445456•In re Taylor CA2/4
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Filed 5/1/25 In re Taylor CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re KIRELL FRANCIS TAYLOR, B340715
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA033959)
on Habeas Corpus.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Thomas Rubinson, Judge. Order to show
cause is discharged; petition is denied.
Mark Yanis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Kirell Taylor of special circumstance
felony murder and related crimes in 2001. In 2024, Taylor,
acting in propria persona, filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus based on the Racial Justice Act, Penal Code section 745
(RJA).1 Taylor alleged the trial court, jury, prosecutor, and a law
enforcement officer exhibited bias against him during trial. He
sought appointment of counsel and discovery of the reporter’s
transcript from jury voir dire that occurred on September 7, 2001.
After the trial court denied his petition on the merits,
without appointing counsel, Taylor filed a substantively identical
petition in this court. A different panel summarily denied it.
Taylor then filed the petition in the Supreme Court, which issued
an order directing the Secretary of the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation to show cause before this court why Taylor
“has not satisfied the requirements for the appointment of
counsel pursuant to Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (e) and
for the production of discovery pursuant to Penal Code section
745, subdivision (d).”
We appointed counsel for Taylor and received and
considered a return from the Secretary and a traverse and
request for judicial notice from Taylor. We deny the request for
judicial notice and conclude that Taylor has not satisfied the
requirements for the appointment of counsel or the production of
discovery because he has not satisfied the statutory requirements
under the RJA. The bias Taylor alleges is predicated upon his
religion, which is not a protected category under the RJA. We
accordingly discharge the order to show cause and deny the
petition.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
BACKGROUND
We draw the following background from the writ petition
Taylor filed in the Supreme Court, No. S284425, and the
appellate record from Taylor’s direct appeal, on which both he
and the Secretary rely in their filings. At this stage, we “accept
the truth of the defendant’s allegations, including expert evidence
and statistics, unless the allegations are conclusory, unsupported
by the evidence presented in support of the claim, or
demonstrably contradicted by the court’s own records.” (Finley v.
Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 23 (Finley).) All
quotations are rendered as they appear in the record.
I. Relevant Pretrial Proceedings
Taylor represented himself both prior to and during his
trial. During pretrial proceedings before Judge Rosenblatt,
Taylor, who is Black and Muslim, filed a motion for change of
venue. Taylor asserted several grounds for the request, including
his membership in “an organization called the ‘Moorish Islamic
Impire of the West,’ which could cause arouse community
hostility from the predominantly Christian and Jewish sects
evolving the San Fernando Valley district” and the “innumerable
stereotyping of Muslims” by “countless Sheriff Deputy Bailiffs
whom some have beset & expressed racial and religious slurs in
my presence.” He also asserted that “based on the victim being
white and the defendant being black there exist a grave
possibility I will not receive a fair just trial in the San Fernando
Valley Judicial District.” Contrary to his suggestion that the
trial court ignored this motion, Taylor voluntarily withdrew the
motion before the trial court heard or ruled on it.
Taylor also filed a motion to wear a kufi, a short round cap
Taylor describes as a “Muslim religious hatt,” in jail and in court.
3
The bailiff informed the court that jail inmates were not
permitted to wear any “personal clothing whatsoever.” When the
court asked Taylor for his response, he asserted that the court
was prejudiced and should be sued for racketeering. He added,
“I’m biased already. I’m Black. I’m Muslim. I’m considered
everything under the sun.” The court asked Taylor to address
the motion, and he said, “Deny it. You’ve been denying
everything else.” The court ruled that the motion was “denied
except that the court will permit Mr. Taylor to wear his kufi in
court, if it has been provided in advance to the Sheriff’s
Department, so that it can be searched, and it is held here as any
other civilian clothing would be held here in court.”
Taylor made several allusions to terrorism during pretrial
proceedings. On two separate occasions, he asserted that the
court was treating him like “the Black Timothy McVeigh.” He
also alleges that he wrote Judge Rosenblatt several ex parte
letters, one of which stated, “Don’t be surprised when I drag
‘OSAMA BIN LADEN’ in your courtroom. But don’t hold me for
kidnapping because I want five million dollars.” The record from
Taylor’s direct appeal reflects that Taylor sent multiple ex parte
letters to Judge Rosenblatt, but it does not contain the letters or
much information regarding their contents. Taylor alleges he
had “plans to capture Osama Bin Laden” and “prevent the 9/11
terrorist attack,” to which he alluded in at least one of the letters.
Taylor also alleges he was in phone communication with “9/11
hijacker” Mohammed Atta, and received from Atta the “top secret
plans” for the attack.2
2 Taylor attached to his petition an air mail envelope that
allegedly contained the plans. In the trial court, Taylor alleged
4
II. Alleged Judicial and Jury Bias
A. Voir Dire
The matter was transferred from Judge Rosenblatt to
Judge Hoff for final pretrial motions and trial. On September 6,
2001, Taylor provided the court with a list of questions he wanted
the court to ask during voir dire. After apparently reviewing the
list, which is not in the record, the court advised Taylor that
some of his questions “really aren’t appropriate to ask.”
Specifically, the court explained, “I don’t believe it’s appropriate
to ask jurors about their religious beliefs,” or whether “they
believe in the existence of God,” because those topics were
“personal” and “private.” However, the court told Taylor, “it’s all
right to ask if they have a bias against a particular religion.” The
court also added that its own questions would cover Taylor’s
“question about can you be fair.”
On September 6, 2001, before the potential jurors were
brought in, Taylor changed into “street clothes” his family
brought to court for him. Taylor alleges in his petition that the
clothing consisted of “traditional Islamic attire,” including his
kufi, and that he wore similar clothing on September 7, 2001.
Respondent asserts that the record at no point “clearly reflect[s]
what he was wearing,” but we treat Taylor’s assertions as true at
this stage. Moreover, witnesses who testified later in the trial
described Taylor as “wearing the white cap and a white tunic”
and a “white outfit, white hat.”
that the exact same envelope contained evidence linking case
victim Christopher Rawlings to a “network of mass mind
manipulation research establishments” that “direct the policies of
the global elite network.”
5
The first phases of jury voir dire occurred on Thursday,
September 6, 2001. The proceedings were reported but not
transcribed.
Voir dire continued and concluded on Friday, September 7,
2001. It was also reported but not transcribed. In his writ
petition, Taylor alleges that he was “dressed in Islamic clothing”
and was “incredibly angered” this day, purportedly due to his
unsuccessful attempts to convince Mohammed Atta to postpone
the 9/11 attacks and alert the FBI of the plans. Taylor further
alleges that he “asked a juror how it will feel ‘to see in the news
and media’ during petitioner’s trial a ‘terrorist attack’ committed
by fake ‘so-called Muslims.’” Taylor makes no allegations about
the prospective juror’s response, any follow-up questions or
colloquy, or whether that person was seated on the jury.
However, the record reflects that on September 13, 2001, Taylor
told the court, outside the presence of the jury, that he “told the
people of the jury panel last week” that “[i]f any terrorism was to
occur or that they read in the paper, I’m not saying that would
occur, that they read in the paper, would they be biased to that
and et cetera et cetera. They told me no.”3 Taylor also asserted
3 Taylor amended the reporter’s transcript attached to his
petition with the handwritten insertion “[NEVER],” so the
sentence reads “They NEVER told me no.” The certified
reporter’s transcript is an official record and “is prima facie
evidence of that testimony and proceedings.” (Cal. Civ. Proc.,
§ 273, subd. (a); People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 225.)
Taylor has not taken any appropriate steps to correct this alleged
omission, or any other alleged errors or omissions in the
reporter’s transcript. (See Eagle Fire & Water Restoration, Inc. v.
City of Dinuba (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 448, 463-464; cf. People v.
6
during closing argument that during voir dire, “I questioned you
guys as to terrorism, Islamic groups, what happened the next
week? Shit happens. And I know that’s probably like, whoa, I’m
sitting at home I know you are like, ladies and gentlemen, I know
you are like, wow, he just asked us this –”
The trial court was dark on Monday, September 10, 2001.
Taylor’s trial was set to resume on Tuesday, September 11, 2001,
but was continued to September 12, 2001 after the trial court was
closed “due to the uncertainties surrounding the terrorist attacks
against the United States this date.”
On the morning of September 12, 2001, before the jury was
brought in, Taylor told the court, “I’m going to open the jury up
and talk about – and question them – voir dire them again about
the incident that happened yesterday based on me being
Muslim.” The court responded, “I’m going to take care of that.”
Taylor replied, “If they got a problem with it and they are
prejudice, I’m kicking them off the panel.” The court again
assured Taylor, “I’m going to take care of that. Okay. That’s my
job.”
When the jury was brought into the courtroom, the court
stated, “Ladies and gentlemen, as we all know, something
horrible happened yesterday, and the real question I have for you
is anybody going to let that interfere with giving both sides a fair
trial in this case?” The reporter’s transcript states, “Jurors
Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1199 [“where the clerk’s and
reporter’s transcripts conflict, the latter controls when, under the
circumstances, it is the more reliable”].) We accordingly
disregard this and other alterations Taylor has made to the
reporter’s transcript.
7
answer in the negative.” Taylor alleges this is false and that in
fact “NO JURORS RESPONDED.”4 He asserts that “(1) all jurors
set stone faced, (2) did not utter one word whatsoever, and (3)
throughout the trial jurors looked at petitioner as a racist ‘black
muslim’ terrorist on the basis of petitioner’s ‘race’ and ‘physical
appearance’ including his words on Sep 7th, 2001” about “an
impending attack to be committed ‘by so-called muslims.’” Taylor
alleges it was “racially discriminatory” “for the jurors to have
perceive petitioner was from the NATION OF ISLAM or AL
QAEDA,” and the trial court evinced bias toward him by
preventing him from conducting further voir dire “to ascertain
the jurors bias about the attacks.”
B. Motion for Mistrial
On September 13, 2001, after several prosecution witnesses
had testified, Taylor moved for mistrial “based on the overlapping
circumstances in this case, the way I’m dressed.” Taylor asserted
he was “pretty much biased by now, pretty much prejudiced in
the jury’s eyes by now, I mean my attire has exemplified that. No
juror would like to look at me in my eyes during my cross-
examination,[5] so, you know, two days after the incident, as
tragic as it was, I don’t think that I’m going to get a fair trial.”
The court responded, “Well, if you remember, I asked all the
jurors before we started and they said they could still be fair
4 Taylor attached the relevant page of the reporter’s
transcript to his petition, with the handwritten annotation,
“JURORS DIDN’T SAY ONE WORD.”
5 Because he represented himself, Taylor cross-examined the
prosecution witnesses. He had not yet testified or been cross-
examined by the prosecutor as a witness.
8
notwithstanding the horrible things that happened Tuesday.”6
The court continued, “Nobody knows, at least I don’t know, who
caused the atrocities that happened in New York and
Washington.”7 Taylor replied, “That could have been prevented
by your leave.” The court responded, “Well, that’s what you say,”
and denied the motion for mistrial.
C. Post-Trial Juror Comments
Taylor attached to his petition an October 2, 2001 Los
Angeles Times article with the headline “Killer Goes Berserk
After Conviction.” The article describes the “pandemonium” that
arose in the courtroom after Taylor’s conviction, as Taylor “spat
at the prosecutor, causing armed bailiffs to drag him away,
kicking and cursing, while his screaming mother also had to be
forcibly removed.”
The article further states: “Jurors, who deliberated about
five hours, said Monday they thought Taylor tried to deceive
them, and that his verbal attacks on police and the court
backfired on him. ‘He not only had not much respect for the
whole American way of life, he had no respect for the judicial
system, which is the best in the world,’ said the jury’s forewoman,
an aerospace project manager who lives in the West Valley. ‘His
demeanor, his behavior and his lack of respect for everybody
6 In handwritten annotations, Taylor claims this statement
was “[False]” and asserts, “To be clear, no jurors responded to the
judge’s question. Judge Hoff made a false statement.”
7 Taylor echoes the court’s sentiment in his petition,
asserting, “On 9-13-2001, the news reports had not even ascribe
the terrorist attacks to Bin Laden.” However, in his traverse, he
claims the court’s remarks were “implausible given that most
Americans knew by the afternoon of 9/11 that Muslim men had
committed the attacks.”
9
really made him lose credibility.’ [¶] Jurors praised Samuels, the
prosecutor, and Purdy, the LAPD detective. They rolled their
eyes when asked about Taylor’s courtroom performance. [¶] ‘His
defense was terrible. I think he was lying about everything,’ said
a 37-year-old Northridge man, a phone company service
technician. [¶] Jurors, who learned about Taylor’s outburst
afterward from court staff, said they were not surprised. [¶]
‘That’s what happens when you believe your lies,” said a female
juror, a 37-year-old textile engineer. ‘It was pretty consistent
with his behavior in court. He always seemed to be on the edge of
hostility.’”
Taylor alleges, “Clearly, members of Al Qaeda ‘had not
much respect for the whole American way of life.’ And, it is clear
the forewoman of the jury looked at petitioner as a racist ‘black
muslim’ terrorist and/or an operative of Al Qaeda whom, ‘NOT
ONLY HAD NOT MUCH RESPECT FOR THE WHOLE
AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE, he had no respect for the judicial
system, which is the best in the world.’”
III. Alleged Prosecutor and Law Enforcement Officer
Bias
A. Prosecutor
On September 13, 2001, outside the presence of the jury,
the court discussed scheduling issues with the parties. The
prosecutor told the court that she was having difficulty
scheduling her DNA expert witness, who “was scheduled to be on
a flight six hours after the flight that was used to commit the
atrocities, that exact flight, Dulles to L.A., a different airline. I’m
amazed that he’s even willing to fly here at all, but he is, but I
just have to accommodate him a little.” Taylor said he had no
problem accommodating the witness. After further discussion,
10
the prosecutor said, “Who is going to know when you are going to
have a terrorist attack, you know.”
Taylor alleges that the prosecutor “turned to her left to look
at petitioner as a ‘black muslim’ ‘terrorist’” while making that
comment. In an attachment to his petition, Taylor similarly
asserts that the prosecutor “turned her body to look at petitioner
directly when she made that coded prejudicial statement.” He
“contends it is unreasonable or naïve at best—and disingenuous
at worst—to suggest, as [the prosecutor] did, that petitioner did
not do anything to try to prevent the 9/11 victims’ plight. PC
Section 745 targets precisely this sort of racially biased
language.” Taylor additionally challenges the prosecutor’s
“indication that petitioner was a ‘black Timothy McVeigh’ and/or
a racist ‘black muslim’ terrorist,” but these allegations are
demonstrably contradicted by the record, which indicates that
Taylor was the only person to mention Timothy McVeigh and did
so unprompted and of his own accord.
B. Law Enforcement Officer
On September 20, 2001, Taylor called the prosecution’s
investigating officer, Andrew Purdy, as a defense witness.
During a line of direct examination about the investigation into
the charged crimes, Taylor asked Purdy, “And is a murder
investigation the utmost investigation as far as crimes?” Purdy
responded, “Yes, that, and maybe terrorism.” Taylor then
repeated, “That and maybe terrorism” before asking his next
question.
Taylor alleges that he, Taylor, actually “screamed ‘That,
and maybe terrorism” in response to Purdy’s testimony. He
further alleges that Purdy “clearly suggested petitioner was an
international Islamic terrorist that should be investigated for
11
treason. The implicit ‘coded language’ in Mr. Purdy’s answer was
tantamount to referring to petitioner as a monkey or” using the
N-word. Taylor asks, “In light of petitioner’s stereotypical
appearance: Was detective Purdy allowed to inject into his
answer his stereotypical racial animosities about terrorism?”
DISCUSSION
The questions before this court are whether Taylor has
satisfied the requirements for the appointment of counsel
pursuant to section 1473, subdivision (e) and for the production of
discovery pursuant to section 745, subdivision (d). We answer
both questions in the negative.
I. RJA Overview
The Legislature enacted the RJA in 2020 (McIntosh v.
Superior Court of San Diego County (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33,
44 (McIntosh); Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1) and amended it in 2022
to apply retroactively to certain categories of cases. (People v.
Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 946 (Wilson); § 745, subd. (j).) Its
“central purpose . . . is to provide meaningful remedies for proven
racial discrimination in the administration of criminal justice,
and thus to eliminate racial bias in California’s criminal justice
system.” (Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 954; see also Stats.
2020, ch. 17, § 2, subd. (i) [purpose is “to eliminate bias from
California’s judicial system because racism in any form or
amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable [and]
inimical to a fair criminal justice system”].) The “expansive”
legislation is intended to reach not only “purposeful
discrimination” but also “unintentional and unconscious” implicit
bias. (Bonds v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 821, 828-
829, original italics; § 745, subd. (c)(2) [“The defendant does not
need to prove intentional discrimination.”].)
12
The RJA provides that “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain
a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the
basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.’” (§ 745, subd. (a).) A
violation of the RJA “is established if the defendant proves, by a
preponderance of the evidence,” conduct enumerated in section
745, subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(4). (§ 745, subd. (a).)
Subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) generally concern racial, ethnic, and
national origin bias exhibited by actors involved in the
defendant’s case, while subdivisions (a)(3) and (a)(4) generally
concern broader racial, ethnic, and national origin disparities in
the defendant’s prosecution and sentencing. As discussed below,
only subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) are at issue here.
If the defendant proves a violation by a preponderance of
the evidence, the court “shall impose,” from a list enumerated in
section 745, subdivision (e), “a remedy specific to the violation
found.” (§ 745, subd. (e).) However, in cases in which judgment
was entered before the RJA’s initial effective date of January 1,
2021, and the petition is based on a violation of section 745,
subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2), the petitioner is not entitled to relief if
“the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did
not contribute to the judgment.” (§ 745, subd. (k).)
A defendant may seek relief under the RJA by filing “a
motion pursuant to [section 745], or a petition for writ of habeas
corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7, in a court of competent
jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd.
(b).) The RJA amended section 1473 by adding subdivision (e),
which “allows a petition for writ of habeas corpus ‘after judgment
has been entered based on evidence that a criminal conviction or
sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of
subdivision (a) of Section 745.’” (Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p.
13
945, quoting § 1473, subd. (e).) Where, as here, a defendant seeks
relief pursuant to a petition for habeas corpus, the trial court
must review the petition and “determine if the petitioner has
made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief.” (§ 1473,
subd. (e).) The RJA defines a “prima facie showing” as the
production of “facts that, if true, establish that there is a
substantial likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a)
occurred.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(2).) “A ‘substantial likelihood’
requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of
more likely than not.” (Ibid.)
If the defendant makes the requisite showing, “the court
shall issue an order to show cause why relief shall not be granted
and hold an evidentiary hearing, unless the state declines to
show cause.” (§ 1473, subd. (e).) After the hearing, “If the court
determines that the petitioner has not established a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall state the factual
and legal basis for its conclusion on the record or issue a written
order detailing the factual and legal basis for its conclusion.”
(Ibid.)
II. Appointment of Counsel
Section 1473, subdivision (e) provides for the appointment
of counsel “if the petitioner cannot afford counsel and either the
petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of
subdivision (a) of Section 745 or the State Public Defender
requests counsel be appointed.” (§ 1473, subd. (e).; see also Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.551(d)(2).) There is no dispute that Taylor
is indigent, and the State Public Defender has not requested the
appointment of counsel in this case. The critical question thus is
whether Taylor has alleged facts that would establish a violation
of section 745, subdivision (a). This inquiry is limited “to an
14
assessment of the facial sufficiency of the factual allegations in
the petition, and to consideration of whether they adequately
allege a violation of the RJA.” (McIntosh, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th
at p. 44, original italics; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.551(c)(2).)
As relevant here, section 745, subdivision (a)(1) provides
that the RJA is violated if “The judge, an attorney in the case, a
law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or
juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of
the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd.
(a)(1).) Section 745, subdivision (a)(2) similarly provides that the
RJA is violated if, “During the defendant’s trial, in court and
during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law
enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or
juror, used racially discriminatory language about the
defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise
exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the
defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not
purposeful.”8 (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).) Subdivision (a)(2) is the only
provision that addresses “racially discriminatory language,”
which the RJA defines as “language that, to an objective
observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including,
but not limited to, racially coded language, language that
compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references
8 By its terms, section 745, subdivision (a)(2) “does not apply
if the person speaking is relating language used by another that
is relevant to the case or if the person speaking is giving a
racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the subject.”
These exceptions are not relevant in the context of this case.
15
the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or
national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).)
In his petition, Taylor alleges that the trial court,
prosecutor, a law enforcement officer, and the jury exhibited
impermissible bias “at trial.” He also refers to “racially
discriminatory language,” and alleges bias based on factors
mentioned exclusively in the RJA’s definition of that term,
namely “culture” and “physical appearance.” These allegations
most directly implicate section 745, subdivision (a)(2). However,
Taylor’s petition also refers to section 745, subdivision (a) and the
RJA generally, and there is considerable overlap between section
745, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2). Moreover, the general rule is
that a habeas petitioner “need not ‘develop’ the legal theory on
which the claim is based, but must fully and fairly state the facts
which underlie the claim for relief” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th
750, 779), and “imposing a ‘heavy burden’” at this stage of an RJA
case “would be contrary to the Act’s structure and purpose.”
(Finley, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 22.) We accordingly consider
whether Taylor has alleged facts sufficient to establish a violation
of either subdivision. We do not consider section 745,
subdivisions (a)(3) or (a)(4), because Taylor’s allegations in no
way concern statistical disparities in prosecution or sentencing.
Subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2), and the RJA generally,
prohibit bias based on “the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or
national origin.” Although Taylor mentions his race at various
points, his factual allegations of bias are predicated upon his
Islamic religious identity and various actors’ purported
associations of that identity with the September 11, 2001 attacks
and terrorism generally. Religious discrimination is offensive
16
and must not be endorsed or tolerated, but it is outside the scope
of the RJA.
Taylor alleges that the jurors “perceived” him “as a racist
‘black muslim,’” and the trial court failed to mitigate this bias
and exhibited bias of its own by declining to conduct more
extensive voir dire and denying his motion for mistrial. Taylor
acknowledges in his briefing that this alleged bias was primarily
“anti-Muslim” in nature. Indeed, he requests judicial notice of
various news and academic articles purportedly demonstrating
“Americans’ virulent and widespread anti-Muslim bias after
9/11,” “retaliation against Muslims after 9/11,” “other judges’
diligence in uncovering anti-Muslim bias in the days after 9/11,”
and “many Americans perceived Muslims as anti-American.”9
However, he argues that courts and scholars “recognize that
discrimination against Muslims can be racial, ethnic, or national
origin discrimination” and asserts that his “intersectional or
overlapping identity as a Black Muslim is inextricable with race
and religion, one that evoked a deep animus among many
Americans after 9/11.”
9 We deny this request, as “[t]he truth of the content of the
articles is not a proper matter for judicial notice.” (Zelig v.
County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1141, fn. 6; see also
Glassman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
1281, 1307 [“Further, even if a reviewing court takes judicial
notice of documents, it is not for the truth of matters asserted
therein”]; Evid. Code, § 452 [listing matters which may be
judicially noticed].)
17
Even if we accept that “discrimination against Muslims can
be racial, ethnic, or national origin discrimination,”10 Taylor’s
factual allegations do not draw any connection between Taylor’s
race, national origin, or ethnicity and the alleged anti-Muslim
bias he suffered. Taylor alleges he was “not allowed to voir dire
the jury to ascertain the jurors bias about the attacks,” but
expresses his concern “in light of what petitioner said to the
jurors on September 7th, 2001, that is, in terms of an impending
attack to be committed ‘by so-called muslims,’” not his race,
national origin, or ethnicity. Moreover, the allegations and
record demonstrate that both Taylor and the court asked the
jurors if they harbored terrorism-related bias, and they
affirmatively “told [Taylor] no” and “answered in the negative”
when asked by the court. Taylor speculates that if he had “been a
White Muslim in typical American dress, the potential for bias
would have been miniscule,” but this speculation is unsupported
by factual allegations or the record. (Cf. Finley, supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at p. 23 [court need not accept allegations that are
“conclusory” or “demonstrably contradicted by the court’s own
records”].)
Taylor’s allegations concerning the prosecutor and law
enforcement officer equally lack a connection to the categories
protected under the RJA. He alleges that the prosecutor
exhibited bias by referring to a terrorist attack during scheduling
10 We note that the federal case law Taylor cites in support of
this proposition addresses “anti-Semitic harassment and
discrimination” (T.E. v. Pine Bush Central School District
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) 58 F.Supp.3d 332, 354-355) and “bias against
Muslims, Arabs, and Islamic Fundamentalism” (U.S. v. Salameh
(2d. Cir. 1998) 152 F.3d 88, 120).
18
and “turned her body to look at petitioner directly when she made
that coded prejudicial statement.” Similarly, he alleges that
detective Purdy “suggested petitioner was an international
Islamic terrorist that should be investigated for treason” when
Purdy testified that murder and “maybe terrorism” were the
“utmost investigation as far as crimes.”
As Taylor’s own gratuitous references to a “Black Timothy
McVeigh” illustrate, however, acts of terrorism are not
stereotypically associated with perpetrators of any particular
race. Moreover, none of the terrorists to whom Taylor refers in
his petition—McVeigh, Atta, and Bin Laden—was Black. Taylor
does not allege these men or other terrorists shared a common
ethnicity or national origin. Taylor speculates in the traverse
that “Purdy likely would not have pivoted to terrorism had his
questioner been a white non-Muslim defendant,” but this
speculation is not supported by any factual allegations. Similarly
speculative is Taylor’s assertion that the prosecutor’s alleged
turn toward him during a discussion of witness scheduling
“transformed a purportedly neutral observation into an
accusatory gesture.” This assertion further ignores both the
patent relevance of the statement to the discussion at hand and
Taylor’s status as the prosecutor’s opposing counsel, whom she
would naturally be expected to address. It also ignores Taylor’s
repeated sua sponte references to terrorism and his claimed links
to the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks, which generally
undermine his position that other actors in the trial were
impermissibly associating him with those same topics. (Cf.
People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 117 [finding “multiple
tactical reasons why defense counsel may not have objected” to
use of term “honor kill” as violative of the RJA, including the
19
defendant’s own remarks to an officer about the shooting “in the
context of his culture”].)
Taylor’s final allegation of bias concerns the juror’s
comment that Taylor “had not much respect for the whole
American way of life,” which he contends was “racially
discriminatory language and bias under the RJA.” This post-trial
comment is plainly outside the scope of section 745, subdivision
(a)(2), which expressly only applies to the use of racially
discriminatory language or other exhibitions of bias or animus
toward the defendant “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court and
during the proceedings.” We are also not persuaded it falls
within the ambit of section 745, subdivision (a)(1), which does not
concern “racially discriminatory language.” Even if the remark
in isolation could be interpreted as an expression of bias toward
Taylor’s perceived ethnicity or national origin,11 the statement
was not made in a vacuum. The remainder of the juror’s
statement specifically referred to Taylor’s “demeanor, his
behavior, and his lack of respect for everybody.” These are not
immutable characteristics protected by the RJA but rather
actions entirely within Taylor’s control that properly may serve
as a basis for an unfavorable impression.
For all the foregoing reasons, Taylor’s petition does not
adequately allege a violation of the RJA. He accordingly has not
demonstrated that counsel should be appointed.
III. Production of Discovery
The RJA authorizes a defendant to “file a motion
requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a
potential violation of subdivision (a) in the possession or control
11 Taylor expressly alleges he was born in California.
20
of the state.” (§ 745, subd. (d).) The motion must “describe the
type of records or information the defendant seeks.” (§ 745, subd.
(d).) The court “shall order the records to be released,” if
statutory privilege and constitutional privacy rights permit,
“upon a showing of good cause.” ( § 745, subd. (d).)
Although Taylor did not file a separate motion for
discovery, his petition “hereby motions the Court to issue an
order for a copy of the voir dire Reporter’s Transcript dated
9/07/2001.” For purposes of the instant order to show cause, we
treat this request as a motion for discovery under the RJA.
“[T]he good cause requirement for discovery under the
[RJA], like the showing required for the disclosure of law
enforcement records under Pitchess [v. Superior Court (1974) 11
Cal.3d 531], requires a defendant ‘only to advance a plausible
factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the
[RJA] “could or might have occurred” in his [or her] case.’”
(People v. Garcia (2022) 85 Cal.Appp.5th 290, 296-297, quoting
Young v. Superior Court of Solano County (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
138, 159 (Young).) The “threshold showing for good cause must
be commensurately broad and flexible,” and indeed has been
characterized as “minimal.” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp.
159-160.)
A “minimal” threshold requirement does not mean a
petitioner is automatically entitled to requested discovery. As
discussed above, Taylor’s petition does not adequately allege that
a violation of the RJA “could or might have occurred.”
Furthermore, it contains no allegations regarding the basis of the
request for this particular reporter’s transcript or its connection
to a plausible RJA claim. Taylor alleges that he was dressed in
Islamic clothing and asked a juror “how it will feel ‘to see in the
21
news and media’ during petitioner’s trial a ‘terrorist attack’
committed by fake ‘so-called Muslims.’” But he makes no
allegations about the prospective juror’s response, any follow-up
questions or colloquy, whether that person was seated on the
jury, or what other racial, ethnic, or national origin bias or
animus the requested records could or might show. There is thus
no “factual foundation, based on specific facts,” supporting
Taylor’s discovery request.
In his traverse, Taylor argues that he “provided strong
circumstantial evidence that the judge was biased against him,”
and therefore “should be permitted to do discovery into a number
of issues with the guidance of appointed counsel in the trial court,
such as how this judge and other judges in LA County handled
trials for both Muslim and non-Muslim defendants after 9/11”
and “any other allegations of bias against the judge, prosecutor,
and detective.” These expansive requests cannot be reconciled
with the specific request made in Taylor’s petition, nor are they
supported by its allegations. Additionally, they underscore the
religious-based nature of his contentions.
Taylor has not established good cause for discovery. The
request accordingly is denied.
22
DISPOSITION
Taylor “has not satisfied the requirements for the
appointment of counsel pursuant to Penal Code section 1473,
subdivision (e) and for the production of discovery pursuant to
Penal Code section 745, subdivision (d).” The order to show cause
is discharged and the petition is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, ACTING P. J.
DAUM, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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